Canada-China Relations Committee on April 19th, 2024

[Dr. Stephen Lucas]

Yes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

Madam Jeffrey, several times in your opening remarks and otherwise you have referred to processes that have been put in place that are broad-based, not related to any specific individuals. You have said that your security posture and policies have been strengthened and adapted and that specific personnel security measures have been updated.

Could you tell us a little about what exactly those processes, those policies, those postures and those measures are?

[Heather Jeffrey]

Yes, I'm happy to speak specifically about some of the policies. For obvious reasons, we won't speak to the details of operational physical security measures.

I would point, for example, to the review of all collaboration agreements by a science security committee, in addition to the investigators and the lab management. I would point to enhanced compliance monitoring from our security branch. As well, we have partnerships with our security and law enforcement agencies. I would point to the mandatory requirement for not just conflict of interest but affiliation declarations, the access control systems and the new student policies that require appropriate clearances.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Have any of these—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Your time has expired, Mr. Chong. I'm sorry.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Okay.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

There will be further opportunities. I think we have a fair amount of time left.

Ms. Lalonde, you now have five minutes.

[Marie-France Lalonde, Liberal, Orléans, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank all the witnesses for joining us today.

There have been some concerns surrounding whether we have the appropriate security measures to set up a level 4 lab in Saskatchewan.

Would you say, based on our readiness, that we're ready to set up a level 4 lab in Canada? What processes would be in place prior to approving a level 4 lab?

[Heather Jeffrey]

The Human Pathogens and Toxins Act has very stringent requirements for work that happens with pathogens of different risk groups. There is a list of pathogens according to their safeguards, and the requirements for them.

The recently announced budget also includes indications of new legislation being brought forward to enhance the regulations further, given the postpandemic requirements for Canada to have domestic laboratory capabilities, health and life sciences capabilities and biomanufacturing capabilities to provide health security for us against future health threats and future potential pandemics.

The processes under the HPTA require licensing. They require clearances for all personnel. They require a graduated approach to be put in place that limits how and with what those new facilities would be able to work. There is inspection and on-site monitoring that is required. The clearance processes have also been enhanced.

Any application for a potential new laboratory requiring that it would be subject to the HPTA, including level 3 and level 4 labs, would require stringent regulation. Licenses and approvals would not be granted for their operation without having detailed planning in place.

[Marie-France Lalonde, Liberal, Orléans, ON]

Thank you, Ms. Jeffrey.

What are the processes in place to protect national security when working with international collaborations in laboratory research? Can you also give some examples of why Canada's collaboration with other countries on scientific research is so crucial?

[Heather Jeffrey]

The work we undertook at the Public Health Agency and through the national microbiology lab in response to COVID-19 is an excellent example of the linkages that are required to combat a novel pathogen.

I would like to turn to Dr. Poliquin to give some of the concrete examples of how the work with our colleagues advanced those efforts.

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

Indeed, international collaboration in this space is essential for the advancement of the work. A concrete example that is pertinent here would be the development of the Ebola monoclonal antibody cocktail involved in the development of multiple components of that treatment, some of which came from American innovation and advancement. It is by putting together those advances that the ultimate product was realized.

By extension, our ability to collaborate internationally and to bring together the best minds to tackle the problems at hand are an essential feature of that work. However, we are very cognizant, and have become even more so, of the shifting threat environment that we operate in. Hence, any new collaborations that are borne out at the NML involve a security dimension and security review prior to our commencing the work.

[Marie-France Lalonde, Liberal, Orléans, ON]

Thank you very much. If I have time, I would like to ask one more question.

What is the purpose of the national microbiology laboratory sharing samples with other public health laboratories?

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

It is essential to share samples between the level 4 labs, as these are what enable the science to be done. By having the specimens on hand, we are able to do diagnostic development, applied research and medical countermeasure development, but a lot of that work is essentially rooted in having access to the samples to do the work.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Ms. Lalonde.

Mr. Villemure has rejoined us.

We're sorry to have lost you there for a few moments. I just want to bring you up to speed on where we are. You will have the next two and a half minutes, followed by Ms. Idlout for two and a half minutes. We then have Mr. Cooper for five minutes and Mr. Erskine-Smith for five minutes.

My calculation gives us time for another round of five, five, two and a half and two and a half, so think about who you would like from your team. It's pretty obvious for the Bloc and the NDP, but for the Liberals and the Conservatives, get your lineup ready for that last go-around, okay?

Mr. Villemure, you have two and a half minutes, sir.

You may be on mute, Mr. Villemure. If you can hear us, unplug your headset and then plug it in again.

Perhaps we'll flip the order.

Ms. Idlout, are you ready for your two and a half minutes?

[Lori Idlout, NDP, Nunavut, NU]

Yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Okay. We'll go to Ms. Idlout first and then back to you, Mr. Villemure, in two and a half minutes.

[Lori Idlout, NDP, Nunavut, NU]

Qujannamiik, Iksivautaq.

What other countries should the committee be aware of, in terms of foreign interference, in our research institutions?

[Heather Jeffrey]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I think that's a question that is probably best posed to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and to our national security colleagues.

At the Public Health Agency, we are alert to ensuring that all our international collaborations are approved and vetted, and we have fully implemented the research policy on sensitive technology research, including the national security guidelines for research partnerships with named research organizations. We are fully compliant with all those procedures, but the realm of foreign interference is in the national security domain, not in public health.

[Lori Idlout, NDP, Nunavut, NU]

Okay. Thank you.

In terms of your work on future preparedness and potential future threats that are most concerning to PHAC, what should we, as parliamentarians, be aware of?

[Heather Jeffrey]

As we saw during the COVID pandemic, there remain significant public health threats in a globalized world. We are currently undertaking work and research looking at H5N1, or avian influenza, measles outbreaks and mpox. We have daily threat assessment and response meetings, assessing all these threats. Our lab and the level 3 and level 4 facilities we have are essential in enabling us to look at some of the high-consequence pathogens.

I'll turn to Dr. Poliquin to outline some additional areas of his work.

[Dr. Guillaume Poliquin]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Indeed, at this time, we are living in a period in which we are seeing increasing activity of diseases. Part of the role of the national microbiology lab is to remain abreast of these.

Mpox is a good example, with a recent outbreak domestically and ongoing activity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example.

It is through connections globally and with our international partners that we are able to keep abreast of what is happening in other countries. That helps to inform our work and our preparedness, both with diagnostics to be ready to detect new threats and with medical countermeasures to help combat them.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken Hardie]

Thank you, Ms. Idlout.

We've lost Mr. Villemure again. If we manage to get him back and fully functioning, I'd like to give him five minutes, if that's okay, because he's missed two rounds.

Mr. Cooper, you have five minutes now.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Madam Jeffrey, have any of the processes, posture, policies or measures recently implemented triggered any review of security clearances in PHAC other than the standard review every 10 years?

[Heather Jeffrey]

I think the committee is aware that there is an ongoing RCMP investigation, and I would have to refer the committee to my colleagues at Public Safety Canada and the RCMP in terms of their investigations and any work that's under way there.