Afghanistan Committee on Dec. 2nd, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

I call the meeting to order. Today is the 18th meeting of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan.

Today we have from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Colleen Swords, associate deputy minister. Welcome.

From the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, we have Douglas Scott Proudfoot, director of the Sudan task force. Welcome, sir.

From Correctional Service of Canada, we have Linda Garwood-Filbert, manager, assessment and intervention.

I have only one submission here in written form for opening remarks, and that comes from Ms. Garwood-Filbert. Do the other two of you have opening remarks to make?

[Colleen Swords, Associate Deputy Minister, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development]

We do.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Do you know how long they are?

[Colleen Swords]

If I go fast, it's about 10 minutes. If I go slow, it's 12 minutes.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Go fast.

Sir.

[Douglas Scott Proudfoot, Director, Sudan Task Force, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Mine will be about three minutes.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Do you know how long yours is, Ms. Filbert?

[Linda Garwood-Filbert, Manager, Assessment and Intervention, Correctional Service Canada]

Around seven minutes, sir.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Members need to know that because that determines how many rounds we get in and how many questions they can ask. We'll get as deep into the rotations as we can.

Welcome.

As usual, we'll give the witnesses time to make their comments and then we'll open it up to questions. Seeing as we have the written one here from Linda Garwood-Filbert, would you like to start now?

[Linda Garwood-Filbert]

Thank you.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

By way of introduction, my name is Linda Garwood-Filbert. I am currently a special projects officer at Stony Mountain Institution. My responsibilities are to research and draft responses for the commissioner, deputy commissioner, warden, and correctional investigator, and to develop convening orders for inquiries and investigations and action plans for both local and national investigations. I currently have 30 years of experience with the Public Service of Canada, 28 of which have been devoted to Correctional Service both at home and abroad.

In late 2006 I was selected for the newly formed position of correctional component director of the Kandahar provincial reconstruction team. This position was meant to enhance the rule of law portfolio, as there was no correctional expertise in Kandahar. This component added to the already established efforts on policing and judicial reform and would provide a comprehensive approach to justice sector reforms. I deployed to the Kandahar provincial reconstruction team on February 5, 2007, and remained there until December 22, 2007.

Thereafter, from January 2, 2008, until January 2, 2009, I was working with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan as the international coordinator for prison reform. My main responsibilities included the development and implementation of the new prison regulations, completion and implementation of the priority reform and restructuring process, prison infrastructure throughout Afghanistan, training and mentoring of prison staff, and development of educational and vocational programming, in addition to a focus on education and post-release opportunities for women and girl prisoners. Overall, I was in Afghanistan for close to two years visiting and monitoring the Afghan prison system.

My primary roles as the correctional component director were to establish a correctional presence at the KPRT; to assess infrastructure challenges primarily at Sarposa Prison but also at the National Directorate of Security and to a lesser extent at the Afghan National Police headquarters detention centre; to develop a full understanding of the central prison department, with a focus on the training and mentoring needs of correctional personnel; and lastly, to establish working relationships with the justice sectors and Government of Afghanistan stakeholders in Kandahar with corresponding links to the UNAMA correctional adviser and the relevant ministries in Kabul.

These links were intended to assist us in extending the existing authority of the Ministry of Justice and the central prison department to the province of Kandahar, thereby impacting justice sector reform. This would also provide a forum through the prison working group in Kabul to have issues specific to Kandahar addressed on a national level.

Not only did I work in concert with the Canadian Forces, DFAIT, and CIVPOL, but I was also able to work closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, NGOs, and other correctional advisers from the United Nations, United States, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Most importantly, I was able to work closely with the warden of Sarposa Prison, his management team, and Government of Afghanistan officials.

The end result was a program proposal, via the global peace and security fund, that focused on infrastructure upgrades, staff training, inmate education and vocational training, living conditions, and health care, with a focus on gender issues and the needs of children, all within the context of international human rights standards for prisoners.

In terms of prison visits, we commenced making site visits as early as February 13, 2007, well before the May 2007 supplementary arrangement signed between the Governments of Canada and Afghanistan that explicitly set out our monitoring rights. During this period, we conducted 13 visits to Sarposa and two visits to NDS. Following the arrangement, another 20 visits to Sarposa were conducted as well as 10 additional trips to NDS prior to my departure in late December.

In other words, in 2007 alone we visited Sarposa Prison on 33 occasions, the National Directorate of Security on 12 occasions, and the Afghan National Police detention centre on two occasions, for a total of 47 visits. These visits were usually unannounced. Overall, I can safely say that Correctional Service was, for the most part, allowed free and unfettered access to Sarposa Prison, the National Directorate of Security, and the Afghan National Police headquarters.

Throughout my mission, I talked to prisoners all the time. Many of these instances were informal in nature. Site visits would include general dialogue and interviews of prisoners, detainees, and prisoner advocates to get their accounts of living conditions and treatment within the prison system. Typically complaints would revolve around food, living conditions, access to family visits, and medical care. These are also typical complaints from inmates in Canada.

My specific role would be to assess treatment against the UN standard minimum rules for treatment and give feedback to the administration on improvements. I would typically look for signs of injury or of distress attributed to the use of shackles, and I would also look at specific medical complaints if they were brought to my attention.

However, in addition to this role, I was also involved in the more formal process of detainee monitoring. When conducting these monitoring interviews with detainees at both Sarposa and NDS, my DFAIT colleague and I were always provided with an office or area where we could talk privately with the detainee. During these visits, CSC observed approximately 26 detainee interviews. While some inmates would recount what they had heard or were told or what had happened to them personally, to the degree possible I attempted to substantiate their claims. Although I took care to look for them, there were no physical signs of abuse to validate their statements. In all my visits and interviews with these inmates, I personally never saw any signs of physical abuse or torture. All detainees who knew they were captured by the Canadian Forces spoke well of their treatment by them, including receiving medical care when needed.

Nonetheless, in April 2007 I reported two prisoner allegations of mistreatment to the AIHRC and ICRC. Following that, all other claims and observations were documented in my reports.

Specifically, there was one detainee who had been told by others about beatings, another who stated he thought he had heard a beating in the next cell, and six who indicated they themselves had been beaten, including two prisoners who indicated that they had been beaten by the Afghan National Police prior to transfer to the National Directorate of Security. Lastly, on a visit to the National Directorate of Security on November 19, 2007, comments were made regarding the discovery of a braided piece of electrical cable found in the office of the director of investigations during the November 5, 2007, visit, the reporting of which by DFAIT led to his subsequent removal.

The only observable treatment not specifically related to Canadian-transferred detainees that I noted at both sites that was contrary to the United Nations standard minimum rules of treatment was the consistent use of chains as restraints on national security prisoners; at the National Directorate of Security, denial of fresh air exercise, holding child detainees with adults, and on one occasion the use of light deprivation; and at Sarposa Prison, the arbitrary detention of prisoners past their release date. In each of these instances, I immediately spoke to the warden and director and reported these incidents to the UNAMA corrections adviser, DFAIT, and Correctional Service with regard to action plans and resolution.

Initially we would also receive calls from the AIHRC informing us that the directorate was not allowing them entry into the facility, and we would mediate on their behalf. This, however, improved over time. The UN human rights officer also indicated that while they had access to Sarposa and the ANP detention centre, they had not been successful with NDS.

I should note that there were a few occasions in which we were not allowed access to certain areas of the facilities, such as when they were in the middle of transferring prisoners. However, based on my experience, these were justified and were not unusual.

During the time I was in Afghanistan, I noticed an improvement in the general conditions of Sarposa Prison. Some examples would be the installation of a new septic system, medications for the clinic, four new security towers, solar lighting, looms and a new carpentry shop, an on-site training centre, and basic officer training, just to cite a few.

The prison officials I worked with were generally receptive and eager to work with us to help improve prison conditions. While I was working for the UN, I also had the opportunity to visit prisons in other parts of the country. By comparison--and following significant investment by Canada--Sarposa Prison in Kandahar was considered to provide some of the best prison conditions in the country.

In conclusion, during the time I spent in Afghanistan, I was impressed with the work being done to ensure the rights and standards that are to be afforded to prisoners and detainees. I witnessed correctional personnel in the central prison department making a sincere effort to learn and develop and to adhere to international standards to the best of their ability. Their acceptance of my department and their cooperation set the stage for the advancement of justice sector reform and the rule of law in Kandahar.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Proudfoot.

[Douglas Scott Proudfoot]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I will present my opening statement in English but I can answer your questions in the official language of your choice.

My name is Scott Proudfoot. I am currently the director of the Sudan task force in the Department of Foreign Affairs, a position I have held since August 2007. In this position I'm responsible for coordinating Canada's whole-of-government engagement in Sudan and for directing Canada's foreign policy toward Sudan.

Previously, I was director of the policy and advocacy division in the Afghanistan task force until July 2007. I began work on Afghanistan in August 2006 when the Afghanistan task force, known as FTAG, was founded. I was its first director.

The task force was created in part to consolidate diverse Afghanistan-related functions that were previously dispersed throughout the department. These included policy formulation and diplomatic engagement, bilateral operations, and public communications. Until the task force was greatly expanded and reorganized in early 2007, responsibility for a number of files remained in other branches. The issues that remained outside the purview of the task force included civilian deployments, program design and execution, narcotics issues, and the detainee issue, where the international security branch retained the lead within DFAIT until the summer of 2007.

Although I was not directly involved in the detainee issue at the time, I do recall seeing reporting on the subject in the autumn of 2006, and I have since reread these reports. The reports in question did not indicate that Canadian-transferred detainees had been subject to mistreatment. They were largely procedural in content and pointed to a number of deficiencies in the implementation of the arrangements then in place for the transfer of detainees to Afghan custody.

I also recall that DFAIT and DND took steps at the time towards remedying these deficiencies and improving the modalities then in place.

By the early months of 2007, however, there was a growing awareness that additional steps were required to minimize the risk of mistreatment of Canadian-transferred detainees. This was based on reporting and recommendations from the field as well as other sources, including information with regard to the broader human rights context.

As a result, in the winter and spring of 2007 Canada expanded and formalized our relationship with the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, increased programming activities to build indigenous Afghan monitoring capacity and to improve conditions in Afghan prisons, and developed a diplomatic contingency plan in the event that there were allegations of mistreatment of Canadian-transferred detainees. This plan was put into effect when such allegations arose in April 2007.

During the March-April 2007 period I became more involved in the detainee issue, along with many others from DFAIT and other departments, and I contributed to elaborating the supplemental arrangement that was concluded with the Afghan government on May 3, 2007. As you know, under the supplemental arrangement, Canada obtained enhanced access rights to detention facilities to which detainees were transferred by Canadian Forces in order to ensure the monitoring of those detainees.

I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you, Mr. Proudfoot.

I have a good friend at home whose last name is Proudfoot. I'll remember that next time. Thanks.

Ms. Swords.

[Colleen Swords]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today and provide my perspective on the issue of Canadian-transferred detainees in Afghanistan. I hope my remarks today will make three points clear.

First, extensive work was under way throughout the period I worked on this file aimed at the prevention of mistreatment of Canadian-transferred detainees. Second, we have in place now a system for tracking and monitoring of Canadian-transferred detainees that is as rigorous as that of any of our NATO allies. Third, I welcomed and expected factual reporting from the field.

First, I'll give you a bit of background. In September 2006, after one year as ambassador to the Netherlands, I was asked to return to Ottawa to take up responsibilities as assistant deputy minister for international security and political director for the G-8. My branch had around 300 staff and a wide range of responsibilities, including peace and security issues, disarmament and non-proliferation, counterterrorism, natural disaster emergency management mission security abroad, and around $250 million for three different programs, including those for security sector projects in Afghanistan.

An undertaking like the mission in Afghanistan is by its very nature multi-faceted. In my branch, three divisions worked on aspects of the file. The functional lead was the division responsible for liaison with DND. Another division was responsible for humanitarian policies and relations with the International Committee of the Red Cross. And the third division managed the civilian component of our peace operation in Kandahar. Of course, we benefited from our experts in humanitarian law in the department's legal branch.

When I arrived there was also a relatively small Afghanistan task force at DFAIT chaired by my assistant deputy minister colleague in the geographic branch, and the embassy in Kabul reported to them. Throughout the fall of 2006 I coordinated the internal DFAIT detainee team and handled issues that required attention at the assistant deputy minister level. When David Mulroney was assigned to DFAIT in late February 2007, he asked me to take on the coordination of the existing interdepartmental group working on detainees to bring some coherence to our policy as well as to prepare more detailed additional measures that might be taken.

By April 2007, the sheer magnitude of work led to the creation of a much better-resourced Afghanistan task force at DFAIT reporting to David Mulroney. As a consequence of this organizational evolution, when my other responsibilities for G-8 matters became more pressing in late May and early June of 2007 the task force took over the lead coordinating role for detainees.

Canada's policy on the issue of the transfer of Afghan detainees has been inspired throughout by a genuine sense of the importance of two fundamental principles: first, Afghanistan sovereignty, with its own responsibility for human rights within its country; and second, Canadian values, including the respect for humanitarian law and human rights more generally. Reconciling these two principles and turning them into concrete action within the very difficult security context and weak level of development in Afghanistan has not been easy. Extensive work was under way during the entire period I was active on this file to address any shortcomings that came to light and determine what more could be done to reduce the risk of mistreatment to Canadian-transferred detainees. I would like to provide some relevant examples.

During preparation for a visit to Ottawa by the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross at the end of September 2006, I was briefed that earlier there had been problems with the timing of notification of transfers. I understand that these are the subject of Mr. Colvin's May 2006 report. Since the December 2005 MOU stipulates that the ICRC has a right to visit detainees at any time, this was an important issue, and we addressed it quickly. Instructions were sent to the field within the week outlining what steps we were taking and providing a single point of contact for the ICRC in Kandahar to ensure notifications were done quickly. Meetings were held in Ottawa and Geneva in June 2006, and our procedures were amended. Basically we started notifying the ICRC informally by phone in Kandahar and then followed up with a written notification, delivered in person, to the ICRC in Kandahar, but we also continued the formal notifications through DFAIT headquarters into the ICRC headquarters in Geneva. Any specific problems raised with us on notifications we addressed immediately.

When I arrived in September 2006, the policy direction we pursued was consistent with the December 2005 MOU. It provided that Afghanistan was responsible for detainees in its custody and for keeping records. It referred to the important role, regarding the treatment of detainees, of the international experts in humanitarian affairs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the body with the constitutional mandate for human rights, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.

We had also developed a strategy for active engagement with the Afghanistan government on their own accountability for human rights protections in their territory. This strategy included more capacity-building in the corrections and justice sector, conscious as we were, from previous peace support operations, that a functioning prison, detention, police, and judicial system lay at the very foundation of establishing the rule of law and respect for human rights.

Thus, in October 2006, DFAIT received a report we had commissioned from the Correctional Service of Canada that assessed Afghan detention and correctional capacity in Kandahar province. It was based on an assessment mission to Kandahar prisons, and it recommended training and mentoring as well as some infrastructure improvements. That led to two Correctional Service of Canada officers being sent to Kandahar. They were funded by the DFAIT security sector program. We've heard from Ms. Garwood-Filbert today.

In the months of February, March, and April, together with some of our other colleagues in the PRT in Kandahar, they made a large number of visits to three different detention facilities in Kandahar. To be clear, they were not at this point specifically monitoring Canadian-transferred detainees, but they did have the opportunity to witness first-hand the state of Afghanistan prisons and to initiate assistance with infrastructure and training.

Another priority for me and our work in the fall of 2006 was to secure the extension of the funding we needed for these very security sector projects, including those in the justice and corrections sector. Our ambassador in Kabul and other Canadians assigned to Afghanistan regularly impressed upon the Afghan authorities the importance of respect for human rights and the international standards that we expected. Given Canada's role in Afghanistan, Afghan authorities, including those at the highest level, were highly receptive to these representations. They fully appreciated the importance we attached to the issue. We believed that their assurances and efforts reflected a genuine commitment to abide by their international obligations.

When information came to us at one point that the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission was having trouble accessing some detention facilities, we raised it with the Afghan authorities. We had access facilitated immediately.

By February 2007, an exchange of letters was signed to make express that the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission would notify Canada if they discovered any mistreatment of a Canadian-transferred detainee. The two Correctional Service of Canada officers had arrived in the field. An interdepartmental working group continued its work to examine short-, medium-, and longer-term options for more active engagement on the issue.

By April 2007 we had developed, after much careful interdepartmental consultation, a detailed contingency plan in the event of an allegation of any mistreatment of a Canadian transferred detainee. There had not been an allegation at this point, but we wanted to be sure that we had in place how we would respond so as to reduce the risk of any repetition.

The interdepartmental group also looked at what would be required if we were to begin our own monitoring regime. This examination included discussions with NATO allies, the ICRC, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, and the Afghan government. We considered important practical questions, such as measures necessary for the security of our staff; training for our staff, who would be doing the monitoring; a better tracking tool; standard reporting templates; and standard operating procedures. We were determined to not just announce that we would start monitoring but to figure out how to do it well.

To summarize, continuous ongoing work and many voices in the field and in headquarters all contributed to the May 2007 revised MOU on transfers. As a result, Canada has in place a process of transferring and subsequent monitoring that is more rigorous than any of our NATO allies, who, I would underscore, also transfer detainees to Afghan authorities.

I would like to respond briefly to some points in Richard Colvin's testimony before this committee. He has made valid points about the complexity of the task and our lack of civilian resources in the early days in Afghanistan. DFAIT officers, like Richard and all civilians serving in Afghanistan, some carrying out monitoring in Afghan prisons, do so in a climate of risk to their lives and safety, as Glyn Berry's family knows all too well.

Richard also indicated that I called at one point to suggest not to put things on paper anymore. Actually, I was calling to assure him that options were being worked on in headquarters and to encourage him to report on what he was best placed to provide, that is substantiated and specific reports on what was happening in the field. I encouraged him to call me if he wanted to discuss suggestions or concerns on our policy. I wanted him to understand what contribution he could best make from the field in the context of the work that was going on in headquarters. Since some more specific written reports followed from him, I assume I had successfully conveyed what we needed from the field.

Confidentiality is fundamental to the International Committee of the Red Cross's ability to perform its humanitarian mission, but I did want to remind the committee of what the head of the ICRC said publicly in Ottawa at the beginning of October back in 2006, and I quote:

I do not have reasons to be worried that Canada will not do its utmost. I am sure they will notify [us], and secondly I am convinced they will do the utmost to make sure that people handed over to the Afghan system will be treated correctly.

And I believe we have done so.

In conclusion, the issue of the treatment of detainees in the context of a complex stabilization and counter-insurgency mission such as the one we are conducting in Afghanistan is probably one the most difficult I have encountered in my 29 years of public service.

Every imaginable option has inherent challenges. The lesson I have learned as this matter was unfolding is the importance of developing a multi-faceted response. When we strive to build the capacities of a country that has suffered decades of conflict and is ranking among the lowest on the human development index, the way leading to respect of human rights is a long one. Still, we have to start somewhere and forge ahead with greater determination.

I also want to assure this committee that every person I have dealt with, both in DND and in all civilian departments engaged in the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, has always done the very best they can both to minimize risks to Canadian-transferred detainees and to improve the justice and corrections sector in Afghanistan more broadly.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much.

We'll get right into our opening round. It's a seven-minute round, and we'll start with Mr. Dosanjh.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you.

My questions are for Ms. Garwood-Filbert.

I'm going to be very specific, and I hope you'll answer my specific questions in very specific terms, madam.

I'm going to place before you three documents. They are marked 1, and then there's part 1(a), and there are 2 and 3. I'll pass these on to you, if someone will take them.

Madam, you have the documents. You have 1 and 1(a) in your hands. The subject of these documents is FW: KANDH-0039.

My questions are the same with respect to all of these three documents. The questions are, one, whether you attended during the visits that are specified for Sarposa in these documents; two, whether you wrote the document or you were consulted on writing the document; and three, whether these were Canadian detainees, because the indications are, I will point out to you, that they were; and four, whether each of the documents contained specific allegations of torture of those detainees. By themselves, yes, these are their allegations. But they're very specific allegations of torture.

So these are the four questions I have.

Let me take you through question one. If you look at document 1, it will tell you somewhere that you actually attended. On page 2 of document 1, right top, it says that Fairchild, Garwood-Filbert, and others attended in a follow-up visit. If you go to the first page, at the bottom it says, “We will also be advising MINA under cover of separate memorandum.” And I would ask Colleen Swords to perhaps tell me afterwards whether this was ever sent to the minister's office.

If you go to page 3 of document 1, it says, “Number of Canadian-transferred detainees present”. “Nature of inter-action with Canadian-transferred detainee(s). Approximately 20 minute private interview...”. “Inter-action with any other detainees.... None”. So all of the interaction that's specified, I would say, is about Canadian detainees.

If you go to the next page, which is not marked.... It's marked page 2 on the top. If you go to the middle of it, the fourth paragraph, it states; “One detainee...claimed to having been 'beaten with electrical cables while blindfolded' on one occasion...at the Kandahar NDS facility.” And then there's something about the medical: “...we withhold his name so as to avoid any possible” problems, because he requested that you withhold his name. That's the first document.

And 1(a) is part of that document in another redacted form. So 1(a) tells us that this document 1 originated on June 4, 2007, if you turn to page 2 of 1(a). On top it says June 5, 2007. So I'm assuming this document 1 is June 5 or 4 of 2007.

If you go to document 2, Madam, it states--document 2 is KANDH0138--“Number of Canadian-transferred detainees present”. Blacked out. “Number of Canadian-transferred detainees seen by officials on visit”. Blacked out. “Nature of interaction with Canadian-transferred detainee”. It says “private interview with...detainees”. Interaction with any other detainees...” Nil. So this report is also about Canadian detainees.

If you go to the bottom third of the second page, it says that this man was slapped in the face once or twice.

If you go to the next page, which is 3 at the bottom, about a third of the way down, “He claims he was interrogated on [blank] occasions while at NDS...and that he was beaten on [blank] of these occasions. He alleged that the interrogations were conducted by [blank]”. “...interrogation[s] lasted between 2 to 4 hours. He alleged that he was beaten several times with a cable and was told he would be [blank], He alleged that”. And that's that document, madam.

I'd like to know whether you wrote that or you were consulted on that.

My third document is document 3. The questions are the same.

Madam, if you look at the top of page 2, it says, “Number of Canadian-transferred detainees present”. Blank. Then in brackets: “there are CF-transferred detainees in the prison now serving sentences”. Then it says, “Number of Canadian-transferred detainees seen by officials on visit”. Blank. Then: “Interaction with any of the detainees”. Not applicable.

So I would assume that this was also a Canadian detainee. If you go to page 3, about a third of the way down, it says he “came to NDS but did not see him personally. ...saw him when at NDS”. Then he goes on to say, “He also used the words...torture”. He had been kept awake for [blank] days. He “was beaten badly but doesn't know with what as his eyes were covered. When asked what was used he said a power cable or wire and pointed to his side and buttocks. By torture he meant having been locked in the NDS [blank] and kept awake. When asked why he didn't come forward with this information previously he said he didn't trust us because we turned him over to NDS.”

I would like you to answer the questions that I posed initially to you on these documents, madam.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Madam, you have less than a minute, I apologize.

[Linda Garwood-Filbert]

First of all, these are not my reports. These are DFAIT reports.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

I'm sorry, you wrote one of the reports.

[Linda Garwood-Filbert]

No, sir, not in this format. I did write reports and I did submit my reports to DFAIT, and DFAIT also wrote their reports.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Madam, it says you--

[Linda Garwood-Filbert]

I did not submit them in this format because I did not have access to this type of technology.

But I will go on to say that all of these comments are familiar to me. I was present, as I said in my statement, at all of the detainee interviews, and Canadian Forces detainees. So I would have been present, and these comments are familiar to me. The dates are consistent with dates that I recall.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

I'm sorry, but the time is up.

We're moving on to Mr. Bachand.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will split my time with my colleague, Ms. Lalonde.

I will address my questions to Ms. Garwood-Filbert.

Ms. Garwood-Filbert, were you the only correctional officer in the provincial reconstruction team?

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Go ahead.