Procedure and House Affairs Committee on Sept. 26th, 2006

[The Chair, Conservative, Gary Goodyear]

Thank you, Minister.

I have to congratulate everybody. We're keeping right to the five minutes, despite the fact that some of the questions are pretty long.

We are going to go to round two now. I would offer up that people can share their time if they want. We have a lot of names on the list and limited time.

The first-round pick is Mr. Proulx, for five minutes. You can share your time if you like.

[Marcel Proulx, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. It depends on the answers. I'll be quick and blunt.

Thank you for being with us this morning, Minister.

Number one, has there been any consideration to the day of the election being Sunday, to assist Elections Canada and everybody in ridings to find proper sites--proper venues--for the polling stations? We do it, on a provincial basis, in the province of Quebec, and it helps us to use schools, school gymnasiums, and so on, instead of puny, incompatible, incorrect private rentals during the week. That is number one.

Number two, I know that Mr. Kingsley will be one of our witnesses later this morning, but I want to hear it from you. Is one of Elections Canada's motivations for having a fixed-date election scheme to save money?

Third is along the same lines as that of my colleague Mr. Guimond. I want to hear from you. Is there any mechanism to avoid a majority government voluntarily arranging for a defeat on a confidence vote, whether it be a budget vote or whatever, so that it could force an election before the four years? In other words, I can understand that under a minority government the Governor General could be very hesitant, but under a majority government, if that majority government decided to voluntarily arrange for a defeat, I think it would be very difficult for the Governor General to say no to an election, seeing that it's a majority government.

[Rob Nicholson]

We actually didn't consider a Sunday as a possibility. Traditionally federal elections are held on Monday, and if the Monday is a holiday—for instance, I believe in 1984 the election was called in the summer and held on the Tuesday after Labour Day—it is postponed one day. But there was no consideration to put it on Sunday, which is consistent with the tradition of holding federal elections on a Monday.

You asked if one of the reasons was that Elections Canada would save money. It seems to me that's a worthwhile byproduct of moving ahead in this area. I believe it would make a difference to Elections Canada, first in trying to nail down space for their offices. As it is now, if they think an election is going to be called, they might have to reserve a place or cancel the lease, and so on. It would take out some of the guesswork, and I think that would be a useful byproduct.

Now, you said in the case of a majority government...I guess that might be the least of a majority government's problems. If they were in a situation where perhaps half their members were voting against a budget, they would have to explain to the Canadian public why they could not present a united front to Parliament—and that would take some explaining.

But the more likely situation perhaps would be the one, which is reputed to have happened in 1974, where the government of the day tabled a budget that was unacceptable in one part to the New Democratic Party and in another to the then Progressive Conservative Party. There are those who believed that the government of the day engineered its own defeat. Nonetheless, it would be the decision of the House of Commons and Parliament to proceed on that basis.

Again, I don't envision a situation where a majority government splits or falls apart. If so, it would have a lot of explaining to do to the Canadian public.

Did you want to add anything to that, Mr. Newman?

[Warren Newman]

I would like to add a comment. Under our Constitution, there are limits to what can be put in a piece of legislation. It would depend very much upon our conventions and our wish to respect our constitutional conventions. In our system, taking into account the principle of responsible government, it would be difficult to go further than what's in this Bill.

So I would simply say that this legislation contains a directive to officials, to the public at large, and to all those associated with the elections process that there will be an election on this date. It is always subject to the formal powers of the Governor General, and those powers, as we know, are exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister. That is part of our constitutional framework, and we must work within that framework.

[The Chair, Conservative, Gary Goodyear]

Moving on to Mr. Hill, please.

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Prince George—Peace River, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Minister, and to your officials, for appearing today.

First, I want to say, maybe in response to Mr. Dewar's comment that he's still looking for real democratic reform, that this is real democratic reform. I had the misfortune of sitting in Canada's Parliament and listening to some things over the last 13 years that certainly upset and annoyed me in the field of democratic reform. I remember the former Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Paul Martin, saying that he refused to initiate some reforms because they would have been piecemeal. In my opinion, any reform is worthwhile, and this is an important step forward. So I congratulate you for bringing it forward, and certainly the Prime Minister for making this attempt at this point—it's only an attempt to relinquish some of the power and control, which he has willingly relinquished.

As Mr. Dewar noted, we are also pursuing some Senate reform, the limitations on terms for senators.

I want to return to Mr. Guimond's approach, because I do believe—and I think you explained this very well, Mr. Minister, in debate in the House of Commons and again this morning with your opening comments—that although for constitutional reasons we cannot define confidence or non-confidence, or restrict it to a great extent, in the court of public opinion once this becomes law, woe befall a Prime Minister or an opposition that precipitously force an election before that date, unless they can go out and defend it to the Canadian people. So I think it will be an important step forward.

I put that forward and ask whether, in the time remaining, which is very short, you want to elaborate further on this whole business that somehow the bill should define what constitutes confidence or non-confidence, and restrict that? I think quite the contrary, that once the date is set, it would be very difficult for any Prime Minister, unless he wants to defend the reasons in public to an angry electorate.

[Rob Nicholson, Conservative, Niagara Falls, ON]

I don't think there's any question about that in terms of public perception. Ultimately, whatever we do is subject to the Canadian voters. They get the final say on that.

You raise an interesting point, because once you try to set down on paper what exactly constitutes confidence, it is very difficult. One of the members suggested to me that it would be very clear. It might include the Speech from the Throne, the budget, and any money bill. Once you say that, you also have to ask, what if this country were deciding to go to war?

I think there is a convention developing now that Parliament will get a say on where we will deploy our troops or engage Canadians overseas in conflict. I would make the argument that once you have the definition, you've left out something else. Deciding whether Canada goes to war or not, for instance, is far more important than many money bills might be in the overall good of this country.

So it's difficult to define and put down on paper, and that's one of the reasons there has been reluctance to do that. You might find yourself in court arguing what does or doesn't come within the constitutional convention of confidence. We want to have a separation of the different areas of government, so it is important to do that.

In terms of electoral reform, Mr. Dewar said he would support it because it's doable and an improvement. It's not an attempt to completely overhaul the whole Canadian parliamentary system, because quite frankly it doesn't need a complete overhaul. We have the best system in the world right here in Canada. The Canadian system that has been adapted over the years is the best, but that doesn't mean it should be static. Nothing should be static. We should always be looking at ways we can improve our system, and I believe this is a step in the right direction.

[The Chair, Conservative, Gary Goodyear]

You have about 20 seconds left.

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Prince George—Peace River, BC]

I have a quick question then.

The other issue that keeps coming up is that somehow this will create lame duck governments. The point I made during debate is that we only need to look to the last government to see a lame duck government. I mean that in the sense that I know all of the standing committees were reluctant to start substantive work because there was always the fear that an election was imminent.

I would ask that you address that either now or--

[The Chair, Conservative, Gary Goodyear]

Perhaps you could answer that on the next round. I'm sorry, we're out of time on this question.

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Prince George—Peace River, BC]

Just leave it hanging then.

[The Chair, Conservative, Gary Goodyear]

Okay.

Monsieur Guimond.

[Michel Guimond]

My question is for you, Mr. Newman.

You've mentioned section 1 of the Bill referring to subsection 56.1(1) of the Canada Elections Act which bears on the powers of the Governor General. Here is what it stays:

56.1 (1) Nothing in this section affects the powers of the Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General's discretion.

Since Confederation, in 1867, has it ever happened that the Governor General has taken the initiative of dissolving Parliament or of not accepting a request of the Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament?

[Warren Newman]

Yes, Mr. Guimond, there was a case in 1926 which is well known by political scientists. That is when Governor General Lord Bing refused the request of Prime Minister Mackenzie King to dissolve Parliament and to call general elections. The Prime Minister had to call on the leader of the Opposition, Mr. Meighen, to form a new government.

There has been a lot of controversy about that. Even experts cannot agree on whether the consequence was to reinforce the powers of the Governor General or whether it reinforced the notion that the Governor General should not do that kind of thing, that is to say to act against the advice of the Prime Minister.

[Michel Guimond, Bloc, Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, QC]

On November 28 of last year, when Prime Minister Martin went to see the Governor General, could she have refused to dissolve Parliament?

[Warren Newman]

Strictly speaking, the Governor General always has the power to accept or refuse to dissolve Parliament because that's his or her legal power. However, this power is framed by very strong constitutional conventions according to which the Governor General normally acts on the advice of the Prime Minister.

[Michel Guimond, Bloc, Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, QC]

I want to refer to the interviews with the Governor General that were broadcast by all the media last weekend. In a few days, she will celebrate the first anniversary of her appointment as Governor General. She has stated that her most difficult decision over the past year was to accept the advice of Paul Martin to dissolve Parliament. We cannot question her about that but I have to say that her role in this matter was simply that of a rubber-stamp. The 1926 case has indeed created a lot of controversy.

Even with a majority government, the Governor General has the power to refuse to accede to a request of the Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament if she believes that it would not be timely to have elections and that the government should carry on until the end of the legal mandate to established by this Bill.

Is that your position?

[Warren Newman]

Legally speaking, you're right: the Governor General has full power and discretion as far as that is concerned but one must add that this power is framed by conventions that are not legal but rather political.

[Michel Guimond, Bloc, Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Gary Goodyear]

You actually have one minute left, Monsieur Guimond.

[Michel Guimond, Bloc, Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, QC]

No, thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Gary Goodyear]

Thank you.

We will have time for one more round if you can each keep it to three minutes. Is that agreeable?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[The Chair, Conservative, Gary Goodyear]

Perfect.

Mr. Dewar.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

I just want to return to the whole idea of criteria of confidence. Just as an observation, one of the things that people were concerned with most recently was the vote we had in front of us certainly on the Afghan mission. It was stated beforehand that it would be a confidence vote. It's evolving, I guess, and you could ponder on it, but it was also stated that regardless of the vote, the executive power would kick in. So I think that's something we're still grappling with, if you will.

I'll just turn to the whole idea of setting criteria, because it was mentioned in your brief that this would be problematic. I want to explore that a bit more. Some would say that some of the reforms we're engaging in.... Again, I support this, and I think it's part of democratic reform; I'm simply saying that it's not the end, certainly.

If we're going to have reform done--and we see this in Senate reform—without engaging in constitutional change, this over time can be problematic. I simply look at Eugene Forsey's opinion in the past, that our Constitution is something we need to respect and to be vigilant about. I guess what I was saying before, and my question directly, is that this is a pragmatic approach, which I support for the short term, but should we not address it in our Constitution at some point? And is there anything in front of us that would preclude us from at some point addressing constitutional change in this area, or maybe in Senate reform when we get to that?