Procedure and House Affairs Committee on May 11th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Good morning. I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 72 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. The committee is meeting today to continue its study.

I see, Mr. Cooper, that you've raised your hand.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I'd like to move a motion on notice pertaining to the order of reference from the House arising from the question of privilege concerning the intimidation campaign orchestrated by an operative at Beijing's Toronto consulate against the member from Wellington-Halton Hills, Michael Chong.

The motion will be distributed. I will now read the motion into the record:

That, in relation to its order of reference of Wednesday, May 10, 2023, concerning the intimidation campaign orchestrated by Wei Zhao against the Member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other Members, the committee

(a) make use, for the purposes of this study, of the evidence received during its study on foreign election interference, without limiting the witnesses who may be called;

(b) make use, for the purposes of this study, of the evidence received by the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics during its study on foreign interference, without limiting the witnesses who may be called;

(c) invite each of the following to appear on their own:

(i) the Honourable Michael Chong, for one hour,

(ii) Eric Janse, Acting Clerk of the House of Commons, for one hour,

(iii) the Honourable Melanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for one hour,

(iv) the Honourable Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety, for one hour,

(v) the Honourable Bill Blair, President of the King’s Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Emergency Preparedness, for one hour,

(vi) Jody Thomas, National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, for two hours,

(vii) David Vigneault, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, for two hours,

(viii) David Morrison, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Acting National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, for two hours,

(ix) Mike MacDonald, former Acting National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, for one hour,

(x) Vincent Rigby, former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, for one hour,

(xi) Michael Duheme, Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for one hour, and

(xii) Cong Peiwu, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Canada, for two hours;

(d) directs the parties to provide their preliminary lists of other witnesses to the clerk of the committee within one week;

(e) order the production,

(i) within one week, of the July 2021 CSIS report entitled “People’s Republic of China Foreign Interference in Canada: A Critical National Security Threat”, together with all records concerning the transmission to, distribution within, analysis of and handling by, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Privy Council Office, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, of this report, and

(ii) within three weeks, of all other memoranda, briefing notes, e-mails, records of conversations, and any other relevant documents, including any drafts, which are in the possession of any government department or agency, including the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, the Critical Election Incident Protocol Panel, any minister’s office and the Prime Minister’s Office, containing information concerning planning or efforts by, or on behalf of, foreign governments or other foreign state actors to intimidate a Member of the House of Commons, provided that

(iii) these documents be deposited without redaction with the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, in both official languages,

(iv) a copy of the documents shall also be deposited with the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, in both official languages, with any proposed redaction of information which, in the government’s opinion, could reasonably be expected to compromise the identities of employees or sources or intelligence-collecting methods of Canadian or allied intelligence agencies,

(v) the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel shall promptly notify the committee whether the Office is satisfied that the documents were produced as ordered, and, if not, the Chair shall be instructed to present forthwith, on behalf of the committee, a report to the House outlining the material facts of the situation,

(vi) the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel shall assess the redactions proposed by the government, pursuant to subparagraph (iv), to determine whether the Office agrees that the proposed redactions conform with the criteria set out in subparagraph (iv) and

(A) if it agrees, it shall provide the documents, as redacted by the government pursuant to subparagraph (iv), to the clerk of the committee, or

(B) if it disagrees with some or all of the proposed redactions, it shall provide a copy of the documents, redacted in the manner the Office determines would conform with the criteria set out in paragraph (iv), together with a report indicating the number, extent and nature of the government's proposed redactions which were disagreed with, to the clerk of the committee, and

(vii) the clerk of the committee shall cause the documents, provided by the Office of the Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel pursuant to subparagraph (vi), to be distributed to the members of the committee and to be published on the committee’s website forthwith upon receipt; and

(f) makes the evidence received during this study available for its study on foreign election interference.

Madam Chair, this motion arises from a question of privilege on a matter that is about as serious as it gets. We have a situation in which, two years ago, an accredited Beijing diplomat at the Toronto consulate arranged to intimidate a sitting member of Parliament by threatening to sanction and punish his family in Hong Kong because that member put forward a motion calling out the Beijing regime for perpetrating genocide against Uyghur Muslims.

This is an attack on this House and on every member of Parliament. It's an attack on our democracy. It is an attempt to interfere with a member of this House's ability to do his job to stand up on behalf of his constituents and on behalf of Canadians, which every member of this House should be able to do free of interference.

CSIS identified that this Beijing operative, this Beijing diplomat, had been involved in orchestrating this intimidation campaign two years ago. It was revealed in a memo and documented in a memo, yet for two years, the member for Wellington—Halton Hills, Mr. Chong, was kept in the dark. The Prime Minister, incredibly, claims that he first learned of this in The Globe and Mail and not two years ago, even though the Prime Minister's national security adviser, Jody Thomas, told Mr. Chong that the memo had been distributed to relevant departments as well as to the national security adviser of the PCO.

One of two scenarios is possible, neither of which is good for the Prime Minister. One is that the Prime Minister is not telling the truth, that he was briefed and that he kept the member for Wellington-Halton Hills in the dark. He covered it up and turned a blind eye to a Beijing diplomat intimidating a sitting member of Parliament and threatening the safety and security of that member's family. The other scenario is that the Prime Minister is incompetent and has set up a structure in which he has been kept in the dark and is not being brought up to speed with respect to what as I said at the outset is a matter that could not be more serious: a Beijing diplomat trying to intimidate a sitting member of Parliament when he's doing his job by threatening the safety and security of his family.

In either case, it underscores that this Prime Minister is simply unfit for the job when it comes to protecting Canada's national interests and defending the safety and security of Canadians. It is further evidence that this Prime Minister does not take Beijing's interference seriously.

I have to say it's very disappointing that, in the face of the Prime Minister's inaction, his incompetence, his neglect and, arguably, the possibility that he is lying or not being forthcoming—I'll withdraw lying—or not telling the full truth, the Prime Minister would go out on a campaign to try to attack and impugn the character of the member for Wellington—Halton Hills by spreading misinformation that the member had been briefed two years ago when he had not. He also sent and directed two members of Parliament, including the member for Kingston and the Islands, to spread that misinformation in the House. That's about as low as it gets.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

I have a point of order.

On that point, Madam Chair, I made a statement, which I later clarified, and I apologized for the manner in which that was received. However, I'm curious why we even have to do this study if Mr. Cooper has already come to all these conclusions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I think we'll return.... I know Mr. Cooper is wrapping up.

I watch the House, even when I'm not in the House, and I know you've clarified that point several times, but repetition works in this place.

Go ahead, Mr. Cooper.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

The bottom line is we need to get to the bottom of what happened, who had this memo, how the memo was transmitted, when it was distributed and to whom it was distributed, and that is provided for in this motion.

It's not only a matter of calling witnesses; it's a matter of producing the evidence. It's not just documents, but following the timeline and following exactly how that memo was distributed to find out exactly who knew and when.

I hope that in the spirit of the unanimous vote on the question of privilege, this motion will also be unanimously adopted.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

Go ahead, Mr. Green.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

First of all, it's a pleasure to be here with all of you today. This is kind of a continuation of some of our work at the ethics committee.

For those of you who have had the privilege of working with us, you'll know that the New Democrats generally support the production of important documents. You'll also know that in a unanimous way, we've agreed that this is a serious issue. We have subject matter experts who are going to be presenting to us today.

I would say on the record that we agree in principle with the production of documents. We believe there needs to be a system in place from which a third party can assess what is and what isn't cabinet confidence and national security and assess all the other things that we tend to hear at committees that prevent us from getting access to information.

That being said, I would say we support this, but we strongly encourage members around the table to allow us to get back to the matter at hand today, which would include the testimony of key witnesses for the remainder of the meeting.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Mr. Turnbull.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thanks, Madam Chair.

I appreciate the comments that everybody has made. Obviously, we all take this matter very seriously. A question of privilege is something that brings concern to all of us as members of Parliament. Particularly in this case, I think it's something we need to get to the bottom of.

I wish I'd seen the motion a bit earlier so that I could have reflected on it, because there's probably a large degree of agreement on the majority of it. In my mind, I was operating on the assumption that we had until Tuesday, based on a previous conversation, to think about additional witnesses. This is prescriptive of specific witnesses the Conservative members are putting forward, but I think our team would like to have some time to reflect on what witnesses we'd like to add to the list. I think all parties should have the opportunity to consider that.

I also would note that we have three panels of witnesses lined up for today. Those witnesses, I believe, have been rescheduled, so I don't want to be disrespectful of their time. I think it's important for us to move forward with committee business for the day.

We've operated in this committee for the vast majority of the time in good faith and have reached agreements on.... You could even look at the fact that we agreed to study foreign interference before some of these allegations started circulating in the media, so we've always expressed an interest in this topic. Remember that the witnesses who are here today are speaking to the topic of foreign election interference, and they have important things to contribute.

It's an important matter. We're ready to work together. That is my general sentiment here, but we need a little time to consider the motion. I believe if we take that time, we'll find a way forward, as we always have done in the past.

With that, I move that the debate be now adjourned.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

That being a non-debatable motion, we'll call the question.

(Motion agreed to: yeas 7; nays 4)

Thank you for that.

I just want to put on the record—and I will be continuing to try to keep us on time—that I do know some of the parameters.

Mr. Chong would be the natural first appearance, and we are working to make sure that we can try to get him here before the constituency week. Then, as we determine the witnesses, we'll work to see where we can put them in.

After the constituency week, we will be heavily on the question of privilege, as members have shared a desire to do so. It remains that Tuesday is when to get your witnesses to the clerk. If a notice has not been sent out yet, it will be shortly.

With that, the committee is meeting today to continue its study on foreign election interference.

We have with us today Mark Bourrie, barrister and solicitor; Michel Juneau-Katsuya, former chief of the Asia-Pacific unit, Canadian Security Intelligence Service; and, from the Vancouver Anti-Corruption Institute, Peter German, barrister and solicitor.

You will each have up to four minutes for an opening statement, after which we will proceed with questions from committee members.

Mr. Bourrie, you have the floor. You can speak in the official language of your choice.

[Mark Bourrie, Barrister and Solicitor, As an Individual]

I'll be making my remarks in English. I've given them to the translators and I've sent them to the clerk.

I'll start off by saying that the remarks will probably be much more valuable to you if you have a copy of the Ottawa Magazine article I sent to the clerk earlier this week. It really has the full story. Four minutes certainly can't do it justice.

With the clock running, I'd like to thank you for inviting me.

As you can see in the 2012 email record I gave to the clerk's office, I had hoped for this opportunity some time ago. I believe my experience with the Xinhua News Agency might give the committee some useful background and context, as it examines China's attempt to extend its influence into Canada's political system.

I've been a practising lawyer for five years, but I started writing for newspapers in the late 1970s. I was quite young. I wrote for several daily papers when I was a student. I spent 13 years as a freelancer in the Georgian Bay area of Ontario writing for The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star.

I came to Ottawa in 1994 and joined the press gallery as a freelancer. Between 1994 and 2007, I wrote for the Toronto Star, the National Post, the Ottawa Citizen, The Hill Times, the Law Times, Canadian Lawyer and a bunch of other publications that you can see in my CV. In 2004, I started working on my Ph.D., which was on the press censorship system in the Second World War, and in 2007 I accepted a limited-term teaching appointment at Concordia University in Montreal. In 2009, I finished my doctorate, my teaching contract was over and I was back in the press gallery.

Most of my freelance work had been divided up by my colleagues or the publications had cut back on what they were buying, so there was some adjustment needed. At the same time, there were interesting things happening in media. Experiments like BuzzFeed, VICE, Canadaland, iPolitics, Blacklock's Reporter and other non-traditional media were trying to take the place of dying media. Away from the media landscape, there seemed to be a real thaw in Chinese-western relationships.

Here are some things to remember for context when you're listening to what I'm going to tell you.

In 2009, Hu Jintao was still president and leader of China, and there were still term limits for his positions. China had just come off a successful summer Olympics. Relations between China and Taiwan seemed to be improving. Canada had sent trade missions to China for years, and all recent governments had tried to get a deal. The Harper government succeeded in 2014.

In 2009, representatives of the Chinese news agency Xinhua asked me to write some freelance pieces for them. I had concerns and tried to get advice from CSIS. There was considerable suspicion about Xinhua's operation in Canada among my colleagues and people on the Hill in general, and I reached out to CSIS for guidance and never heard back. Most of my interactions with Xinhua are documented in the Ottawa Magazine piece I sent to the committee clerk and in the email material I also forwarded to you.

Xinhua was trying to accomplish two things that seemed mutually exclusive but it turned out were not. It wanted to make money and expand to become a wire service feeding content to credible news organizations throughout the world. It made deals with large outlets like the Associated Press and with Chinese media in Canada and other places. It also wanted to give credibility to Chinese institutions and the regime.

Xinhua was apolitical. I saw no attempt to push the interests of one Canadian political party over another, but then my experience was limited. Xinhua did not want to offend political actors here, and the articles of that time are I believe still online. Xinhua covered lavish social events at the Chinese embassy that drew in Liberal and Tory MPs and senators. It refused to run any criticism of the Conservative government.

However, it turned out that Xinhua's bureau chief collected intelligence for China, and he asked me to spy for him. He wanted information on the private meeting between Prime Minister Harper and the Dalai Lama in April 2012, so I quit and I told him why.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Mr. Bourrie, we want to know why, but I need to move to the next person. Hopefully there's time for questions and comments. We will also circulate your opening comments.

[John Nater, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

I'm okay if we give him 30 seconds, if there's unanimous consent to give 30 seconds.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Is that fine?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

We're going to give all opening comments five minutes. That means our time will be limited.

Go ahead, Mr. Bourrie.

[Mark Bourrie]

I'll talk like an auctioneer.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Please tell us why, but not too fast for the interpreters. Thank you.

The floor is yours.

[Mark Bourrie]

I'm going to go off the cuff here. The emails are in the material I sent, my emails with Xinhua.

The bureau chief of Xinhua wanted me to ask around to find out through any contacts what happened when Prime Minister Harper met with the Dalai Lama. He wanted me to file material about the Dalai Lama in Ottawa that he made clear would not be used in journalism, and I basically told him to screw off. That's the Coles Notes version.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

That's excellent.

I can confirm that—

[Mark Bourrie]

I blew the whistle on them.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

You blew the whistle on them. Thank you.

I was repeating what he said, for the record.

The documents that have been shared are in translation. Until they are in both official languages, they will not be circulated, but they are on the way, just so everyone knows.

With that, Mr. Juneau-Katsuya, the floor is yours.

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya, Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Unit, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual]

To keep things as concise as possible, I've deleted a few paragraphs from the speaking notes I gave to the interpreters. So I trust they will be able to keep up with me.

Madam Chair and committee members, thank you for this opportunity to give you my thoughts and analyses based on 30 years of work, research, investigations and analyses of Chinese intelligence activities in Canada. This is work that I did as a counter-espionage agent, a private sector security advisor, and a university researcher.

Right off the bat, I can confirm to you that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, has been aware of Chinese interference in Canadian elections since the mid-1990s. At the time, my unit had prepared the Sidewinder report, working with the RCMP. That was when we learned for the first time, from the Elections Canada archives, that the Embassy of China had contributed in 1995 to the campaign funds of Liberal Party of Canada and the Conservative Party of Canada. At the time, the Chinese service was inept. But over the following 30 years or so, they boldly and expertly enhanced their techniques and operations.

The problem, however, is not only coming from Chinese operators. It is also caused by our own candidates, elected officials and political staff, who are naive or calculate intentionally to gain power with the assistance of the Chinese government. The Chinese intelligence services are so good at it because they understand the electoral system and the weaknesses of human beings, and their work is a long-term game.

Today, I want to be very clear. We can prove that every federal government from Mr. Mulroney's to Mr. Trudeau's has been compromised by agents of Communist China. Every government was informed at one point or another. Every government chose to ignore CSIS's warnings due to negligence, self-interest or partisanship. Every government has been infiltrated by agents of influence acting on behalf of the Chinese government, and we knew who they are. Every government took decisions about China that are questionable and can only be explained by interference exercised from within or motivated by self-interest.

Not only have sitting governments been compromised, but all federal political parties have been compromised at one point or another. The inaction of the federal government—all federal governments—has led to attacks on many municipal and provincial governments. Ultimately, every government has been part of the problem, not the solution, and remember that not only China is practising interference.

Considering these facts, I would like to respectfully propose some actions to be taken.

One, establish a mandatory process for all future elected officials, political staff and volunteers in which they swear to and sign a declaration saying they are not under the influence or acting on behalf of a foreign government or entity. This form will clearly warn of possible criminal procedures in cases of intentional deception.

Two, eliminate the possibility for foreigners to vote for the selection of candidates and nominees. This is obvious nonsense.

Three, give an explicit and clear security briefing to all newly elected MPs and have them sign off that they attended and understood the briefing, again with a warning of repercussions in cases of deception. Prevention is our best defence.

Four, prohibit all outgoing cabinet and senior public servants from working on or participating in any activity or job related to their previous functions for a period of three to five years, for both foreign and national entities.

Fifth, I propose that Canada pass criminal legislation on foreign interference, identifying activities considered unlawful and the penalties that could be incurred.

Sixth, I recommend the establishment of an independent office, separate from CSIS and the RCMP, which would report directly to the House of Commons, and whose director would be appointed by the House. The proposal that a national coordinator position be established within a department is nonsense.

Seventh, this office should have its powers spelled out in a statute that gives it the right, as a peace enforcement body, to investigate, search, arrest and criminally prosecute, without having to request anyone's permission.

Eighth, I propose the establishment of a transparency monitoring mechanism to reveal identified cases of interference, once they have been investigated and confirmed. As I said, education and awareness are the best defence.

Nine—

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.