Bill C-11 (Historical)

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins

This enactment creates measures to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins and all activities associated with them. It establishes a comprehensive legislative regime that extends beyond the present importation regime. It requires every person conducting activities involving human pathogens or toxins to take all reasonable measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

[Gary Lunn, Conservative, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

moved that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to have this opportunity at second reading to address the important issues of the safety and security of human pathogens and toxins. That is a primary reason behind Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

I want to begin by explaining what a pathogen is. A human pathogen is a micro-organism capable of causing disease or death in humans. Examples include: salmonella bacteria, the agent of anthrax, listeria bacteria and the Ebola virus. The need to enhance biosafety in Canada's laboratories and prevent an inadvertent release of these agents is one of the two primary focuses of Bill C-11.

The need to safeguard Canadians from the risk of an intentional release of these dangerous agents constitutes the second primary focus of the proposed human pathogens and toxins act. As we know, the world changed after September 11, 2001. The events of that day highlighted the need for greater vigilance on our part. This was emphasized in the month that followed when an anthrax attack in the United States resulted in 22 identified cases and five deaths.

The cost of a bioterror attack is high, both in terms of lives lost, lives affected and economic consequences. It is the responsibility of government, of this Parliament, to put in place the necessary measures to minimize the likelihood of such an event.

There are approximately 3,500 laboratories that import human pathogens into Canada. These laboratories are regulated under the existing human pathogens importation regulations which have been in force since 1994. They must also comply with our laboratory biosafety guidelines which are widely accepted as Canada's national biosafety standard.

Unfortunately, these regulations and associated laboratory biosafety guidelines are only mandatory for facilities that import human pathogens. They are not mandatory for the additional 4,000 laboratories that do not import, but which acquire human pathogens within Canada.

While labs working with these pathogens do so in a safe manner and widely apply these guidelines on a voluntary basis, we need legislation and regulations in place to reinforce these safe practices, and establish consistency by ensuring all labs in Canada, whether federal, provincial or private, are adhering to these guidelines.

Canada faces some serious risks as a result of this legislative and regulatory gap. These include risks to the safety of persons working in and around laboratories and risks to our national security. There is always the potential for accidental release of human pathogens or toxins.

As I have said, about 4,000 laboratories in Canada use domestically acquired human pathogens and toxins. The fact that these laboratories are subject only to a voluntary biosafety regime is not acceptable, especially since similar laboratories that import human pathogens operate under a mandatory biosafety regime.

It is time to level the playing field in Canada so that all persons working with these agents, and especially all laboratories, are required to operate under the same rules and to comply with the same national biosafety guidelines.

To this end the new human pathogens and toxins act is designed to ensure that unless exempted, no person may carry on activities with these dangerous substances without a licence and without complying with the laboratory biosafety guidelines.

Beyond accidental release, Canada also faces the risk of a deliberate release of a human pathogen or toxin. This is not a pleasant scenario but one which we must consider fully in order to protect Canadians. To address this risk the new legislation includes a provision for a new national system of security screening for persons handling the most dangerous of these agents. Other than for individuals working in federal government laboratories, there is no such system in place in Canada at this moment.

It is important that the government take reasonable precautions to ensure that while not interfering with research, people handling the most dangerous human pathogens and toxins in Canada have received appropriate security screening. At the same time, the government will seek to ensure that there is a minimal paper burden on those handling less dangerous human pathogens and toxins.

The new legislation will address both biosafety and biosecurity risks through a range of mechanisms including: new criminal prohibitions, offences, and penalties; expanded inspection and enforcement; a new authority to make regulations; and new security screening requirements for persons having access to the most dangerous human pathogens and toxins.

This proposal would render Canada more consistent with its international partners and allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, which have all passed new security legislation. It is time that Canada joined them.

This new legislation is needed now. It is required to safeguard the health and well-being of Canadians, especially those persons working in laboratories. It is also required to demonstrate to the Canadian public, and to our international partners, that the Government of Canada is taking very seriously the issue of national security related to dangerous human pathogens and toxins.

The proposed legislation represents a made in Canada approach that would emphasizes safety and strong security linkages. The urgency in moving ahead with expanded federal oversight over human pathogens and toxins has been widely recognized. We have discussed this proposal with our provincial and territorial public health colleagues and with the diverse laboratory community in Canada, including academia and the private sector. They have agreed with the need to move ahead and they have shown a keen interest in further discussions concerning details about licensing, inventories, security screening, and how they will be included in future discussions.

We will continue to engage our stakeholders as Bill C-11 moves through the parliamentary process.

As well, we will commence in-depth consultations with stakeholders across the country on the program and regulatory framework. These consultations will help us ensure that we have correctly balanced the needs of biosafety and biosecurity, on the one hand, and the interests of ongoing science and research, on the other. In proposing this legislation, we are building on our existing importation program.

It is important that we turn our attention to applying existing biosafety and biosecurity controls equally to all persons carrying on activities with these dangerous agents across Canada. For this reason, I call on my colleagues in this House to support Bill C-11. I am looking forward to questions.

[Joy Smith, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the parliamentary secretary to clarify the difference between human pathogens and toxins.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Mr. Speaker, a human pathogen is a micro-organism capable of causing disease or death in a human. For the purposes of this legislation, this includes animal pathogens that can cause disease in humans. For the purposes of this legislation, toxins are defined as substances produced by or derived from micro-organisms which are able to cause disease in humans and which are listed in schedule 1 of the proposed bill. Human pathogens are divided into risk groups, taking into account varying levels of risk.

[Dave Van Kesteren, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Essex, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I, too, was listening with interest to the proposed bill. I have a question for the parliamentary secretary. How would this relate to existing regulations for import of human pathogens?

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague brings up a very important question because right now there are regulations and legislation that exist for importation. However, for laboratories actually using these pathogens in the laboratory, they are not legislated and regulated in the proper way. That is why it is very important that we move this legislation forward, so we level the playing field for all laboratories in Canada.

[Greg Rickford, Conservative, Kenora, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the parliamentary secretary this question. What would be the implications of an intentional release of human pathogens?

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Mr. Speaker, as I said in my speech, Canadians are concerned. On September 11, 2001, the world changed. There have been attacks in the United States. The member probably remembers the anthrax incidents. There were 22 cases, resulting in the death of five people.

It is about time that Canada brings our legislation and regulations up to the level that our international partners expect. It is not a scenario that one wants to think about. The release of these pathogens and toxins could have severe consequences on our population. That is why I am calling on all my colleagues to work with me, to work with the minister, and to work in committee to get this legislation passed because it is definitely needed.

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the remarks made by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health and his description of Bill C-11. I agree with him that this is a very important issue and we have learned a lot based on some very traumatic episodes in our history over the last little while.

My concern is that all of these great plans will come to nought if in fact the government does not have an underlying framework that respects the question of government supported or sponsored initiatives, whether it be in terms of emergency services or laboratories.

My question to the parliamentary secretary is quite simple. Could he give the House assurances that the government, unlike in other areas, has absolutely no intention of privatizing our public laboratories?

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Mr. Speaker, that is a very important question. Our laboratories play an important role for public health in Canada and I would like to assure the member that federal laboratories are going to remain in that framework.

Extensive consultations were held with stakeholders, particularly the laboratories. I want to let the member know that stakeholders, including the biosafety officers at laboratory institutions, welcomed these proposals and generally support the expanded federal oversight of human pathogens and toxins.

However, some important issues were raised at the stakeholder consultations. These include: the documentation requirements for permits, registration, inventory maintenance, security screening of personnel with access to dangerous human pathogens, and potential cost implications of compliance with these new biosafety requirements. The government intends to address all of these concerns by engaging in a wide range of consultations with stakeholders over specific elements of security screening in order that the legislative and regulatory framework is implemented in such a way to allow for efficient compliance.

Stakeholders involved in research and development also asked whether the proposed legislation could have negative implications on their research. As the member brought forward, it is very important that these labs continue with their research.

The focus of the proposed legislation is the strengthening of biosafety. The principles of biosafety do not in any way impede research and development but, rather, aim at those activities proceeding without harming the scientist or the public. The Public Health Agency of Canada will aim to find the appropriate balance between safety and security, and supporting this very important scientific research.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I with to thank the parliamentary secretary for some of the references he made to the handling protocols of these pathogens. I want to ask him, what specifically in the bill would give satisfaction to the people of my riding, where the level 4 federal laboratory is located?

In the case of what happened recently, a car accident occurred where a FedEx truck ran into a car and its contents spilled out. Guess what was in the FedEx truck? There was anthrax, the Newcastle disease virus, and a number of other serious toxins. People who farm chickens will know that Newcastle disease is not something we want in the community.

There was a level 4 virology lab shipping anthrax and Newcastle by FedEx with no protocols whatsoever, any more than one would give to sending a Christmas gift to a relative. I want to see very strict protocols within this bill and some satisfaction, so that I can tell the people of my riding that we are addressing this appalling issue.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I have actually had the privilege of visiting the hon. member's riding and the very important level 4 lab in Canada. He is correct that these labs handle extremely pathogenic substances, such as Ebola.

That is exactly why the government is moving forward on this very important legislation. We need those specific controls when laboratories handle these substances and transfer them from one lab to another. In the present legislation, it is only mandatory when the laboratories import those pathogens into the country. However, for transfer within the country, as the member so rightly pointed out, it is voluntary. I would point out that the lab in his riding is exceptional and has very high standards, but it is important that the Government of Canada is able to regulate and watch over the particular instances that the member mentioned.

It is a very good question and I am looking forward to getting this important legislation before a committee, so the experts can appear to be asked those very specific questions. Hopefully, we can support this bill and move it forward for specifically the reasons that the hon. member brings forward.

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I seek consent to share my time with the member for Etobicoke North.

[The Acting Speaker, Conservative, Barry Devolin]

Is there unanimous consent?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure today to speak to Bill C-11, an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins. The Liberal Party supports improving Canadians' health and safety. We support measures that improve the safety and security of laboratories in Canada for all Canadians. We will scrutinize this bill in committee to ensure that it is as accountable, transparent and useful as possible.

It is important that we establish a legislative framework that extends beyond the present importation and storage regime for pathogens and toxins, especially for things such as anthrax, salmonella and influenza. The current regime is inadequate and not up to the standard of other international regulations. It only requires that all labs that import human pathogens and toxins adhere to the laboratory biosafety guidelines, the LBGs, but these existing guidelines are not mandatory for labs that acquire human pathogens and toxins from domestic sources even though they are applied widely on a voluntary basis as an industry standard. This voluntary approach is no longer good enough. We need to bring Canada into the modern world that actually deals with the biosecurity reality we now face.

The bill would require laboratories carrying out activities with risk groups 2, 3 or 4 human pathogens or select toxins to register with the Public Health Agency of Canada's Office of Laboratory Security. It would subject the licensees with a risk of group 3 and 4 pathogens and possibly select toxins to stricter operating regulations and it would require a permit to import a human pathogen or toxin. As well, as was raised by the hon. member from Winnipeg, the bill would require transfer permits to send and receive any human pathogen or toxin between laboratories within Canada that are not part of the same facility.

It would also require licensees, as part of their annual or biannual update of inventory, to notify the Public Health Agency of Canada of the nature of the disposal of human pathogens and toxins. These changes would bring Canada into line with more stringent regulations in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Although there is a need for the minister to have the ability to improve the safety and security of Canada's laboratories, the powers given to the minister in the bill are very serious. We believe that putting in place the kind of scientific advice that would be important to the minister should be as transparent as possible. I am in favour of there being an advisory committee to give transparent advice to the minister, so it is clear that scientists make scientific judgments and politicians make political judgments.

The Liberal caucus will support this bill at second reading because it modernizes and improves the laboratory licensing system and improves the overall health and safety of Canadians. However, since provinces and territories are responsible for licensing, we will have to further study and listen to the representatives from the provinces and territories at committee to make sure that those jurisdictions are comfortable with this collaborative approach.

I want to thank the minister and her department for the excellent briefing they gave us this morning on the bill. I was relieved to hear that the $36 million that will be required to implement the bill is already in the fiscal framework and that the bill will protect the health and safety of Canadians by closing the significant gap in Canada's national security framework.

The current regime is inadequate. As we have said, there has been this legislative gap about knowing where these dangerous human pathogens or toxins exist and how they are transferred. It is hugely important as we go forward that there be a comprehensive framework that the rest of the world understands exists in Canada, which is now seen to be a weak link in dealing with human pathogens and toxins through the various controlled activities.

I am very comfortable with the different levels of penalties. Obviously, in this dangerous world, the idea of releasing, abandoning or disposing on purpose a human pathogen or toxin must face the highest possible criminal offence.

It is important that these new criminal aspects include duty of care, the complete prohibition of controlled activities with certain human pathogens, such as the smallpox virus, as well as prohibition of controlled activities with a human pathogen or toxin without a licence.

I am happy that the regulatory framework will be enhanced in terms of the specific licensing requirements, inventory requirements, security screening requirements, and the outlining of the duties and qualifications of the new biological safety officers.

I am happy that since the bill was last presented, there have been changes to it in terms of the schedules; the transferring and the inspection powers now explain that inspection must be on reasonable grounds; and there is now the ability to move conveyances.

I am pleased that the stakeholder consultation was done properly. No real opposition was expressed, although some issues were raised around the implementation. The need for balance, the technical issues and the cost of complying with the new requirements for the individual smaller labs seem to have been taken into consideration and there is a commitment for continued consultation with the stakeholders.

The basic approach of the bill makes colossal sense. On royal assent, in phase one, the prohibitions, the duty of care, and the offences in the registry will come into force. I am happy that in phase two the development of the regulatory framework will again involve extensive consultation with the stakeholders. Phase three will bring into force the rest of the requirements.

I am very pleased with the collaboration and cooperation of the department on this bill. I look forward to studying this bill in detail at committee.

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we live in an era of change and uncertainty. Infectious disease remains among the leading causes of death worldwide and the greatest killer of children and young adults.

New infectious diseases, such as HIV-AIDS and SARS, are emerging. Old infectious diseases, such as malaria, plague and tuberculosis, are re-emerging, and intractable infectious diseases remain an ever-present threat.

Although most deaths from infectious disease occur in developing countries, no region of the world is risk-free. It is, therefore, in the best interests of all countries, including Canada, to support initiatives to control infectious disease.

Bioterrorism also remains a very real threat. As mentioned, in October 2000, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to American news media offices and two senators. The letters killed five people and infected over twenty others. Broad public health measures were implemented to treat the thousands who were potentially exposed and decontamination of government buildings and postal offices took years. The total cost to the United States was more than $1 billion.

Microbiological agents and toxins can and do impact global health. In 2003, SARS spread to 30 countries across 5 continents and killed almost 800 people, 44 of them in Toronto.

We must protect Canadian health and we must protect global health. The more we increase biosafety measures, the greater the probability that we will be able to mitigate the deadly effects of infectious disease, even if they are launched deliberately by human agents.

The World Health Organization urges countries to promote biosafety practices for the safe handling, containment and transport of microbiological agents and toxins; to review the safety of laboratories and their existing protocols; to develop programs that enhance compliance of laboratories; and to encourage the development of biological safety training.

Thousands of infectious samples are shipped daily around the world for clinical trials, disease investigations, surveillance, et cetera. Animal and human specimens need to be transported efficiently, legally, safely and in a timely manner. Shippers must be aware of regulatory requirements, personnel must undertake appropriate training and specimens must be packed to protect transporters from risk of infections.

There are new reports of infections resulting from transport related exposures, excluding the 2001 anthrax letters in the United States. However, there have been reports of the transmission of acute respiratory infections associated with air travel as a result of direct person-to-person contact.

Best practices regarding the transport of microbiological agents and toxins must be used to protect the environment and human health. Perhaps more support is needed to prevent the introduction and spread of communicable diseases from other countries and among provinces.

In the laboratory, containment of microbiological agents and toxins is critical to preventing outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging diseases. Over the last 70 years, research to combat infectious disease has resulted in over 5,000 associated infections in the laboratory and almost 200 deaths. Infamously, in 1978 a smallpox laboratory accident caused one death and led to the suicide of the laboratory director. More recently, in 2008 the Bush administration acknowledged that the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, the only U.S. facility allowed to research the highly contagious foot and mouth disease, experienced several accidents with the virus.

It is, therefore, imperative that laboratories have strict facility safeguards, microbiological practices and safety equipment that protect laboratory workers, the environment and the public from exposure to infections, micro-organisms and toxins that are stored in the laboratory.

Responsible laboratory practices will help prevent intentional release, loss, misuse, theft or unauthorized access of biological material, and will contribute to preserving important scientific work for future generations.

New research shows that infectious diseases are now emerging at an exceptional rate, with humans accumulating new pathogens at a rate of one per year. This means that agencies and governments will need to work harder than ever before to keep abreast of the increasing threat.

It is, therefore, imperative that we take every opportunity to protect people and the environment from infectious disease, as emerging infectious disease has the potential to eliminate opportunities for infectious disease eradication or elimination.

In 1969, smallpox remained a devastating disease, killing 1.6 million people that year. Eradication of the disease was achieved because of a worldwide effort that was supported by the necessary political will, human and technical resources and a safe vaccine.

In 1979, the year that smallpox was declared eradicated, HIV was rapidly spreading across Africa and the world. If the global smallpox eradication campaign had been postponed, the world might not have been able to eradicate smallpox as easily as it did in 1980. Biosafety must be paramount, whether in the air, across the land or in the lab.

After six years of planning, I led an expedition to the Arctic to search for the cause of the 1918 Spanish influenza, history's deadliest disease. My research team would safely exhume six bodies with the hope of identifying the influenza virus to make a better antiviral or a flu vaccine.

Opening the graves was akin to opening Pandora's Box as there was the chance of re-releasing history's deadliest disease. Our safety protocols, planned over two years, were approved by a blue ribbon panel hosted by the National Institute for Health and the government of Norway. We did our utmost to provide a safe working environment on the frozen tundra.

After receiving all the necessary permits for transportation, my research team shipped tissue samples, packed in containers to prevent mechanical and temperature damage, from the High Arctic to our most secure laboratory, a biosafety level four laboratory in Britain.

For six years I lived and breathed biosafety, lived with the risk of finding live virus and took every precaution to undertake our work safely and ethically. No formal permission process existed for exhuming bodies. However, we asked permission from the families, the governor of Svalbard, et cetera. We also developed our own biosafety protocols related to exhumation and sampling decontamination.

Strengthening global surveillance is not enough to eliminate or eradicate infectious disease. We need close ties among public health, trade and transportation organizations. We need strong laboratory regulations and an improved means of communicating and reporting to protect the lab workers and the surrounding community from accidental exposure to infectious agents. We also need better collaboration with those monitoring the biological weapons convention.

We have had multiple wake-up calls. This new bill is a step in the right direction. Complacency cannot be an option when it comes to biosafety.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, this morning, my colleagues spoke to Bill C-11, an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins. Now it is my turn. The summary of the bill reads as follows:

This enactment creates measures to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins and all activities associated with them. It establishes a comprehensive legislative regime that extends beyond the present importation regime. It requires every person conducting activities involving human pathogens or toxins to take all reasonable measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

As my colleagues said, it is important to keep Canadians safe. It is every Parliament's duty to ensure the safety of Canadians within the scope of its constitutional powers. As we have seen, the proposed legislation would require all persons conducting these activities to comply with a number of guidelines. It would ensure consistency by obliging all labs to adhere to laboratory biosafety guidelines developed by the Public Health Agency of Canada. Licences must be obtained for controlled activities, such as possessing, handling, using, producing, storing, permitting authorized access to, transferring, importing, exporting, releasing or otherwise abandoning, or disposing of a human pathogen or toxin.

The federal government claims that it is entitled to introduce this bill because of its jurisdiction over criminal law. However, at this point, I have to wonder whether the government should really have made this bill a priority. As we know, since the guidelines were introduced over 15 years ago, there have been no incidents in Canada, regardless of whether labs have been following those guidelines.

Also on the order paper is a bill the government introduced in January, Bill C-6, formerly Bill C-52, on the safety of consumer products. The government has known at least since November 2006 that there are problems in this area. The Auditor General said so. Since the summer of 2007, there have been several major recalls, including a recall of toys containing lead. It would have been better if this bill were before the House now, seeing as how there have been no pathogen problems to date under the existing acts and regulations.

We know that the highest risk groups are groups 3 and 4. I would remind this House that the human pathogens in these groups pose a high risk to the health of individuals and a low or high risk to public health. Twenty-four labs in Quebec and 150 in Canada fully meet the guidelines for groups 3 and 4. In addition, the backgrounder on Bill C-54, which is the number this bill had in the last Parliament, states that “The risk to Canadians posed by the presence of human pathogens and toxins in labs is low.”

This is still a very important issue. However, this bill, in its current form, must not be allowed to stop or impede lab work, which is crucial to determining the causes of diseases and advancing science through research. In committee, it will be very important to look at this aspect of the bill in depth and to meet with a wide range of specialists working in this field to make sure that they will be able to do this work once this bill has been passed, especially with regard to risk group 2, which poses a lower risk to the health of individuals and public health. Of course, these labs include hospital and university labs where very important research is under way.

I would like to raise another point before I go on to the topic of university research. I am just wondering whether the Criminal Code already covers intentional threats to public safety, such as terrorist acts, and unintentional threats, such as criminal negligence. To my way of thinking, these threats to public health or public safety are already covered by legislation passed here.

I would like to start with the issue that, in the current version of the bill could, in our opinion, pose a number of problems. That issue is research conducted in our universities. The parliamentary secretary told us earlier that the government had held a number of consultations. And at a meeting with officials from the Public Health Agency of Canada, we were told that a number of consultations had been held. However, despite these consultations, researchers still have a number of important questions, especially regarding who will pay the costs of complying with the new requirements. This concern is mentioned in the Public Health Agency of Canada notes, but was not addressed by the parliamentary secretary in his earlier remarks.

We know that university research is already underfunded, yet today, as we prepare to refer this bill to committee, we do not know if assistance will be made available to institutions to help them comply with the new guidelines or if labs will be left to cover all the costs themselves.

Has the government actually conducted studies to determine the impact this new legislation would have on university courses, on how our hospitals operate and on the research industry in Quebec and Canada?

This question is extremely relevant because, as I said earlier, I have not yet received an answer. I understand the government's desire to impose a new guideline so that no products are released that could pose a risk to public health, but as for the operations of laboratories, I have yet to receive an answer.

I simply have one question. Does the government want us as parliamentarians to pass legislation that I think is incomplete, in the sense that it does not address all the concerns raised by the community? It is asking us for carte blanche, in a way, and asking us to trust it and wait until later. It seems to be saying that it will communicate with the various stakeholders and labs again, that it will ensure that the regulatory framework will meet their expectations and not pose a problem for their operations. If that is in fact what the government and the department intend to do, why then, from the first draft, from the time this bill was introduced for first reading, has this bill not included provisions to address the concerns justifiably raised by the community?

Once again, the government decided to introduce a bill in this House without assessing the direct impact it will have on the community. If it had done so in a responsible manner, this version of the bill would already include provisions to address the concerns raised by the academic community. We would have already heard the government's response regarding its assessment of the impact of Bill C-11 on university education.

The bill also proposes a number of fines. I understand that when a bill is introduced that will affect the Criminal Code, for example, fines must be imposed. However, what the government wants to do is impose fines on universities and hospitals, when everyone knows very well—and I said so a little earlier in my speech—that there is an abysmal lack of funding for those two kinds of institutions where research is done.

The bill also establishes penalties and fines for anyone who shows wanton or reckless disregard concerning pathogens and toxins. The bill also establishes financial penalties and imprisonment for anyone who intentionally releases pathogens.

I am wondering, as are my Bloc Québécois colleagues, about the need for these new prison sentences given that they are already contained in existing legislation. Are measures put in place by this bill with respect to breach of duty, wanton or reckless breach of duty and intentional release not already in the Criminal Code and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act? And are measures prohibiting intentional misuse of pathogens not included in the Anti-Terrorism Act? These are the questions to ask when the bill is before the Standing Committee on Health.

I am pleased that my colleagues from the Conservative and Liberal parties have agreed to hear important witnesses who, on a daily basis, will have to work under and adapt to this new legislation to establish new standards for storing and handling human pathogens and toxins.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to go back to two or three other aspects that are more directly related to the bill. Clause 39, for example, states:

The Minister may, without the consent of the person to whom the information relates, disclose personal information and confidential business information obtained under this Act to a person from whom the Minister seeks advice, to a department or agency of the government of Canada or a province, to a foreign government or to an international organization—

For all intents and purposes, although those receiving this confidential information are required to maintain confidentiality—as stated later in the clause—I find it rather strange that consent is not required. It should be understood that the person may not be consulted or, at the very least, notified that information will be disclosed. This could be discussed with the minister and his officials in order to clarify this aspect of the bill, which could be problematic if, in fact, confidential information is disclosed without notifying the individuals or institutions concerned.

I would also like to talk about another issue that relates a bit more directly to the bill. Clause 67 states that the minister may make an interim order involving a product in the case of problems with enforcement of the legislation. The minister would then make an interim order effective immediately. The clause also states that the two houses of Parliament need not be informed for up to 15 days.

Should an emergency occur that requires immediate action on the part of the minister, this House should be informed much sooner than that. Perhaps the parliamentary secretary or even the minister would like to touch on that. When it comes to incidents involving public health and safety, all members of the public, as well as all parliamentarians, should be informed and given the opportunity to debate the issues without delay. To me, that means within hours or, at most, a few days. Fifteen days is far too long. Indeed, it would be odd for Parliament not to be informed of a situation endangering public health within 15 days.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize the importance of ensuring public safety. We must also ensure that our universities and hospitals can carry on doing their research, and that the government provides more support for research.

[Carol Hughes, NDP, Algoma—Manitoulin—Kapuskasing, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague from Verchères—Les Patriotes for his speech and comments.

I think that we all agree that we need effective health protection and that this bill could be a step in the right direction. I think it will be very important to hear witnesses in committee in order to ensure that this bill is the best way to guarantee that necessary, useful research poses no risk to Canadians.

My colleague has raised some real concerns about this. He spoke about funding for laboratories and wondered whether these labs would be able to cover the additional costs new legislation would impose.

Some research laboratories have protested because obeying the new law will cost them more time or money.

Is my colleague worried that no funding has been proposed to help these laboratories actually make these changes? Is he also worried by the fact that these laboratories may have to make cuts elsewhere in order to pay for these changes?

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague for her question. She is absolutely correct. The parliamentary secretary has also said that the laboratories are not against the bill.

The laboratories are conscious of the risks that their activities pose to public health. However, my colleague rightly pointed out, they are asking how they, with the financial resources they currently have, will be able to adapt their practices and, as I said earlier, not cause any incidents. No incidents have been recorded in Quebec or in Canada. They are wondering how they will absorb the cost—billions of dollars for all of the laboratories. How will they absorb this?

My colleague is right to be worried when she suggests that cuts might have to be made elsewhere in order to obey the law. When there is a finite amount of funding for the work to be done, it is obvious that spending on unanticipated items means cuts elsewhere.

She is also quite right to say that when this bill is studied in committee, it will be very important to hear the stakeholders' concerns clearly and directly from them. Furthermore, we will ensure that this bill includes satisfactory answers for these people, and not simply some future regulatory framework without apparent guidelines or content. Clearly, there must be a balance between safety and research.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague brought up some important comments and questions.

I would like to put on the record the fact that this government is very open and willing to work with our colleagues to ensure we have strong legislation. I think he will agree that this is long overdue. Just because there have not been any particular instances does not mean we should not be ready for something like this to occur because the implications can be incredibly severe.

He brought up questions with respect to funding. I point out that the new legislative regime will be generally consistent with all the existing guidelines. It is expected that most laboratories will be compliant with these guidelines, as they have been since 1990. We are not putting in something that is too unreasonable or something with which the laboratories are not familiar.

If the member has some particularly important witnesses whom he would like to bring forward, the government is willing to work with him in that regard.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health for his comments. I am pleased to see—and I also noticed from his speech—that he is somewhat open. We simply do not see such clear and precise openness in the bill, but I am pleased to hear that this government is open to hearing from a variety of stakeholders in order to ensure that there will be no impact on the work currently being done in our academic and other institutions.

As we all know, the bill stipulates that a list of all users of these products would have to be submitted. What does that mean for a university? Does that mean all the students in the department, all the students who actually handle the substance or all the students who might walk through the hallways and common areas? These are additional questions that must be answered with the stakeholders and with the goodwill of all parliamentarians.

All these comments must be explored during the committee's study of the bill. I am delighted to see everyone coming together to ensure that this bill can be put in place while respecting current practices.

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased we have the opportunity today to speak to Bill C-11, important legislation that deals with human pathogens and toxins. One thing that needs to be said at the outset of this debate is that nowhere is it more important to have a proactive government using all the tools available through the public sector than when it comes to human pathogens and toxins.

We start from the basic premise that the legislation, at face value, looks good. It is long overdue. It is part of a package of antiquated legislation that needs to be updated and brought into the 21st century. However, there also needs to be a new kind of thinking on the part of government, the kind of thinking that appears contrary to the ideological predilections of the Conservative government.

I want to start by putting on the table the overriding concern for Canadians. When it comes to the safety and well-being of Canadians, there can be no shortcuts. There can be no privatization, no offloading and no passive regulatory scheme.

This area demands a proactive government, a strong public sector component and laboratories that are within and only within the public sector, not privatized, no public-private partnerships, no deals with the private sector, no commercialization.

First and foremost, this is about safety. Canadians know a lot about exposure to dangerous pathogens and toxins, and they are worried. They are worried because they have not seen from the government the kind of action that is necessary to guarantee their safety and security at times of crisis.

The record of the Conservatives, and the Liberals before them, is atrocious. Neither party has understood the role of government in this area. The dismantling of our health protection system started under the Liberals and has continued to this day under the Conservatives.

Under the Liberals, we lost laboratories in the federal public service. We lost laboratories that tested for dangerous pathogens. We lost laboratories that looked at interactions between drugs and foods. There were outcries from scientists who felt their scientific judgment had been pushed aside in the name of expediency.

In the past the Liberal government took away the resources and means by which one could actively oversee a system pertaining to human safety, whether we talk about drugs, foods, pathogens, toxins, organs, blood, just name it. Let us not forget the Krever Commission and the whole blood scandal. Let us remember the lessons of our history and ensure that history does not repeat itself when it comes to something as fundamental as human health and safety.

The path set out by the Liberals has been continued by the Conservatives. Did we see a replenishment of inspectors when it came to problems in our food safety systems? Did we see a well coordinated, thoughtful, profound response when it came to something as devastating as listeriosis, which resulted in 20 deaths in our country? No. We saw once more the kind of scattergun approach that the Liberals brought to this chamber. We saw a passive government response that said it would let the industry regulate itself. We saw confusion everywhere, with no central coordination or authority to oversee this entire area.

We have lost something fundamental that has to be regained, that the Conservative government has to recommit to, if we are going to get anywhere with something as profound as protecting people from dangerous pathogens and toxins.

I want to start with some basic principles. This legislation says it will broaden the mandatory application of the laboratory biosafety guidelines from just imported pathogens to include domestic sources as well. It will supposedly ensure that the government has a complete inventory of where potentially dangerous pathogens exist and that sites are licensed appropriately. It says it will parallel the treatment of pathogens in many other industrialized countries, because we are far behind the rest of the world on these issues, and that it will bring the malevolent use of these organisms under the criminal code regime and provide for the inspection of work sites and penalties for misuse.

That sounds good. It sounds progressive and along the lines of what Canadians have been asking for on other issues pertaining to drugs and foods for some time.

It would appear that this bill will make Canadians safer, or will at least make them feel safer. That comes after dealing with Walkerton, SARS, listeriosis, and what have become regular announcements of food contamination and recalls. Just remember that E. coli, salmonella, and listeriosis have all now become household names across this country. There are no exceptions across communities in this country.

In Winnipeg, as my colleague from Winnipeg Centre mentioned earlier, we have a level 4 lab. We are very proud of that fact. We are proud of the record of achievement of that laboratory, but we know that it takes a certain ideological perspective to ensure that the public safety is guaranteed whenever such a facility is established in a community. It takes a perspective that says that government's job is to protect people from any dangerous spills or seepage or accident pertaining to pathogens and toxins. It says that the workers in that lab must be safe, that the people in the community must be safe, and that whenever such dangerous pathogens are transported, people everywhere must be safe.

But there was a bit of a problem back in 1999 with that lab. The Liberals were in power. There was a leak, and 2,000 litres of lab effluent were dumped into the public sewage system. That was on June 23, 1999.

It took a community to stand up and demand its rights for government to take action. The Liberals were then in power, and the Government of Canada decided to keep things relatively quiet, to keep it a secret, to not be fully transparent. Health Canada did not publicize the spill. News of it came through media reports.

Naturally the community was very upset. I and my colleague, the member for Winnipeg Centre, decided to work with the community to make sure that their voices were heard and that lessons were learned from this incident. In fact, shortly after that spill we launched a community lab safety task force, hosted a round table of experts and activists, and met with many people in the community on this issue.

It paid off. Eventually the government announced a community liaison committee to improve communications, and other measures were taken as a result of this incident.

However, it took the community to speak up about it. There was no full disclosure, and that should never happen.

That is why I started this debate by saying there must some basic principles in place in order for this legislation to mean anything and to work.

At the top of the list is the principle that there must be full transparency and accountability to the public. There can be no secrets. There has to be full disclosure when accidents happen or mistakes are made. The public has to be kept informed every step of the way.

I know that the Conservatives are not naturally inclined to do that, despite all their protestations when they were in opposition and their promises during the last election to be accountable and transparent. We have seen almost no evidence of that. They break their word, they change their minds, and they refuse to disclose when the public needs to be told of an important public policy development. I do not need to go into the long list of issues on that front. We could talk about appointments to the Senate or about breaking their own law on fixed election dates. The list goes on and on. There are all kinds of issues related to the Conservatives' promises of transparency and accountability.

However, that kind of action on the part of the Conservatives cannot be allowed to continue, especially when it comes to something as important as human pathogens and toxins. We are talking about life-and-death situations. There is no room for that kind of culture of secrecy and arrogance to be continued for one second in this country today, especially on this critical issue.

The first issue, then, is public accountability and full transparency.

Second, there has to be coordination. The right hand of government has to know what the left hand is doing. There has to be some semblance of a coordinated system within government to deal with the issues pertaining to human pathogens and toxins, partly because of the public health issue at stake here, but also because of the threat of bioterrorism.

We all have questions today pertaining to the legislation. Is the government any more prepared today than it was last fall with respect to the listeriosis crisis? Is it any more prepared today than when we had the SARS crisis? Is it any more prepared today than when we learned the tragic news of September 11? Do we have a coordinated, centralized shop within government that oversees this area?

I do not think so. I am having a hard time finding it. I know the public safety department is sometimes responsible. Health Canada is sometimes responsible. There are pots of money here and pots of money there. There is a little bit of shifting here and there between government departments, but who is in charge? Where does the buck stop? Which minister is absolutely responsible?

This is a very legitimate concern in the light of a couple of recent developments. In September 2008 the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence found our response capabilities lacking. The Senate committee found that the federal government will not even tell local front-line responders where it stashes its emergency medical supplies. It will not tell them where they are located.

It is interesting that when those who are responsible for delivering emergency services at the local level in Medicine Hat stumbled on a federal supply, the federal government, rather than using the opportunity to build coordination and efficiency, took the supplies and hid them somewhere else. Does that make sense? Is that responsible, accountable, fully transparent government action in the midst of a very serious situation? It certainly does not bode well for future crises that are likely to occur in this country.

Canadians are especially concerned about the government's ability and capacity to protect them from a non-terrorist threat.

I talked about listeriosis earlier. Let me go back to that for a moment because it is our most recent example of what happens when we do not really have a government in charge that knows what it is doing and puts the needs of Canadians first. We only have to refer to the Canadian Medical Association's article in the midst of that crisis to give full meaning to this point.

The Canadian Medical Association Journal actually stated on October 21, 2008, that “...the most visible figures in the recent recall of affected foods have not been public health officials but rather the head of Maple Leaf Foods and the minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada”.

Where was the Prime Minister? Where was the Minister of Health? Where was the coordinated response to something as tragic as listeriosis? Why was it left to the private sector to explain the situation? Is it not the job of government to put in place regulations and standards and laws and programs that the private sector must adhere to? Is it not the fundamental role of government to set the stage and to put in place the framework by which those who operate in the private sector are guided? How was it possible that through consecutive Liberal and Conservative governments we just let this system deteriorate to the point that nobody was in charge, the private sector was regulating itself, inspection capacity was greatly reduced, and standards based on a series of recommendations on paper were not on site? Were there regular surprise visits to meat plants, food stores, retailers, manufacturers, and producers?

No. Rather, there was simply a risk management model that said there might be a problem, that we were going to let business live up to these standards, that we were not going to inspect them regularly to make sure that they were, and that when it happened, we were going to duck and run.

There is the lesson. That is why this legislation is so important today and why we need more than simply the words of this bill before us. We need a whole government plan. We need to know that this government finally gets it and understands that we have to have a precautionary model when it comes to pathogens and toxins, just as we have to have a precautionary do-no-harm model when it comes to protecting people from dangerous drugs and problematic foods. There is no other way around it.

I do not see that here. I do not see the government coming forward with a plan about how it is going to coordinate any government plan in this regard and how it is going to put in the resources necessary to make sure we actually have that kind of proactive do-no-harm model in place.

It is not risk management. It is not saying, “Well, this is out there in the market. These pathogens or toxins exist, and we are going to protect as much as possible”, but in fact, “We are going to warn people, and if something happens, then we're going to take action. We'll wait until someone dies or gets sick before we take action.”

Has that not been the way of the Conservatives, and the Liberals before them, on all these issues? I think so. I heard someone say no. I think it has been the way, and that has to change.

I know my time is almost up. There is much more to say in terms of this issue, but I want to end by saying that the framework we expect to be in place in dealing with this legislation must include transparency and accountability. It must emphasize public ownership and public sector involvement, and not privatization or P3s. This model must be based on the precautionary principle, the do-no-harm model, and not on risk management. Finally, it must ensure that all Canadians are involved and fully informed and participative in any schemes or programs that address threats to people's food security, threats in terms of bioterrorism and threats in terms of human pathogens and toxins.

[Tony Martin, NDP, Sault Ste. Marie, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Winnipeg for her thoughtful and well presented case in terms of our support for this kind of oversight and her concern about whether the government will actually implement all of it and do the things that will be required to protect us.

As a member of Parliament in Ontario, I will never forget the Walkerton scandal and the scenario that unfolded in front of us in the days of the Mike Harris government. I think the member might have been around in those days. That was as a result of, yes, some human failure but also the fact that over a number of months into the Mike Harris government there was a moving of oversight on the environmental front of laboratories to the private sector. There was also a reduction in the number of people working for the ministry of the environment which all came together to present to us a very tragic circumstance in which people lost their lives.

In bringing this, obviously wanted, needed and important legislation forward, is the member confident that the government, within which there are many from the Mike Harris days, will actually implement it and not, at the first opportunity, shift it all over to the private sector again and/or reduce the number of people in the ministry of the environment in terms of oversight and reporting on this kind of very important public business? Does she believe the government may continue to cut staff to the point where even the best of legislation and oversight will not actually be effective?

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the question from the member for Sault Ste. Marie who is very knowledgeable about this issue coming from Toronto based on the Walkerton crisis. He asked whether we felt any more confident today than we did back then around public safety with these kinds of scenarios. I am afraid I cannot point to anything that gives me confidence yet that the government gets it and is able to commit the resources and make the policies that will put in place a proactive system that will protect people in the future.

We all learned from Walkerton but I want to go back to listeriosis because that is our most recent example.The Canadian Medical Association said in October, “Overall it would seem that as a country, Canada is far less prepared now for epidemics than in the past”. It almost seems like we may be going backwards, not making new advances.

The national advisory committee on SARS and public health told us that the Chief Public Health Officer should serve as the leading national voice for public health, particularly in outbreaks and other health emergencies. However, as in the listeriosis outbreak, the public received its briefings not from the Chief Public Health Officer but from the head of the very company that was causing the problems.

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency actually admitted in November that its silence was a problem but the Conservative government said nothing.

I am not sure that the government has learned yet. I think some of us have some good ideas about how we should go forward but we have no sign yet that the government is committed to the preservation of a publicly administered, publicly run, publicly funded system that has strong oversight based on the precautionary do-no-harm model.

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health]

Mr. Speaker, I am looking forward to working with the member in committee on this very important bill. I also want to assure her that we do get it, which is why we are putting the bill forward. We think the bill is long overdue.

If the member believes it is important for the Canadian government to ensure Canadians are safe, will she support the bill as we move it forward? We do need to move the bill forward as quickly as we can to ensure it is debated in committee and then implemented for the safety of Canadians?

I would like to have the member put on the record whether she will be supporting the bill.

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, that is a hard question to answer. I have said that the bill looks progressive and positive at face value and that I want to see it studied at committee. However, I also said that it is pretty hard to judge a government action on a very important issue by legislation alone. If the resources, staff and policies are not in place to protect Canadians, we have a serious problem and we need to continue to address it through the course of this legislative process.

I will give a couple of examples of why I have such doubts. One of the Conservative government's first acts on taking power in 2006 was to eliminate the Public Health Agency minister and public health seat at the cabinet table. It took away the whole role at the cabinet table. It also left the Chief Medical Officer of Health responsible to the Minister of Health. According to the CMA journal, this left our country without a national independent voice to speak out on public health issues, including providing viable leadership during a crisis.

We also need to watch for cutbacks and wonder if the government is taking some shortcuts in this area. I mentioned earlier that the government decided to convert to a system of increased food industry self-inspection, which has been widely speculated to have caused some of the problems we have seen with respect to salmonella, outbreaks of E. coli and listeriosis. We also should not forget that the Conservatives cut back the avian influenza preparedness program.

I also want to mention that this area requires in-depth research and a constant injection of funds into research if we are ever going to understand the relationship between these pathogens and toxins in terms of human health. What did the government do in its last budget? It cut back on investments in health and research in the scientific communities, which is an ominous, worrisome response on the part of the government at a time when we need more investment, scientific understanding and coordination between the research communities and laboratories that work in these areas.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague's concerns about Bill C-11.

During her speech, she mentioned what happened in Walkerton a number of years ago, which was a terrible tragedy. Walkerton, while not in my riding, used to be part of it. It is just on the edge of Bruce county.

The one thing I and the people of Walkerton do not need to hear is the implication by members of the opposition or anybody else that it was a breakdown in the system. The clear truth of what happened in Walkerton was that two employees did not do their jobs.

The government is bringing forth Bill C-11 to improve the health and safety of Canadians. It was the same thing on the listeriosis outbreak not too long ago, although the government over the last two years hired 200 more inspectors for CFIA. Those are the kinds of things the government has done.

Does the hon. member support improving the health and the risks for health problems in Bill C-11?

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I must disagree as vehemently as possible with the hon. member. We have all studied the Walkerton issue. My colleague from Sault Ste. Marie was in the Ontario legislature at the time and knows very well that this was a systemic issue, an issue of systems breaking down, government cutbacks, privatization, outsourcing, off-loading and lack of coordination. It was not just the result of two individuals not doing their job. It was the result of a government that did not invest in the infrastructure and programs that were needed within the public sector to maintain people's safety during a time of crisis.

I will translate that into what is happening here. If that attitude continues, we are in deep trouble. The government can be darn sure that we will not support the legislation if it continues to find bogeymen instead of looking in its own backyard to find the problems that exist. Why in the world is the government cutting back $42.7 million in this fiscal year, $52.9 million next year and $72.2 million more in 2011-12 from the Public Health Agency and Health Canada?

How can we be confident when the government is talking out of both sides of its mouth at once? On the one hand, it is pretending tough legislation but on the other hand it is prepared to privatize our Crown corporations, cut back in terms of the Public Health Agency and provide no coordination when it comes to emergency medical services.

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we are debating Bill C-11 today, which is an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

The schedules to the bill list these pathogens and toxins. It is really quite a who's who of all the biological bad guys out there and it is pretty scary for a layman to read. I had two esteemed colleagues from my Liberal Party up, who are both doctors and probably pretty comfortable with the words, but there is aflatoxin, anthrax, cholera, diphtheria and dozens of ugly sounding toxins and pathogens.

Any layperson who looks at that would say that we need this legislation, and it is a consensus in the House that we need this legislation. There was a bill in the prior Parliament that did not make it through as it was a short Parliament. My party supports the bill in principle and, if adopted by the House, hopefully it will go to committee.

However, I must point out some issues that I do have with the bill. One issue that I raised previously is an issue that I will raise again, and if nobody moves amendments to this bill, I probably will. The issue concerns the granting by this House of powers to the administration, not just to the government but to persons in the government. In this particular case, they are referred to in the bill as inspectors. It has to do with this whole concept of the House giving power in a statute to the government to make regulations and enforce provisions of the act that are regulatory, in addition to the statutory provisions.

In modern government, we all accept that we need to do that. The real trick is in how we do it, how Parliament does it and whether or not Parliament will scrutinize, review and oversee the regulatory work and the enforcement that happens after the powers are delegated.

It is okay for Parliament to pass a law that says a citizen shall not do X. That is not a delegation. That is a creation of an offence and authorities enforce those offences. However, when Parliament passes a law that gives the authority to a minister or the governor in council to make a regulation, to create some kind of a regulatory offence, that is a delegation. When we do that in Parliament we should take steps to ensure that the enforcement and execution of those powers happen within the law. Parliament has created a method for doing that.

I will address this bill through a lens of our civil liberties, our freedoms. I have always tried to do that as a member of Parliament and I will do it here. I am not doing it just to be critical of the bill. I am doing it to better assure the rights and freedoms of Canadians under this particular legislation.

Sections in the bill would give substantial regulatory powers to the minister and to inspectors. When we are dealing with these human pathogens and toxins, one could expect that we would do that. There is no way we would send the minister or a member of Parliament over to some illegal laboratory to pick up some anthrax. This is done through hard-working, honest and dedicated public servants who need the authority to do that hard work.

I now want to look at the legislation to see how we are asking them to do this. I would refer the House to subclause 41(1), which reads:

Subject to section 42, an inspector may, for the purpose of verifying compliance or preventing non-compliance with this Act...enter at any reasonable time any place or conveyance [such as a motor vehicle or a bus] in which the inspector believes on reasonable grounds that an activity to which this Act or the regulations apply is conducted...

Not just for the purpose of preventing a breech of the act but for the purpose of ensuring compliance, the inspector may enter any place, any reasonable time. We pretty much just give to an inspector the right to do something that not even a policeman could do without a warrant or specific statutory authorization. There had better be a real good reason for this, to give all this power to a particular individual.

We are dealing with some difficult chemicals here, some pathogens and toxins, but here are some of the things that inspectors could do. They can examine the place. They can require the person in the place to do things. They can seize and detain, open and examine, direct the owner or the person having possession, care or control, to do certain things, to move certain things. They can examine and make copies, require any person in the place to do the same, and the list goes on.

These are significant powers. We should keep in mind the basis on which the inspector enters the premises. It is for the purpose, low threshold only, of verifying compliance. That would mean on a bad day, “I think I will go check these guys because I feel like it”. It could be that. I am not saying that it would be, but what if that is the case? “I will go into this place to check it because I want to verify compliance. I do not like the way they park their cars in the parking lot”, or maybe, “I do not like the owner”. This is the power that the act now gives, not by regulation, but by statute, right up front, to an inspector.

Subclause 41(6) says, “No person shall knowingly obstruct or hinder...an inspector who is carrying out their functions”. No person shall obstruct or hinder. That sounds reasonable, but let me tell the House that there are occasions where, from time to time, this restriction on hindering is abused. I am not making it up because I represent constituents whom I think have been criminally assaulted by government officials in the Canada Border Service Agency.

My constituents, a family, father, wife, two teenage boys, 14 and 16, came back to Canada at Windsor. They had made some purchases in the U.S.A. and low-balled the amount of money, they underestimated the amount they spent, so they were invited to go to secondary for inspection. It was all pretty reasonable stuff. I have been sent to secondary for inspection. People there are a little bit officious, but they are just doing their job: “Stand up. Move over there. Do this. Do that. Do not talk”. Okay, they checked my car. I did not tell them I was an MP.

Anyway, this family came across. The inspectors in that case were border services officers, that is, immigration officials, food inspectors, customs officials, tax collectors. They ended up breaking the arm of my constituent. They broke his arm. They put both the teenage boys in handcuffs and dragged them into the office along with the wife. When all was settled, they charged my constituents with obstruction. These guys behaved like bikers. They beat up this family and then they charged them with obstruction. Here we have a section which authorizes that Canadians be charged with obstructing or hindering an inspector.

I happen to be a lawyer. I went to Windsor with these people to defend them in court against this charge of obstruction. It was wrong and the charges were dismissed.

Four people were summoned by Her Majesty to come to court that day, to tell the truth, and say what happened. One CBSA official showed up and did not rise in court when the case was called. Those individuals did not even appear to a summons. That was lawlessness. There is no appeal mechanism for that agency. There is an informal one in the minister's office, but there is no oversight.

These are tax collectors, food inspectors, immigration officers, who are running around arresting people, beating them up, but do not show up in court to prosecute a case, so the case was dismissed. It was kind of a happy ending after the man's arm was broken and he missed work. I did inform the minister about this and the minister said not much could be done. Maybe there should be a lawsuit. These are just regular people who do not have a lot of money to start lawsuits to get justice.

The obstruction charge is contained in Bill C-11 and I am very nervous about that.

Clause 42 also has provisions about entering a dwelling house. We crossed this bridge before in the House. Someone cannot go into a dwelling house without a warrant and the bill makes provision for that, happily.

I see a problem with subclause 42(3) which deals with the warrant and going into a dwelling house. It says that the inspector may not use force unless it is specifically authorized. The problem is that the use of force issue is too vague in the statute. It is not clear what extent of force is being referred to. If I have a warrant to enter a dwelling house, do I have the ability to turn the doorknob if that requires the use of force? Do I have the ability to break a window? Do I have the ability to lift the latch?

A warrant to enter a dwelling house, as I understand it now, allows the reasonable use of force. I have a question with respect to this. If an inspector shows up with a warrant and breaks down the door but the owner of the house does not know what is going on and tells the inspector he cannot come in, is that obstruction? Based on the case I described with the CBSA, I can bet my boots that is obstruction.

On the other hand, it might be a good day if the inspector is in a good mood and apologizes for breaking the window but explains that he has to check for pathogens and toxins. Maybe everything would work out.

I am looking at this from the perspective of a citizen. The wording about use of force in that section is, in my view, too vague. It has to be fixed in some way, otherwise there would be a legal issue and by the time the case was litigated and sorted out by the Supreme Court half a million dollars would be spent. I am suggesting that the committee to which the bill would be referred sort that out.

Clause 40 says that when the minister delegates these authorities he or she may restrict the powers of the inspector. That is the wrong way to put it. I think the inspector should only have those powers that the minister delegates to him or her. The minister should not have the whole raft of powers under the statute which he or she could then pull back under authorization because I do not think the minister would ever do it.

There are no criteria for the minister. There is no framework for the minister to act. There is no framework under which the minister could say, “I think I am only going to give you powers 1 to 5 and you do not get powers 6 to 10”. There would be an automatic predisposition on the part of the minister and the public service simply to give all of the powers to the inspector without restriction.

Why would anyone take the time to restrict the powers given to the inspector? Why handicap the inspector? The statute already gives the inspector powers. This is a mistake. The minister should decide which specific powers should be in the hands of the inspector. Then we know clearly what the inspector can and cannot do. The minister knows, government knows and Parliament knows. This way it is an open book.

Clause 40 is a problem and I hope the committee will deal with that. If the committee does not, I am going to do it here in the House. I am giving notice right now.

Last is regulatory activity. Canada has a fairly good regulatory process. It allows the delegation of authorities from Parliament to the government or ministers and sometimes to agencies. I will not read clauses 67 and 68 of the bill, but they provide for the delegation of regulatory powers.

In Canada's system now, normally a statutory instrument or regulation is pre-published before it is enacted, there is consultation, then it is adopted by the cabinet or the minister, it is published in the Canada Gazette, and then it is reviewed by the Standing Joint Committee for Scrutiny of Regulations in the House. It is reviewed for compliance with the law, the originating statute, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the criteria adopted by the House. This way we make sure that regulations passed are legal and fair. That has worked fairly well for the last 30 or 40 years.

However, clause 68 of this bill exempts some of the statutory instruments and regulations from the Statutory Instruments Act. It takes it right out. It says these regulations are not statutory instruments. For the layman that may be kind of a foggy term and some may ask what it means.

In some cases in this bill it only means that the regulation is not pre-published and consulted, that it simply is made, and there may be good public policy reasons for doing that. In an emergency, three months cannot be taken to consult. Dealing with risks to human health, sometimes action has to be taken quickly. We do that and authorize regulations to be made without the need to pre-publish and study, et cetera. However, there are a couple of components that are worrying to me and should be to the House.

First, the bill specifically authorizes incorporation by reference. That means an adoption of a rule that somebody else made. Maybe it is a rule made by the European Union or Brazil or Japan or wherever. That is incorporation by reference. Not only that but it allows what is called ambulatory incorporation by reference, which means whenever Brazil changes its rule, our rule changes. We have to get a handle on that because that is a pure delegation of regulation-making by us to them.

Second is the exemption from the Statutory Instruments Act. We cannot do that. We must allow Parliament to continue reviewing it. We must specifically authorize Parliament to review these instruments under sections 19 and 19.1 of the Statutory Instruments Act. Those amendments should all be made to this bill.

[Judy Wasylycia-Leis, NDP, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I certainly appreciate the input of the member for Scarborough—Rouge River on this legislation. He has raised a very important point.

It has always been a challenge for members of the House, whenever we are dealing with legislation that tries to address the possibility of terrorist threats, in this case bioterrorism, to find the right balance between protecting the public and ensuring due process according to our Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

I understand what the member is saying. Obviously, I am concerned that we do not allow a focus on individual rights and freedoms to give any licence to the government to move away from a well-resourced inspection capability that is given all the money and resources it needs to proactively investigate and search for any toxins or pathogens that could cause serious harm to any Canadian anywhere.

However, before we head off to committee, I would like the member to give us some advice with respect to which witnesses he thinks it would make sense to invite to our committee. How does he envisage that fine balance we are always trying to find in terms of human rights and protecting the public?

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the standards that we should be according to the citizens with respect to powers like this are fairly well known to the Department of Justice. The problem is that as every new government moves in, it says to the Department of Justice to make those powers just a bit more robust. The line keeps being pushed. They keep pushing up and they refer to Supreme Court cases and Court of Appeal cases.

I think someone from the Department of Justice not associated with the creation of this bill should be a witness to outline the current standards of civil liberties vis-à-vis government powers. That would be a good standard.

Another example, in clause 71 of the bill, the word “knowingly” has been deleted. A citizen who is in possession of a toxin or pathogen, when the bill comes into force, has a problem unless he or she notifies the minister. It is an offence. That section should contain the word “knowingly”. Clause 6 of the bill contains the word “knowingly”. The citizen should have to know that he or she has the item before he or she is found criminally or quasi-criminally responsible for an offence.

I think the Department of Justice could give some very good answers.

[Réal Ménard, Bloc, Hochelaga, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is not difficult to imagine how pleased I am to speak to Bill C-11. I thank my party whip's office for providing me with this wonderful opportunity.

This bill may seem technical on the surface. But when we examine it a little more closely, we see that it is a technical bill through and through.

Nevertheless, in spite of its technical nature, this bill is important because it deals with pathogens, those micro-organisms that can carry infection and disease, that can cause devastation and that can transmit viruses and sources of infection. This bill is about pathogens, toxins, laboratories and research. It is also about our desire to ensure that research facilities are safe and secure without adversely affecting research activities carried out throughout Canada.

When it comes to health—my colleagues know this—we can always question if this is a federal jurisdiction. I would like to remind members that when the 33 Fathers of Confederation met, in what was called a constituent assembly, they divided the powers.

Naturally when we examine the facts, we know very well that when we ask which authority has the constitutional power—known as a head of jurisdiction in constitutional law—to intervene in a particular area, we must read sections 91 and 92. We note that health may well be an area of greater concern to the provinces because it deals with providing care to the population and it concerns the operation of health establishments.

In all modern societies, many resources are allocated to the operating budget of the various departments because health is a concern of all citizens. I am pleased to remind members that, from 1995 to 1997, the government refused to make investments in health. There were campaigns throughout Canada and a federal-provincial conference including all health ministers of all political stripes. The Bloc Québécois took out ads in the papers calling on the federal government to assume its responsibilities and to make significant investments through its health transfers. The Bloc was obviously speaking on behalf of the National Assembly of Quebec.

I am not trying to suggest that the federal government has no responsibility for health. For example, we know that the federal government has fiduciary responsibility for aboriginal people. In addition, if I am not mistaken, more than half the federal health department's programming has to do with aboriginal people. The federal government obviously has a role to play in patents, and that responsibility is shared by the Department of Health and the Department of Industry.

I have wondered about the whole issue of patents. Are they in consumers' interests? How do we strike a balance? There needs to be a public policy of investment to promote research. Ten years can easily go by from the time a molecule is isolated to the time a drug is available to consumers. That is an investment cycle involving several million dollars. There needs to be a balance between consumers' interests and policies that promote research, because there are major investments involved.

The federal government has a role to play with regard to aboriginal people, patents and epidemics. Perhaps we need to look at this bill in that light.

This bill says that guidelines exist for pathogens that may be viruses or major sources of infection. The idea is to create a stricter system of regulations for pathogens and toxins.

I read in the bill we received and the research notes prepared by my party that there are thousands of labs in Canada that may not fully comply with policies that are not as strict as what is proposed in the bill.

From now on, we will need a licence or permit to conduct what are being called controlled activities. People in labs will need a licence to possess, handle, use, produce, store, authorize access to, transfer, import, export, release, abandon or dispose of human pathogens or toxins.

We could ask if such a system is necessary. I believe that my colleague, the member for Verchères—Les Patriotes, mentioned that the Bloc Québécois is not opposed to the bill, but we would like to know a bit more about the repercussions. For example, what will this mean for the research institutions? What will this mean for the laboratories?

One of the great advances for humanity in recent years is that we do not simply talk about old age anymore, we now talk about very old age. As a human society, if we are prudent, if we do not drink too much, if we do not smoke, if we do a bit of physical activity, if we go to the gym regularly and if we pay attention to what we call health determinants, chances are good that we will live to be 100 or more. That is what we mean by very old age. We have met centenarians in our ridings. I could ask my colleagues how many of them have, in their activities as a member, met people older than 95 or 100. There are more and more of them. In Canada, it is said that there are more than 100,000 centenarians. I have no doubt, Mr. Speaker, when I look at you and see how healthy you are, that you will be a centenarian yourself, and I wish that for you.

We live in a society in which there are more and more centenarians, in which people are living much longer and in better health, and this is thanks to research. It means we are able to control certain diseases that used to be crippling, and not all that long ago. Remember, just a few years or a few decades ago, mononucleosis was a fatal disease. Today, there are some differences, depending on the strain in question, but people do not die from mononucleosis. It has been called the kissing disease. Of course, I do not wish to get too autobiographical about it.

That said, I think my point is clear. More and more of our fellow citizens are living longer and longer thanks to research, and this research may require the use of pathogens that must obviously be isolated in conditions where this is no contamination, understandably. As an aside—and I am sure you know this, Mr. Speaker—I have 16 years of service in this House and I have had various responsibilities within the Bloc Québécois caucus. My first role was as our research and development critic.

I recall Lucien Bouchard, a great leader whom I respect and regard very highly, inviting me to a meeting in his office. I had been elected in October 1993. At the time, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien had recalled the House for January. We did not sit in November and December because Prime Minister Chrétien had to attend various international meetings with NATO.

When Mr. Bouchard appointed his shadow cabinet, he gave me a very important responsibility: research and development. I told Mr. Bouchard that I was flattered. During the 1993 campaign, we were very concerned, as a political party, about the fact that there had been a lot of public investment in the national capital region, where several public laboratories were—and still are—located, and very little investment on the Outaouais side. There was a lot of investment in the national capital region, but even though research was being done, compared to the numbers for the Outaouais, there was a huge disparity.

The Bloc Québécois wants to make sure that this bill's worthy objectives result in all laboratories complying with human pathogen handling standards. We have been told that several thousand labs in Canada do not follow Health Canada's biosafety guidelines. The government wants to make the guidelines more coercive by introducing a licensing system. It wants to ensure that organizations conducting research will not be penalized. The bill's schedule differentiates between pathogens that can be very harmful to public safety and those that are less dangerous. We see that different classes of licences will be issued.

The Bloc Québécois would like to know what this means for research. I was a member of the Standing Committee on Health when we studied the bill to create the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. In the 1990s, John Manley was the minister responsible for that file: as minister of industry, he was responsible for research and development. The OECD had released a report that lambasted Canada for investing so little in research and development. The bill was introduced.

The Bloc Québécois had a number of concerns. We wanted to ensure that various funding organizations, such as the Medical Research Council of Canada, would continue to support us. In good years, Quebec received nearly 30% of the funding. We wanted to be sure that, under the new Canadian Institutes of Health Research, we would hold on to our share of research contracts.

The Canadian Institutes of Health Research is a network of virtual institutes across Canada. Some of these institutes are concerned with population health, while others focus on cancer, aboriginal people, mental health and so on. The institutes are connected to each other in a structure that can produce interesting outcomes. Certainly, within these publicly funded research labs, research involving pathogens is being conducted. If the bill is passed, what will that mean? That is one question the Bloc Québécois has.

We also have questions about fines. As I said, we are told that biosafety guidelines already exist. In Canada—and I feel it is my duty to share these figures in the interest of full disclosure—there are 7,500 labs, nearly 4,000 of which allegedly do not comply with the guidelines. In addition, 5,500 labs, including 1,100 in Quebec, reportedly import pathogens. This comes as no surprise, considering how vibrant the research sector is in Quebec. There are apparently 24 labs in Quebec and 150 in Canada that are working with group 3 and 4 pathogens and are subject to these guidelines.

This bill tries to impose a system of offences that opens the door to criminal proceedings. We must always be extremely careful when it comes to imposing fines.

I used to sit on the Standing Committee on Health. That was a great time in my life. I was the health critic for at least five years. I focused on research and development. I was a bit surprised when Mr. Bouchard told me he was giving me the research and development file, because I was someone who had trouble plugging in a VCR. But I learned about it, I took an interest in it, and I understood its importance. I then became the immigration critic. Immigration is an extremely important issue, and as I am a member from Montreal, it was an issue in my own community. After that, I was the health critic for five years. Today, I am the justice critic. I have led an interesting life, when you sum it all up.

I would remind the House that when I was the health critic we examined the issue of new reproductive technologies. I was very disappointed to learn something about the regulations for new reproductive technologies. We know that one in five couples in Canada is infertile. Therefore, it is important that the issues of surrogate mothers, gamete conservation and donations be covered by regulations. I am very surprised to see that the regulations we have been expecting for at least two years have not yet been submitted to the Standing Committee on Health. I hope that the Minister of Health will remedy this situation because we worked very hard in committee.

The Government of Quebec went to court to challenge certain legislative provisions with respect to new reproductive technologies, known as assisted reproduction, because some of the legislation's provisions meddled in provincial jurisdiction. Quebec already has its own support system for infertile couples.

Why am I mentioning this? To make a link with the offences established by the bill. Failure to obtain a permit would result in a hefty fine of $250,000 for a first offence and increasing fines for subsequent offences.

It is not clear to me—nor does the bill provide clarification—how this system of fines will be administered. Will there be an inspection system? How will licences be issued? How will laboratories be monitored? And how will inspectors carry out annual inspections of the 5,000 or so laboratories that are deemed not to be compliant with the guidelines? And what will that mean?

It is a complex bill that may have a noble goal, taking precautions against possible transmission, but certain aspects of it are troubling. I know that the members of the Standing Committee on Health would like to ensure that this bill, before obtaining royal assent, has been the subject of proper consultation. Have universities and hospitals been consulted? Have large research and development associations been consulted? And the pharmaceutical industry, in terms of both generic and brand name drugs, has it been consulted? If we looked a little more closely, we would find that the consultations have been rather superficial.

I am being told that my time is running out, which is too bad because I have many more things to say about a bill as gripping as this one, but I will finish with three things. First, the Bloc Québécois will work very hard in the Standing Committee on Health to make sure that we have a thorough understanding of this bill.

Second, we hope that the principal stakeholders will appear before the Standing Committee on Health. Finally, we will judge the bill according to its merit.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like first to express my deep appreciation to my colleague from Hochelaga on his eloquent address.

As he explained so well, the hon. member for Hochelaga has a wealth of parliamentary experience. I was listening so hard during his speech that I could not check the schedules to find out what the security level is for the pathogens that cause mononucleosis. If he so desires—because this topic seems especially close to his heart—I could delve into this a bit more deeply.

My question is for him because the hon. member for Hochelaga is the justice critic for the Bloc Québécois.

Bill C-11, as written, institutes penalties for persons or institutions that are negligent, fail to take precautions or intentionally release pathogens into the environment. I would like to know if he, as our justice critic, knows whether the Criminal Code already deals with intentional attacks on public safety, such as terrorism, or unintentional acts, such as criminal negligence?

[Réal Ménard, Bloc, Hochelaga, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague from Verchères—Les Patriotes for anything more he can possibly do to lift the veil on the kissing disease, also known as mononucleosis. I get the feeling he is very interested in this. I would be eternally grateful to him for anything he can do to refine my knowledge of the consequences.

My colleague is quite right. When it comes to the legal realm, two factors must be borne in mind. In order for charges to be laid, there must first be mens rea—a legal term denoting the intent to commit a criminal act—and then there must also be an actus reus, or the deed itself.

Take the example of a professor at McGill University who is putting his third-year medical students through their paces. Say they are handling pathogens because they want to study smallpox, a very serious disease. There is nothing small about smallpox. If we were to determine, through an inspection system yet to be established, that McGill University did not have its licence, could the students who engaged in these studies be found guilty? That is what the Bloc Québécois wants to know. Everyone knows, of course, that there are already provisions in the Criminal Code covering criminal negligence and certainly terrorism.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I want to turn the member's attention to the whole notion of how government regulates on the one hand and on the other hand provides the coordination of regulation, which arguably it is trying to do with this legislation. When it comes to imposing, embedding and sensible follow-up, it makes me think of the whole crisis with the BSE. The government's own veterinary scientists said that there was a problem. They said that when cows were fed rendered materials, they would get BSE. Instead of listening to them, the government fired them. I think of Shiv Chopra who is now in front of a disciplinary committee. We are spending millions of taxpayer dollars on a guy who has blown the whistle for human health.

Even though we have legislation like this, what needs to be done to protect Canadians against human pathogens and toxins? If we do not have the right people in government, if we do not have the right people hired in the health protection agencies in government, how can this help in the long run?

[Réal Ménard, Bloc, Hochelaga, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague for his question.

I have also been alerted several times, especially when I sat on the Standing Committee on Health, to the fact that scientists who challenge some of Health Canada’s regulatory policies can be fired. The hon. member is quite right, therefore, to remind the House that when a regulatory system is being established, it should be left up to scientists to determine how appropriate it is and what the best way to implement it is.

The advice I would give my colleague—and I am sure that my colleagues on the Standing Committee on Health will adopt this as well—is that a bill like this is going to involve a lot of regulations. It would be best if, three years after taking effect, they could be reviewed by the Standing Committee on Health, as will be done for assisted reproduction and the tobacco regulations.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues for giving me the opportunity to speak to Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins. Although technical in nature, this bill is very necessary and important federal legislation. It is a public safety issue as much as it is a public health bill. Bill C-11 proposes a mandatory licensing system for the federal government to track the human pathogens that exist, such as anthrax, salmonella and influenza.

While many Canadians do not consider the flu to be a national threat, we need only remind ourselves of the 1918 flu pandemic, commonly referred to as the Spanish flu, that spread to nearly every part of the world, including the Arctic and remote Pacific islands. The Spanish flu did not claim simply those normally at risk, such as the elderly, infants and the infirm; in fact, it claimed the lives of normal, healthy adults, mostly because it tricked strong immune systems into a catastrophic overreaction. It is estimated that anywhere from 20 million to 100 million people were killed worldwide, roughly double the number of people killed during World War I. Indeed, many of those who survived the horror of trench warfare ironically succumbed to this deadly strain of influenza A, a form of bird flu.

Modern science has made it possible to recreate influenza A and other pathogens. That is why it is necessary to implement government controls to track who is in possession of them in Canada.

Many residents of Toronto remember the social and economic impact of the SARS outbreak in 2003. Severe acute respiratory syndrome is believed to have originated in China, but within weeks it had been reported in 37 countries around the world, including Canada. It resulted in 800 deaths, 44 of which were in Toronto. This virus tested international containment efforts and changed the way Canada deals with pandemic threats.

Many of the staff on Parliament Hill recall the extraordinary measures that were taken in 2001 following the anthrax attacks, when letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to several media outlets and the offices of two U.S. senators. This attack killed five people and infected 17 others. Anthrax is one of the oldest recorded diseases of grazing animals and is even believed to be the sixth plague mentioned in the book of Exodus. One can see I read religious books. It occurs in nature, but it also has been harnessed as a weapon of war. Sheep and cattle are especially vulnerable to anthrax spores because they are soil-borne and are inhaled or ingested while the animals graze. For the people who did not know about it, I am giving a lesson in agriculture.

Anthrax spores were harnessed as bioweapons in both world wars. Thousands died in Manchuria in the 1930s when anthrax was tested on prisoners of war. It was stored as a weapon of mass destruction in the arsenals of the former Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States until 1971. However, the 2001 anthrax attacks were classified as weaponized or weapons-grade strains of the spores. While that should have made it easier to identify the attacker, it was not until August 2008, seven years later, that the FBI identified the culprit as a scientist who worked at a government biodefence lab.

That is why it is absolutely necessary that Canada and the federal government modernize the capability of tracking human pathogens and toxins. This legislation, Bill C-11, will give inspectors enhanced powers to ensure that the laboratory biosafety guidelines, called LBG, are followed properly. That is why the official opposition supports sending this bill to committee for an in-depth study.

Bill C-11 will require laboratories handling deadly toxins to register with the Public Health Agency of Canada's Office of Laboratory Security. Bill C-11 will require an import permit to bring a human pathogen or toxin into Canada. It will require a permit to transfer a pathogen or toxin between laboratories in Canada. Bill C-11 will require laboratories to notify the Public Health Agency when registered pathogens or toxins are disposed of. All in all, the bill will bring Canada in line with the more stringent regulations in the United States and the United Kingdom.

As has been eloquently stated by my colleague from Etobicoke North, it is in the best interest of all countries, including Canada, to support initiatives to control infectious diseases. The world is now an island. There is free flow of traffic, human beings, goods, services and food. As such, all countries should be alert and develop strategies to minimize the risks from infectious diseases. As I mentioned before, we have seen examples of the avian flu, SARS, et cetera.

Microbiological agents and toxins can and do impact global health. As I mentioned before, in 2003 SARS killed 800 people. Biosafety is essential if we are to mitigate the deadly effects of infectious diseases. The World Health Organization urges countries to: one, promote biosafety practices for the safe handling, containment and transport of microbiological agents and toxins; two, to review the safety of laboratories and their existing protocols; three, to develop programs that enhance compliance of laboratories; and four, to encourage the development of biological safety training.

Thousands of infectious samples are shipped daily around the world for clinical trials, disease investigations, surveillance, et cetera. Animal and human specimens need to be transported efficiently, legally, safely, and on a timely basis. Shippers must be aware of regulatory requirements, personnel must undertake appropriate training, and specimens must be packed to protect transporters from risk of infection.

Best practices regarding the transport of microbiological agents and toxins must be used to protect the environment and human health. Perhaps more support is needed to prevent the introduction and spread of communicable diseases from other countries and among other provinces.

It is therefore imperative that laboratories have strict facility safeguards, microbiological practices and safety equipment that protect laboratory workers, the environment and the public from exposure to infectious microorganisms and toxins that are stored in the laboratory.

Responsible laboratory practices will help prevent intentional release, loss, misuse, theft, or unauthorized access of biological material and will contribute to preserving important scientific work for future generations.

To conclude, this is not a partisan matter. This is about the health and safety of Canadians. That is why my Liberal colleagues and I are proud to support the bill. Bill C-11 is a great improvement over Bill C-54. Infectious diseases know no boundaries. Pathogens are not restricted to one's own airspace. As such, we should do everything to increase biosafety.

Since the bill requires licensing and the provinces and territories are responsible for licensing, it is important to have a further study and review of this legislation. As well, we must ensure that there is transparency, effectiveness and accountability at the ministerial level as well as at the level of inspectors. We need to build trust so that Canadians and the world can be assured that they will be safe and secure when it comes to activities involving pathogens and toxins.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in the discussion on this important bill.

The bill requires disclosures, but the track record of the government of disclosing information, even under the Federal Accountability Act, is abysmal. In fact, there is a recent report with regard to the listeriosis outbreak in which 20 Canadians lost their lives. The government has systemically withheld the release of access to information requests for a number of months, thousands and thousands of pages.

With regard to the bill, is it fulsome enough to ensure that not only is it the law in Canada, but that there are repercussions when a government fails to respond to the letter of the law?

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, from looking at the bill, I understand that accountability and transparency are issues. It is important that the bill goes to committee to ensure the minister and inspectors do not have unlimited powers and whatever powers they have are transparent and accountable.

I agree with the hon. member that the government so far has not been very accountable in that respect. Therefore, it is important the bill goes to committee for further study.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in the debate on Bill C-11, an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

There is a number of pieces of legislation of a same or similar nature in which I have had some involvement. The discussion that has just taken place in House is with respect to the need for openness and transparency as key issues.

Let me briefly look at some of the basics of the bill.

First, Bill C-11 proposes a mandatory licensing system for the federal government to track what human pathogens exist, those being anthrax, salmonella and influenza, for example, where they are and who possesses them in Canada. It also proposes to provide enhanced inspection powers to inspectors to help ensure compliance with laboratory biosafety guidelines and to ensure that the legislation is applied properly and consistently across Canada.

That is a very succinct but important statement on behalf of the Government of Canada. This is a very important bill for us to have.

As the previous speaker had indicated, in a response to the question that I posed to her, there have been questions of openness and transparency with regard to the reporting of important information to the public.

In terms of the key messages, I think all members in the House are committed to improving the safety and health of Canadians. I have often said that the measure of success of a country is not so much an economic measure as it is a measure of the health and well-being of its people.

When there are circumstances where the health and well-being of people is being impacted by matters beyond their control, such as the importation or storage of such things as anthrax or salmonella or influenza, it is relevant.

We support the measures that have been proposed to improve the safety and security of Canadian laboratories for all Canadians. We want to review the legislation at committee to ensure that it is accountable, transparent and as effective as possible.

The purpose of the act, as I indicated, is to establish the safety and security regime to protect the health and safety of the public against the risks posed by human pathogens and toxins. The bill does establish that legislative framework that extends beyond the present importation and storage regime for pathogens and toxins.

The current regime requires that all labs that import human pathogens or toxins adhere to the requirements, but that these existing guidelines are not mandatory for laboratories that acquire human pathogens and toxins from domestic sources. This is a problem.

Even though they are applied widely on a voluntary basis as an industry standard, voluntary guidelines are not good enough when it comes to the health and safety of Canadians.

The bill also requires that all Canadian labs that possess human pathogens or toxins, regardless of where they were acquired, adhere to these guidelines. Bill C-11 specifically includes a number of provisions which will help to achieve these objectives.

It requires laboratories carrying out activities with risk groups two, three or four human pathogens or select toxins have to register with the Public Health Agency of Canada Office of Laboratory Security. It also subject licensees with risk group three and four pathogens and possibly select toxins to stricter operating regulations.

It requires an importation permit to import the human pathogen or toxin. It requires a transfer permit to send and receive any human pathogen or toxin between laboratories within Canada that are not part of the same facility. It also requires the authorization from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada to export agents on the export control list. It also requires licensees, as a part of their annual or biannual update of inventories, to notify the PHAC of the nature of the disposal of human pathogens and toxins.

These changes are meant to bring Canada in to line with more stringent regulations, which are in place in the United States and in the U.K., for example. It also gives substantial regulatory powers to the minister and inspectors. It will be necessary to further study these powers to ensure the transparency, effectiveness and accountability. This leads me to my specific contribution to the debate, which is with regard to the accountability aspect as well as the regulatory powers.

I have had the opportunity to be a member of the scrutiny of regulations committee, the standing joint committee of the House of Commons and Senate, for a number of years, and was its chair for a couple of years. What struck me was the regulatory guidelines and requirements, as laid out in certain pieces of legislation, tended to push the envelope with regard to a concern about what is called backdoor legislation. Backdoor legislation refers to providing undertakings or responsibilities in the regulations where that authority is not enabled by the legislation itself. It means putting something into the legislation that is not even part of the bill itself, simply covered under, “The minister may make regulations from time to time”.

When the regulations are required by a bill, the bill in the end will not show that it comes into force on receiving royal assent, but will be at a date specified by order-in-council, which is by cabinet. The reason for that is so the regulations necessary and called for under the legislation can be properly drafted, reviewed and gazetted et cetera prior to their enforcement.

There is some concern when we get to matters like this. We have seen far too many examples of where regulations have not been prepared on a timely basis. It represents a reluctance by the government to have legislation come into force. It may just simply be, here is a bill that will do all these wonderful things and it will be the law in Canada when the regulations are done.

Time and time again there have been delays in the implementation of legislation simply because regulations have not been done, and I can give an example.

One was the reproductive technologies act that I was involved with through the health committee. This dealt with the whole question of embryonic stem cell research and the establishment of a committee that would review the application of researchers to do research involving embryonic stem cells.

At that time, the officials told us in committee that the regulations required to make this happen would take something like two years, yet the government said that we needed it, that it was pursuant to a royal commission report on the reproductive technologies. It was urgent and had some very significant recommendations, but much of the legislation from years gone by is still not in place. One of the reasons for that was we put into the legislation that the minister was required to submit the proposed regulations to the committee for its comments. The minister of the day refused to give the committee the authority to amend or to reject regulations. They were simply there for review and comment.

With regard to that legislation, and it is years now after the royal commission report, which was about 15 years ago, we now have a situation where regulations pursuant to that legislation, which was passed at all stages in this place and in the other place, still are not the law in Canada. In fact, the committee to establish it has not been established and all the regulations related to the research permissions or authorizations are not in place.

Notwithstanding that Parliament as a whole, along with the Senate, passed urgent legislation, the law has not been totally put into force because regulations have not been promulgated, which totally frustrates the responsibilities of Parliament to do its job. I hope to have an opportunity to follow up with the new health minister on what the minister is doing in this regard.

However, that is a good example of a situation where legislation has gone through all stages, with two or three months of comprehensive committee hearings, and it is still not fully in force primarily due to regulations and the fact that the government has not even come forward with them.

It is not a matter of whether the regulations were a problem. As the members well know, when we deal with legislation in this place we do not get to see the regulations. We do not get to see those fine-tuning items that give us an idea of the scope or the intent of the legislation. There is a fine line at which a regulation will go beyond what was enabled in the legislation.

The Standing Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Regulations is there to review these things as they occur but after the fact to determine whether the regulations have been properly enabled within the legislation.

I raise that because it leads to the whole question of whether we have backdoor legislation where regulations are trying to do things that were not enabled in the legislation and whether the proviso that there be regulations made, which the government chooses not to make, could delay or even stop legislation that goes through the entire parliamentary process from ever becoming law in Canada.

How can Canadians keep ahead of the curve when they do not know whether legislation that is passed in Parliament will become law. We have far too many examples. It goes to the true question of accountability and transparency.

One of the first things the current government did was bring in the Federal Accountability Act. It puffed its chest and said that it would be accountable. When I first looked at it I thought that people should understand what the expectation was from accountability. I was looking at some of this material on the weekend and I came up with a definition that I challenge the government to follow. The definition of accountability is to explain and justify one's actions or decisions in a clear, concise and truthful manner. To synthesize this down, it means to be honest and give the straight story. I want to understand and I want to understand why the government took that decision.

If a government promises to do something and it does not do it, accountability demands that it explains and justifies that decision. Sometimes we make decisions to do things but circumstances change and it is important to back off and rethink the decisions. There is no point in going forward with something that changes because there is new information. However, when I think of some of the examples, such as promising not to tax income trusts but imposing a 31.5% tax one year later, really did not do much for the government, which boasted that it was helping seniors by introducing things like pension income splitting when it knew that over 85% of seniors would not benefit from it simply because they were in the lowest tax bracket, did not have eligible pensions or were seniors who had no one to split with.

When we take it to that extent, when the government claims that it represents 100% of a group and then does something for a group that only 14% or 15% actually can benefit from, that is not being accountable.

I have many examples of that and I hope to get a chance to talk about them at some other opportunity.

On February 22, CP had an article dealing with access to information requests. It is relevant because the concerns that have been raised by the opposition with respect to this bill have to do with transparency, accountability and openness. According to the Canwest news service, since January 2008 the Department of Foreign Affairs has prevented the release of more than 160,000 pages of government records on everything from the mission in Afghanistan, to new free trade deals with NATO, to material being left at the home of the girlfriend of the former minister of foreign affairs. It goes even further.

The Access to Information Commissioner has said that the government has demonstrated a systemic problem of inhibiting the intent of the Access to Information Act by having most of the releases vetted by the Prime Minister's Office or the Privy Council Office. This is contrary to the spirit and the intent of the law.

With respect to one of the releases, the government asked for a four month extension but once the four month extension expired the government said that even though it had the documents they were not really relevant to what was asked for so it had nothing to give. The Privy Council Office, on the other hand, turned around and said that it could not give the information because it was secret and could not be given out.

When Mr. Marleau, the Access to Information Commissioner, says that there are systemic problems in the government and that the worst offenders of the spirit and intent of the Access to Information Act are the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office, one can understand why the opposition is concerned about accountability, transparency and openness. An officer of Parliament, appointed by this Parliament, has said that it is the Prime Minister's own office that is the biggest problem in ensuring that Canadians do not get the information to which they are entitled.

Access to information, openness and transparency are foundations of our democracy. The Prime Minister, by denying the workability of the Access to Information Act, is taking away the opportunity for Canadians to experience what they can get under a truly democratic system. Canadians have the right to know.

If the government is not going to support the Access to Information Act and its intent and its principles, then now is the time for it to say so. If it wants to back away from the Federal Accountability Act now is the time to say so.

In these challenging times for Canadians, now is the time for the government to put the interests of the people ahead of its own partisan interests. The government has spent all of its time campaigning, not governing, and the country needs the government to govern. The government must be accountable. This litany of unaccountability must stop now in the best interests of the people of Canada.

[Dean Del Mastro, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Canadian Heritage]

Mr. Speaker, it surprises me when a Liberal stands and talks about accountability or access to information.

I would love some information on which Quebec riding associations received money in the sponsorship program but I do not see that member offering that kind of access to information.

I am prepared to set aside most of the bluster of the member as he really did not speak to the bill at all. I am not really sure he knows what bill we are actually debating.

I would love to ask him about a recent announcement in his riding that was positively received. The Prime Minister and the Premier of Ontario recently announced significant upgrades to GO Transit in the province of Ontario. I would love him to talk about how that will benefit the people of Mississauga because it was a great announcement.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like the member to know that we are debating Bill C-11, important legislation that would provide information to Canadians. It would enable us to track human pathogens, such as anthrax, salmonella and influenza. However, the speeches that have been given today by the opposition members have to do with concerns about accountability, transparency and openness.

During my speech, I gave some examples of where we have not had the transparency and openness that Canadians deserve. It is a part of the foundation of democracy. If the member does not agree with what I had to say, I accept that because he has the right to do that, but if his only reaction to a speech that demonstrates clearly that the government has not been accountable to the people of Canada and if his only concern is what somebody did in the province of Ontario when we are talking about an important bill on human pathogens, it tells me more about the member than it does about me.

It is important for us to understand that transparency, openness and accountability are fundamental to the foundations of democracy. The opposition has raised certain considerations. We are prepared to support the objectives of the bill but we do have concerns about the mechanisms in which the transparency, openness and accountability will be delivered given the abysmal track record of the current government.

[The Speaker, Liberal, Peter Milliken]

Order. When debate resumes on this matter, there will be seven minutes remaining for the hon. member for Mississauga South for questions and comments consequent on his speech.

It being two o'clock, we will now proceed to statements by members.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

[The Speaker, Liberal, Peter Milliken]

Resuming debate. Is the House ready for the question?

[Some hon. members]

Question.

[The Speaker, Liberal, Peter Milliken]

The question is on the motion. Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the motion?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[An hon. member]

On division.

[The Speaker, Liberal, Peter Milliken]

I declare the motion carried. Accordingly, the bill stands referred to the Standing Committee on Health.

(Motion agreed to, bill read the second time and referred to a committee)