Procedure and House Affairs Committee on May 30th, 2023

[Dan Stanton]

I can't answer why, but I do feel that it's very important. I feel there's increasing distrust in Canada in terms of our democratic institutions. I was at the other committee on April 10, and if you had asked me then, I would have said, “No, we don't need a public inquiry; I don't think it's necessary,” and I'd come in with all sorts of security reasons for it.

Since then, there's been so much reporting and, even assuming that a percentage of the reporting has some truth, I—and I'm usually not someone who believes in conspiracy theories, and I'll always give someone the benefit of the doubt—keep thinking that there may still be some negligence. I think maybe there is, but I think Canadians are increasingly wondering what's going on. That's why I am.... I want a public inquiry, because I want Canadians to regain that trust in institutions. I'm sad about that.

When I had a performance agreement as an executive manager in the service, the first priority that we had to sign off on was the protection of Canada's democratic institutions and processes. That was it, and we were evaluated on that. All I've been hearing in the last couple of years is how Canadians are increasingly becoming less and less trusting in their system. That's why I want an inquiry.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I have a question about confidence in our democratic system. I would like to repeat some of the comments you made on May 23. You wondered whether the special rapporteur was in the best position to hold these consultations and whether his findings would have enough legitimacy for there to be a national consensus and for public confidence and democratic institutions to be preserved.

Are you concerned about what will happen if there is no public inquiry? We are trying to win back or, rather, gain people's trust. I'd like you to tell me a little more about that, because the situation is quite worrisome.

[Artur Wilczynski]

I find that very worrisome. As you mentioned, and as the special rapporteur mentioned as well, democracy is a matter of trust. The Prime Minister picked up on that same idea. Given the facts before us, I think there's a broad consensus on the need for an independent inquiry. I think that's very important because it's a way of establishing that trust. Without trust, we have neither democracy nor institutions in common.

We must do everything in our power to shed light on what happened in the last election. We also need a transparent process to prepare for the threats that are still present and that will evolve over the next few years. I agree with my colleague that the best way to do that is to have an independent inquiry.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

We're told that a public inquiry could pose a risk to our national security. You say that, according to the Five Eyes, this is déjà vu. What other information can we provide to the government for it to take action? As you know, there was even a vote in the House of Commons to have an independent public inquiry conducted by all the opposition parties. What is missing?

[Artur Wilczynski]

To me, it's not a question of the classification of the information handled by the special rapporteur or as part of an independent investigation. As my colleague pointed out in his testimony, there have already been cases of public inquiries involving the handling of highly classified documents. Our allies and our Five Eyes colleagues fully understand the importance of transparency in this context. They apply these procedures themselves.

So I don't see it as a question of security or document classification. Frankly, I think it's a matter of political will.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

You just answered an important question, Mr. Wilczynski.

I would also like to know your opinion, Mr. Stanton.

[Dan Stanton]

When you look at inquiries, for example, the John Major inquiry, you talk about security and sensitivity of information. There were surveillance questions. There were intelligence officers, deputy ministers and former ambassadors. There was a whole smorgasbord of people who were questioned.

When I look at the nature of this investigation—and I've worked this area for years, most of my career is in counter-intelligence—foreign interference is what we refer to as low-hanging fruit. This isn't an espionage ring. This isn't of great sensitivity. I'm not understating it. I'll probably have former colleagues ask me what I'm doing, but it's not that sensitive.

It's already out that CSIS uses interviews, and it's in the media that CSIS listens to phones of targets, so there's not going to be that much coming out that's going to shake western civilization—not to be facetious. That's why I say that, if we want to have an inquiry, it's probably the safest one in terms of national security to have on this type of operation.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Ms. Blaney, the floor is yours.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you so much, Chair.

I thank the witnesses for being here today. I'm really finding this interaction very interesting. I share your concerns about the fact that so many Canadians are losing faith in our democratic institutions. That worries me, and I think it worries all of us, hopefully, in this place.

The other thing that I'm concerned about is that it seems like the debate right now is if the special rapporteur should or should not have the job. I feel like this is not what we should be focusing on. We need to be focusing on the issues and getting to them. It seems like this is a bit of a barrier to that, and that concerns me.

You both talked a little bit about how information should have been given to Mr. Chong more effectively and more quickly. Of course, I know that I also have a member of my caucus who is facing the same or a similar challenge of just not having that information.

Could you, from your expertise, share with us if this is a legislative gap? Is it a process gap? What is preventing information? It seems strange to me, and it sounds like our legislative rules say that this has to go to the minister, and then the minister decides. It seems to me that, if a member of Parliament, a candidate during an election, is targeted, they need to have that information. Not having that information is an issue of security.

I'm just wondering—

[Dan Stanton]

Let me address that, because I've had that experience, and I've spoken in the past to members of Parliament on this type of issue. When the service does these interviews, there's a certain amount they can disclose, like talking to you. I'm going to have to tell you who I am and then you're going to tell me things, so it's a bit of a back-and-forth of information getting.

Then, when there's information that comes in.... Perhaps some of the information that came in on Mr. Chong was not really necessarily assessed as credible. It could have come from a source of unknown reliability. It could have come from some other party or something. It's not like the moment the service gets that information, they're going to go to that member of Parliament and say, “Look, we understand you're...”. They have to assess that. The process of assessing could be a number of interviews with that subject.

I did, in my final words, say that, when the service obviously understood that this was accurate, that some entity in the PRC was targeting him, they should have told him, but they don't always have the luxury of that accurate, full picture as the threat is unfolding.

I don't know what the mechanism is other than to have trust in the intelligence service that they will know when it's reaching a point where they should act or turn it over to policy-makers.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

I'm going to let you answer, I promise, but I just want to add clarity to that.

I hear what you're saying. There has to be something tangible to pass that on, but who gets to decide who passes that on? That seems to be the challenge.

[Dan Stanton]

That's the point. It looks to me—I mean, I wasn't part of the process—like the service was sending these reports routinely for quite some time and that there's an expectation that the policy-makers or the machinery of government have a strategy to deal with PRC foreign interference and would incorporate that into their decision. That's the whole point.

It's not hitting tripwires like terrorism and espionage, but it is hitting tripwires. If there's a certain lethargy with government in terms of receiving the reporting, it's not a surprise to me, when it starts getting a little more serious with respect to an MP, that there's nobody home. It goes to culture, which my colleague mentioned earlier. There simply may be a culture where they don't respond to the reporting, but CSIS isn't waiting by the phone. They're just continually putting this out as part of the intelligence production process.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Mr. Wilczynski.

[Artur Wilczynski]

I was just going to add what I think is an important conversation to have: Exactly what are the thresholds for that reporting?

As my colleague Mr. Stanton pointed out, you really do need an assessed understanding of what the threat is, as opposed to any kind of information that may be in the domain that comes to the attention of the intelligence services and names or addresses a specific member of Parliament.

The challenge if you do that, if you have this open-ended “any time anyone says anything about an MP”, you're opening yourself up to a whole new threat vector in terms of disinformation, misdirection and information campaigns.

I think there does need to be an exercise of judgment around when that happens. It has to be based on an assessment of the level of threat to that member of Parliament or any other Canadian, and whether some kind of engagement with that individual who is targeted would help them manage the risk, or if there is another course of action that would be more appropriate that mitigates the risk to them and, in the case of members of Parliament, to this institution.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

It appears to me that there's a bit of a void.

Mr. Wilczynski, I appreciated what you said about that conversation back and forth, and that it's not happening in the way that it should.

Could you explain, from your perspective, who is responsible for establishing protocols around the sharing of intelligence and information from intelligence agencies to government? Is there a gap between that and how the departments and the ministers take that information?

[Artur Wilczynski]

Government identifies its intelligence priorities. That is a cabinet process that tells the intelligence communities to go forth and get us intelligence. There is a level of opacity in that process that, I think, is challenging. There is scope for making how government decides what our intelligence priorities are more transparent to Parliament and more transparent to Canadians.

When those priorities are identified, we understand who needs it and then work very hard to ensure that the people who asked for that intelligence get it. The problem is, as I pointed out in my statement, oftentimes we don't hear back from deputies, senior officials or ministers whether we are getting what they need. That's why I said that interface needs to be improved, and there's a role for the national security and intelligence adviser to strengthen that process.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

We'll now do a quick round.

Go ahead, Mr. Berthold.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Mr. Stanton, you've stated publicly and directly on Twitter that you support an independent national investigation into foreign interference. You've been quite vocal about this. It has rarely happened that someone in your position has taken a similar position. Why do you think that all the other processes currently under way, such as our committee's study or Mr. Johnston's proposals for public hearings, aren't the best vehicles for doing so?

[Dan Stanton]

It's a good question.

There are good vehicles. The thing with the parliamentary committees such as NSIRA and NSICOP is that their prime work—and they do excellent work—is to review the compliance of the collector agencies. They are hard-driven to focus on that, not so much focusing on the machinery of government and how they are handling things. There's obviously merit in having that.

What I am sensing, mostly through media, parliamentarians and everything else, is that a lot of Canadians are getting frustrated or agitated to find out if there's any clarity to this. We also have the concerns with leaking. I am very much against leaking. Part of the reason I'm speaking publicly, and part of the reason I'm saying I'd like to have an inquiry is that I'd like to see the leaking stop as well.

It is kind of odd for me, as the security guy, to be saying, “Let's have an open hearing.” It's kind of against my DNA in a way. My mind tells me that this is the best route to go right now, because I don't think a lot of people want to wait a couple of years.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Stanton, you said that, in very specific situations, information can be reviewed during a public inquiry. You also said that such an inquiry wouldn't interfere with our activities and relations with the other Five Eyes countries, particularly in view of the subject matter.

Our committee asked for the production of documents, that is to say all the information that has leaked to the media. We've asked for copies of the memos and emails, and for these documents to be provided to the law clerk of the House of Commons for redaction.

Do you think parliamentarians should have access to these documents, after they have been reviewed and redacted by the law clerk of the House, in order to shed light on the situation?

[Dan Stanton]

Ultimately, if the answers were going to come from cabinet confidences or that type of email exchange, it would. I'm aware of the fact that there's a sensitivity, and that's why I'm saying, with a public inquiry, you can still have those in camera discussions or exchanges with the commissioner. There are no lawyers or anyone there. They can just review it and get some answers.

It's not an either-or thing. We either have a public inquiry and we can't talk about classified matters at all, which means it's going to be pointless, or we just stick with the regular institutions we have to review it and then the public says, “How do we know it was reviewed?” That's why, in my opinion, it's a public inquiry.

You can put all sorts of safeguards on public inquiries. It just takes a bit of creativity. It's all legal. It's been done before.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Do you also think that the same creativity could be shown when our parliamentary committee asks for access to this information? Can the various groups and national security also be protected by the existing system?

[Dan Stanton]

That's a tough one.

I don't have a legal background on it. I'm just speaking in terms of a public inquiry. There are precedents for public inquiries. We've had them on national security matters. That's why I don't feel like we're really reinventing the wheel.

When you get into those issues of whether parliamentarians can demand those documents, you're asking the wrong person.

[Artur Wilczynski]

I'd like to answer your question very quickly.