I agree. I think that's very helpful.
The change that I suggested, drawing on the Nova Scotia bill and making the application of these amendments to criminal conduct that has occurred prior to the coming into force of the bill, is, as you suggested, valuable. I think it's valuable from the point of view of transparency and clarity, and because the courts say about legislation that it will be presumed to operate prospectively unless Parliament has made its intention clear that it is to operate with respect to events that have occurred in the past. So I think it's very helpful in that way.
But to pursue your other line of thought, why is it that retrospective legislation in a civil context, even if it may be constitutionally valid, can nevertheless seem inappropriate and generate some controversy? I guess it's because, and you've alluded to this, that when we change people's rights and expectations retrospectively, there can often be an unfairness. They have planned their lives in accordance with the existence of those legal rights, and to change them can often be seriously unjust. We've had many instances of that and controversies about that, which have led to important judicial rulings.
I agree. I think it's worth thinking about and reflecting on that. Even if this is a constitutionally valid approach, is there something unfair about it? Does it fall into that category of retrospective legislation that should give us some pause? I think that's where I would say to the committee that with this particular bill, in my view, you ought not to be particularly troubled about that.
The reason for that is, again, because it's a relatively modest extension of the principles that are already embodied in section 19 and 39 of the act. In other words, I would think that a member of the House or a member of the Senate, convicted of a serious crime in a manner that's connected to their Parliamentary responsibilities, would not have a legitimate expectation that they would remain a member of that body.
I hope that's not an unfair suggestion. If that's right, then all we're doing, as I suggested earlier, and as Mr. Williamson has said, is filling a gap in the existing scheme. We're filling a loophole, as he put it because there's a way around the risk of disqualification or expulsion by resigning before it happens. If one has been convicted of a serious offence, that's a way in which one can maintain one's pension.
It seems to me that by closing that loophole, we're giving effect to what would be a fair and reasonable expectation in the circumstances rather than interfering with one in the way that.... I agree, sometimes retroactive legislation can operate very unfairly, but this doesn't strike me as an example of that.