Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me.
I am familiar with Bill C-16 and the debates that took place in the House of Commons at second reading on September 18 and 19.
I will be making my presentation in French.
I can make an audible noise in English, enough to teach in an American university, so I'm willing to answer your questions in either language.
In the debate of which I am aware, I believe I was able to discern a reasonable consensus among the participants with respect to the nature and scope of the legislation. It is commonly referred to as the fixed election date bill, but everyone seems to clearly understand that in reality, the election calendar will not be as definitive as it is for our neighbours to the South, for example.
To paraphrase Mackenzie King, what Bill C-16 offers us are elections at fixed dates, to the greatest extent possible, but probably at dates that are not fixed. The Prime Minister will still be able to ask the Governor General to hold an early election, and not only if the government loses the confidence of the House. This is an interesting compromise.
A totally rigid election calendar is extremely rare in parliamentary systems. In that regard, among sovereign countries, Norway is the exception that confirms the rule. However, it is common to restrict the right to dissolve Parliament. In practice, election dates are more predictable under other parliamentary systems than in Canada.
That being the case, the temptation is great to suggest that Bill C-16 will change nothing; however, giving into that temptation would be a mistake. With this bill, a prime minister will not be able to request and secure the dissolution of Parliament as easily as before. In that context, it will be much more difficult to call an election simply to make it easier for a government to be re-elected. But one should not underestimate the climate, and thus a potentially negative public reaction to that kind of decision. It would definitely be starting off on the wrong foot for a prime minister to have to spend the first week of an election campaign responding to accusations of political opportunism, or even of having broken the law.
So, I endorse this bill. I must say that some of the arguments made in support of this legislation are not as convincing as others, but in my view, the strongest argument relates to equity. Giving a party leader the privilege of choosing the date of the next election, without any guidelines, gives that party an exclusive advantage, which may be a less decisive factor that some may say or believe. In my opinion, the general thrust of the Elections Act is clearly to put all the players on the same footing. That is an argument we hear over and over again in the debate and there is a good reason for that: it's a valid argument.
Where I did get the sense that there is a difference of opinion among MPs was with respect to the desire of some to take advantage of this bill to explicitly set out in legislation, and perhaps even in the Constitution, the conventions governing responsible government. As far as that goes, I'd say that it's quite a nice idea, but I don't see it as being urgent.
There has been a tendency to do that in Continental Europe. In France, they call it “rationalized parliamentary government”. It's clear and has more of an educational thrust. You have a short paragraph laying out exactly when a government is defeated and when it is not. I'd say that our practice in this area, which for the last century and a half has been to rely on conventions that I personally am quite familiar with, having studied parliamentary tradition, has served us quite well. There have been some ambiguous cases. Mention has been made of the May 2005 vote, but as you know, the debate did not last long. Ultimately, the House of Commons clearly reaffirmed its position. The lesson I draw from the May 2005 episode is that technicalities do not allow a government to prolong its existence indefinitely.
The other idea that has come forward is that some would like to amend one of the existing conventions by abolishing the prime minister's power to make any issue a matter of confidence. Let's just clarify what we're talking about here. This refers to a situation where a prime minister says to members of Parliament: “You may not like every detail of the measure I am proposing but, in my subjective opinion, it is fundamental. So, I am going to put you in the position of having to either accept or refuse; I am putting my head on the block. If you reject this measure, I will consider that I have lost your confidence and will advise accordingly. ” That is what happens when a prime minister asks for a vote of confidence. Some would like to see that abolished.
I do not agree. This practice is a feature of pretty well every parliamentary system, and there is a very important reason for that, which has to do with the very nature of the parliamentary system. A parliamentary system is not just one based on a legislative assembly of parliamentarians where the government does nothing more than fulfill the will of the House of Commons. Under a parliamentary system, what is known as the Executive does not just carry out orders. The strength of the parliamentary system is tied to the government's ability to show leadership, subject to the House of Commons' power to defeat it and the ultimate power of the electorate to arbitrate a fundamental disagreement that may have arisen between the government and Parliament.
Basically, Mr. Chairman, I endorse this bill both because it reduces the possibility of a prime minister abusing his power to dissolve the House of Commons, and because it maintains that power while at the same time increasing the chances that it will be used more appropriately.
In closing, I would just say that it is quite rare for a government to propose an institutional measure that it does not benefit from in one way or another. Now that this opportunity has arisen, I believe you should take full advantage of it.
Thank you.