I can make a comment on that. As I said earlier, this is a good investment. Look at the United Kingdom. They've put £4 million into better offshore compliance, and they expect a yield of £7 billion. That's a pretty good return. I think the cost-benefit analysis of exchange agreements comes out very much in favour of having these agreements and implementing them.
My second comment is that in our discussion this afternoon on tax havens, think we need to be clear concerning what we're talking about. To me and for the OECD, a tax haven is a jurisdiction that has either zero tax or a very low tax, has bank secrecy, lacks transparency, and is badly regulated. Of all those criteria, the key is bank secrecy. You can't get information out of Panama. You couldn't get information out of Barbados; that has now changed.
I think for us the next step involves moving beyond these agreements, getting these reviews out of the way and getting them completed, and identifying what more these tax havens have to do. As I said, we've completed 18 reviews. Barbados got a thumbs down; Botswana got a thumbs down; Panama got a thumbs down. In those 18 reviews, we identified 64 recommendations for improvement. It may not go as fast as you would like, but there is real progress being made here.
There is perhaps is one other comment. I think an earlier speaker was confusing things. There is a difference between evading taxes and using tax incentives that governments put in. If a country wants to offer tax incentives—and Canada, like almost all other OECD countries, does that—that's a sovereign right. We've nothing against that. If a country condones or facilitates tax evasion, that's something that I think is not acceptable, and this is what the OECD has been fighting about.