With all due respect, sir, looking purely at numbers is a little bit of a mug's game. Of course, what's not reflected in the numbers is that most of those folks are leaders. So in terms of leadership, we have more leadership capability or capacity invested in the OMLT component of our force structure than we do in our battle group, in the fighting element of our force structure. And the commanding officer of the OMLT organization is a full colonel, whereas the commanding officers of the other units are lieutenant-colonels. So intellectually, and from a leadership perspective, that investment is there.
I also need to add, of course, that an awful lot of what the rest of the joint task force does is in support of the Afghans. We conduct partner operations with them. We support them logistically. We support them from a communications standpoint, and so on. Increasingly, as I said in my statement, our expectation is that they will lead and we will support and enable. And that supporting and enabling is not just about the mentoring part of the structure; it's about the whole joint task force.
So I can assure you that we are already where you are suggesting we need to be, and we'll continue to move in that direction. One of the challenges, of course, is that we have a fixed number of Afghans to work with. The Afghan National Army is only of a certain size, and what we actually need is to see more Afghan National Army in the south and in Kandahar province. At that point we will find a way to provide more mentors to assist with that particular process.
But this is a positive story. It's important. We get it, and we will continue to put all possible emphasis in this area.