Mr. Speaker, it is always a great honour to stand in this place to speak on behalf of the residents and constituents of Edmonton Strathcona. I am particularly delighted to stand today to speak about our sanctions regime and the work that needs to be done to strengthen it and ensure it is as adequate and as strong as it can be.
We know that sanctions are one of the tools we have to hold governments and individuals around the world to the rule of law, to human rights, to democracy and to fairness and justice for their citizens. For a very long time, many members in this place have worked very hard and well together to try to increase the effectiveness of our sanctions regime and the ability of sanctions to do what we hope they will do, which is to change the course of governments and individuals, to change their behaviour and punish them for the harms they have caused without harming and punishing innocent people and citizens.
The act we are debating today is Bill S-8. This act would amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, to make consequential amendments to other acts and to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations.
The proposed legislation amends the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, or the IRPA, and it provides Canada with much-needed abilities to better link government sanctions with authorities related to immigration enforcement. I think we can all agree that this means that not only will foreign nationals sanctioned due to the invasion of Ukraine be inadmissible to Canada, but it will also stop all previously sanctioned individuals from places like Iran, Myanmar or Burma, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe among others.
I and the NDP are very supportive of the bill, but we need to consider, and most of my comments today will be on this, that this is a small piece of what needs to be done to strengthen Canada's sanctions regime.
The bill would not fix some of the things for which we have been calling for some time; for example, the absence of parliamentary oversight. We have very little parliamentary oversight of our sanctions regime, and I will speak to that a bit later.
This would also not fix the enforcement in areas that are not immigration related, for example, the seizure of assets. Again, I will speak to this in more depth later on, but I would raise again in the House that to date about $121 million has been seized from Russian oligarchs as part of our sanctions regime to force Russia to stop its illegal war in Ukraine. While that $121 million is an awful lot to me and probably an awful lot to most of us in this room and in the country, it is not an awful lot for Russian oligarchs.
The bill would also not fix the challenge that we as parliamentarians have with clarity. We still do not have a good system in this place that explains why the government chooses to add some people to the list to be sanctioned, how those decisions are made and how the timing of those decisions is determined. We know we work with our allies and other countries. That is very important for sanctions to be effective. However, as parliamentarians, we need to have more clarity on how those decisions are made.
As we go forward in looking at strengthening the sanctions regime, there are people in the House who have been doing very important work on this. I have to call out my colleague from the Conservative Party, the member for Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, for his excellent work on the Magnitsky sanctions. The Deputy Prime Minister also did great work on ensuring the Magnitsky act was put in place. Of course, as some people have mentioned before, and my colleague from the Bloc mentioned just previously, the challenge is that putting a law in place does not actually matter if we do not enforce it or if we do not ensure it is adequately applied.
A perfect example of this is that with the Magnitsky sanctions, we are supposed to do a five-year review. Five years is 2022. There is some review being done in the Senate, but we have not done any review within the foreign affairs committee or within this Parliament. For me, that is the challenge we have.
I spoke briefly about the need to strengthen our sanctions regime. For years, the NDP has been pushing for a stronger sanctions regime. We are happy to see some of the important changes that this bill would bring forward, but there are things we have been asking for for years, including in the 2017 foreign affairs committee study on Canada's sanctions regime. Many of the recommendations from that study have not been implemented. We look forward to the government moving somewhat faster than it has to date to make sure those are implemented, especially considering that right now what we are seeing in Ukraine is a vital need for sanctions to be a key piece of our response to the Ukrainian war.
Another example of why our sanctions regime has not been as effective as it could be is the waiver. We saw the government in the summer, in the middle of July, put a waiver in place that would cancel some of the important sanctions we put in place against Russia. I am not going to stand here and pretend that would not have been a very difficult decision for the government to make. Our German allies and Ukrainian allies were asking for different things, and that is a very difficult situation to be in. While I did not agree with the decision that was made by the government, I do accept it was a difficult decision to make.
That said, first of all, the pipeline the waiver was supporting was a piece of equipment returned to Germany to be returned to Russia, and Russia did not pick it up. The second thing is that the pipeline it was meant to be used on has now been blown up. There is no reason whatsoever for us to still have this waiver in place and still have this lessening of our sanctions against Russia, yet we still do.
The Government of Canada has still not cancelled the waiver, which is appalling. It is something it should be doing immediately. I know the foreign affairs committee will be recommending that, if we can get out of the filibuster that has been put in place by some of our colleagues in the Conservative Party.
The other piece of our sanctions regime that I want to know about is how we can double-check it to see that what is happening is adequate and being done properly. I have talked a bit about sanctions oversight, and we know that after Russia invaded Ukraine in February, sanctions were put in place. However, we also know that those sanctions trickled out after months and months. We learned that many oligarchs had the opportunity to move their assets from Canada so they would not have those assets seized. That is a missed opportunity since those assets were supposed to help rebuild Ukraine and help with the rebuilding initiatives.
We also know that the government has failed to provide the clarity on sanctions that we have hoped for. For example, I have asked about this multiple times in the House and through Order Paper questions to get more information and details on who is being sanctioned, what is being sanctioned, what has been seized, how it is being seized and what processes are being used. However, I have never been able to get an adequate answer from the government.
In fact, one of the Order Paper questions was returned to me with a response that said the government was not 100% sure that it would be able to give me accurate information, so it provided me with no information at all. That is an interesting tactic. I would love to see somebody try to say in a high school or university course that since they are not sure they are giving all the information, they will give none at all. That is something we have problems with. We still do not have that level of clarity.
I have another concern. When the government introduced the last budget implementation act, there was a change to the way that sanctions were dealt with. In the past, there was parliamentary oversight because the government needed to record the use of the sanctions regime or the sanctions act and needed to report it to Parliament. It needed to be tabled with Parliament.
In the Budget Implementation Act, that requirement was removed. Therefore, it is now no longer the government's obligation to tell Parliament what those sanctions are or what has been seized. We could find out if we took the government to court and used a judicial remedy, but we cannot find out just through parliamentary processes.
This is taking away the right of all parliamentarians to have that transparency and to have that understanding of how our sanctions are being chosen, how they are being enforced and if they are working. A sanction is not that useful if it is not being enforced. A sanction is not that important if countries or individuals understand that it will not be enforced in Canada.
There is an interesting thing I found out as I was doing some digging around sanctions. If we want to find out what goods are coming into Canada from Russia, we can look at Russian shipping records. We cannot find that out by looking at Canadian shipping records.
It is very interesting to me that there is transparency that can be found in the U.S., the U.K., the EU and Russia, but we cannot find it here.
That is another challenge I have with our sanction regime. As I said at the beginning, this particular bill would help with some aspects of our sanction regime. I am very happy to support this legislation. I am very happy to see that it would be fixing some of those holes around our sanction regime. However, this seems very much, to me, like tinkering around the edges.
We have heard from the Senate. One of the key quotations from the Senate hearings on Bill S-8, from Canada's foremost expert on sanctions policy, Andrea Charron, was this:
While there is nothing wrong with highlighting in the Immigration and Refugee Act that inadmissibility due to sanctions is possible, this repeats a pattern whereby Canada tinkers on the margins of legislation without addressing core policy and process issues. If we are to continue to sanction autonomously with allies, we need to fix fundamental issues of policy and [fundamental issues of] process.
I believe that we have many things we still need to do. We need to have a comprehensive review of Canada's sanction regime. The NDP has proposed a study at the foreign affairs committee on Canada's sanction regime. That study was meant to have taken place during this fall's session. We are very hopeful that it will take place very quickly once the winter session begins. I urge my colleagues in the Conservative Party to stop filibustering our committee so that we can get on with the very important work of foreign affairs.
We can ensure that our sanctions are being more effectively applied. We can bring forward legislation that would align with the recommendations in the 2017 foreign affairs committee report that called for greater transparency. It called for a review of our sanctions regime and called for a parliamentary body of all parties that would assist in identifying which names and which individuals should be on the Magnitsky list and should be sanctioned by the Government of Canada.
One of our biggest problems, and I have said this many times, is that if we cannot fix our sanction regime, our sanction regime very quickly becomes not as effective and not as useful as we need it to be.
I think that members of the House have brought up circumstances where that is the case. We know that, for example, in Ukraine, sanctions are one of the key tools we have to hold Russia to account for its illegal invasion in Ukraine. It is one of the key levers that Canada can pull to force the Russian Federation to rethink this horrific and illegal attack on civilians.
It is also one of the things that we can use when other human rights abuses are raised around the world. We are seeing horrific attacks on protesters in Iran. Just this morning, I woke up to another horrific example of a protester being executed because he was fighting for his freedom. We know that there are many Iranians who are in grave danger right now. If this sanction regime can be fixed and can help the people in Iran even a little bit, it has to be done.
I am interested in looking at sanctioning a whole range of characters around the world who we know have been responsible for atrocious human rights abuses, such as what we see in Yemen and from members of Saudi Arabia. We need to be ensuring that, as a country, we are standing up for human rights, using the tools we have at our disposal for those efforts.
I also want to point out that the sanctions regime is a tool we also have to use for our feminist international assistance policy and for the feminist foreign policy that we certainly hope the government tables in Parliament very soon. We know that a huge percentage of the people who are identified by the Magnitsky sanctions and the other SEMA sanction measures are perpetrating human rights abuses that are disproportionately impacting women and girls around the world. We know that sexual violence and gender-based violence have been used as a tool to silence journalists and human rights defenders around the world. We know that rape has been used. This violence does not align with a country like Canada, which has a feminist foreign policy and a feminist international assistance policy, and we need to be looking at our foreign responses through that lens.
I would like to end my comments with this. As I was travelling here from Edmonton yesterday, I took some time to read some of the speeches from the Nobel Peace Prize winners, and I want to read a quote to the House. It is by Oleksandra Matviichuk from the Center for Civil Liberties, the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize winner. She spoke to me about the need for sanctions and why it was so important that we work with our allies to make our sanctions regime stronger.
She stated:
Peace, progress and human rights are inextricably linked. A state that kills journalists, imprisons activists, or disperses peaceful demonstrations poses a threat not only to its citizens. Such a state poses a threat to the entire region and peace in the world as a whole. Therefore, the world must adequately respond to systemic violations. In political decision-making, human rights must be as important as economic benefits or security. This approach {must} be applied in foreign policy...
