Evidence of meeting #97 for Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was content.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Jeanette Patell  Head of Canada Government Affairs and Public Policy, Google and YouTube, Google Canada
Shane Huntley  Senior Director, Threat Analysis Group, Google, Google Canada
Nathaniel Gleicher  Head of Security Policy, Meta Platforms Inc.
Lindsay Hundley  Influence Operations Policy Lead, Meta Platforms Inc.
Wifredo Fernández  Head of Government Affairs, United States of America and Canada, X Corporation
Rachel Curran  Head of Public Policy, Canada, Meta Platforms Inc.
Josh Harris  Senior Privacy and Data Protection Counsel, X Corporation

5:35 p.m.

Head of Public Policy, Canada, Meta Platforms Inc.

Rachel Curran

We've developed that over the last couple of years in particular, Mr. Green, but it dates back further than that. These tools I'm referencing now.... For instance, we set teens' accounts to “private” when they join Instagram or Facebook. We prevent adults they don't follow from sending them messages. We limit the amount of potentially sensitive content they can see in “Explore”, “Search” or “Reels”. We prohibit content that promotes suicide, self-harm or eating disorders—

5:35 p.m.

NDP

Matthew Green NDP Hamilton Centre, ON

Did these developments happen after October 5, 2021? The whistle-blower in this context stated that it was in 2021. He went on to say that children were receiving “unwanted sexual advances” and that “an even higher percentage of these children are receiving unwanted sexual advances on a monthly basis.”

Did these new tools you're talking about happen before or after 2021?

5:35 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative John Brassard

Please provide a very quick response, Ms. Curran.

5:35 p.m.

Head of Public Policy, Canada, Meta Platforms Inc.

Rachel Curran

Yes, a lot of these tools were developed recently, in the last couple of years. Youth safety, of course, was a priority long before that, but the tools I am talking about have been developed recently.

5:35 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative John Brassard

Thank you, Ms. Curran and Mr. Green.

Again, to our guests, make sure you have your French interpretation on.

Mr. Gourde, you have the floor for five minutes.

December 13th, 2023 / 5:35 p.m.

Conservative

Jacques Gourde Conservative Lévis—Lotbinière, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question is for the Meta representatives.

During the 2019 and 2021 election campaigns in Canada, there were foreign influence activities carried out on platforms like the ones you manage. The purpose of these activities was to defeat certain candidates. Since these activities fall outside the scope of the Canada Elections Act, which is enforced by Elections Canada, we have no way of knowing whether election spending limits were respected, among other things.

Now that we all know this, for the next federal election, would it be possible for Meta to set up a monitoring period from the time Elections Canada calls the election?

During this 35- or 45-day period, is there a process that allows people who feel they have been wronged to file a complaint?

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are unable to help us during this period. Should we file a complaint directly on your platforms and send a certified copy to Elections Canada to speed up the process?

5:40 p.m.

Head of Public Policy, Canada, Meta Platforms Inc.

Rachel Curran

Thank you for the question, Mr. Gourde.

In fact, there is no evidence that any foreign interference or influence operations targeting Canadians during the last election were present on our platforms. For more detail on that, I'm going to turn it over to my colleagues, Mr. Gleicher and Dr. Hundley.

5:40 p.m.

Head of Security Policy, Meta Platforms Inc.

Nathaniel Gleicher

Thank you, Rachel.

Thank you for the question.

We investigate proactively and enforce against any foreign interference operations we identify, and then we publish information about them in our quarterly threat reports. When we publish that information, we also publish details on particular countries or regions that were significantly targeted, and when we do have proof, we will also publish information about who, or what organization, was behind the operation.

We have a dataset that outlines every single influence operation we've identified and removed from our platforms. It is available for download and review, and we would be happy to provide it to the committee. It also includes the information I am describing, to be able to look backwards.

Going forward—

5:40 p.m.

Conservative

Jacques Gourde Conservative Lévis—Lotbinière, QC

I'm sorry. My next question will be more specific.

For the next election, do you have a process in place that will allow us to file a complaint directly with you if we become aware that there has been foreign influence on one of your platforms, since these activities cannot be monitored by Elections Canada?

How can we work with you to avoid this problem?

5:40 p.m.

Head of Public Policy, Canada, Meta Platforms Inc.

Rachel Curran

Thank you for the question, Mr. Gourde.

Yes, we'd be happy to set up a protocol with policy-makers specifically to do that.

I can tell you that ahead of any election in Canada, we work not only with Elections Canada, but also with Global Affairs and with the Privy Council Office, to make sure we're monitoring and addressing any issues on our platforms, including foreign interference, but we would be happy to set up another or a different protocol with members of Parliament specifically.

5:40 p.m.

Conservative

Jacques Gourde Conservative Lévis—Lotbinière, QC

You just told us that you collaborated with Elections Canada and the Privy Council in 2019 and 2021, but it doesn't seem to have worked. We've only just learned, barely a year ago, that there have been problems. What you're saying doesn't tally with the reality we've experienced.

Were these protocols already in place in 2019?

5:40 p.m.

Head of Public Policy, Canada, Meta Platforms Inc.

Rachel Curran

They were, Mr. Gourde. In fact, we found no issues and no problems on our platforms during the last couple of elections, including the one in 2019.

We work quite rigorously ahead of those elections, as well as during and afterwards, to monitor for any problems and to remove any problematic content. For instance, we've reported out on that publicly, and we did not see any evidence of foreign interference on Meta platforms during the last election or during the one in 2019.

5:40 p.m.

Conservative

Jacques Gourde Conservative Lévis—Lotbinière, QC

My question is for the representatives of Google Canada.

For your part, have you observed any foreign influence activities on your platforms during the 2019 and 2021 elections?

5:40 p.m.

Senior Director, Threat Analysis Group, Google, Google Canada

Shane Huntley

I can take that question.

My team tracks very closely foreign interference operations. As I said, we are transparent about what we do detect. We have not detected any interference in Canadian elections on our platform as part of our investigations over the last number of years.

5:40 p.m.

Conservative

Jacques Gourde Conservative Lévis—Lotbinière, QC

Thank you very much.

My next question is for the representatives of X Corporation.

You acknowledged that the old Twitter was a platform often used to relay fake news.

Is there a protocol to prevent this and speed up the removal of fake news during an election period?

5:40 p.m.

Head of Government Affairs, United States of America and Canada, X Corporation

Wifredo Fernández

There are a couple of interventions that are applicable here. First is our civic integrity policy. Our civic integrity policy targets four areas of potential violations: misleading information that could be misleading about how to participate in an election; misleading information that could intimidate people from participating; information that could suppress the vote; and false affiliations, so impersonation.

Second, we have a product we have been investing a lot of resources in called “Community Notes”, which is a decentralized approach for the community on X to add context to content they believe may be misleading in order to help other readers. This allows people on X to become contributors, to rate the helpfulness of these community notes and to write notes.

5:45 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative John Brassard

Thank you, Mr. Fernández.

5:45 p.m.

Head of Government Affairs, United States of America and Canada, X Corporation

Wifredo Fernández

You're welcome.

5:45 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative John Brassard

Mr. Kelloway, go ahead for five minutes.

5:45 p.m.

Liberal

Mike Kelloway Liberal Cape Breton—Canso, NS

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses here today.

My first series of questions will go to Meta and then, if we have time, to Google.

The first one is around the Wall Street Journal. In 2021, they reported that there was a clear link between Instagram and detrimental mental health effects. Can you crystallize the actions taken by Meta since this particular report?

Maybe we could start with Ms. Curran.

5:45 p.m.

Head of Public Policy, Canada, Meta Platforms Inc.

Rachel Curran

Listen, I talked about some of the new tools and features that we have developed to keep teens safe on our platforms and to address any concerns around safety or mental health.

Let me talk about some of the tools we have developed for parents as well. We now have parental tools that let parents and guardians see whom their teen reports or blocks and set blocking hours for when they can use our platforms. We also recently launched the family centre, with expert resources on how to have dialogues with teens about their online habits. We also give teens ways to manage their time on social media so it's intentional and meaningful. We give them the option to set time limits or to turn on “Take a Break” on Instagram, which would remind them to take regular breaks while scrolling through social media. We send teens notifications to remind them of that. We also notify them when it might be time to look at something different if they have been scrolling on the same topic for a while.

5:45 p.m.

Liberal

Mike Kelloway Liberal Cape Breton—Canso, NS

Thank you, Ms. Curran.

I think I will stay with you, if possible. Is there more recent data available on the mental health of users who use Instagram or Facebook? I'm thinking particularly of male and female youth demographics.

5:45 p.m.

Head of Public Policy, Canada, Meta Platforms Inc.

Rachel Curran

Yes. Look, the most recent research that we have doesn't support the hypothesis that digital technology is behind trends in teen mental health and well-being. The existing body of research doesn't rule out other common factors like economic instability, substance use and academic pressure.

There's also a growing body of research that suggests that social media can play a positive role in teens' lives and provide support in particular to those who are struggling or to members of marginalized groups.

We're always reviewing this research and funding external independent researchers to look into these issues, but so far the research is really mixed.

5:45 p.m.

Liberal

Mike Kelloway Liberal Cape Breton—Canso, NS

Thank you very much.

I have one last question for you, Ms. Curran, or for your colleagues at Meta. Are messages on Facebook stored? I want to make sure I get it correctly. Are they stored?

5:45 p.m.

Head of Public Policy, Canada, Meta Platforms Inc.

Rachel Curran

Maybe I'll turn that over to my colleague, Mr. Gleicher. If he doesn't have the answer, we will get back to the committee in writing.