Information & Ethics Committee on April 21st, 2023

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

Basically, we had the mandate to work on any form of interference coming from anywhere, so of course, we encountered also American interference, be it surveillance or through influence operations.

However, what we have done also is establish a difference between goals that are followed by diaspora to push for promoting their own interests—for instance, I quoted Qatar—or goals to destabilize our institutions, which is the case of Russia.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Sure. Were there instances of any other countries? For instance, there's been anecdotal information domestically in Canada about India. We talked about the U.S. From your perspective, what's the difference between foreign interference and foreign influence?

I hear this: When the west is doing it or when our allies are doing it, it's influence, but when non-aligned actors do it, it's interference. Do you share that analysis, or is your analysis of interference versus influence different?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

I will give you two examples from American history so you understand what for me is the difference between influence and interference.

When the Americans worked hard to have a coup in Chile, this was interference—direct interference. The objective was to destabilize an elected government in Chile in 1973, I think. When Americans are financing various think tanks, whether in France or Germany, this is influence. The aim is not to destabilize the democratic process. It is not in any way in a covert form, and it does not put our laws at risk.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Okay. That's helpful. Thank you.

Just out of curiosity, did Canada ever come up in any of your studies?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

No.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

That's good to know.

A briefing published by the European Parliamentary Research Service states that the EU's “Transparency Register is the only transparency scheme amongst OECD nations requiring registered think-tanks, research centres and academic institutions to disclose their funding.”

Can you describe the purpose of ensuring that these organizations disclose their funding, and would you recommend that doing this be implemented in Canada as well?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

First of all, I must say our system is not perfect, because it's not always implemented well, but the idea behind it is clearly shown by.... I don't know if you have heard about “Qatargate”, but my committee is also mandated to do the follow-up on this. You have NGOs. For instance, we had an NGO called Fight Impunity, which looks good on paper. It's perfect. Everybody wants to fight against impunity. They came and were really hostile to the United Arab Emirates. Maybe they had good reasons to be hostile to the United Arab Emirates, but the fact is that their funding was coming from Qatar. If you don't disclose where your money comes from, then of course there is a lack of understanding as to why you are focusing so much on this or that.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Matt.

Thank you, Mr. Glucksmann.

That completes the first round of questioning. We're going to go to our second round.

Mr. Kurek, you're to start the second round. For five minutes, go ahead, please.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you to our witness. I very much value the testimony you've provided.

I'd like to follow up with some of the questions that Monsieur Gourde asked about energy in particular, because it has certainly been a tumultuous couple of years in energy. Coming from an energy-producing part of our country, I follow it closely and I found it very interesting how you talked about Europe's experience and the interference specifically related to Russian energy. You mentioned Gazprom and whatnot. Certainly Canada's experience is different because we're not importing—at least not raw energy. There are refined products that do come to Canada.

I'm wondering if you could expand a little bit on that and specifically on the impact that sort of interference, that sort of nefarious influence, has on destabilizing regimes, especially at a time when you have not only the dynamics associated with the geopolitical sphere but also a conflict that is ongoing.

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

You know, it's a common line to say that you can do wars for pipelines. Actually, Putin did war “through” pipelines. The pipes were a tool in his hybrid warfare against European democracies.

I'll explain the strategy on Nord Stream, for instance, which is connected to elite capture. Gerhard Schröder was the chancellor of democratic Germany. Five to 10 days before he was going to lose the election in 2005, he signed the Nord Stream project with Putin. A few weeks after his planned defeat, which everybody knew he would lose, he went to work for Gazprom. The result was that European dependence on Russian gas only grew until February 24, 2022.

When the war started, we discovered that not only had Germany built Nord Stream 1 and 2, but that they had also sold their stocks in Germany to Gazprom. Gazprom emptied these stocks, these reserves, and as a result, we could not have an embargo on fossil imports from Russia. The European Union, during the first six months of the war, financed the Russian regime 800 million euros per day because of these policies.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

Thank you for that. It's certainly helpful in the larger context.

I want to bring it back to where Canada fits into this as an ally with Europe and as a democratic nation. I've certainly been frustrated with some of the activism that has taken place that has restricted Canada's ability to be a reliable partner in terms of supplying energy. I'm wondering if in your experience you've seen how the efforts of hostile foreign states have not only encouraged and manipulated the geopolitics around imports and exports but are also keeping that dependence from being removed with allies like Canada could be to Europe.

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

Yes, I see your point, but we didn't come across this. We looked for it, by the way, to check, and we didn't see any proof that you had Russian hands, for instance, behind movements or doubts about Canadian exports.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

At the beginning of my round, we talked about Russia. In my last 30 seconds or so, I'm wondering if you could maybe expand on and discuss China and whether there are parallels to the influence that China is exerting, specifically the Communist regime there.

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

Yes. China really plays according to the Russian textbook. When people are doubting whether there's an alliance between China and Russia, they should just look at the facts. China is actually implementing the same strategies, except that it's not energy dependency; it's full-scale dependency. Even when we are doing the grain deal, which we are right to do in the European Union, where we have a lot of subventions, these are direct subventions to the Chinese production apparatus, because who is building our solar panels, for instance?

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Kurek and Mr. Glucksmann.

Mr. Bains, you have five minutes. Go ahead.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Glucksmann, thank you for joining us today and sharing what's happening in the European Union and the complexities around influence and interference, and the differences.

We know that Russia has been for decades a major player when it comes to foreign interference. You've been an adviser to the former president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili. What can we learn from Georgia when it comes to Russia's foreign interference actions?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

Thank you for mentioning Saakashvili's name, because right now, as we speak, he is in prison, held by a Russian puppet, the Georgian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. That's the first way Russia is interfering—with money. This is a direct way of interfering, and then you have others. Of course, in the case of Georgia you had the military invasion and dismembering of the nation, with 20% occupied territories. You also had the manipulation of information and campaigns.

For instance, in Georgia LGBTI rights were never much of an issue in the political debate. Suddenly, you had movements against gay pride and movements all across the country saying that it was a direct threat to Georgian identity, and that when Saakashvili was in charge, he was a pro-western leader who was inserting decadence into the country. That was thousands and thousands of people. When we then analyzed where it came from, it was a Russian-financed operation.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

I'm going to go into how we've heard a lot about the misinformation and disinformation. I think it's the largest threat to democracy today in the way it's being used to attack.

You talked about how Russia had the Internet Research Agency. What did the EU do to counter that?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

It's very hard, actually, to fight it without crossing the line of freedom of speech. If you think the earth is flat, it's not my problem as a legislator, but if a foreign government launches campaigns so that millions of my fellow citizens believe the earth is flat, then it becomes a problem for me. What we have to act upon is not the fact that people will share weird opinions, but to cut this from foreign actors using it and putting money in it.

What we have done is, first, impose regulations on platforms, and that's the key. I'm often critical about the European Union, but one piece of legislation that I'm very proud of is the Digital Services Act on platforms.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Last year in Ottawa we had an illegal occupation of demonstrators. According to the National Observer, Russia's state-controlled broadcaster, RT, spread disinformation through proxy sites and on social media messaging apps like Telegram, which was widely used by the convoy's genuine grassroots supporters.

How, in your view, do we as democracies counter these efforts that warp the public's perceptions? I think in your answer you mentioned how it's just pouring money into a certain message to distract, in a way, and to create some type of movement. How can we counter that?

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

I'm sorry. I didn't hear the beginning of your question, but one thing is that.... I don't know the statutes in Canada, but in Europe, Russia Today is under sanctions and, also, all their bank accounts are frozen and they cannot operate anymore, but what we have seen is that actually it doesn't prevent at all the Russian propaganda from being shared.

What we need to do is to identify the networks and sanction them, but very quickly and at the same time use existing examples of coherent and victorious fights against disinformation and the manipulation of information. I was very proud to chair the first-ever official delegation of the European Parliament to Taipei. I encourage you to work with Taiwanese authorities and to learn from them what they do to keep democracy growing while being under a permanent attack from the Chinese Communist Party.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, John Brassard]

Thank you, Mr. Bains and Mr. Glucksmann.

Mr. Villemure, you have two and half minutes for your questions.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you so much, Chair. I will do my best during the two and a half minutes that are allotted to me.

Mr. Glucksmann, I’d like to know if you've noticed whether the advent of artificial intelligence has had any impact on the type, manner, or scope of foreign interference.

[Raphaël Glucksmann]

Not yet to its full effect, but it will happen extremely quickly.

For example, I went to the NATO Centre of Excellence in Riga, where I could see the progress made in artificial intelligence. This will be tomorrow’s massive problem.