Evidence of meeting #87 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was armenian.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Jennifer Wistrand  Deputy Director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, As an Individual
Audrey Altstadt  Professor of History, University of Massachusetts Amherst, As an Individual
Zaur Shiriyev  Analyst, South Caucasus, International Crisis Group

12:20 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, September 21, 2022, the committee will now resume its study of security at the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. You can speak in the official language of your choice. Interpretation services are available.

In accordance with the committee's routine motion concerning connection tests for witnesses, I am informing the committee that all witnesses appearing virtually today have completed the required connection tests in advance of our meeting.

I would now like to welcome our three witnesses.

First, we have Professor Audrey Altstadt, a professor of history at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. She is joining us virtually. We are also grateful to have Ms. Jennifer Wistrand, the deputy director of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, who is here in person. Last but not least, from the International Crisis Group, we have Mr. Zaur Shiriyev, who is an analyst for the South Caucasus division.

Each of you will be provided with five minutes for your opening remarks, after which we will proceed to questions from the members. Once you are getting close to the timeline, I will hold this up, which means we're asking you or cajoling you to wrap it up in 10 to 15 seconds.

All that being said, given that Ms. Wistrand is here in person with us, we will start with her. Then we will go to Professor Altstadt and then Mr. Shiriyev.

Professor Wistrand, you have five minutes for your opening remarks.

12:20 p.m.

Dr. Jennifer Wistrand Deputy Director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, As an Individual

Dear members of Parliament, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss matters related to your ongoing study of security at the borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

In my opening statement, I will briefly outline some points that I believe are important. I would be happy to go into more detail about these points, as well as other points that are of interest to you, during the question-and-answer session that follows.

Since Azerbaijan's September 19 military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the de facto government of the breakaway region surrendering, Azerbaijan's and Armenia's leaders, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia, have been seriously discussing the conditions necessary to establish a durable peace between their two states.

Long-term peace is possible. However, it's premature to think that a comprehensive peace agreement can or should be developed at this time. A series of pre-negotiations or partial peace agreements that focus on specific security, humanitarian and other issues would lay the necessary groundwork for the two sides to reach the point of being able to develop a comprehensive peace agreement that could resonate both among the countries' elected officials and among everyday Azerbaijanis and Armenians, who have been taught to believe, over the last 30 years, that the “other” is their existential enemy.

Some of the security, humanitarian and other issues that need to be addressed in the preliminary agreements that are developed are the exchange of all Azerbaijani and Armenian prisoners; mutual recognition of all territorial boundaries between Azerbaijan and Armenia; support for Armenians who left Nagorno-Karabakh as refugees following the September 19 military offensive and who would like to integrate into Armenia; support for Azerbaijanis who became internally displaced persons, or IDPs, following the 1992-94 war and who would like to return to Nagorno-Karabakh; protections for Armenians who would like to remain in, or return to, Nagorno-Karabakh, i.e., ethnic, religious and linguistic minority rights; protection of Armenian cultural heritage sites in Nagorno-Karabakh; and shared official terminology for all administrative units in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Additionally, a mutually acceptable mediator is needed. Between 1992 and 2022, the OSCE Minsk Group, which was co-chaired by the United States, France and Russia, regularly met with its Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts; however, the group's successes were limited. For example, the entity that succeeded in brokering the ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Armenia in November 2020 was not the OSCE Minsk Group, but rather Russia. Russia was the only country that subsequently sent peacekeeping troops to the region. Since 2022, the European Council, under the leadership of Charles Michel, has begun to negotiate between President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan.

Unfortunately, there is no one group, council or country that is best placed to mediate. The United States, France and Russia have large Armenian diaspora populations, which renders them potentially biased in the eyes of Azerbaijan. France's decision to increase its military support for Armenia in the wake of the September 19 military offensive would seem to justify Azerbaijan's concerns.

Armenia and Russia have historically had a strong relationship. This has led Azerbaijan to question the latter's ability to be an impartial arbiter. However, the Russian peacekeeping troops' failure to maintain the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, beginning in December of last year, combined with their failure to prevent the September 19 military offensive, has prompted Armenia to question Russia's interventions as well.

Armenia's and Turkey's lack of diplomatic relations, in the face of Azerbaijan's and Turkey's strong relationship, eliminates the possibility of a Turkish mediator. Georgia is home to both minority Azerbaijani and minority Armenian populations, and for 30 years, it has served as neutral ground for Azerbaijanis and Armenians who have wanted to bridge their differences. Georgia could negotiate between its neighbours, but its unresolved territorial disputes with Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia might influence its perspective.

Canada could play the mediator role. Canadian diplomats have the standing and skills to do so. However, like the United States, France and Russia, Canada has a sizable Armenian diaspora population. Canada might be better placed to contribute humanitarian aid and development support to Armenian refugees and Azerbaijani IDPs in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The sooner countries are perceived to cease favouring one side over the other in this conflict, the sooner Azerbaijan and Armenia will be ready to develop a comprehensive peace agreement that can hold.

Thank you.

12:25 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Thank you very much, Ms. Wistrand.

We will now go to Professor Altstadt.

Professor Altstadt, you have five minutes for your opening remarks.

12:25 p.m.

Audrey Altstadt Professor of History, University of Massachusetts Amherst, As an Individual

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure to be here. Thank you for the invitation.

Ladies and gentlemen, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh that we are discussing now is primarily a problem of the 20th century. It is specifically a result of boundary delineation in the Soviet Union by its early leaders, including Stalin.

In these introductory remarks, I will make three major points.

Number one, both Armenians and Azerbaijanis consider the Karabakh region to be historic patrimony and, therefore, each rejects the claims of the other. The region has had a mixed population for centuries, and cultural monuments and cemeteries of both peoples exist there.

Number two, the initial settlement in the early 1920s concerning conflicting claims to the area known now as Nagorno—or mountainous—Karabakh took place in the early twenties as part of a larger territorial dispute over three regions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, dating from their period of independence from 1918 to 1920. Under Soviet rule, the three regions were distributed between the two republics.

Going from west to east, these were, first, Nakhchivan, in the far west, bordering Turkey. That went to Azerbaijan. Next, the area of Zangezur, now part of Armenia, was awarded to Armenia, thus separating Nakhchivan from the rest of Azerbaijan. Finally, the mountainous region in Karabakh was the subject of the creation of a Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast—or region—known as the NKAO. It was created inside Azerbaijan, but it provided cultural autonomy for the local Armenians living there.

All parties were unhappy with this arrangement, but it was created, like other autonomous regions, in particular, I believe, to ensure that local parties would contend against each other rather than fighting against Moscow.

Number three is that the first Karabakh war, which took place from 1988 until 1994, was preceded by a Karabakh movement in Armenia. The leaders of that movement took the opportunity that they perceived under Gorbachev to attempt to get the NKAO transferred from Azerbaijan to Armenia. Demonstrations in Yerevan were followed by local fighting in the Karabakh region, and then targeted killings and evictions of populations occurred in both republics. With the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991, fighting escalated and became officially a war between two sovereign states rather than an internal Soviet conflict.

By the ceasefire of 1994, Armenian forces had successfully taken control of the Soviet creation of the NKAO, as well as the area between it and the Armenian border to the west, a swath of territory from the NKAO south to the Iranian border and some territory to the east. The total amount held by Armenian forces was 14% of Azerbaijan's territory. Azerbaijani forces were defeated, obviously, and humiliated. Sources agree that Azerbaijan lost the larger number of the 30,000 fatalities of this long conflict and about three-quarters of the one million displaced civilians.

Despite these catastrophic losses, Azerbaijanis said privately, if not publicly, that western governments and human rights groups did not raise a cry at that time about displaced Azerbaijanis or about ethnic cleansing, nor did they provide aid to Azerbaijan for the IDPs at that time, when Azerbaijan was still a poor country.

Thereafter, every party on Azerbaijan's political spectrum—and certainly every individual I encountered—wanted to take back that land, get citizens back to their homes and restore some of the national dignity lost in that war. Azerbaijan was going to try to take that back. It was predictable. It was only a matter of time.

With post-Soviet independence, the Azerbaijani government forged alliances with Turkey and Israel, both of which sold it weapons systems. Turkey also provided extensive military training over years, and Azerbaijan had the oil revenues to pay for it all.

Today, governments and international agencies raise human rights considerations about Azerbaijan retaking Nagorno-Karabakh, as they should and must. At the same time, western governments and agencies know the Azerbaijani government has an appalling human rights record toward its Azerbaijani citizens. However, western entities continue to do business with Baku and put human rights and democracy on the back burner.

Azerbaijanis in opposition to the government of Ilham Aliyev will say that the west has a double standard. It cares more about the repression of Armenians than of Azerbaijanis under the same government. Even human rights activists inside Azerbaijan don't see hope coming from the west.

I would like to raise the possibility of highlighting all the human rights abuses taking place in the region, thereby giving hope to human rights defenders of all nationalities.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

12:30 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Thank you very much.

We will now go to Mr. Shiriyev.

Mr. Shiriyev, you have five minutes for your opening remarks.

12:35 p.m.

Zaur Shiriyev Analyst, South Caucasus, International Crisis Group

Good afternoon, Chairman Ehsassi and distinguished members of the committee. I am deeply honoured to have this opportunity to address you and to discuss the ongoing issues between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Both nations' leaders are making positive public statements, signalling readiness for a peace treaty, suggesting that an agreement is near. The major stumbling blocks in the negotiations are now much less prevalent, particularly since Azerbaijan's retaking of Nagorno-Karabakh seems to bring an end to the decades-long conflict over the enclave. However, while Karabakh was the most contentious issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is not the only one. Other issues like connectivity, border demarcation and delimitation remain to be addressed, requiring the resumption of talks.

First of all, although both sides indicate readiness to sign a peace agreement soon, talks have not yet been resumed. While we cannot claim that there is no process—as both sides are exchanging drafts of the peace agreement, with Armenia having shared its response to the draft with Baku on November 21—there is an expectation of a response from Baku. This exchange keeps the peace momentum going, but further actions are required. The foreign ministers responsible for the agreement's details need to engage more visibly. As we know, Baku's decreasing interest in western negotiation platforms is noticeable. It prefers bilateral talks without third party mediation, especially after tensions with Washington and the European Union. A strong push is necessary to resume talks and finalize the peace agreement.

Second, connectivity has been a contentious issue, sparking various speculations that Azerbaijan could forcibly establish connectivity through Armenian territory. Baku has repeatedly denied such accusations. At present, it appears that progress is being made in defining the principles of connectivity, which include respect for sovereignty, jurisdiction, equality and reciprocity. These could be integrated into the peace agreement, but an interstate agreement is necessary to work on connectivity and its practical implementation.

Furthermore, regional players' interests cannot be overlooked. In the Azerbaijan-Armenia talks, external influences often complicate matters. Russia, interpreting the 2020 ceasefire agreement, seeks control over Armenian connectivity routes, which Yerevan opposes as infringing on its sovereignty. Meanwhile, Iran opposes Azerbaijan-Armenia connectivity through Armenia's southern borders.

Another issue is the unresolved security concerns over the state border, which is not demarcated and remains a real front line with numerous military positions, often only metres apart. While it is understood that border delimitation and demarcation will be a long-term process, agreeing on principles, resolving contentious issues such as enclaves and exclaves, and reaching consensus on procedural matters and the use of maps is crucial.

While the focus on these key issues is pivotal, I also think that, before and during the process of the signing of a peace agreement, more steps must be taken by the respective governments to address the humanitarian and other issues. A starting point is the release of the detainees held by both sides—two Azerbaijanis in Armenia and over 30 Armenians in Azerbaijan. Within this framework, prioritizing the issue of missing persons should be central to the collaboration between the sides.

Another humanitarian issue is the problem of land mines. Land mines affect both sides to various degrees, but it is more severe in Azerbaijan, where a majority of mines prevent the safe return of displaced Azerbaijanis to their homes. In this respect, both sides need to take action. The first action should be joining the Ottawa convention. At the same time, the international community should offer significant international aid as an incentive for joining this convention.

The last issue is that, when discussing this peace agreement, there is also a need to end the diplomatic, media and court wars between the sides. Signing a peace agreement is crucial, but continuing diplomatic and media wars is problematic. Ending ongoing court cases and pledging to not initiate lawsuits against each other at the state level should be integral to the peace agreement.

Last, there's a need for peace incentives for both sides from the international community. Given the region's unfamiliarity with peace as a pathway to prosperity, the initial step should be to redefine peace as prosperity for both populations by associating it with financial assistance. Very clearly, there is a need, which might be organizing a donor conference upon the signing of the peace agreement.

My final point is that we should acknowledge the conflict's long historical background, which still resonates in the thinking of the parties today. The solution will require a graduated series of steps, beginning with a peace agreement. This agreement should ensure most people feel safe in assuming that another war is not an option, marking the first step towards peaceful coexistence in a regionally sovereign and secure environment.

Thank you, Mr. Chair and distinguished members of the committee.

12:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Thank you very much, Mr. Shiriyev.

We'll now go to the members for questions.

We'll start with MP Chong.

You have four minutes.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question is for Ms. Wistrand.

We know approximately 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled Nagorno-Karabakh. You made reference in your opening comments to the fact that some want to remain in Armenia and some want to return to Nagorno-Karabakh. You also made reference to internally displaced persons.

Out of the 100,000 ethnic Armenians, how many want to remain in Armenia to settle, and how many want to return to Nagorno-Karabakh? Do we have any sense of those numbers?

12:40 p.m.

Deputy Director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, As an Individual

Dr. Jennifer Wistrand

It's a very good question. I don't know, personally. To be honest, it would be too soon, at this time, to determine that.

I come from having looked at the internally displaced persons situation in Azerbaijan. It has been 30 years now. I spent two years in the country about 15 years ago, and I went back with the World Bank multiple times. Thirty years on, we saw people talking about wanting to return, but whether or not they actually would.... I think it's comparable to the Armenian situation.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

Is your reference to internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan to ethnic Azerbaijanis?

12:40 p.m.

Deputy Director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, As an Individual

Dr. Jennifer Wistrand

That's correct.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

How many people who identify as Azerbaijani do you estimate want to return to Nagorno-Karabakh?

12:40 p.m.

Deputy Director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, As an Individual

Dr. Jennifer Wistrand

In terms of numbers, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates, as of the end of last year, that there were 659,000 Azerbaijanis who are IDPs.

Again, if you poll people, or just ask them, as I've done, many will say, “Yes, I want to return”, but I think that's a generational issue too. I'm sure that, if you were personally displaced, you'd have a greater chance of wanting to return than you would if you were a child who was born, let's say, on the outskirts of Baku and never knew Karabakh.

I think it's very tricky when you ask someone...emotionally versus what they would actually do.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

Do all of those 659,000 people view themselves as internally displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh?

12:40 p.m.

Deputy Director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, As an Individual

Dr. Jennifer Wistrand

It would be either from Karabakh or.... As mentioned in Professor Altstadt's comments, there were seven regions adjacent to Karabakh, which Armenia also occupied—that 14% of the territory.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

It's just Nagorno-Karabakh. Okay.

What is the Republic of Armenia's position on those ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh who wish to settle permanently in the Republic of Armenia?

12:40 p.m.

Deputy Director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, As an Individual

Dr. Jennifer Wistrand

My understanding is that they want to do everything they can to integrate people who would like to stay in Armenia.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

Professor Altstadt, I have a question for you.

You mentioned, in your opening remarks, that western governments continue to do business with Baku.

Is that a reference to the deals western governments, particularly European governments, have been making with Baku to increase natural gas exports from Azerbaijan, in order to displace Russian natural gas in western Europe?

12:40 p.m.

Professor of History, University of Massachusetts Amherst, As an Individual

Audrey Altstadt

Yes, sir, that is one of the many areas where western entities—private companies, governments and international organizations—continue to do business with Baku. They will all say that energy security is among their main pillars for dealing with the Azerbaijani government, along with other types of security. They will also tell you the third pillar is human rights and democracy. It has been my contention that this is the short leg of the tripod.

Yes, the German and EU gas deals are among the most recent.

12:40 p.m.

Conservative

Michael Chong Conservative Wellington—Halton Hills, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I have no further questions.

12:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Thank you very much.

We'll now go to MP Zuberi.

You have three minutes.

12:40 p.m.

Liberal

Sameer Zuberi Liberal Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

If Dr. Fry is having—

12:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

She can't start. She is having connectivity issues.

12:40 p.m.

Liberal

Hedy Fry Liberal Vancouver Centre, BC

Am I still having connectivity issues? I don't know.

12:40 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi

Yes, that is what I've been advised, Dr. Fry, unfortunately.