Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, members.
My insight and understanding of PRC foreign interference comes from 32 years of operations with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, most of which was in what we called counter-intelligence. I worked in CI against hostile states—posted in the field and in headquarters—for a number of years. This also includes what we refer to as state-driven foreign interference.
When I started working was during the Cold War, and espionage was the all-consuming threat in the west, and in Canada in particular. That was what we worked against—against various state actors. There has been an evolution since about the implosion of the Soviet Union, and, in fact, espionage has become rather passé. It's high risk. It's very difficult to do against hard targets. You have to get people to commit treason. It's a lot easier with foreign influence.
What we have seen in the last 30 years is that foreign interference has eclipsed classic espionage as a national security threat in terms of both its scope and its speed. Why risk stealing another state's secrets when you can influence and manipulate the targeted country's policy-makers? You can get close to what we consider the soft underbelly of the state through its democratic institutions.
The People's Republic of China, in this effort, is the A-team. It's the best at this. Its level of sophistication, confidence bordering on arrogance, has made it probably the most daunting threat from a foreign intelligence perspective. While China continues to play chess, Canada plays whack-a-mole. We need to raise our game.
There has been some talk recently that we don't have any legislative hammer to hit foreign interference with, that there isn't legislation, like with espionage and terrorism. I respectfully disagree with that. If you look at the Security of Information Act, particularly at the back of it, in subsection 20(1)—I will just read a little of it to you—and in section 3, you have the language that is appropriate, in my opinion, for prosecuting foreign interference.
Subsection 3(1) says it's “prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State” if someone commits an offence punishable by two years or more in prison to advance a political objective or to benefit a foreign entity.
If we move to subsection 20(1), we see that it's an offence if, “for the benefit of...a foreign entity”, a person “induces or attempts to induce” or causes something to be done that “increas[es] the capacity of a foreign entity” or “is reasonably likely to harm Canadian interests.”
These offences are easily captured by the Security of Information Act, in my opinion. I think that perhaps this committee or others might want to take a look at some of that. I have highlighted that in the legislation.
We know now that this is an existential threat. What really has been done? What has been done since the allegations came out in November?
Well, there has been the proposal for a foreign-agent registry listing, which has merit, but unless I'm mistaken, there already is a bill in the Senate, Bill S-237, which is a foreign-agent registry bill that has been there since August. Why don't we just move it through the Senate and the House of Commons, instead of going across the country and having town halls to see what people think of it?
I don't mean to be facetious, but I really think that if the government wants to have a registry—and I know a lot of Canadians want to—we have already done some groundwork there.
We're allocating millions of dollars to the RCMP, I learned last week, with no investigative strategy, no prosecution strategy. We're just saying, “Here. Take this money and use this.” In 32 years of national security work, every time we have had a crisis, every time we have had an incident, that's what the government has done. It'll throw money at the RCMP. It'll say, “You folks have to sort that out.” I don't think that's really an appropriate response.
We haven't had a national security policy renewed since 2004. That's the first time we ever had a national security policy written. The threat landscape in this country has changed enormously in the last 20 years—qualitatively. There are new threats with AI and all sorts of things. I think Canadians deserve something like that, and it should be a national security policy that is China-centric.
I don't mean to sound partisan. I don't mean to blame any particular government. I worked this threat from the PRC for many, many years. I actually was the national program manager 12 or 13 years ago. It was a different government at the time, and the reaction to foreign interference reporting—as I think was suggested earlier—was no different from what it is today. There was nobody home. There really wasn't much of a response.
This really isn't a partisan issue for me. I think this threat and how the government is going to react, or how it reacts to it historically, has transcended party and time. What we really need is a more holistic approach to pushing back against that threat.
Finally, I want to say that I'm so delighted to be here to speak today, but particularly with Mr. Ho and Mr. Chiu as panel members—and the other fellows, as well, of course. However, I think it's extremely important that we have Chinese Canadians, that they have a platform to talk about what has been going on.
They need to have a voice, and not simply as some PR exercise to find out what they think now and then. These are the people who have been in the crosshairs of the People's Republic of China's regime for 30 or 40 years, and they are the people who need to come forward. They need to have the trust and confidence that there are going to be outcomes and a follow-up if they are going to take a risk and come forward to say what's happening. Not only does the government have to listen, but Canadians have to listen to our Chinese Canadian community for once and hear what they have to say.
