Evidence of meeting #36 for Canada-China Relations in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was csis.
A video is available from Parliament.
8:10 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
Thank you, Director Vigneault.
We'll now go to Mr. Chong for five minutes.
8:10 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
CSIS has assessed that foreign interference from the PRC is a serious threat to Canada. I want to quote what CSIS has assessed: “Foreign interference is a complex national security threat. It poses a significant threat to the integrity of our political systems, democratic processes, social cohesion, academic freedom, economic prosperity and challenges Canadians’ rights and freedoms.”
You mentioned earlier in your testimony that espionage is not exactly the same thing as foreign interference, but it's very closely related. How do you assess the PRC's espionage activities in Canada in terms of threat?
8:10 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Because of the organized systematic approach and capabilities of the PRC, we assess that the PRC is the most significant espionage threat against our country.
Mr. Chong will know that the dynamic is somewhat similar to foreign interference in the sense that you have a continuum of activities. The intent is very clear. One of them, for example, is to have the most sophisticated modern military in 2049, and, through the five-year programs, to dominate certain aspects of the economy in the future. The means can vary from the overt to the very much covert, and in the dynamic we see in foreign interference, we see the same thing. We see legitimate means of engaging in our economy that are absolutely appropriate. I've talked to different companies that are essentially telling us they know, when they get into some deals, that they will lose intellectual property.
It's very sophisticated, up to and including very covert espionage.
8:15 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
Thank you for that answer.
You mentioned earlier in your testimony that CSIS is concerned with the thousand talents program. How do you assess the thousand talents program with respect to government scientists? In other words, do you think it is appropriate for Government of Canada scientists to participate in the thousand talents program or any of the 200 or so other recruitment programs of the People's Republic of China?
8:15 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I will reiterate what I said earlier in the sense that in these types of cases, we do an assessment of the generic nature of those talent programs. That's one thing. Then at the request of the agency, we do the screening of very specific individuals and provide that assessment, that advice, to the host agency for them to make determinations.
The reason I reiterate this point, Mr. Chong, is that there might be some circumstances in which it is totally transparent and it is an activity that would benefit Canada and, in this case, China. There might be some cases like that, so I would not want to be categorical and say one hundred per cent no—
8:15 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
It could be appropriate in some cases and not in others.
8:15 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
They have to be very transparent. That is one of the key issues at play here.
April 8th, 2024 / 8:15 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON
That's understood.
We know that Dr. Qiu clandestinely and corruptly co-operated and collaborated with the government and the military of the People's Republic of China. She also received payment for travel within the People's Republic of China from both of those entities and did not declare it with the Government of Canada.
One of the entities she clandestinely collaborated with was the Wuhan Institute of Virology. The Wuhan Institute of Virology is not on the list of named research organizations of the Government of Canada, so it is technically possible for a government entity to collaborate with that organization.
Do you assess that to be an acceptable security risk, particularly in light of the fact that according to publicly sourced reports, Dr. Qiu is working at the Wuhan Institute of Virology—or working with scientists there—as we presently speak?
8:15 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I would say that having entities listed by the government as problematic is a very welcome approach. It speaks to Mr. Fragiskatos' question earlier about how we work with people. Giving them more information about what might be appropriate or not is very important. In this case, listing these organizations and telling them why there might be a problem help people make their own decisions. We at CSIS have provided advice to ISED and Public Safety, which came up with that list.
In the specific case of the Wuhan institute, again, there might be legitimate reasons why, for the benefit of Canada, it would be appropriate to work with them. I think it would be useful in this case, if there were to be any such arrangement, to ask specifically what kind of due diligence has been done on these—
8:15 p.m.
Conservative
8:15 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
I'm sorry, sir. You are out of time.
We'll have to go now to Mr. Erskine-Smith for five minutes.
8:15 p.m.
Liberal
Nathaniel Erskine-Smith Liberal Beaches—East York, ON
Thanks very much, Chair.
As the director of CSIS, you are one of the people in this country who thinks about national security more than most. When you reflect on the timeline here, there have been accusations of delay and inappropriate due diligence.
As of August, a lab employee identifies two colleagues who might be targeted by the PRC. In September 2018, PHAC, through some due diligence, becomes aware of a patent filed by Dr. Qiu. Later that year, in December 2018, a security consultant is engaging in fact-finding and ultimately reports to PHAC in March 2019. The RCMP escorts the individuals out of the lab in July 2019.
When you reflect on that timeline, do you think PHAC acted with appropriate due diligence?
8:15 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I think this chronology is very instructive because now, with what we know in 2024, it's easy to look back at the events of the day and try, with the knowledge we have....
I was talking earlier today to my colleagues who are responsible for the screening branch, looking at those dates and so on. My experts were telling me that as far as cases go, this one was very quick to come to fruition.
I know there were some questions about due diligence and due process, but one thing that is important is how to start to mitigate the threat significantly. These individuals were walked out and not given access to their information in the lab itself. This is one way to mitigate the threat while the rest of the investigation takes place.
I will reiterate, Mr. Erskine-Smith, that my expert colleagues have told me that they thought it was a fairly expeditious process.
8:20 p.m.
Liberal
Nathaniel Erskine-Smith Liberal Beaches—East York, ON
I appreciate that.
In your view, from a security vantage point, what more could PHAC have done? These individuals we're talking about are employees from the early 2000s. This is not an infiltration operation. This is an operation where they were ultimately co-opted down the road of their careers, which strikes me as a more challenging thing to screen, all things considered.
I wonder what your view is as the director of CSIS. What more could and should PHAC have done in the circumstances to mitigate the risks that ultimately were realized?
8:20 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
The way I'll try to answer this question is to say that of course, as Mr. Erskine-Smith mentioned, we look at the issues through a national security prism. We make an effort to share our knowledge, our expertise and our concerns with our colleagues to make sure that one of the filters through which they look at issues within their organization is a national security aspect. Increasing the security culture of these organizations is one thing we're very keen to do.
It is more of a generic comment, as opposed to a specific one, looking back at times.... Anytime we can work more closely with organizations to increase what I would refer to as a connective tissue between national security and their business, it makes Canada and these organizations more resilient.
8:20 p.m.
Liberal
Nathaniel Erskine-Smith Liberal Beaches—East York, ON
That's a very good answer.
I was amazed by this, actually. I read the April 2020 security assessment, the first security assessment, and it's pretty thin. There was an interview, and Dr. Qiu lies straight up to your officials. Then mere months later, on June 30, there is a second security assessment, and it's incredible what your agency was able to glean and document in a mere matter of months, especially with a level 4 lab. That close relationship between CSIS and a level 4 lab is essential, is it not?
8:20 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Yes, absolutely.
As I mentioned, the evolution of the threat activity of the PRC and other countries against Canada has been such that we had to change our approach at CSIS. We have to collect, very covertly, intelligence and secrets, which the government—Parliament, essentially—through the CSIS Act, is asking us to do. At the same time, we need to increase our transparency, because the ecosystem in Canada has changed because of those threat actors.
When you look, Mr. Erskine-Smith, at the dynamic in the lab at the time and the dynamic with the organization, I think what you see is the realization of that threat, but also a number of people who started turning to security issues much more significantly. Again, I commend the work of this committee, because I think through this work, more Canadians will be thinking about these issues. This is only way to more transparency, which will increase our resiliency. I would say that—
8:20 p.m.
Liberal
8:20 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ken Hardie
I'm sorry, gentlemen, but you are out of time. It goes by very quickly.
8:20 p.m.
Liberal
8:20 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
I'd like to ask two quick questions, Mr. Chair.
First, if CSIS gets wind of the fact that a top researcher in Canada is part of the Thousand Talents Program, does it intervene?
Secondly, the Laboratories Canada strategy, adopted in 2018, which includes state-of-the-art work environments protected against cybersecurity threats, will extend over a 25‑year period. Do you think we need to act faster?
8:20 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I don't know the details of the strategy, which is spread over a 25‑year period. However, I do know that government strategies of this nature are implemented over several years. However, we always try to manage the most important threats as quickly as possible.
What was your first question, Mr. Bergeron?
8:20 p.m.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
My first question was about the top researchers who are part of the Thousand Talents Program.
8:20 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Absolutely, yes. If our security screening work or our intelligence gathering work tells us that any individual in Canada is involved in a program being run by China or another country, we will intervene.