Canada-China Relations Committee on April 8th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Excuse me—

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

It was in September 2018 when the patent was discovered.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

That's not what I asked you, though, Minister.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

We're out of time. I'm sorry, Dr. Ellis.

Minister Holland, I appreciate your appearance here today.

Our hour has gone a bit over. We will now suspend for a few minutes while we line up for the next panel.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Everybody, in the interest of time, shall we get back to work and introduce our second panel?

I would now like to welcome David Vigneault, director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and the following officials: Adam Fisher, director general, litigation and disclosure, and Leonard Stern, deputy director general, security screening.

Mr. Vigneault, you have five minutes for some opening remarks.

[David Vigneault, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good evening, everyone.

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, it is an honour to join you this evening and to have the opportunity to contribute to your discussion on the matters revealed in the Winnipeg National Microbiology Laboratory documents and, more broadly, on the importance of protecting Canada's research from foreign interference.

My goal today is to provide some clarity on CSIS's role in protecting our research, through its screening mandate, intelligence collection and advice, and stakeholder engagement. I also welcome the opportunity to provide clarity on CSIS's disclosure processes, and how we are working to maximize transparency while protecting sensitive information.

As this committee is well aware, Canada's research sector is often targeted by foreign threat actors seeking to advance their interests at our expense. This can take many forms, from covertly influencing research agendas or peer review processes to engaging in funding arrangements whereby details about the source of funds can be obscured or misrepresented. Through deceptive partnerships and collaborations, vital research and novel intellectual property are stolen. The PRC is by far the greatest perpetrator of these activities.

Needless to say, as state actors become more sophisticated, these threats become harder to identify and counter. It is therefore imperative that Canadians work together. This effort begins with informed and transparent discussions among and within all levels and branches of government, as well as with communities, academia and businesses.

As a committed partner in this effort, CSIS continues to investigate, provide advice to the government and, when appropriate, take measures to reduce threats. This work includes close collaboration with other government departments. For example, CSIS leverages its unique tools and access to provide to requesting departments thorough security assessments on individuals who require access to classified Government of Canada information or sensitive sites. This is one of the tools used to protect Canada's research infrastructure against insider threats.

Other tools include stakeholder engagement, which, through education and knowledge dissemination, builds resilience against foreign interference, and thus ensures that government investments do not inadvertently advance the research of hostile states in sensitive areas.

While, as an intelligence service, CSIS needs to be able to protect its own intelligence in order to fulfil its mandate, CSIS has also actively been taking measures to increase transparency with Canadians through increased public engagement with communities and institutions on national security issues. CSIS has briefed more than 200 organizations and 1,000 individuals across Canada who are now well informed about possible threats, which has provided them with the tools to protect themselves, their research, and their employees.

CSIS also exercises transparency through regular proactive and responsive disclosures of information. In the case of the Winnipeg lab documents, CSIS worked collaboratively with the panel of arbiters to maximize transparency through sanitization, including by summarizing certain redactions to provide unclassified information. This resulted in the publication of a greater amount of national security information than previously released. The panel recognized that the release of the remaining redactions could be detrimental to Canada's national security.

What is considered injurious to national security is not static; rather, it evolves over time. With the passage of time, these assessments may change. This is why CSIS dedicates subject matter experts to review documents line by line, irrespective of their initial classification, to maximize transparency to Parliament and Canadians.

The PRC has been bold in its attempts to threaten Canada's security, prosperity and research through strategic espionage and foreign interference. To counter these threats, CSIS is continuously implementing lessons in how it responds to the constantly evolving threat environment. This includes increasing transparency with Canadians through an increased openness and willingness to release as much information as possible through processes such as this one.

Finally, I will note that in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians, I cannot publicly comment on operational matters and requirements. Nonetheless, I welcome this opportunity for frank and transparent discussions to the extent that's possible, and will be happy to answer your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Director Vigneault.

I should note that we have been rejoined by Ms. Lantsman. It's good to have you there on the screen.

For our first round of questioning, we will go to Dr. Ellis for six minutes.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Specifically related to the national microbiology lab, is it true that in August 2018, CSIS provided a briefing to national microbiology lab security officials?

[David Vigneault]

Absolutely. As part of its effort to make sure there's increased resilience against threats posed by a number of foreign actors, CSIS engaged in proactive discussions with the Public Health Agency, including the national microbiology lab, about threats and indicators of insider threats. That was a very important and very useful discussion in 2018.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Mr. Vigneault, I'm not sure how much you may or may not want to comment on this, but is it not true that the SDG of the national microbiology lab brought the names of two Chinese scientists forward to CSIS at that time?

[David Vigneault]

My understanding is that these discussions took place a few weeks after that discussion, but they were generated by the initial discussion.

We received names of the two individuals in question, yes.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

I'm not entirely sure, Mr. Vigneault, if you're aware of the timelines, but I'll ask you this anyway.

That would then lead us all to believe that there were concerns about Dr. Qiu and Dr. Cheng before the discovery of the two patents in the PRC registered under Dr. Qiu's name. Is that true, sir?

[David Vigneault]

My understanding is that some initial concerns were brought forward by PHAC and the NML to CSIS. As a result, we started further investigations. It's as a result of those investigations that we discovered the information about the patent.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Is there any more information about the nature of the exact concerns that officials brought to CSIS back in August 2018 with respect to Dr. Qiu and Dr. Cheng?

[David Vigneault]

I don't have any other details at this point.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Is that something you can provide to the committee in writing?

[David Vigneault]

I will absolutely endeavour to see what we can do. Of course, there will be limitations over what has already been disclosed through the process. If there is more information we can share, we will do so.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Mr. Vigneault, given that I realize there are security concerns around this, we asked the minister previously about other ongoing security assessments or investigations of the thousand talents program or like programs. I understand that there's a new name for that program potentially. It's for any scientists working at any government labs in Canada. Is there currently an investigation going on with respect to that?

[David Vigneault]

As I mentioned in my initial comments, there are limits to what I can disclose publicly.

If it's helpful, I can tell the member that the thousand talents program is something we're keenly aware of and quite concerned with. The different ways the PRC—or, for that matter, other countries—could try to use this type of program are something that CSIS investigates fairly thoroughly, and we work with our international partners to better understand those dynamics.

Unfortunately, I'm not at liberty to discuss more specific details.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Mr. Vigneault, are you at liberty to say if CSIS is aware of any TTP-like scientists working in Canadian labs at the current time?

[David Vigneault]

Unfortunately, my previous comments would apply to this question as well.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

That's fair enough. I appreciate that.

One of the things we know—the minister talked a lot about this—is that due process is more important than national security. Obviously your lens is a little different than that of the minister. Do you share those comments?

[David Vigneault]

I did not have the opportunity to listen to all of the minister's previous comments, but what I can tell you is that as an intelligence service working in a democratic environment governed by the rule of law, we are, of course, keenly focused, as per our mandate, on investigating all threats to national security. We try to do that very thoroughly.

We are also mindful that Canadians are entitled to due process and different procedures. In the case of a security screening assessment, our role is very clear. We investigate and we provide advice to the requesting department, which is the owner of the decision at the end of the process.

[Stephen Ellis, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester, NS]

Sir, I might suggest things were a bit different. Things had evolved to the point that early in 2019, this scientist's computer was mirrored, in my understanding from the information we have in the briefing, yet the institution, the national microbiology lab, the scientist worked for allowed a very deadly pathogen—probably two pathogens, Ebola and Henipah virus—to be transferred to an existing level 4 lab in the PRC, the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Sir, in your assessment of threat and security, does that make any sense?

[David Vigneault]

I think the specific dynamic of when, how and under what authority those samples were transferred has been looked at by this committee, and I would argue that the members of this committee have more specific knowledge than CSIS on that very aspect.

What I can tell you is that it is an area of great concern for CSIS when we see that directly or indirectly, covertly or not, the PRC is in any way able to potentially increase their threat activity against Canada and against other western nations and their neighbours. That's the prism through which we look at these issues at CSIS.