In classic counter-insurgency operational theory, the challenge is to gain traction on a bottom-up basis. In talking about traction, we use the notion of ink spots that spread over time while we're building national institutions.
We are more focused on the bottom-up piece of this: districts, villages. Back in 2006, I would say we were more focused on Kandahar as a province. We're still looking provincially at what assistance is required for governance. At the same time, though, we have to prioritize. We have to focus. We have to focus functionally and we have to focus geographically. What we have seen increasingly over the last year or so is a district- and community-level focus to try to create stabilization zones that we can expand upon.
In each of those stabilization zones, we need to superimpose a number of different effects. One is our own security effect, using our own forces. Another is a security effect achieved by Afghan National Security Forces. Superimposed on that, once there's a level of confidence from IOs, NGOs, and so on, we use CIDA funds to bring in contractors who are able to deliver concrete effects that include the building of governance capacity. This way the locals have confidence in the guy or the shura who has a responsibility for helping and protecting them.
That's why the whole-of-government approach that we refer to is so important—a single effect won't last. We can apply it, but it fizzles. The spark goes out relatively quickly unless we're able to superimpose something else on top.