Bill C-42 (Historical)

Strengthening Aviation Security Act

An Act to amend the Aeronautics Act

This enactment amends the Aeronautics Act so that the operator of an aircraft that is due to fly over the United States in the course of an international flight may provide information to a competent authority of that country.

[Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Commissioner, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm very happy to come before you today on this important question of use of personal information in airline security.

I'm accompanied by two people who have very relevant expertise. To my right is Carman Baggaley, a senior policy advisor who has worked for a long time in this area. To my left is Maître Daniel Caron, who is our legal counsel on this issue. I also have two other people accompanying me who have relative expertise in this area.

Honourable members, Bill C-42 is a very deceptively simple bill. It's certainly a short one. It only contains two sections and it does only one thing. It amends the Aeronautics Act to allow the operator of an aircraft that is scheduled to fly over a foreign state to provide certain personal information about the passengers on the flight to the foreign state when required to do so by the laws of the state.

Aviation security has always been important, but for reasons that we all understand it has become a priority in Canada and for countries around the world.

Since the terrorist attacks of 2001 and subsequent aviation-related incidents, we have witnessed the introduction in Canada of numerous aviation security measures, including the Public Safety Act, the implementation of the advanced passenger information passenger name record--recognized under the initials API/PNR program--and the passenger protect program, commonly called the Canadian no-fly list.

All of these measures give rise to privacy concerns. They have resulted in the creation of massive government databases, the use of secretive no-fly lists, the increased scrutiny of travellers and airport workers, and greater information-sharing with foreign governments.

However, the bill before you, Bill C-42, differs from the measures listed above in that it will not result in the introduction of any new domestic aviation security programs, nor will it involve the collection of additional personal information by Canadian government agencies. Rather, it will allow American or other authorities to collect personal information about travellers on flights to and from Canada that fly through American airspace. This in turn will allow American authorities to prevent individuals from flying to or from Canada.

Bill C-42 raises important sovereignty issues. We are not questioning the American government's authority to implement its secure flight program. International law is clear that a state's sovereignty extends to its airspace. However, the Canadian government has a duty to protect the privacy and civil rights of its citizens. Thus it's important that we understand how the secure flight program may affect Canadian travellers.

Before commenting specifically on Secure Flight, I would like to remind the committee that we have just had an exhaustive study of aviation security in Canada. The Major Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 devoted a whole volume to the subject.

The inquiry made two general recommendations that I think are germane to the subject: when selecting equipment and procedures for passenger screening, consideration should be given to individual rights, including privacy rights and the rights guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Given the importance of the "no search, no fly" rule and the potential impact of security measures on individual rights, Transport Canada and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada should collaborate to devise tools and criteria to evaluate proposed security measures.

The Major Report also identified gaps or vulnerabilities in aviation security and it recommended that efforts to enhance security should focus on three areas: air cargo; airport security, particularly access to the airside and restricted areas of airports; and fixed base operations and general aviation—recreational and business aircraft that often operate in close proximity to major airports.

From our perspective it's noteworthy that the Major Inquiry did not recommend greater focus on passenger screening or collecting even more information about travellers. In fact, the report states that Canada's no-fly program has not proven to be effective.

With that context, I would like to highlight some of the significant aspects of Secure Flight, the American no-fly program. Air carriers, including Canadian carriers flying through American airspace, will be required to provide the Department of Homeland Security not only with basic identifying information—name, date of birth and gender—but also, "if available", additional information such as passport information and itinerary information. Since this information will always be available for international flights from Canada flying over the U.S. airspace, that full information will always be provided.

Although the Department of Homeland Security's Privacy Impact Assessment is somewhat unclear on this, our understanding is that information collected can be disclosed and used for purposes other than aviation security, such as law enforcement and immigration purposes.

DHS will retain this information for as long as seven days after the journey has been completed even for individuals who are not on the no-fly list. That period will be seven years for potential matches and 99 years for confirmed matches.

One important difference between the U.S. secure flight program and the Canadian program is that under the U.S. program the responsibility for checking passengers against the no-fly list rests with the Department of Homeland Security, not with the airlines as in Canada.

According to DHS, this will result in greater accuracy and therefore fewer false positives--for example, a similar name, but the wrong person. However, this means that DHS will collect personal information from Canadian travellers. The Canadian government attempted to have all Canadian overflights exempted from the secure flight program. It was unsuccessful, although overflights between two Canadian cities, like Montreal and Halifax, which may pass through American airspace, were exempted.

If Bill C-42 is passed, we believe the Canadian government has an important role to play in working with the American government and Canadian airlines to minimize the impact of the secure flight program.

These are our suggestions:

Ensure that the minimal amount of personal information is disclosed to American authorities. The secure flight program requires only three pieces of information. In particular, Transport Canada should work with the airlines to avoid excessive disclosures of personal information. On this point we note that the Aeronautics Act currently allows the Governor in Council to make regulations respecting the type or class of information that may be provided to the foreign state.

The government should also question the retention periods of seven days for no-match and seven years for potential matches. The U.S. is committed to collecting only personal information necessary for airline security.

The government should also negotiate robust and accessible redress mechanisms with the Department of Homeland Security for Canadians who are prevented from flying as a result of the secure flight program.

It should also make Canadians aware of the U.S. secure flight program and our passenger protect program to minimize the confusion that may result from the operation of the two programs.

These are my initial remarks.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to make these observations on this legislation. I would be happy to attempt to answer any of your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Thank you, and welcome back after that brief recess.

Just for the advice of the committee, business order number two, pursuant to the order of reference of Tuesday, October 26, 2010, is Bill C-42, an act to amend the Aeronautics Act.

I will advise the committee members that this is being video-recorded, just for your information.

Joining us today from the office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada is Ms. Jennifer Stoddart, the Privacy Commissioner.

Welcome, and please proceed.

[Michel Guimond, Bloc, Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, QC]

I'm prepared to delete the words "as well as all other problematics linked to the quality of life of the population" in order to secure the committee's consent. My primary objective was to address the noise issue. If this wording receives the committee's consent, I can leave it that way. However, I won't tear up my shirt, particularly since it is new, over the issue of including the words "all other problematics".

I agree with Mr. Jean. I have no objection to us adding the following words at the end of the motion: "that the Committee report no later than December 15 and hold additional meetings". The idea is to find a way to coordinate our respective agendas. We could start the study right away. If you want us to set a date, it can be December 15. The committee can thus immediately start its work on the question, without mentioning the December 15 deadline. I'm flexible.

I want us to find a way to study it. We have to consider the list of witnesses who will be speaking on Bill C-42. I've spoken with other colleagues who also have concerns. We're holding two meetings a week, and we'll have to conduct the clause-by-clause consideration of this bill. So we won't have the option of holding additional meetings. That is my view.

[Vic Toews, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

Let me take this opportunity to thank the committee for the invitation to appear before you today. It's a pleasure to be here to assist with your deliberations on Bill C-42, An Act to amend the Aeronautics Act.

Before describing the legislation in front of you, I'd like to take a few moments to briefly put it into context. Members of this committee will know that shortly after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the United States government quickly implemented a number of security measures, as did Canada. One of these involved enhancing the ability of Canadian air carriers to work with their international partners, in particular our American friends to the south, to deter and detect terrorists.

Specifically, the former government, the Liberal government of the day, introduced Bill C-44, which amended section 4.83 of the Aeronautics Act. The amendment was designed to allow Canadian air carriers to provide the U.S. with passenger and crew information for all flights destined for that country. That is what it did, and the bill received royal assent on December 18, 2001, less than one month after it was introduced in the House. Simply put, the legislation before us today will do the same thing for any Canadian flights that fly over the continental U.S. airspace on their way to destinations such as Mexico or the Caribbean.

Aside from general security considerations, the rationale for passing this bill is much the same as it was in 2001. As the then Minister of Transport, Minister Collenette, noted at committee hearings:

Any sovereign state, whether the U.S., Britain or anyone else around the world, has a right to know who is coming into its country, whether by land, sea, or plane.

He also noted:

Under the Aeronautics Act, carriers are obliged to operate under the legislation of another country once they enter its air space.

This is in line with international law, which recognizes the right of any country, including Canada, to regulate foreign air carriers entering that country's airspace.

In response to the events of 9/11 and the subsequent 9/11 commission report, the U.S. passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which among other things called for the government to repatriate from airlines the responsibility for checking passenger manifests against the U.S. no-fly and selectee lists.

In 2008 the U.S. published the secure flight final rule, spelling out how the U.S. government intends to implement the law. The secure flight final rule outlines what steps all domestic and international air carriers will need to take for flights to, from, within, and over the United States.

The final rule stipulates that airlines are required to provide each passenger's full name, date of birth, and gender to the Transportation Security Administration before departure for all domestic and international flights landing in the U.S., as well as those that fly over U.S. airspace. The TSA, under the final rule, has assumed responsibility for checking airline passenger manifests against selectee and no-fly lists so that individuals who have been identified as posing a security threat are prevented from carrying out a possible act of terrorism.

The United States is implementing the final rule in phases. Domestic flights and most flights to and from the U.S. are already sharing secure flight information. The U.S. hopes to implement secure flights over continental U.S. airspace by the end of this calendar year.

Members of this committee will know that our government is committed to working with our international partners to enhance aviation security, both here in Canada and around the world.

Last December, the world was once again reminded of the threat terrorism continues to pose to those of us who choose to travel by air. A man on Northwest flight 253 on its way to Detroit attempted to detonate an improvised explosive device. We know that the flight spent a lot of time over Canadian airspace.

The threats to our country are real. We therefore need to remain vigilant and continue working with our partners to ensure the safety and security of our citizens. And that is what our government is doing. Over the past 12 months we have actively engaged with the United States and other international partners around the world to strengthen our collective capacity to address aviation threats.

At the International Civil Aviation Organization general assembly meeting this past September, nations agreed to adopt strengthened aviation security measures. In addition to Canada's Passenger Protect program introduced in 2007 as a way to prevent persons who pose an immediate threat to aviation security from boarding a flight, in the weeks following the attempted terrorist attack on Christmas Day the Government of Canada took additional steps to strengthen aviation security.

This included purchasing explosive trace detection equipment and full-body scanners; announcing its intention to develop a passenger behaviour observation program; and providing funding of $1.5 billion over five years to help the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority strengthen the security of our aviation system and protect air travellers.

We have also published our intention to introduce changes to the Canadian aviation security regulations in order to ensure that our domestic airports have the safest and most effective security systems possible. But the threats remain and they are evolving.

On October 29, 2010, cargo planes en route from Yemen were found to have explosives on board. Canada acted quickly. All air cargo originating from Yemen or transiting through Yemen is now banned from entering Canada.

We are well-placed to further strengthen our air cargo security measures moving forward. Our government committed funds of $95.7 million over five years to further enhance air cargo security at Canadian airports by building on the air cargo initiative unveiled by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in June 2006.

These are all important initiatives. All will go a long way toward helping to fight terrorism and protect the safety and security of Canadians--something that our government has made a top priority since we were first elected in 2006.

As important as these initiatives are, however, our government is also acutely aware of the need to protect privacy and individual rights, as in the United States. During the development of the Secure Flight program, we reminded the Americans that our countries have bolstered security on both sides of the border and in our shared airspace, in line with our respective legal requirements, and in line with our interest in protecting the privacy and human rights of passengers.

We formally raised a number of issues with them as they were developing their final rule, in order to influence its final outcome. We stressed to them that every effort would need to be made under Secure Flight to guard against false matches, which are not only inconvenient and disruptive to both the professional and personal lives of travellers, but also potentially damaging to their reputations.

We noted that transparency and redress are key elements to any passenger-matching program. We indicated that passenger information should not be vetted against any list other than those used to maintain aviation security. We also expressed concern about data retention periods.

The United States is of the view that Secure Flight will enhance the security of domestic and international commercial air travel through the use of improved watch-list matching, while also facilitating legitimate passenger air travel and protecting individual rights through the use of mechanisms such as a comprehensive privacy plan, and the Department of Homeland Security's traveller redress inquiry program, otherwise known as TRIP.

Our government also pushed for and received an exemption from Secure Flight for all Canadian domestic flights. These are flights from one Canadian city to another that fly over U.S. airspace. That's important, since some of our domestic flights will normally spend a majority of their time in U.S. airspace.

In a perfect world, initiatives such as Passenger Protect and Secure Flight would not be needed, but the reality today is that every government can and will take action to protect its citizens against the threat of terrorism. We therefore need to work together to ensure that we continue to facilitate the legitimate movement of our citizens across each other's borders, while also taking action to enhance our joint security. This is what Bill C-42 will do, while also helping to ensure that Canadian travellers can continue to fly to international destinations in the easiest and most cost-effective way possible.

Thank you.

Mr. Chair, I would be happy to answer any questions the committee might have.

[The Chair, Conservative, Merv Tweed]

Okay. With that, we'll open the second part of our meeting.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Tuesday, October 26, 2010, we are here to discuss Bill C-42, An Act to amend the Aeronautics Act.

Joining us at the table today is the Honourable Vic Toews, Minister of Public Safety. I'll ask the minister to maybe introduce the people at the table with him and then proceed with opening comments.

Please begin.

[Michel Guimond, Bloc, Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, QC]

Unfortunately, my assistant was talking to me about my list of witnesses for Bill C-42, which I just passed on to the clerk. So, I missed what you said.

[Michel Guimond, Bloc, Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I will try to keep this short, as I don't want to drag out the discussions needlessly. The motion is fairly clear; it's self-explanatory. What's more, I've had the opportunity to speak with most colleagues in this room about noise caused by airport operations in urban areas. A number of colleagues broached the subject first, since the noise issue is causing problems.

Each year, a number of Canadians file complaints. They claim that they are inconvenienced and that their peace and quiet is disturbed. We know that quality of life is becoming increasingly important and that airports are not always located in agricultural or isolated regions. Municipalities have policies aimed at reducing urban sprawl and increasing urban densification in order to get the most out of their municipal budgets. More and more Canadians are now moving to locations near airports or have been living near these facilities for years. Their peace and quiet is affected by the countless landings and takeoffs.

In certain areas, small sightseeing aircraft and private planes add to the daily number of landings and takeoffs. We're talking about an increasingly popular hobby or career. Since the number of small private aircraft is rising, the number of flying schools is also increasing. Air carriers have responsibilities. Airports also wish to make their operations profitable. In 1995, the government began transferring the management of airports to regional authorities.Various interest groups, provincial and municipal governments, users, and so on, are represented on the administrative council.

We have been through a similar situation. I was a member of the Standing Committee on Transport from 1993 to 1997 during which time the Government of Canada transferred responsibility for the management of airports and ports. This motion should be adopted by the committee members, especially since it concerns a country-wide issue. We would potentially go on tour, meet with regional representatives, hold meetings outside of the Ottawa ivory tower. We could go on site and have the opportunity to determine the scope of the noise problem ourselves.

I think we can agree on the fact that we are not too inconvenienced by airplane noise in this room. I doubt that any of you have heard these noises, since there is a safety perimeter to be respected for flights over Parliament Hill. It would be a good idea to have a few meetings in the regions to be able to study the issue. That's what I wanted to bring up.

Like you, I have taken part in discussions. The meeting is now public. Today, we will begin with the Minister of Public Security. Some of our witnesses wish to speak to Bill C-42. I'm not sure what the best way to proceed would be.

Other committees have already proceeded in the following way: dividing the committee into two, while respecting quorum and the membership breakdown typical of a minority government. This way, we can hold hearings on Bill C-42, and, at the same time, hold hearings on the noise issue.

As it stands now, given the number of witnesses we'll have for Bill C-42, we might have to consider meeting on Christmas Eve, December 24, or on the morning of January 1. That's not what I want.

I think that we should begin discussions in the near future on the serious issue of noise caused by airport operations in urban areas.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Strengthening Aviation Security Act

[The Speaker, Liberal, Peter Milliken]

The House will now proceed to the taking of the deferred recorded division at second reading of Bill C-42.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-42, An Act to amend the Aeronautics Act, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Safeguarding Canadians' Personal Information Act

[Joe Volpe, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the closing comments by the minister, when he referred to bites, et cetera, reminded me of a statement made by our colleague from Montmorency yesterday. So much of the government legislation is sound bite legislation, “safeguarding Canadians' personal information act”. It almost as if we had a guard dog on site. The only problem is that the guard dog has a bark like a sheep dog and a bite like a chihuahua. When is the government going to get away from sound bite legislation and actually do something worthwhile?

The minister justifies it all by saying we have an Internet economy that is worth some $62.7 billion and so we will ensure we can grow that. The government is not going to do anything about that at all.

What is going to happen is companies that want to get on the Internet for the purposes of expanding their commerce are going to do so. They are not going to worry about whether the government wants to jaw-jaw its way into this. They are going to take a look at this legislation and say that the member from Montmorency is right, that those guys have a bite and a bark like a chihuahua.

This is especially so after the industry committee has made some recommendations to the minister. With the benefit of those recommendations, he still goes ahead and presents legislation that he himself acknowledges requires further study from the committee and make the kinds of suggestions to improve the bill that he knows he must put in place if this will be acceptable legislation.

All of us are desirous of maintaining our privacy, in keeping what is ours to ourselves, keeping our security safeguarded at all times, to ensure that anything that pertains to our person, our businesses, our interests is released only when we think it is appropriate for our sake, for our interest.

For the government to come forward and say that it will safeguard all of that, except in certain circumstances, does not make safeguarding personal privacy interests very secure. What it does is introduce exceptions to kinds of privacy and security that it claims to be support.

Its sound bite title is, like everything else the government does, smoke and mirrors, deception and manipulation.

One can easily applaud the fact that there are amendments to PIPEDA, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, and notice that there is nothing in that title that sounds like a sound bite that it is actually a factual issue, but the government decides to take this legislation and make it look like it has done something else with it. That might enhance its opportunities to sell itself as something proactive.

It took the government four and a half years to discover that 80% of businesses are on the Internet, that means they have a website, and that 88% of Canadians are Internet savvy, that means they can browse the net. All of these things do not a business make, but they are the fertile ground for businesses interested in making their commerce more time sensitive, more immediate and more global.

Bill C-29 amends PIPEDA to, among other things, permit the disclosure of personal information without the knowledge and consent of the individual who possesses that for certain purposes. Some of the purposes will make sense. It is a little bit like the Trojan horse that gives access to a treasure trove in somebody else's domain.

The first of these does sound as if it makes sense. Number one is for identifying an injured, ill or deceased individual, communicating with their next of kin. There are very few people who would say that is bad.

Second is for performing police services. There are no other qualifiers. There are a lot of people who want to know what that means.

Third is for preventing, detecting or suppressing fraud. Successfully or unsuccessfully? What is the intent? Which organization?

Fourth is for protecting victims of financial abuse. How so? By releasing their information?

Another series of amendments is to permit organizations, any organization, for certain purposes not specifically outlined, to collect, to use, to disclose without the knowledge and consent of the individual, his or her personal information, number one, contained in witness statements related to insurance claims. Whose commercial interests are we looking at there? Second is information produced by the individual in the course of his or her employment, business or profession. That is virtually anything. Everybody in this place is producing information literally on a minute-by-minute basis, but some organization is going to have access to that.

Members might say that in a great, open and transparent environment such as the Parliament of Canada, such as the House of Commons, anybody who is engaged in this ought to so admit. It is something that we might have asked the Minister of Defence, for example, who today talked about the complexity of the procurement process and military hardware acquisition as being a little too complicated for the simple-minded public that wants to find out whether it is transparent and whether it meets the test of value for money, as being a bit of an intrusion and just barely tolerable.

This is hardly accountability. It is hardly transparency and it certainly does not lead to the business of openness, but under PIPEDA, everybody else has to operate that way.

A third set would require organizations to report material breaches of security safeguards to the Privacy Commissioner and to notify certain individuals and organizations of breaches that create a real risk of significant harm. Somebody is going to make a judgment. I will come back to that in a moment.

As I go through this, I ask how we can safeguard Canadians' personal information. I am a consumer like everybody else in this House. As an individual and like many people in this House, excluding all those who serve the House, I am a legislator, and I do not believe that my personal information will be any safer, believe it or not, under the current drafting of Bill C-29.

The Government of Canada prepares a piece of legislation by which I, as a member of Parliament, as a consumer, as a private citizen, just like the Minister of Immigration, who is really listening to this, think that my information is easily protected by some of these measures that have gaping holes, in a legislation that did not exist before. It is going to need a lot of amendments in order for me to feel comfortable.

Why do I focus on me, Mr. Speaker? Just like you, we represent the general public and the general public expects us to feel what they feel, to see what they see, to experience what they live every day. There is not a Canadian out there who is not thinking, “Hold up. Is this legislation really designed to protect my privacy, or are they beginning to insinuate some sort of little loophole for others who are involved in business or whatever, to use to my disadvantage?” There are a lot of them out there already.

It is interesting that this legislation did not have this sound bite title that said, “We are going to go after all the crooks. We know they are out there but they are not being reported. We are going to build jails for them so that when we catch them, if we ever put police on the beat and if we ever sustain the court system enough that they will be able to process all of these accused and alleged criminals, we will actually be able to house them”.

That is not what this is about. If that is the kind of intention they have, I do not see that intention in the legislation. Primary in this kind of assessment relates to the requirement that I mentioned a moment ago to report a “material breach of security safeguards involving personal information under its control” to the Privacy Commissioner. That is what is going to happen. All of this is going to be reported to the Privacy Commissioner.

First, the threshold for determining that requirement for that disclosure is ambiguous. I noted that the minister did not make any effort to be specific to give us an indication of where the intent is. He did not give us any indication of the precision of the language. Not only is it ambiguous; it is confusing, quite frankly. As I said a moment ago, it has more holes in it than a retaining wall that has been breached by an invading army.

Second, there is no enforcement provision included in the bill to ensure that this will be done. When my colleague from Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord says that the sound-bite legislation that the Conservatives put in place is a little bit like a chihuahua barking away and trying to bite, he is right. If there is no enforcement mechanism, what is the purpose of making all of these statements? Who are they playing for fools? Do they really think Canadians do not look, do not listen, do not watch, do not critique?

I took a look at what the bill states and under proposed section 10.1:

(1) An organization shall report to the Commissioner any material breach of security safeguards involving personal information under its control.

It does not tell us how it got there in the first place or whether the organization had the right to get it there. It goes on:

(2) The factors that are relevant to determining whether a breach of security safeguards is material include:

Here is a definition for them, and so when I say it is ambiguous, confusing, wide open, it says, first of all, the “sensitivity of personal information”. Who is the best judge of whether personal information is sufficiently sensitive? Is it going to be the organization? Is it going to be the Privacy Commissioner? Is it going to be the person about whom that information is rendered? The proposed section continues:

(b) The number of individuals whose personal information was involved...

This reminds me of days gone by when priests in a confessional were trying to explain to penitents the significance of lies. One of the penitents said, “Father bless me for I have sinned, but it is no big deal; I just told a lie”.

The priest did not know any other way to get the penitent to understand the severity of that lie and said, “I tell you what. Here is a pillow full of feathers. Go up to the top of the hill. It is rather windy right now. I want you to open that pillow.”

The penitent went to the top of the hill, opened the pillow full of feathers and, behold, the wind blew them all over the place.

The penitent went back to the confessional and said, “Father I did what you asked me to do”.

The priest said, “Good, go pick them all up”.

The penitent said, “I cannot do that. Those things have gone for miles and miles now”.

Members can understand what the priest said then. That is the gravity of personal information about which one spreads lies, but the bill does not say that the person about whom information is being supplied has any control over it. Somebody else is shaking that pillow at the top of the hill. The proposed section continues:

(c) An assessment by the organization that the cause of the breach or a pattern of breaches indicates a systemic problem.

Yes, that will happen. Every organization is willing to beat its chest and say, “Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa”. It is not going to happen. Very few people did it in times when people spoke Latin, and now that English has replaced Latin as the lingua franca, there are even fewer people.

So who makes the determination? Mr. Speaker, I guess you are like me. If it were my personal information that was being breached, I would want to report it to the commissioner. Yet Bill C-29 leaves that decision up to the organization that is supposedly making the report if not, in fact, the breach.

Bill C-29 also states that under proposed subsection 10.2(1), “Unless otherwise prohibited by law,” and look at that loophole:

an organization shall notify an individual of any breach of security safeguards involving the individual’s personal information under the organization’s control if it is reasonable in the circumstances to believe that the breach creates a real risk of significant harm to the individual.

As the hon. member for Elmwood—Transcona said a few moments ago, so now the Americans, under Bill C-42 that the House had discussed before, can ask any of our domestic airlines, our carriers, to give them every piece of information in their possession, including everything one can name from there on in, everything one has to lay bare when one goes to buy a plane ticket. Bill C-29 essentially says that organization can do all of that.

What is the definition of significant harm under proposed subsection 10.2(2)? It is:

For the purpose of subsection (1), “significant harm” includes bodily harm, humiliation, damage to reputation or relationships, loss of employment, business or professional opportunities, financial loss, identity theft, negative effects on the credit record and damage to or loss of property.

Now one has to prove how significant that was. There are not very many people who are going to be better defenders of one's character and one's interest than oneself.

Real risk of significant harm and the factors that have to be included are those that are relevant to determining whether a breach of security safeguards creates real risk of significant harm to the individuals, and have to include the following. Listen to this. They have to include this:

(a) the sensitivity of the personal information involved in the breach;

Who is making the decision on the sensitivity? Somebody else.

It goes on:

(b) the probability that the personal information has been, is being or will be misused.

I am just thinking of Bill C-42. Any foreign state can ask of a Canadian carrier information that it will say is not going to be a problem and it is not going to do anything nasty with it, so the probability of that personal information being used or misused is practically nil, so it will take it all. Oh, good.

Again, while the conditions are defined, the interpretation is wide open and even includes variables that are impossible to determine. For example, how can an organization assess the probability that the personal information will be misused?

Most critical is that there is no enforcement and there are no penalties if the organization does not disclose a breach. This is untenable.

Other jurisdictions with similar laws have very high penalties for non-prompt disclosure. Let me see. I wonder where those other jurisdictions are.

Well, for example, right here in Canada, under the Alberta Personal Information Protection Act, PIPA, individuals and organizations can be fined up to $10,000 and $100,000 respectively for failing to notify the commissioner of a breach. There is an onus of responsibility. There is none in Bill C-29.

In Florida, which is just down the road, there are penalties of up to $500,000 for similar breaches. I mention Florida especially since our carriers are going to have to reveal everything to the Americans anyway; it is about a three-hour flight from Pearson Airport in Toronto. In Michigan, penalties run up to $750,000. Bill C-29 has no penalty. Why would these jurisdictions, including Alberta, have penalties and not the federal act that the government wants us to believe is the best thing since sliced bread?

[Jim Maloway, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Mr. Speaker, the previous questioner seemed to be concerned about the privacy of Canadians. Yet we debated for several hours today Bill C-42, An Act to amend the Aeronautics Act. It would allow Canadian carriers to give private information on the PNR to the American security.

How does the minister reconcile this whole effort to update the privacy legislation of the country with Bill C-42, in which we will give information away to American entities without reciprocity? The Conservative government could have demanded the same treatment. The Americans have 2,000 flights a day flying over Canadian airspace. We have 100 flights flying over American airspace.

Surely the government could have said that if the U.S. demanded the information from it, the Canadian government would demand the same information on those 2,000 flights. Did the government do it? I do not believe so.

Strengthening Aviation Security Act

[Tony Martin, NDP, Sault Ste. Marie, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to speak this afternoon to Bill C-42 and to follow my colleagues who have spoken so eloquently and thoughtfully on this bill, particularly the critic for our caucus, the member for the Western Arctic who understands this public business in a way that many of us could only hope we could.

He made his own excellent speech making a case for slowing this process down, really thinking it through and perhaps finding other ways of responding to some of the very real challenges and threats that are out there today that do not require throwing this huge net out to catch so many people for absolutely no reason and cause them all kinds of inconvenience when they want to go on a vacation or go to another country for a wedding or funeral.

I have seen in this place over the last number of years, from particularly the present government but the previous government as well, where we get brought into a culture that is developing in the United States, particularly since 9/11. We understand the difficult situation and the reality of 9/11. We know there needed to be a response but the response that we made and continue to make is one that I believe indicates that the terrorists won. If the terrorists wanted to throw a cloud over society, over the free movement of people and goods and over the kind of relationship that we were developing in North America between Canada, the United States and Mexico, they could not have done it better.

We keep buying into a culture of paranoia, fear and, as so many of my colleagues have said here over the last couple of days, of misinformation.

How many times do we need to hear another American politician say, very publicly and in the media, without any thought whatsoever it seems, that the terrorist who hit the United States on 9/11 came through Canada's borders and that we were somehow responsible, that we somehow played a part and that we somehow were negligent with the security that we implement at our border?

We know that is just not true in each incident. Thank god we have good ambassadors to the United States who pick up on those things and go after those misinformed American politicians who go out there, probably for personal political gain, to make these statements that are so wrong and so false and cast us in this very difficult, challenging and problematic light.

We heard another U.S. senator just last week make the very same statement. After all of these incidents, after challenging them so publicly, after our ambassadors went after those folks and told them they were wrong and after us making our case time and time again, we still have another American senator saying very clearly and confidently that somehow the terrorists of 9/11 came through U.S. borders from Canada and that somehow we had a responsibility for that.

This culture of fear, paranoia and misinformation does not serve any of us well. We see it in our own ridings, particularly those of us who have to deal with constituents who find themselves crossing the border to go into the United States.

I live in a border community and I see many constituents not being able to get across the border anymore. It is not because they have done anything wrong or that they are bad people. It is not because they have a track record of misbehaviour or criminal activity. It is because sometimes there is a mistake or they have the same name as somebody else born on the same date and information pops up on the computer, because everything is computerized now it seems, that indicates a red flag.

Some of those people in Sault Ste. Marie are often on their way to a medical appointment in London and go down through Michigan and over through Sarnia. They may be on their way to a family wedding or even a funeral of a loved one or a friend and they are challenged at the border and must come back. Oftentimes, these people come to my office asking me to deal with this in a matter of half an hour or an hour. Sometimes if I write a letter assuring the border officials that these people are legit, bona fide, and plead with them to give these people a break, cut them some slack and allow them to go across to the wedding, or whatever it is they have to do, and I give my personal assurance that they will return to Canada, they can sometimes get through.

Just as problematic and difficult is putting together these lists that we are calling for in Bill C-42. It is frightening. People who cross the border from Sault Ste. Marie to get to Michigan were perhaps in their teens back in the sixties and may have smoked a little grass. Those people may have a record, some may even have been pardoned but all of a sudden there is a red flag on their record and they cannot cross the border. After 20 or 30 years of good living, hard work, getting up in the morning and feeding their kids, paying their rent, paying taxes and being good citizens in our country, they are all of a sudden fearful, because of this culture of paranoia, that they will not be able to cross the border anymore.

People would be totally surprised at the insignificance of some of the incidents that pop up and that these people get challenged over. I could tell stories that would make people cry in terms of the treatment or the challenge that people confront, or the heartbreak because they cannot get across for a day or two to attend some personal event that is happening in the life of an individual or family. That is wrong.

We need to sit down with our neighbours to the south to figure out how we can catch people who may have wrongful intent, and we can do that. As a matter of fact, we have always done that and we have been very successful at it. That is why the terrorists who perpetrated 9/11 did not come from Canada. They were from inside the United States. We do a good job of looking after our border. We know who is living in our country and we have good people working in our security systems.

However, we continue to buy into more and more of what is often referred to as the thickening of the border, more and more of this new way of gathering and sharing information and the new technology that comes with that which is creating more and more inconvenience for ordinary citizens who just want to go about their business and are now afraid.

I have dealt with the problems of several people who came to my constituency office who were on the infamous no-fly list. We were successful in most cases but it took us forever.

People are absolutely stunned when they arrive at the airport and ask for their boarding pass and are told by the person behind the counter that there is a red flag and that they are on the no-fly list. They have absolutely no idea why. Sometimes they lose out on a trip they were going to make with their wife and family, a trip often paid for but one for which they cannot get their money back, because they are on the no-fly list and cannot get across the border.

That is just the beginning of it. To try to get them off that list is almost a Herculean task. What an effort. It goes on forever. First we have to find out who is responsible for the list and to whom we should talk in order to get the person's name off the list. We would think that after we had done it once or twice, we would have it figured out and there would be some kind of a shortcut to take to get this resolved, but no, that is not the case. In every instance, it is this long, drawn-out, prolonged, difficult, back and forth exercise. Sometimes it seems as though we are involved in espionage simply in trying to clear the name of a constituent. We are talking about members of the community who have lived the good life, who have kept their noses clean, have gotten up every morning to go to work, have paid their bills and taxes. We are talking about people who simply want to go through American airspace to another country for a little vacation or on business and who now may find themselves, even more than before when there was just a no-fly list, on another list that will stop them from doing what they want to do.

Someone asked just a few minutes ago what the problem is here, that we all have passports and we can just show our passports and away we go. I have to say that the experience in my office is that even with a bona fide Canadian passport, people can still get stopped. People can still get challenged at the border. People can still get turned back, because somebody somewhere has found something else that pops up, that is above and beyond the passport. With this new regime that we are considering here today, who knows what else might be out there waiting to catch people?

Some people may remember the western hemisphere initiative. We can tell this to our kids some day and they will wonder what we are talking about. There was a time in the relationship between Canada and the United States when people could actually flow freely back and forth across the border. People could go from Sault Ste. Marie, Canada to Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. People married each other; because of the free flow we almost thought we were of similar citizenship. We really did. We were neighbours. Then all of a sudden one day we woke up and we were told that in a year or two we were going to need passports. We had to plan for that and it was a difficult experience.

I remember all the trips that colleagues from my caucus made to Washington to speak to senators, to tell them how foolish this was, how it was going to catch so many people and how it was going to affect the free flow of people and trade. We were told not to worry, that it will all be okay, that it will sort itself out, that in time we will not even notice that we have to show a passport. In my own instance and in my own community, this has become a huge problem.

Just with the traffic that flows back and forth nowadays on the bridge in Sault Ste. Marie from Ontario to Michigan, the numbers have plummeted. They have gone down significantly. I suggest it is because of some of this new public policy that we and our neighbours to the south have put in place.

I am sure it affected other industrial sectors, but it has certainly affected the tourism industry. We have a ski hill in Sault Ste. Marie with the best snow in the whole of the U.S. Midwest and into Canada. Searchmont ski hill used to bring in between 50,000 and 70,000 people a year to ski, particularly if it was a good winter. They are not coming as readily anymore because even though Canadians have become more and more accustomed to using a passport, our American friends have not, and they are not coming across the border. They are not coming here to ski, to stay in our hotels and to spend money anymore.

The snow train in Sault Ste. Marie used to bring in 100,000 people a year. We are lucky now if we get 40 people and the number is going down. It is terrible. It is shocking.

This is our economy. This is our bread and butter. This is what puts food on the table for workers in our neck of the woods. They work on the train. They keep the tracks clear. They provide the entertainment. It is a huge industry in Sault Ste. Marie and Algoma, and it has deteriorated significantly over the last couple of years as we have begun to experience the infamous western hemisphere initiative. Tourism is down.

I expect that if we bring in what we are talking about here under Bill C-42, right now it is Americans who are not coming here, but if people from other countries have to pass through American airspace and have to get on a list and be prior approved, the numbers will plummet even further.

What happened to the notion of free trade and fair trade, the free flow of people and the free flow of goods and services for a tourism industry in Canada and in northern Ontario that is as good as, if not better than, anywhere else in the world?

We are creating regimes here of public policy, of oversight, of throwing nets out that are catching people who perhaps we did not intend to catch. It is affecting us in a very negative and hurtful way.

We continue to make it more and more difficult. More and more with our public policy we are moving toward an integration with this American culture of paranoia, fear and misinformation.

We started out following on the coattails of the Americans as they were paranoid about the possibility of being attacked by other rogue regimes that might have rockets and nuclear weapons. They came up with the star wars idea which they wanted us to buy into. We said no. We looked at it and thought about it and looked at what it was going to cost and how successful it might be in the end. Some thoughtful, intelligent people look at it, and thankfully as a country we said no to star wars and it went away. We do not hear much anymore about that anti-missile net that we were going to set up to catch missiles from rogue countries.

Then we were invited by the Americans, again in their heightened state of true paranoia, to join them in the war in Iraq that was about weapons of mass destruction. At the end of the day we found that the weapons did not exist. Thankfully, we can give credit to the hundreds of thousands of people across this country who marched, rallied and gathered in town squares to say that this was not the right thing for Canada to get involved in. They were telling the Americans not to do it. They were telling the Brits not to do it. More important, they were telling our government not to follow suit, that it was not in our best interest and it was going to turn out bad.

After a few years of assessing that incursion, that war on Iraq by the Americans, we have decided that it probably was not the world's best moment. It probably was not the Americans' best moment.

It turned out that it was probably a good and smart decision, in keeping with the tradition of Canada as peacekeepers in the world, as a third entity that can bring a position to the table that might resolve conflict as opposed to adding to it.

Then we went on from there to passports. Now we are looking at--

[Brian Masse, NDP, Windsor West, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise on Bill C-42 and support my colleagues in the House of Commons.

The member for Burnaby—New Westminster is absolutely correct. With regard to safety management systems and other deregulatory matters, the government has put passengers at risk. It is attempting to say that it is doing this for security reasons, but that is certainly not true.

I want to start with the privacy aspects of this bill. The Patriot Act in the United States gives all kinds of liberties to the U.S. departments and agencies. However, one of the things that we need to put on the record is that the passenger name record is part of this agreement. That is what is required for these secret treaties that take place.

The PNR is a file created by the travel agent when someone books a ticket. It is a system created by the travel industry to facilitate travel, so that all bookings and other information are passed along as people move from one travel company to another. The PNR can contain information on credit cards, other passengers on the same flight, locations travelled to, phone numbers, medical conditions, and even food eaten on the plane.

That is what the PNR can provide, and the information can now be available to several countries that are now going to have access to travellers' personal information, with no stopgap.

One of the things I want to touch on is the U.S. Patriot Act. I think it is an important model to look at, because right now Canadian information can be accessed in the United States. The requirement of the Patriot Act is that the company cannot tell people when they are accessing that information. That information can be granted to the American law enforcement agencies.

There is no agreement or consent on how that information is used or scrubbed or where it goes. That is the reality.

It is interesting that the previous administration, the Liberals, outsourced the census data collection agency. We fought to keep it in-house, because Lockheed Martin had its data collection system in the United States.

In the end, all the Canadian census information, all the private information that we had under the control of the Privacy Commissioner, became null and void. Once it went to the United States to be assembled, there was no way it could be recovered. We could not know when, how, or where that information was going, because by law this cannot be disclosed.

CIBC, which has its data management evaluated in the United States, is vulnerable to having its information accessed through the Patriot Act. Once again, it is against the law for CIBC to notify customers that this information has been accessed.

That is one of the things that many civil liberty organizations have been fighting for years, and this is going to be happening under Bill C-42. All the information that is out there is going to be in their systems, and we will not know when or how it is used under the Patriot Act.

The European data collection systems operate under certain principles. At least they have some backstops for privacy.

It is interesting to talk about airline security, what is happening out there, and how this is going to help. I want to bring up a local case of airline security. It showed that some of the common sense solutions are not working. Even though the U.S. is a big proponent of infringement on Canadian civil liberties, they have serious problems in their own maintenance of airline security. None was more compelling than that of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the attempted bomber who landed in Detroit, Michigan, near my area, 40 kilometres away from the border.

It is important to note that he flew from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan. He had started in the Middle East. This was the famous underwear bomber who had to be tackled and subdued. He flew across part of Canada, too. He showed up at the airport and got a one-way ticket to Detroit, with no baggage and no winter clothing in the middle of winter.

American officials were tipped off a week earlier about the possibility and did nothing about it.

We heard nothing but deafening silence from the government about this security breach. It put Canadians at risk because the plane travelled across parts of Quebec and Ontario and back into Detroit. All these extra elements would not have made a difference, because common sense was not applied in this case. Instead of raising this with the U.S., we did nothing. That was unfortunate.

These are opportunities to point out that we in Canada do some good things here, not to chastise the United States. This was an opportunity to let the Americans know that we protect privacy.

During the U.S. election several comments were made about the 9/11 attackers coming from Canada. Comments were made about Canada being weak on terrorism. The reality is that the terrorists had U.S. documents. They did not come from Canada. In fact, Canada played a significant role in 9/11 by allowing stranded airplanes to land. Many Canadian officials, volunteers, and members of fire departments went to Ground Zero later on. The U.S. continues to claim that we are weak on security. And we still do not have a full contestation. It is appalling at best.

I want to talk a bit about the European Commission's Data Protection Working Party. The commission set up six principles to guide it through the collection and transmission of personal information.

First, the purpose limitation principle states that private information should be processed for a specific purpose and subsequently used or further communicated only insofar as this is not incompatible with the purpose of the transfer. It is very specific in scope.

Second, the information quality and proportionality principle states that no excessive information should be provided, especially depending on flight information.

Third, the transparency principle requires that individuals be provided with information as to the purpose of the processing and the identity of those in control of the information in the third country and other information insofar as this is necessary to ensure fairness.

That is the one sticking point. It is a problem when dealing with the United States, our number-one trading partner.

Under the Patriot Act, this information can be accessed by government departments such as the FBI and the CIA. A judge could issue a release of information. We will not know how or when the information is used or where it goes. That is problematic, especially if one is not travelling to the United States. It is unfortunate. It is a situation that defies our historic aviation principles, and it is one that will expose people to data collection and privacy issues. Once again, we have no recourse.

Fourth, the right to access, rectification, and opposition principle states that the subject of the information should have the right to obtain a copy of all the information that is processed relating to him or her and the right to rectify the inaccurate information. In some situations the person should be able to object to the processing of the data relating to him or her.

Fifth, the person should be made aware of what the exposure will be and be able to choose whether or not to travel. They should know what they will be getting into if they are travelling. People can make a choice. People have a chance to have their say and make another decision if too much information is going to be exposed. Another means of transportation can be chosen, but there is a choice in the matter.

Sixth, there is a restriction on onward transfer principle. Transfers of personal information to further countries should be permitted only where the second country is also subject to the same rules as the country originally receiving the information.

There we have it. Once again, the Patriot Act is going to create problems for that, because it does not subscribe to any of those types of elements.

It is really important to talk about some of the civil liberties. Here is what some of the experts are saying.

Roch Tassé of the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group said, “The Americans will have a veto on every passenger that gets on a plane in Canada even if they are not going to set foot on American soil”. Mr. Tassé added, “What will happen if Canada invites the ambassador from a country such as Cuba?”

These are situations where we have lost our sovereignty.

Living in a border town, I can say that our American friends and cousins are our greatest allies and we have so many people with so many strengths who travel back and forth. Literally thousands of nurses go from Windsor to Detroit every single day.

Generally speaking, the relations are good, but I have seen applications of an extreme nature take place. It is ironic. We have in Windsor doctors who the province and the federal government will not let practise in Canada with the credential barriers that they have. They are actually practising in Detroit. They go over there every day and they save American lives. At the border, though, they are treated as a security threat. That is the reality.

The ironic thing is that, even right now, sometimes in Windsor when we cannot get a specialist or we cannot get an appointment and there is nothing in London, for example, we will actually then send a Canadian over to an American hospital, who can get treated by a doctor who is not qualified supposedly in Canada and we will pay a premium for it. It is the most absurd thing that is happening.

We have seen these situations take place where, individually, people get singled out.

We had a number of high profile cases in the U.S. where people were put on the no-fly list, even including American politicians. It is not out of the realm that it could happen. So I think Mr. Tassé's comments are very good.

The Air Transport Association of Canada also made its grievances known. It believes the submission of Canadian passenger details by Canadian airlines violates Canada's laws on the protection of personal information and electronic documents, as well as laws on aeronautics. That was its opinion of this bill.

I would agree. When we look at the bill and what it does, it circumvents some of the privacy elements that we have built into the entire system.

This comes ironically at a time when the government is killing the long form mandatory census and bringing in a new national household survey. It was interesting, because when the government first came out with this, the minister argued that this would violate the privacy of Canadians and the government wanted to protect their privacy. The long form mandatory census is against that. It violates an individual's personal privacy.

I called the Privacy Commissioner's office and talked to the deputy and asked, how many cases are there of privacy having been breached or how many complaints do we get on the census? There had been a handful over the last 20 years. It turned out, when I asked whether the census goes through a privacy system, they said yes. They actually work with the census group and with the Privacy Commissioner. It goes through an audit there and also at Treasury Board to ensure that no one's personal privacy is affected. They described their working relationship as excellent. There was no weight at all to the minister claiming that the census was affecting personal privacy. There was no evidence provided to the Privacy Commission. The commission was actively engaged, and in fact, it actually changed some of the questions or some of the techniques of the census so that privacy is protected. It did that a number of different times.

I am going to wrap up by thanking our transport critic for working on the bill. It is an important issue for ourselves because we believe privacy and civil liberties have been trampled on at different times under the guise of security.

But in the case I mentioned before, which was in Detroit, there are obviously other techniques that can be employed. Simply do not let people on with a one-way ticket, no luggage and no screening of any significance, and even bomb material on the plane.

In these types of situations, if we are going to be looking at exposing Canadians' personal privacy through secret deals, then there needs to be backstopped, clear paths of recourse developed to ensure that Canadians are going to be protected.

The government of the day never did anything about challenging the Patriot Act, getting some clauses or some elements in there, in the U.S., to actually deal with the Canadian situation to make sure, at least, that if there was going to be an exposure, there would be some protection for them, some accountability.

That never happened. So at the end of the day we are left with this type of mess where Canadians' privacy is certainly going to be threatened and put at risk. I think it is unfortunate, because a lot of people probably will not even know this happens, the exposure of their personal privacy. In this day and age, that is something people still want to keep maintained.

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I like the member for Fort McMurray—Athabasca, even though he takes licence with the facts. We saw this with SMS and we heard the same promises. The government said that the bill was bad but it would fix it later in the regulations. That is apparently what he is doing now. He is saying that the bill is egregiously bad. In fact, any Canadian can go on the House of Commons website, look up Bill C-42, and find out what the government has concocted. It is a matter of real concern that the government is making some promises to try to fix what it did not do in the bill.

He raised the issue of domestic flights. This one paragraph bill rips up the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. It says that “an operator of an aircraft departing from Canada that is due to land in a foreign state or fly over a foreign state and land outside Canada” is subject to providing Canadians' private, personal information.

He has raised this red herring that flying from Vancouver to Winnipeg is exempt, and he is trying to say that this is some kind of victory. This is a bit disingenuous, just a bit. The Air Transport Association of Canada has clearly said that “the submission of Canadian passengers' details by Canadian airlines violates Canada's laws on the protection of personal information and electronic documents, as well as laws on aeronautics”.

We rest our case. The Air Transport Association of Canada agrees with us, not with him, and I think most Canadians agree with us, not with him.

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to praise the member for Western Arctic for the work he does on the transport committee and in the House. He has been first and foremost in fighting for transportation safety in this Parliament. In the previous Parliament, he fought to stop the government's irresponsible plans around self-managed safety systems, or basically self-serve safety, the famous SMS systems, in the airline industry. He managed to stop the government cold from doing to the airline industry what it irresponsibly did to the railway industry. We certainly saw an increase in accidents and derailments in the railway industry.

His work there and now his work on Bill C-42 shows that he has the concerns of Canadian families from coast to coast to coast, since he represents the Arctic in mind. It is because of his incredible efforts in the House that more and more Canadians are becoming aware of what the government is intending to do with Bill C-42. It is ripping up personal information protection and allowing personal confidential information, in an unprotected way, to be given to other countries, like the Dominican Republic, which is an authoritarian government, or Panama, which ranks among the world's worst in terms of dirty money laundering and tax havens.

What the government could have done, to answer the member for Western Arctic's question, is put in place the principles around confidentiality and protection of private information, which include, most notable among the six principles that the European Commission has adopted, the restriction on aberrant transfers, that we can only transfer information to third parties or third countries when it is protected.

In this case, as we know, and as the member for Western Arctic has very eloquently raised in the House, the government did not do it. It did not get the job done. It did not even try to get the job done. It did not even try to apply any of those principles of protection of confidential and private information, not even one. That is why the bill is so bad. It did not even make the attempt to provide some protection of Canadians personal private information, including credit cards. It is clear that the government did not understand what it was doing, that it did not understand the implications and that now the current government really has to withdraw this bad bill.