Foreign Affairs Committee on April 20th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 59 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022. Members are attending in person in the room, as well as remotely by using the Zoom application.

I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of members.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mike, and please do mute yourself when you are not speaking.

Interpretation for those on Zoom is at the bottom of your screen, and you have a choice of either floor, English or French. Those in the room can use the earpiece and select the desired channel. I will remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Wednesday, November 16, 2022, the committee resumes consideration of Bill C-281, an act to amend the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law), the Broadcasting Act and the Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act.

It is now my pleasure to once again welcome our officials.

From the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, we have Ms. Marie-Josée Langlois, director general, strategic policy branch; Mr. Jeffrey Marder, executive director, human rights and indigenous affairs; and Ms. Ashlyn Milligan, acting executive director, non-proliferation, disarmament and space. As well, from the Department of Canadian Heritage, we have Ms. Amy Awad, senior director, marketplace and legislative policy.

I should also add that as of 12 o'clock we will have, from the Department of National Defence, Major-General Paul Prévost, director of staff, strategic joint staff, who will be joining us virtually by Zoom.

I will now open the floor in relation to amendment G-1.1, which was under consideration when we last adjourned on Tuesday, April 18, 2023.

(On clause 3)

I have Mr. Oliphant.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I can continue, then, in conversation on that amendment.

I think Mr. Bergeron raised an important point to say that the Standing Orders are the Standing Orders and that what happens if we were to pass G-1.1 is that we would essentially nullify that section, and it then would be simply the Standing Orders that would prevail. I think that's precisely true. I think he's made the point about why we're trying to do this, and I guess there still needs to be made—for me—an argument that this activity is somehow consequentially different from every other activity we do as a committee in terms of requesting government comments, reports, etc., or that any other committee does on very important work in the House of Commons.

I would be fine either way to defeat the actual clause that puts in these unusual requirements or accept ours, but I think he's absolutely right that indeed this is nullifying the difference and that the Standing Orders are Standing Orders. Through time, I think the Standing Orders have been tested by different governments and different opposition parties and have proven themselves to work.

I would think that if a case is being made that says there's an urgency about this or that there's a simplicity about it, it could be either one. It could be either that it's more urgent than any other work we do—that case could be made—or it could be argued that it's simpler. We've heard from officials that in fact it's not simpler, and that the burdens to attest for these sanctions issues are high, and we want due diligence to be done, because sanctions, if they are mistaken, have life-threatening consequences for individuals. We want to make sure our sanctions regime, which is already strong, is robust and works. We also want to make sure that when we do put sanctions on people, they're the right people at the right time doing that.

That's why I would still support our amendment that says the minister “must table a response”—it could even be subamended to a complete response or a robust response—“in accordance with the Standing Orders of the House of Commons or the rules of the Senate that apply to government responses to committee reports”.

As I said, I'm agreeing with Mr. Bergeron that this does nullify that section, but I think it's important to nullify it either through an amendment or through defeating the clause.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Go ahead, Mr. Genuis.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

I'll be relatively brief. I think we had a lot of this discussion at the last meeting, but I'll just reiterate.

I appreciate Mr. Oliphant's frankness in saying that yes, the intention of this government amendment is to gut this portion of the bill. I have a couple of comments about why we think this section of the bill is important.

Foreign policy in general is an area where the executive has, and should have, a wide degree of discretion—more discretion, I would argue, than in many other policy areas. I think we have to reflect on what some of the reasonable constraints on that discretion would be.

I think one of them is in the case of sanctions. The government decides on sanctions; Parliament doesn't decide. The government decides on sanctions. Many countries around the world have tried to develop mechanisms for parliamentary committees or for groups of parliamentarians to be able to have trigger mechanisms or other kinds of mechanisms for exercising effective accountability over the government's decisions around sanctions. I think it makes sense, in a parliamentary democracy, to have the required discretion on the part of the executive but to have some kinds of mechanisms.

This is a parliamentary trigger mechanism that preserves the discretion of the executive, but it allows a parliamentary committee to effectively nominate someone for sanctions. It requires a robust response that gives reasons for the sanctions having been or having not been applied, and it requires that response regardless of prorogation or dissolution. These are mechanisms in terms of accountability and response that are stronger than the existing Standing Orders, and they make sense in the case that the government has broad levels of discretion.

I have a draft amendment that I would like to move if Mr. Oliphant's amendment is defeated. That draft amendment would deal with some of the precision concerns around timelines as well as around ensuring that information that would tip people off isn't disclosed in advance of sanctions being made, so to speak. My amendment could be subamended at that point.

I think having a parliamentary trigger that uniquely applies in a foreign affairs issue of sanctions, an area where governments have broad discretion, is consistent with what our allies have done in terms of Magnitsky sanctions. There's a congressional trigger in the United States, for example. I think it preserves the accountability role of Parliament in an area where there is, and should remain, broad executive discretion.

I'm opposed to the amendment as said.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Mr. Genuis.

We will now go to Ms. McPherson.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I just wanted to say that I think today we should come to this work with the idea of getting through some of the important amendments that have been brought forward. I know that everybody comes with that idea, so it's just to try to put that in the frame of our work.

I actually am going to support this amendment, for the simple reason that I believe that Standing Orders are in place for a reason, that there is some value in keeping the Standing Orders. I think it's a reasonable thing for us to respect that.

I agree with Mr. Oliphant that all committees do very important work. All committees have very important things that they want to bring forward. I don't think there needs to be a different reality for this work.

I say that, knowing that I am deeply worried about our sanctions regime and that I have brought forward a study to have this group look at the sanctions regime. I don't think the enforcement of our sanctions regime is particularly robust. I don't think it is working particularly well in this country. I do have concerns about it.

That being said, I think respect for the Standing Orders, for me, is the rationale that I will bring to this amendment.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Ms. McPherson.

We will now go to Mr. Lawrence.

[Philip Lawrence, Conservative, Northumberland—Peterborough South, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

We heard testimony from, and had discussions with, some of the leaders in the world with respect to humanitarian law and also specifically with respect to the Magnitsky act—and I refer to Bill Browder, Marcus Kolga, among others—who have said repeatedly that this government has failed to put in place the Magnitsky sanctions. It's just the reality of the numbers. I believe it's zero in the last five years. They also commented, strenuously, that this was something they would support.

Clearly the government is failing to put in the Magnitsky act. If we just rely on the Standing Orders, we know what will happen. Human rights violators around the world will continue to be able to avoid these sanctions. Even when SEMA sanctions are put in, they're not enforced. If we keep going along this way, we'll just be, in fact, putting in place the definition of “insanity” and we will continue to keep doing the same things while expecting different results.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We now go to Mr. Oliphant.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I would just add that we will be having a scheduling meeting, and I actually think that while the Senate is doing work on sanctions, this committee should do work on sanctions as well. I think that our regime is robust, and in defence of our government's work on sanctions, when the Magnitsky act was signed into law, SEMA—the Special Economic Measures Act—was also strengthened concurrently. In the practical aspect of working with our allies and like-minded countries on sanctions, the burden for us to be able to do the sanctions under SEMA is actually easier, we're finding, than Magnitsky, so that's one of the reasons we do that.

However, I will concur with Ms. McPherson that this committee should take some solid time on sanctions and come up with recommendations on both their application and their enforcement. Let's get some real data and let's get a way of doing it.

Until we do that, I would say that it would be premature to do this kind of a motion and that we can reconsider some of these issues when we do that study and make recommendations on it to the House.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Go ahead, Mr. Genuis.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Chair, I am going to come back in on this, just because I think some of the arguments are discordant with the reality.

There is nothing not respectful to the Standing Orders about passing legislation that creates a parliamentary trigger. It doesn't attempt to nullify the Standing Orders or deny the authority of the Standing Orders. It creates additional reporting obligations for the minister, and there are all kinds of places where statute creates additional reporting obligations for the minister that go beyond what is required in the Standing Orders. In particular, this measure seeks to apply in cases where the Standing Orders would not apply, such as during a prorogation.

We welcome upcoming discussion and study on sanctions, but surely it should be apparent on faith that having greater accountability to Parliament in the process of responding to recommendations around sanctions, and doing what other countries have done in having a parliamentary trigger, is part of how we ensure effective accountability to Parliament for sanctions.

For members who believe that the sanctions regime is not operating in an optimal fashion right now, one simple way we can address that is by requiring stronger reporting to Parliament around sanctions. This doesn't preclude any of that subsequent work, but studies are times when committees can explore issues and make recommendations to governments. It is when we review legislation that we exercise the hard power of a committee.

We could make a real difference here by adding reporting requirements that would, I think, push the government to do more in terms of sanctions. They would push not just “the” government but any government to do more in terms of sanctions. These trigger mechanisms would provide greater accountability to Parliament when a future government is in place.

This is the goal of this legislation, fundamentally: to strengthen the democratic architecture around human rights issues and give Parliament more tools to be informed of and respond to government decisions around sanctions and other human rights issues. I think if this government amendment is passed, some of the folks who are members of the government today may in the future say that they wish they had this tool available in order to hold future governments to account and to encourage the use of sanctions.

We could have a long discussion about SEMA versus Magnitsky sanctions, and I suspect we'll have some of that discussion in the upcoming study, but to have this parliamentary trigger mechanism gives the government wide discretion to continue to choose whether they want to use SEMA or Magnitsky, or not use anything, in a particular case.

Again, that accountability reporting measure will be strengthened by this, and that's again why it's important. It would be disappointing to see this part of the bill gutted, and I think many of the people who follow these issues and engage on sanctions issues will be disappointed if that's the result.

I'll leave it there.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We now go to Ms. McPherson.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

I just want to ask if Mr. Genuis could outline exactly what his amendment would do.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Just to clarify, are you wondering about my amendment? I'm not proposing a subamendment. I have a subsequent amendment that I—

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Yes, I'm sorry. It won't go forward if this passes.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Yes, exactly. I will not be able to move this amendment if Mr. Oliphant's passes, but the draft amendment that I have is CPC-4.

First of all, there was a concern raised about whether the existing provisions would create an obligation for the government to provide information about sanctions that have not yet been made—

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

On a point of order, I believe it is out of order to discuss a potential amendment that hasn't been moved.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

On this same point of order—

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

I can ask him what his intention is.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Yes. On the same point of order, we're debating whether or not to pass an amendment that would preclude the presentation of a subsequent amendment. I think it's reasonable for folks to be aware of the alternatives. I think it's relevant.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Mr. Genuis.

Go ahead, Mr. Oliphant.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I think that the discussion can take place, but it should take place outside the meeting. It would mean that if somebody wanted to suspend the meeting for a moment and have that discussion, I think that would be appropriate if people wanted to hear what.... I think that to keep the flow of business working the way that amendments follow from amendments and to keep this order going, it would be best if that happened.

I understand Ms. McPherson's desire to know. I would like to know too. I think we have it in our package, CPC-4.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

I just want to get some of his intent. I can ask him to provide his intention without asking about the....

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Does anybody want us to suspend for five minutes?

No?