It was area 6. So in 1996, the year before the new entrants came in, there was about a 10,000-tonne total allowable catch fished by the traditional fishermen. That started to increase in 1997. It rose by 74,000 tonnes up to 2008, and 93% of that increase went to the new entrants.
It's pretty clear from the quota allocation policy that these same recipients of the increases are to shoulder the burden, or most of the burden of the decreases to protect the interests of the traditional fishermen who were in the area prior to the new entrants and who received virtually none of that increase at the time.
It's very fortunate that this year we have very strong prices for shellfish in Newfoundland and Labrador that will basically offset the effect of that reduced shrimp quota for the harvesters, at least, but it's going to be a tremendous adjustment. We don't know what the pricing structure will be, ongoing.
To this point, the quota declines have been most significant in the southern areas, including this area 6. However, scientific research vessel surveys indicate that the shrimp resource just to the north, in area 5, and indeed, there's some indication in area 4, north of that again, is also in decline. In these areas, it's the traditional larger shrimp vessels that are going to take the brunt of that hit.
Point five, ignoring the fact that the new entrants received 93% of the quotas, I think I must observe that the Newfoundland union's solution to this is to forget about the millions of dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars of investments that were made on the basis of the existing allocation policy, and also to take away the shrimp quotas that support the high paying, year-round jobs that are filled mostly by Newfoundlanders and Labradorians working on the larger vessels.
When considering this vision of the future, we would ask the standing committee and the all-party committee in Newfoundland two questions. Which of those year-round enterprises and fishermen in Newfoundland and Labrador should lose their investments and lose their jobs in favour of seasonal, low-paying jobs in the same province? Secondly, how will the reconstruction of the recovering northern cod fishery be paid for by investors and financed by bankers if they're not able to rely on a stable fisheries allocation policy in that fishery?
The last point, number six, is that we support the proposition that our elected leaders and elected representatives should promote stability rather than uncertainty in Canada's fisheries policy, and should therefore respect the quota allocation policy that Minister Mifflin designed in 1997, exactly and precisely to address the situation that we're facing today.
Further, it makes more sense for the elected representatives to adopt a program to assist people to adjust to the new reality, to voluntarily exit from the industry, if necessary, and in some cases, to help the transition toward a stronger, more viable recovery in the cod fishery in Newfoundland.
That's it. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.