Bill C-11 (Historical)

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins

This enactment creates measures to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins and all activities associated with them. It establishes a comprehensive legislative regime that extends beyond the present importation regime. It requires every person conducting activities involving human pathogens or toxins to take all reasonable measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure today to speak to Bill C-11, an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins. The Liberal Party supports improving Canadians' health and safety. We support measures that improve the safety and security of laboratories in Canada for all Canadians. We will scrutinize this bill in committee to ensure that it is as accountable, transparent and useful as possible.

It is important that we establish a legislative framework that extends beyond the present importation and storage regime for pathogens and toxins, especially for things such as anthrax, salmonella and influenza. The current regime is inadequate and not up to the standard of other international regulations. It only requires that all labs that import human pathogens and toxins adhere to the laboratory biosafety guidelines, the LBGs, but these existing guidelines are not mandatory for labs that acquire human pathogens and toxins from domestic sources even though they are applied widely on a voluntary basis as an industry standard. This voluntary approach is no longer good enough. We need to bring Canada into the modern world that actually deals with the biosecurity reality we now face.

The bill would require laboratories carrying out activities with risk groups 2, 3 or 4 human pathogens or select toxins to register with the Public Health Agency of Canada's Office of Laboratory Security. It would subject the licensees with a risk of group 3 and 4 pathogens and possibly select toxins to stricter operating regulations and it would require a permit to import a human pathogen or toxin. As well, as was raised by the hon. member from Winnipeg, the bill would require transfer permits to send and receive any human pathogen or toxin between laboratories within Canada that are not part of the same facility.

It would also require licensees, as part of their annual or biannual update of inventory, to notify the Public Health Agency of Canada of the nature of the disposal of human pathogens and toxins. These changes would bring Canada into line with more stringent regulations in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Although there is a need for the minister to have the ability to improve the safety and security of Canada's laboratories, the powers given to the minister in the bill are very serious. We believe that putting in place the kind of scientific advice that would be important to the minister should be as transparent as possible. I am in favour of there being an advisory committee to give transparent advice to the minister, so it is clear that scientists make scientific judgments and politicians make political judgments.

The Liberal caucus will support this bill at second reading because it modernizes and improves the laboratory licensing system and improves the overall health and safety of Canadians. However, since provinces and territories are responsible for licensing, we will have to further study and listen to the representatives from the provinces and territories at committee to make sure that those jurisdictions are comfortable with this collaborative approach.

I want to thank the minister and her department for the excellent briefing they gave us this morning on the bill. I was relieved to hear that the $36 million that will be required to implement the bill is already in the fiscal framework and that the bill will protect the health and safety of Canadians by closing the significant gap in Canada's national security framework.

The current regime is inadequate. As we have said, there has been this legislative gap about knowing where these dangerous human pathogens or toxins exist and how they are transferred. It is hugely important as we go forward that there be a comprehensive framework that the rest of the world understands exists in Canada, which is now seen to be a weak link in dealing with human pathogens and toxins through the various controlled activities.

I am very comfortable with the different levels of penalties. Obviously, in this dangerous world, the idea of releasing, abandoning or disposing on purpose a human pathogen or toxin must face the highest possible criminal offence.

It is important that these new criminal aspects include duty of care, the complete prohibition of controlled activities with certain human pathogens, such as the smallpox virus, as well as prohibition of controlled activities with a human pathogen or toxin without a licence.

I am happy that the regulatory framework will be enhanced in terms of the specific licensing requirements, inventory requirements, security screening requirements, and the outlining of the duties and qualifications of the new biological safety officers.

I am happy that since the bill was last presented, there have been changes to it in terms of the schedules; the transferring and the inspection powers now explain that inspection must be on reasonable grounds; and there is now the ability to move conveyances.

I am pleased that the stakeholder consultation was done properly. No real opposition was expressed, although some issues were raised around the implementation. The need for balance, the technical issues and the cost of complying with the new requirements for the individual smaller labs seem to have been taken into consideration and there is a commitment for continued consultation with the stakeholders.

The basic approach of the bill makes colossal sense. On royal assent, in phase one, the prohibitions, the duty of care, and the offences in the registry will come into force. I am happy that in phase two the development of the regulatory framework will again involve extensive consultation with the stakeholders. Phase three will bring into force the rest of the requirements.

I am very pleased with the collaboration and cooperation of the department on this bill. I look forward to studying this bill in detail at committee.

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we live in an era of change and uncertainty. Infectious disease remains among the leading causes of death worldwide and the greatest killer of children and young adults.

New infectious diseases, such as HIV-AIDS and SARS, are emerging. Old infectious diseases, such as malaria, plague and tuberculosis, are re-emerging, and intractable infectious diseases remain an ever-present threat.

Although most deaths from infectious disease occur in developing countries, no region of the world is risk-free. It is, therefore, in the best interests of all countries, including Canada, to support initiatives to control infectious disease.

Bioterrorism also remains a very real threat. As mentioned, in October 2000, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to American news media offices and two senators. The letters killed five people and infected over twenty others. Broad public health measures were implemented to treat the thousands who were potentially exposed and decontamination of government buildings and postal offices took years. The total cost to the United States was more than $1 billion.

Microbiological agents and toxins can and do impact global health. In 2003, SARS spread to 30 countries across 5 continents and killed almost 800 people, 44 of them in Toronto.

We must protect Canadian health and we must protect global health. The more we increase biosafety measures, the greater the probability that we will be able to mitigate the deadly effects of infectious disease, even if they are launched deliberately by human agents.

The World Health Organization urges countries to promote biosafety practices for the safe handling, containment and transport of microbiological agents and toxins; to review the safety of laboratories and their existing protocols; to develop programs that enhance compliance of laboratories; and to encourage the development of biological safety training.

Thousands of infectious samples are shipped daily around the world for clinical trials, disease investigations, surveillance, et cetera. Animal and human specimens need to be transported efficiently, legally, safely and in a timely manner. Shippers must be aware of regulatory requirements, personnel must undertake appropriate training and specimens must be packed to protect transporters from risk of infections.

There are new reports of infections resulting from transport related exposures, excluding the 2001 anthrax letters in the United States. However, there have been reports of the transmission of acute respiratory infections associated with air travel as a result of direct person-to-person contact.

Best practices regarding the transport of microbiological agents and toxins must be used to protect the environment and human health. Perhaps more support is needed to prevent the introduction and spread of communicable diseases from other countries and among provinces.

In the laboratory, containment of microbiological agents and toxins is critical to preventing outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging diseases. Over the last 70 years, research to combat infectious disease has resulted in over 5,000 associated infections in the laboratory and almost 200 deaths. Infamously, in 1978 a smallpox laboratory accident caused one death and led to the suicide of the laboratory director. More recently, in 2008 the Bush administration acknowledged that the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, the only U.S. facility allowed to research the highly contagious foot and mouth disease, experienced several accidents with the virus.

It is, therefore, imperative that laboratories have strict facility safeguards, microbiological practices and safety equipment that protect laboratory workers, the environment and the public from exposure to infections, micro-organisms and toxins that are stored in the laboratory.

Responsible laboratory practices will help prevent intentional release, loss, misuse, theft or unauthorized access of biological material, and will contribute to preserving important scientific work for future generations.

New research shows that infectious diseases are now emerging at an exceptional rate, with humans accumulating new pathogens at a rate of one per year. This means that agencies and governments will need to work harder than ever before to keep abreast of the increasing threat.

It is, therefore, imperative that we take every opportunity to protect people and the environment from infectious disease, as emerging infectious disease has the potential to eliminate opportunities for infectious disease eradication or elimination.

In 1969, smallpox remained a devastating disease, killing 1.6 million people that year. Eradication of the disease was achieved because of a worldwide effort that was supported by the necessary political will, human and technical resources and a safe vaccine.

In 1979, the year that smallpox was declared eradicated, HIV was rapidly spreading across Africa and the world. If the global smallpox eradication campaign had been postponed, the world might not have been able to eradicate smallpox as easily as it did in 1980. Biosafety must be paramount, whether in the air, across the land or in the lab.

After six years of planning, I led an expedition to the Arctic to search for the cause of the 1918 Spanish influenza, history's deadliest disease. My research team would safely exhume six bodies with the hope of identifying the influenza virus to make a better antiviral or a flu vaccine.

Opening the graves was akin to opening Pandora's Box as there was the chance of re-releasing history's deadliest disease. Our safety protocols, planned over two years, were approved by a blue ribbon panel hosted by the National Institute for Health and the government of Norway. We did our utmost to provide a safe working environment on the frozen tundra.

After receiving all the necessary permits for transportation, my research team shipped tissue samples, packed in containers to prevent mechanical and temperature damage, from the High Arctic to our most secure laboratory, a biosafety level four laboratory in Britain.

For six years I lived and breathed biosafety, lived with the risk of finding live virus and took every precaution to undertake our work safely and ethically. No formal permission process existed for exhuming bodies. However, we asked permission from the families, the governor of Svalbard, et cetera. We also developed our own biosafety protocols related to exhumation and sampling decontamination.

Strengthening global surveillance is not enough to eliminate or eradicate infectious disease. We need close ties among public health, trade and transportation organizations. We need strong laboratory regulations and an improved means of communicating and reporting to protect the lab workers and the surrounding community from accidental exposure to infectious agents. We also need better collaboration with those monitoring the biological weapons convention.

We have had multiple wake-up calls. This new bill is a step in the right direction. Complacency cannot be an option when it comes to biosafety.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, this morning, my colleagues spoke to Bill C-11, an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins. Now it is my turn. The summary of the bill reads as follows:

This enactment creates measures to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins and all activities associated with them. It establishes a comprehensive legislative regime that extends beyond the present importation regime. It requires every person conducting activities involving human pathogens or toxins to take all reasonable measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

As my colleagues said, it is important to keep Canadians safe. It is every Parliament's duty to ensure the safety of Canadians within the scope of its constitutional powers. As we have seen, the proposed legislation would require all persons conducting these activities to comply with a number of guidelines. It would ensure consistency by obliging all labs to adhere to laboratory biosafety guidelines developed by the Public Health Agency of Canada. Licences must be obtained for controlled activities, such as possessing, handling, using, producing, storing, permitting authorized access to, transferring, importing, exporting, releasing or otherwise abandoning, or disposing of a human pathogen or toxin.

The federal government claims that it is entitled to introduce this bill because of its jurisdiction over criminal law. However, at this point, I have to wonder whether the government should really have made this bill a priority. As we know, since the guidelines were introduced over 15 years ago, there have been no incidents in Canada, regardless of whether labs have been following those guidelines.

Also on the order paper is a bill the government introduced in January, Bill C-6, formerly Bill C-52, on the safety of consumer products. The government has known at least since November 2006 that there are problems in this area. The Auditor General said so. Since the summer of 2007, there have been several major recalls, including a recall of toys containing lead. It would have been better if this bill were before the House now, seeing as how there have been no pathogen problems to date under the existing acts and regulations.

We know that the highest risk groups are groups 3 and 4. I would remind this House that the human pathogens in these groups pose a high risk to the health of individuals and a low or high risk to public health. Twenty-four labs in Quebec and 150 in Canada fully meet the guidelines for groups 3 and 4. In addition, the backgrounder on Bill C-54, which is the number this bill had in the last Parliament, states that “The risk to Canadians posed by the presence of human pathogens and toxins in labs is low.”

This is still a very important issue. However, this bill, in its current form, must not be allowed to stop or impede lab work, which is crucial to determining the causes of diseases and advancing science through research. In committee, it will be very important to look at this aspect of the bill in depth and to meet with a wide range of specialists working in this field to make sure that they will be able to do this work once this bill has been passed, especially with regard to risk group 2, which poses a lower risk to the health of individuals and public health. Of course, these labs include hospital and university labs where very important research is under way.

I would like to raise another point before I go on to the topic of university research. I am just wondering whether the Criminal Code already covers intentional threats to public safety, such as terrorist acts, and unintentional threats, such as criminal negligence. To my way of thinking, these threats to public health or public safety are already covered by legislation passed here.

I would like to start with the issue that, in the current version of the bill could, in our opinion, pose a number of problems. That issue is research conducted in our universities. The parliamentary secretary told us earlier that the government had held a number of consultations. And at a meeting with officials from the Public Health Agency of Canada, we were told that a number of consultations had been held. However, despite these consultations, researchers still have a number of important questions, especially regarding who will pay the costs of complying with the new requirements. This concern is mentioned in the Public Health Agency of Canada notes, but was not addressed by the parliamentary secretary in his earlier remarks.

We know that university research is already underfunded, yet today, as we prepare to refer this bill to committee, we do not know if assistance will be made available to institutions to help them comply with the new guidelines or if labs will be left to cover all the costs themselves.

Has the government actually conducted studies to determine the impact this new legislation would have on university courses, on how our hospitals operate and on the research industry in Quebec and Canada?

This question is extremely relevant because, as I said earlier, I have not yet received an answer. I understand the government's desire to impose a new guideline so that no products are released that could pose a risk to public health, but as for the operations of laboratories, I have yet to receive an answer.

I simply have one question. Does the government want us as parliamentarians to pass legislation that I think is incomplete, in the sense that it does not address all the concerns raised by the community? It is asking us for carte blanche, in a way, and asking us to trust it and wait until later. It seems to be saying that it will communicate with the various stakeholders and labs again, that it will ensure that the regulatory framework will meet their expectations and not pose a problem for their operations. If that is in fact what the government and the department intend to do, why then, from the first draft, from the time this bill was introduced for first reading, has this bill not included provisions to address the concerns justifiably raised by the community?

Once again, the government decided to introduce a bill in this House without assessing the direct impact it will have on the community. If it had done so in a responsible manner, this version of the bill would already include provisions to address the concerns raised by the academic community. We would have already heard the government's response regarding its assessment of the impact of Bill C-11 on university education.

The bill also proposes a number of fines. I understand that when a bill is introduced that will affect the Criminal Code, for example, fines must be imposed. However, what the government wants to do is impose fines on universities and hospitals, when everyone knows very well—and I said so a little earlier in my speech—that there is an abysmal lack of funding for those two kinds of institutions where research is done.

The bill also establishes penalties and fines for anyone who shows wanton or reckless disregard concerning pathogens and toxins. The bill also establishes financial penalties and imprisonment for anyone who intentionally releases pathogens.

I am wondering, as are my Bloc Québécois colleagues, about the need for these new prison sentences given that they are already contained in existing legislation. Are measures put in place by this bill with respect to breach of duty, wanton or reckless breach of duty and intentional release not already in the Criminal Code and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act? And are measures prohibiting intentional misuse of pathogens not included in the Anti-Terrorism Act? These are the questions to ask when the bill is before the Standing Committee on Health.

I am pleased that my colleagues from the Conservative and Liberal parties have agreed to hear important witnesses who, on a daily basis, will have to work under and adapt to this new legislation to establish new standards for storing and handling human pathogens and toxins.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to go back to two or three other aspects that are more directly related to the bill. Clause 39, for example, states:

The Minister may, without the consent of the person to whom the information relates, disclose personal information and confidential business information obtained under this Act to a person from whom the Minister seeks advice, to a department or agency of the government of Canada or a province, to a foreign government or to an international organization—

For all intents and purposes, although those receiving this confidential information are required to maintain confidentiality—as stated later in the clause—I find it rather strange that consent is not required. It should be understood that the person may not be consulted or, at the very least, notified that information will be disclosed. This could be discussed with the minister and his officials in order to clarify this aspect of the bill, which could be problematic if, in fact, confidential information is disclosed without notifying the individuals or institutions concerned.

I would also like to talk about another issue that relates a bit more directly to the bill. Clause 67 states that the minister may make an interim order involving a product in the case of problems with enforcement of the legislation. The minister would then make an interim order effective immediately. The clause also states that the two houses of Parliament need not be informed for up to 15 days.

Should an emergency occur that requires immediate action on the part of the minister, this House should be informed much sooner than that. Perhaps the parliamentary secretary or even the minister would like to touch on that. When it comes to incidents involving public health and safety, all members of the public, as well as all parliamentarians, should be informed and given the opportunity to debate the issues without delay. To me, that means within hours or, at most, a few days. Fifteen days is far too long. Indeed, it would be odd for Parliament not to be informed of a situation endangering public health within 15 days.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize the importance of ensuring public safety. We must also ensure that our universities and hospitals can carry on doing their research, and that the government provides more support for research.

[Carol Hughes, NDP, Algoma—Manitoulin—Kapuskasing, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague from Verchères—Les Patriotes for his speech and comments.

I think that we all agree that we need effective health protection and that this bill could be a step in the right direction. I think it will be very important to hear witnesses in committee in order to ensure that this bill is the best way to guarantee that necessary, useful research poses no risk to Canadians.

My colleague has raised some real concerns about this. He spoke about funding for laboratories and wondered whether these labs would be able to cover the additional costs new legislation would impose.

Some research laboratories have protested because obeying the new law will cost them more time or money.

Is my colleague worried that no funding has been proposed to help these laboratories actually make these changes? Is he also worried by the fact that these laboratories may have to make cuts elsewhere in order to pay for these changes?

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague for her question. She is absolutely correct. The parliamentary secretary has also said that the laboratories are not against the bill.

The laboratories are conscious of the risks that their activities pose to public health. However, my colleague rightly pointed out, they are asking how they, with the financial resources they currently have, will be able to adapt their practices and, as I said earlier, not cause any incidents. No incidents have been recorded in Quebec or in Canada. They are wondering how they will absorb the cost—billions of dollars for all of the laboratories. How will they absorb this?

My colleague is right to be worried when she suggests that cuts might have to be made elsewhere in order to obey the law. When there is a finite amount of funding for the work to be done, it is obvious that spending on unanticipated items means cuts elsewhere.

She is also quite right to say that when this bill is studied in committee, it will be very important to hear the stakeholders' concerns clearly and directly from them. Furthermore, we will ensure that this bill includes satisfactory answers for these people, and not simply some future regulatory framework without apparent guidelines or content. Clearly, there must be a balance between safety and research.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague brought up some important comments and questions.

I would like to put on the record the fact that this government is very open and willing to work with our colleagues to ensure we have strong legislation. I think he will agree that this is long overdue. Just because there have not been any particular instances does not mean we should not be ready for something like this to occur because the implications can be incredibly severe.

He brought up questions with respect to funding. I point out that the new legislative regime will be generally consistent with all the existing guidelines. It is expected that most laboratories will be compliant with these guidelines, as they have been since 1990. We are not putting in something that is too unreasonable or something with which the laboratories are not familiar.

If the member has some particularly important witnesses whom he would like to bring forward, the government is willing to work with him in that regard.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health for his comments. I am pleased to see—and I also noticed from his speech—that he is somewhat open. We simply do not see such clear and precise openness in the bill, but I am pleased to hear that this government is open to hearing from a variety of stakeholders in order to ensure that there will be no impact on the work currently being done in our academic and other institutions.

As we all know, the bill stipulates that a list of all users of these products would have to be submitted. What does that mean for a university? Does that mean all the students in the department, all the students who actually handle the substance or all the students who might walk through the hallways and common areas? These are additional questions that must be answered with the stakeholders and with the goodwill of all parliamentarians.

All these comments must be explored during the committee's study of the bill. I am delighted to see everyone coming together to ensure that this bill can be put in place while respecting current practices.

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased we have the opportunity today to speak to Bill C-11, important legislation that deals with human pathogens and toxins. One thing that needs to be said at the outset of this debate is that nowhere is it more important to have a proactive government using all the tools available through the public sector than when it comes to human pathogens and toxins.

We start from the basic premise that the legislation, at face value, looks good. It is long overdue. It is part of a package of antiquated legislation that needs to be updated and brought into the 21st century. However, there also needs to be a new kind of thinking on the part of government, the kind of thinking that appears contrary to the ideological predilections of the Conservative government.

I want to start by putting on the table the overriding concern for Canadians. When it comes to the safety and well-being of Canadians, there can be no shortcuts. There can be no privatization, no offloading and no passive regulatory scheme.

This area demands a proactive government, a strong public sector component and laboratories that are within and only within the public sector, not privatized, no public-private partnerships, no deals with the private sector, no commercialization.

First and foremost, this is about safety. Canadians know a lot about exposure to dangerous pathogens and toxins, and they are worried. They are worried because they have not seen from the government the kind of action that is necessary to guarantee their safety and security at times of crisis.

The record of the Conservatives, and the Liberals before them, is atrocious. Neither party has understood the role of government in this area. The dismantling of our health protection system started under the Liberals and has continued to this day under the Conservatives.

Under the Liberals, we lost laboratories in the federal public service. We lost laboratories that tested for dangerous pathogens. We lost laboratories that looked at interactions between drugs and foods. There were outcries from scientists who felt their scientific judgment had been pushed aside in the name of expediency.

In the past the Liberal government took away the resources and means by which one could actively oversee a system pertaining to human safety, whether we talk about drugs, foods, pathogens, toxins, organs, blood, just name it. Let us not forget the Krever Commission and the whole blood scandal. Let us remember the lessons of our history and ensure that history does not repeat itself when it comes to something as fundamental as human health and safety.

The path set out by the Liberals has been continued by the Conservatives. Did we see a replenishment of inspectors when it came to problems in our food safety systems? Did we see a well coordinated, thoughtful, profound response when it came to something as devastating as listeriosis, which resulted in 20 deaths in our country? No. We saw once more the kind of scattergun approach that the Liberals brought to this chamber. We saw a passive government response that said it would let the industry regulate itself. We saw confusion everywhere, with no central coordination or authority to oversee this entire area.

We have lost something fundamental that has to be regained, that the Conservative government has to recommit to, if we are going to get anywhere with something as profound as protecting people from dangerous pathogens and toxins.

I want to start with some basic principles. This legislation says it will broaden the mandatory application of the laboratory biosafety guidelines from just imported pathogens to include domestic sources as well. It will supposedly ensure that the government has a complete inventory of where potentially dangerous pathogens exist and that sites are licensed appropriately. It says it will parallel the treatment of pathogens in many other industrialized countries, because we are far behind the rest of the world on these issues, and that it will bring the malevolent use of these organisms under the criminal code regime and provide for the inspection of work sites and penalties for misuse.

That sounds good. It sounds progressive and along the lines of what Canadians have been asking for on other issues pertaining to drugs and foods for some time.

It would appear that this bill will make Canadians safer, or will at least make them feel safer. That comes after dealing with Walkerton, SARS, listeriosis, and what have become regular announcements of food contamination and recalls. Just remember that E. coli, salmonella, and listeriosis have all now become household names across this country. There are no exceptions across communities in this country.

In Winnipeg, as my colleague from Winnipeg Centre mentioned earlier, we have a level 4 lab. We are very proud of that fact. We are proud of the record of achievement of that laboratory, but we know that it takes a certain ideological perspective to ensure that the public safety is guaranteed whenever such a facility is established in a community. It takes a perspective that says that government's job is to protect people from any dangerous spills or seepage or accident pertaining to pathogens and toxins. It says that the workers in that lab must be safe, that the people in the community must be safe, and that whenever such dangerous pathogens are transported, people everywhere must be safe.

But there was a bit of a problem back in 1999 with that lab. The Liberals were in power. There was a leak, and 2,000 litres of lab effluent were dumped into the public sewage system. That was on June 23, 1999.

It took a community to stand up and demand its rights for government to take action. The Liberals were then in power, and the Government of Canada decided to keep things relatively quiet, to keep it a secret, to not be fully transparent. Health Canada did not publicize the spill. News of it came through media reports.

Naturally the community was very upset. I and my colleague, the member for Winnipeg Centre, decided to work with the community to make sure that their voices were heard and that lessons were learned from this incident. In fact, shortly after that spill we launched a community lab safety task force, hosted a round table of experts and activists, and met with many people in the community on this issue.

It paid off. Eventually the government announced a community liaison committee to improve communications, and other measures were taken as a result of this incident.

However, it took the community to speak up about it. There was no full disclosure, and that should never happen.

That is why I started this debate by saying there must some basic principles in place in order for this legislation to mean anything and to work.

At the top of the list is the principle that there must be full transparency and accountability to the public. There can be no secrets. There has to be full disclosure when accidents happen or mistakes are made. The public has to be kept informed every step of the way.

I know that the Conservatives are not naturally inclined to do that, despite all their protestations when they were in opposition and their promises during the last election to be accountable and transparent. We have seen almost no evidence of that. They break their word, they change their minds, and they refuse to disclose when the public needs to be told of an important public policy development. I do not need to go into the long list of issues on that front. We could talk about appointments to the Senate or about breaking their own law on fixed election dates. The list goes on and on. There are all kinds of issues related to the Conservatives' promises of transparency and accountability.

However, that kind of action on the part of the Conservatives cannot be allowed to continue, especially when it comes to something as important as human pathogens and toxins. We are talking about life-and-death situations. There is no room for that kind of culture of secrecy and arrogance to be continued for one second in this country today, especially on this critical issue.

The first issue, then, is public accountability and full transparency.

Second, there has to be coordination. The right hand of government has to know what the left hand is doing. There has to be some semblance of a coordinated system within government to deal with the issues pertaining to human pathogens and toxins, partly because of the public health issue at stake here, but also because of the threat of bioterrorism.

We all have questions today pertaining to the legislation. Is the government any more prepared today than it was last fall with respect to the listeriosis crisis? Is it any more prepared today than when we had the SARS crisis? Is it any more prepared today than when we learned the tragic news of September 11? Do we have a coordinated, centralized shop within government that oversees this area?

I do not think so. I am having a hard time finding it. I know the public safety department is sometimes responsible. Health Canada is sometimes responsible. There are pots of money here and pots of money there. There is a little bit of shifting here and there between government departments, but who is in charge? Where does the buck stop? Which minister is absolutely responsible?

This is a very legitimate concern in the light of a couple of recent developments. In September 2008 the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence found our response capabilities lacking. The Senate committee found that the federal government will not even tell local front-line responders where it stashes its emergency medical supplies. It will not tell them where they are located.

It is interesting that when those who are responsible for delivering emergency services at the local level in Medicine Hat stumbled on a federal supply, the federal government, rather than using the opportunity to build coordination and efficiency, took the supplies and hid them somewhere else. Does that make sense? Is that responsible, accountable, fully transparent government action in the midst of a very serious situation? It certainly does not bode well for future crises that are likely to occur in this country.

Canadians are especially concerned about the government's ability and capacity to protect them from a non-terrorist threat.

I talked about listeriosis earlier. Let me go back to that for a moment because it is our most recent example of what happens when we do not really have a government in charge that knows what it is doing and puts the needs of Canadians first. We only have to refer to the Canadian Medical Association's article in the midst of that crisis to give full meaning to this point.

The Canadian Medical Association Journal actually stated on October 21, 2008, that “...the most visible figures in the recent recall of affected foods have not been public health officials but rather the head of Maple Leaf Foods and the minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada”.

Where was the Prime Minister? Where was the Minister of Health? Where was the coordinated response to something as tragic as listeriosis? Why was it left to the private sector to explain the situation? Is it not the job of government to put in place regulations and standards and laws and programs that the private sector must adhere to? Is it not the fundamental role of government to set the stage and to put in place the framework by which those who operate in the private sector are guided? How was it possible that through consecutive Liberal and Conservative governments we just let this system deteriorate to the point that nobody was in charge, the private sector was regulating itself, inspection capacity was greatly reduced, and standards based on a series of recommendations on paper were not on site? Were there regular surprise visits to meat plants, food stores, retailers, manufacturers, and producers?

No. Rather, there was simply a risk management model that said there might be a problem, that we were going to let business live up to these standards, that we were not going to inspect them regularly to make sure that they were, and that when it happened, we were going to duck and run.

There is the lesson. That is why this legislation is so important today and why we need more than simply the words of this bill before us. We need a whole government plan. We need to know that this government finally gets it and understands that we have to have a precautionary model when it comes to pathogens and toxins, just as we have to have a precautionary do-no-harm model when it comes to protecting people from dangerous drugs and problematic foods. There is no other way around it.

I do not see that here. I do not see the government coming forward with a plan about how it is going to coordinate any government plan in this regard and how it is going to put in the resources necessary to make sure we actually have that kind of proactive do-no-harm model in place.

It is not risk management. It is not saying, “Well, this is out there in the market. These pathogens or toxins exist, and we are going to protect as much as possible”, but in fact, “We are going to warn people, and if something happens, then we're going to take action. We'll wait until someone dies or gets sick before we take action.”

Has that not been the way of the Conservatives, and the Liberals before them, on all these issues? I think so. I heard someone say no. I think it has been the way, and that has to change.

I know my time is almost up. There is much more to say in terms of this issue, but I want to end by saying that the framework we expect to be in place in dealing with this legislation must include transparency and accountability. It must emphasize public ownership and public sector involvement, and not privatization or P3s. This model must be based on the precautionary principle, the do-no-harm model, and not on risk management. Finally, it must ensure that all Canadians are involved and fully informed and participative in any schemes or programs that address threats to people's food security, threats in terms of bioterrorism and threats in terms of human pathogens and toxins.

[Tony Martin, NDP, Sault Ste. Marie, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Winnipeg for her thoughtful and well presented case in terms of our support for this kind of oversight and her concern about whether the government will actually implement all of it and do the things that will be required to protect us.

As a member of Parliament in Ontario, I will never forget the Walkerton scandal and the scenario that unfolded in front of us in the days of the Mike Harris government. I think the member might have been around in those days. That was as a result of, yes, some human failure but also the fact that over a number of months into the Mike Harris government there was a moving of oversight on the environmental front of laboratories to the private sector. There was also a reduction in the number of people working for the ministry of the environment which all came together to present to us a very tragic circumstance in which people lost their lives.

In bringing this, obviously wanted, needed and important legislation forward, is the member confident that the government, within which there are many from the Mike Harris days, will actually implement it and not, at the first opportunity, shift it all over to the private sector again and/or reduce the number of people in the ministry of the environment in terms of oversight and reporting on this kind of very important public business? Does she believe the government may continue to cut staff to the point where even the best of legislation and oversight will not actually be effective?

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the question from the member for Sault Ste. Marie who is very knowledgeable about this issue coming from Toronto based on the Walkerton crisis. He asked whether we felt any more confident today than we did back then around public safety with these kinds of scenarios. I am afraid I cannot point to anything that gives me confidence yet that the government gets it and is able to commit the resources and make the policies that will put in place a proactive system that will protect people in the future.

We all learned from Walkerton but I want to go back to listeriosis because that is our most recent example.The Canadian Medical Association said in October, “Overall it would seem that as a country, Canada is far less prepared now for epidemics than in the past”. It almost seems like we may be going backwards, not making new advances.

The national advisory committee on SARS and public health told us that the Chief Public Health Officer should serve as the leading national voice for public health, particularly in outbreaks and other health emergencies. However, as in the listeriosis outbreak, the public received its briefings not from the Chief Public Health Officer but from the head of the very company that was causing the problems.

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency actually admitted in November that its silence was a problem but the Conservative government said nothing.

I am not sure that the government has learned yet. I think some of us have some good ideas about how we should go forward but we have no sign yet that the government is committed to the preservation of a publicly administered, publicly run, publicly funded system that has strong oversight based on the precautionary do-no-harm model.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health]

Mr. Speaker, I am looking forward to working with the member in committee on this very important bill. I also want to assure her that we do get it, which is why we are putting the bill forward. We think the bill is long overdue.

If the member believes it is important for the Canadian government to ensure Canadians are safe, will she support the bill as we move it forward? We do need to move the bill forward as quickly as we can to ensure it is debated in committee and then implemented for the safety of Canadians?

I would like to have the member put on the record whether she will be supporting the bill.

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, that is a hard question to answer. I have said that the bill looks progressive and positive at face value and that I want to see it studied at committee. However, I also said that it is pretty hard to judge a government action on a very important issue by legislation alone. If the resources, staff and policies are not in place to protect Canadians, we have a serious problem and we need to continue to address it through the course of this legislative process.

I will give a couple of examples of why I have such doubts. One of the Conservative government's first acts on taking power in 2006 was to eliminate the Public Health Agency minister and public health seat at the cabinet table. It took away the whole role at the cabinet table. It also left the Chief Medical Officer of Health responsible to the Minister of Health. According to the CMA journal, this left our country without a national independent voice to speak out on public health issues, including providing viable leadership during a crisis.

We also need to watch for cutbacks and wonder if the government is taking some shortcuts in this area. I mentioned earlier that the government decided to convert to a system of increased food industry self-inspection, which has been widely speculated to have caused some of the problems we have seen with respect to salmonella, outbreaks of E. coli and listeriosis. We also should not forget that the Conservatives cut back the avian influenza preparedness program.

I also want to mention that this area requires in-depth research and a constant injection of funds into research if we are ever going to understand the relationship between these pathogens and toxins in terms of human health. What did the government do in its last budget? It cut back on investments in health and research in the scientific communities, which is an ominous, worrisome response on the part of the government at a time when we need more investment, scientific understanding and coordination between the research communities and laboratories that work in these areas.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague's concerns about Bill C-11.

During her speech, she mentioned what happened in Walkerton a number of years ago, which was a terrible tragedy. Walkerton, while not in my riding, used to be part of it. It is just on the edge of Bruce county.

The one thing I and the people of Walkerton do not need to hear is the implication by members of the opposition or anybody else that it was a breakdown in the system. The clear truth of what happened in Walkerton was that two employees did not do their jobs.

The government is bringing forth Bill C-11 to improve the health and safety of Canadians. It was the same thing on the listeriosis outbreak not too long ago, although the government over the last two years hired 200 more inspectors for CFIA. Those are the kinds of things the government has done.

Does the hon. member support improving the health and the risks for health problems in Bill C-11?

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I must disagree as vehemently as possible with the hon. member. We have all studied the Walkerton issue. My colleague from Sault Ste. Marie was in the Ontario legislature at the time and knows very well that this was a systemic issue, an issue of systems breaking down, government cutbacks, privatization, outsourcing, off-loading and lack of coordination. It was not just the result of two individuals not doing their job. It was the result of a government that did not invest in the infrastructure and programs that were needed within the public sector to maintain people's safety during a time of crisis.

I will translate that into what is happening here. If that attitude continues, we are in deep trouble. The government can be darn sure that we will not support the legislation if it continues to find bogeymen instead of looking in its own backyard to find the problems that exist. Why in the world is the government cutting back $42.7 million in this fiscal year, $52.9 million next year and $72.2 million more in 2011-12 from the Public Health Agency and Health Canada?

How can we be confident when the government is talking out of both sides of its mouth at once? On the one hand, it is pretending tough legislation but on the other hand it is prepared to privatize our Crown corporations, cut back in terms of the Public Health Agency and provide no coordination when it comes to emergency medical services.

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we are debating Bill C-11 today, which is an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

The schedules to the bill list these pathogens and toxins. It is really quite a who's who of all the biological bad guys out there and it is pretty scary for a layman to read. I had two esteemed colleagues from my Liberal Party up, who are both doctors and probably pretty comfortable with the words, but there is aflatoxin, anthrax, cholera, diphtheria and dozens of ugly sounding toxins and pathogens.

Any layperson who looks at that would say that we need this legislation, and it is a consensus in the House that we need this legislation. There was a bill in the prior Parliament that did not make it through as it was a short Parliament. My party supports the bill in principle and, if adopted by the House, hopefully it will go to committee.

However, I must point out some issues that I do have with the bill. One issue that I raised previously is an issue that I will raise again, and if nobody moves amendments to this bill, I probably will. The issue concerns the granting by this House of powers to the administration, not just to the government but to persons in the government. In this particular case, they are referred to in the bill as inspectors. It has to do with this whole concept of the House giving power in a statute to the government to make regulations and enforce provisions of the act that are regulatory, in addition to the statutory provisions.

In modern government, we all accept that we need to do that. The real trick is in how we do it, how Parliament does it and whether or not Parliament will scrutinize, review and oversee the regulatory work and the enforcement that happens after the powers are delegated.

It is okay for Parliament to pass a law that says a citizen shall not do X. That is not a delegation. That is a creation of an offence and authorities enforce those offences. However, when Parliament passes a law that gives the authority to a minister or the governor in council to make a regulation, to create some kind of a regulatory offence, that is a delegation. When we do that in Parliament we should take steps to ensure that the enforcement and execution of those powers happen within the law. Parliament has created a method for doing that.

I will address this bill through a lens of our civil liberties, our freedoms. I have always tried to do that as a member of Parliament and I will do it here. I am not doing it just to be critical of the bill. I am doing it to better assure the rights and freedoms of Canadians under this particular legislation.

Sections in the bill would give substantial regulatory powers to the minister and to inspectors. When we are dealing with these human pathogens and toxins, one could expect that we would do that. There is no way we would send the minister or a member of Parliament over to some illegal laboratory to pick up some anthrax. This is done through hard-working, honest and dedicated public servants who need the authority to do that hard work.

I now want to look at the legislation to see how we are asking them to do this. I would refer the House to subclause 41(1), which reads:

Subject to section 42, an inspector may, for the purpose of verifying compliance or preventing non-compliance with this Act...enter at any reasonable time any place or conveyance [such as a motor vehicle or a bus] in which the inspector believes on reasonable grounds that an activity to which this Act or the regulations apply is conducted...

Not just for the purpose of preventing a breech of the act but for the purpose of ensuring compliance, the inspector may enter any place, any reasonable time. We pretty much just give to an inspector the right to do something that not even a policeman could do without a warrant or specific statutory authorization. There had better be a real good reason for this, to give all this power to a particular individual.

We are dealing with some difficult chemicals here, some pathogens and toxins, but here are some of the things that inspectors could do. They can examine the place. They can require the person in the place to do things. They can seize and detain, open and examine, direct the owner or the person having possession, care or control, to do certain things, to move certain things. They can examine and make copies, require any person in the place to do the same, and the list goes on.

These are significant powers. We should keep in mind the basis on which the inspector enters the premises. It is for the purpose, low threshold only, of verifying compliance. That would mean on a bad day, “I think I will go check these guys because I feel like it”. It could be that. I am not saying that it would be, but what if that is the case? “I will go into this place to check it because I want to verify compliance. I do not like the way they park their cars in the parking lot”, or maybe, “I do not like the owner”. This is the power that the act now gives, not by regulation, but by statute, right up front, to an inspector.

Subclause 41(6) says, “No person shall knowingly obstruct or hinder...an inspector who is carrying out their functions”. No person shall obstruct or hinder. That sounds reasonable, but let me tell the House that there are occasions where, from time to time, this restriction on hindering is abused. I am not making it up because I represent constituents whom I think have been criminally assaulted by government officials in the Canada Border Service Agency.

My constituents, a family, father, wife, two teenage boys, 14 and 16, came back to Canada at Windsor. They had made some purchases in the U.S.A. and low-balled the amount of money, they underestimated the amount they spent, so they were invited to go to secondary for inspection. It was all pretty reasonable stuff. I have been sent to secondary for inspection. People there are a little bit officious, but they are just doing their job: “Stand up. Move over there. Do this. Do that. Do not talk”. Okay, they checked my car. I did not tell them I was an MP.

Anyway, this family came across. The inspectors in that case were border services officers, that is, immigration officials, food inspectors, customs officials, tax collectors. They ended up breaking the arm of my constituent. They broke his arm. They put both the teenage boys in handcuffs and dragged them into the office along with the wife. When all was settled, they charged my constituents with obstruction. These guys behaved like bikers. They beat up this family and then they charged them with obstruction. Here we have a section which authorizes that Canadians be charged with obstructing or hindering an inspector.

I happen to be a lawyer. I went to Windsor with these people to defend them in court against this charge of obstruction. It was wrong and the charges were dismissed.

Four people were summoned by Her Majesty to come to court that day, to tell the truth, and say what happened. One CBSA official showed up and did not rise in court when the case was called. Those individuals did not even appear to a summons. That was lawlessness. There is no appeal mechanism for that agency. There is an informal one in the minister's office, but there is no oversight.

These are tax collectors, food inspectors, immigration officers, who are running around arresting people, beating them up, but do not show up in court to prosecute a case, so the case was dismissed. It was kind of a happy ending after the man's arm was broken and he missed work. I did inform the minister about this and the minister said not much could be done. Maybe there should be a lawsuit. These are just regular people who do not have a lot of money to start lawsuits to get justice.

The obstruction charge is contained in Bill C-11 and I am very nervous about that.

Clause 42 also has provisions about entering a dwelling house. We crossed this bridge before in the House. Someone cannot go into a dwelling house without a warrant and the bill makes provision for that, happily.

I see a problem with subclause 42(3) which deals with the warrant and going into a dwelling house. It says that the inspector may not use force unless it is specifically authorized. The problem is that the use of force issue is too vague in the statute. It is not clear what extent of force is being referred to. If I have a warrant to enter a dwelling house, do I have the ability to turn the doorknob if that requires the use of force? Do I have the ability to break a window? Do I have the ability to lift the latch?

A warrant to enter a dwelling house, as I understand it now, allows the reasonable use of force. I have a question with respect to this. If an inspector shows up with a warrant and breaks down the door but the owner of the house does not know what is going on and tells the inspector he cannot come in, is that obstruction? Based on the case I described with the CBSA, I can bet my boots that is obstruction.

On the other hand, it might be a good day if the inspector is in a good mood and apologizes for breaking the window but explains that he has to check for pathogens and toxins. Maybe everything would work out.

I am looking at this from the perspective of a citizen. The wording about use of force in that section is, in my view, too vague. It has to be fixed in some way, otherwise there would be a legal issue and by the time the case was litigated and sorted out by the Supreme Court half a million dollars would be spent. I am suggesting that the committee to which the bill would be referred sort that out.

Clause 40 says that when the minister delegates these authorities he or she may restrict the powers of the inspector. That is the wrong way to put it. I think the inspector should only have those powers that the minister delegates to him or her. The minister should not have the whole raft of powers under the statute which he or she could then pull back under authorization because I do not think the minister would ever do it.

There are no criteria for the minister. There is no framework for the minister to act. There is no framework under which the minister could say, “I think I am only going to give you powers 1 to 5 and you do not get powers 6 to 10”. There would be an automatic predisposition on the part of the minister and the public service simply to give all of the powers to the inspector without restriction.

Why would anyone take the time to restrict the powers given to the inspector? Why handicap the inspector? The statute already gives the inspector powers. This is a mistake. The minister should decide which specific powers should be in the hands of the inspector. Then we know clearly what the inspector can and cannot do. The minister knows, government knows and Parliament knows. This way it is an open book.

Clause 40 is a problem and I hope the committee will deal with that. If the committee does not, I am going to do it here in the House. I am giving notice right now.

Last is regulatory activity. Canada has a fairly good regulatory process. It allows the delegation of authorities from Parliament to the government or ministers and sometimes to agencies. I will not read clauses 67 and 68 of the bill, but they provide for the delegation of regulatory powers.

In Canada's system now, normally a statutory instrument or regulation is pre-published before it is enacted, there is consultation, then it is adopted by the cabinet or the minister, it is published in the Canada Gazette, and then it is reviewed by the Standing Joint Committee for Scrutiny of Regulations in the House. It is reviewed for compliance with the law, the originating statute, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the criteria adopted by the House. This way we make sure that regulations passed are legal and fair. That has worked fairly well for the last 30 or 40 years.

However, clause 68 of this bill exempts some of the statutory instruments and regulations from the Statutory Instruments Act. It takes it right out. It says these regulations are not statutory instruments. For the layman that may be kind of a foggy term and some may ask what it means.

In some cases in this bill it only means that the regulation is not pre-published and consulted, that it simply is made, and there may be good public policy reasons for doing that. In an emergency, three months cannot be taken to consult. Dealing with risks to human health, sometimes action has to be taken quickly. We do that and authorize regulations to be made without the need to pre-publish and study, et cetera. However, there are a couple of components that are worrying to me and should be to the House.

First, the bill specifically authorizes incorporation by reference. That means an adoption of a rule that somebody else made. Maybe it is a rule made by the European Union or Brazil or Japan or wherever. That is incorporation by reference. Not only that but it allows what is called ambulatory incorporation by reference, which means whenever Brazil changes its rule, our rule changes. We have to get a handle on that because that is a pure delegation of regulation-making by us to them.

Second is the exemption from the Statutory Instruments Act. We cannot do that. We must allow Parliament to continue reviewing it. We must specifically authorize Parliament to review these instruments under sections 19 and 19.1 of the Statutory Instruments Act. Those amendments should all be made to this bill.