Evidence of meeting #83 for Procedure and House Affairs in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was information.
A video is available from Parliament.
7:30 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Yes, that would be accurate.
7:30 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Okay.
I just want to go back to Minister Blair's testimony. I think it's just important to put it on record.
On June 1, he said, in specific response to the issue of the IMU concerning MP Chong, “The director determined that this was not information the minister needed to know”.
He further went on to say, “In this case, they”—meaning you—“made an operational decision that...was not required.”
He then added that he was not provided this because of your supposed operational decision, which he characterized as one that was “quite appropriately” made.
How do you explain the minister's testimony? It's not just a case of his not seeing it; he's talking about an operational decision that was made by you that he even went on to say was quite appropriately made, which was to not inform him.
7:30 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I think what is clear is that the process did not work.
I and other witnesses in front of your committee have spoken about the fact that with the way the intelligence is being ingested by different parties at the ministerial level, and also at all levels of officials, the system may often not be adequate. There is a need to make a significant improvement. I would venture to say that this is one such example, where the information was meant to be seen by the minister and was not.
I think it's a problem that we need to fix. It's a problem that is important because the people of CSIS and other intelligence organizations take risks to collect the intelligence. We need to make sure that it is available to the right people.
7:35 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
I certainly agree with you, Mr. Vigneault, that this is something the minister should have seen.
I have a lot of questions for the minister as to why he would make such statements that fly in the face of what you have said, by making very specific claims about certain operational decisions that he claims were quite appropriately made to keep him in the dark on a matter that you said is prepared in the way of a report when you see something of high importance. I could see why it was of high importance, given what we were dealing with, which was MP Chong and another MP and their families being targets of the Beijing regime.
We know that after the IMU was prepared, there was a CSIS memo of July 2021 that revealed that MP Chong and, I believe, other MPs were being targeted by Beijing. Jody Thomas, the Prime Minister's national security and intelligence adviser, when she appeared on June 1, said that memo from CSIS was sent to the PCO as well as to the deputy ministers of foreign affairs, public safety and national defence.
Was that memo sent to anyone else, to your knowledge?
7:35 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
For sure it was those individuals. I don't remember if there were other individuals, but those would have been the most senior people who would have been the recipients of this.
7:35 p.m.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Very briefly, was that memo an IMU document or product?
7:35 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
If I recall correctly, this memo was what we call an intelligence assessment, so not raw information or raw intelligence, but an analysis of the intelligence available on a specific topic.
7:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger
Thank you.
Once again I have demonstrated that when we take turns I will provide leniency to make sure that we get through our round of questions.
With that, we'll go to Madam Romanado.
7:35 p.m.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Through you, I'd like to thank the witnesses for being here.
Monsieur Vigneault, I will ask a couple of questions. Could you just answer yes or no to confirm, because I have multiple questions and limited time?
Can you confirm whether the IMU referenced for May 2021 identified MP Chong in any way?
7:35 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Unfortunately I'm not at liberty to speak about the classified nature of our information. I apologize to the member, but I'm not at liberty to speak in detail about specific information of a classified nature.
7:35 p.m.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
Can you confirm if the July 2021 intelligence assessment identified, in any way, MP Chong? I'm trying to get to the point of the question of privilege. Can you let me know if that intelligence assessment identified Mr. Chong?
7:35 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Unfortunately I cannot provide a specific answer. What I can say that's hopefully helpful to the member is that for the people who are receiving.... Sometimes we produce information, and even when it's very sensitive, names are included. Sometimes names are not included but are available to people who have the right need to know, so that process exists and is used frequently.
7:35 p.m.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
Monsieur Vigneault, “On June 28 2017, the National People’s Congress passed the National Intelligence Law and outlined the first official authorisation of intelligence in the People’s Republic of China”.
I'm quoting directly from a Government of Canada website, where it says:
The intelligence law highlights one important continuing trend within the state security legal structure put in place since 2014: everyone is responsible for state security. As long as national intelligence institutions are operating within their proper authorities, they may, according to Article 14, “request relevant organs, organisations, and citizens provide necessary support, assistance, and cooperation”.
Can you elaborate with this committee if this changed the posture with respect to intelligence-gathering within CSIS?
7:35 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Indeed this was another significant milestone. It essentially codified and publicized the fact that the PRC, the Communist Party, saw everybody—every company, every citizen—as someone who needed to support intelligence services. The way the PRC is looking at its citizens, irrespective of the fact that they may have dual citizenship and irrespective of the fact they may have been living in another country for years—a couple of generations—they would apply the same standard to apply that law and they would be putting pressure on individuals to collaborate with the intelligence service if that was their desire.
Yes, CSIS took good note of that, and it changed the way we were looking at our analysis and our investigations.
7:40 p.m.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
According to testimony from Mr. Chong, he was made aware of direct threats to him in early May 2023, based on reports and a subsequent briefing. Again, not elaborating on the specifics, can you confirm that he was made aware of potential threats to him in early May 2023?
7:40 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I believe that the member is referring to the threat reduction briefing that I had with Mr. Chong. Yes, I believe the date is accurate—I can confirm—but that would be the first time that we would have shared that classified information with Mr. Chong.
7:40 p.m.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
In that regard, earlier in your testimony today, you said “intelligence must be shared to have an impact”.
If that is, in fact, correct—if Mr. Chong was not made aware of any threats to him or his family until May 2023—would you agree, then, with respect to the question of privilege? If he was not made aware, how would he have been intimidated?
7:40 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I think, as I mentioned earlier, that it's an important point. CSIS had a few interactions with Mr. Chong, including at the point we had the intelligence, and the person engaging with Mr. Chong had the experience and knowledge to make sure that this intelligence was specifically tailored for Mr. Chong. It does not negate the fact that the specific and classified intelligence was not shared with Mr. Chong, but that defensive briefing was absolutely informed by that.
As has been mentioned, and I've said earlier, I think we're pointing here to a gap that exists that we need to find a way to resolve because of the ongoing threat of foreign interference in our democratic processes.
7:40 p.m.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
Thank you.
Hopefully, I'll have another chance.
7:40 p.m.
Conservative
Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB
Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr. Vigneault, for being here again.
Madam Henderson, thank you.
I have just a few questions to help me understand an intelligence assessment report, which I think, if I understand correctly, comes from the secretariat. If I understood Mr. Rigby's testimony correctly, this information was collated and sent to the national security adviser, Public Safety, Foreign Affairs and National Defence.
What's the difference between that assessment and an IMU, the issues management note? What's the difference between those two?
7:40 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
It's an important point, given the fact there have been a lot of references to different intelligence processes or documents.
Intelligence starts from collecting information. You have initial information. That will be what we call a raw intelligence product.
7:40 p.m.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
We have data. We have information. It could come from different partners.
That information is used by intelligence analysts to create intelligence. You have one report that would speak to something specific we know.
A compilation of these reports, those building blocks, plus any other information, like open-source information, information from our allies or information from other intelligence services is then used by our specialists, our experts, and they will produce what we call an intelligence assessment, to try to paint a picture of a situation.
I think that was the July document that was referred to earlier.
The IMU, issues management note, is a tool. Given the fact that there's so much information and there are so many moving parts in our system, we have put in place this tool to draw the attention of different people, sometimes ministers but often the rest of the bureaucracy, to something we want to draw attention to. It may not contain any intelligence; it may just be something that is happening that we want to be mindful of.
7:45 p.m.
Conservative
Blaine Calkins Conservative Red Deer—Lacombe, AB
That's very, very clear.
You talked about this issues management note. It's been the topic of discussion, at least in the questions we've had. The former minister of public safety was here, we understand that, and has made some claims that seem to be contradictory, not only to what David Johnston said in his report but also to what we've heard. I'm trying to flesh this out, because what's at stake here is the safety and security of a member of Parliament.
When was this IMU, or when were these issues management notes...? When was this process established, roughly? Could you tell this committee? This is not something new, is it?