Evidence of meeting #89 for Procedure and House Affairs in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was information.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Rob Stewart  Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

11 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

I call the meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 89 of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

The committee is meeting today to study the question of privilege related to the member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other members.

Before we begin, I remind you that all comments go through the chair. The clerk and I will maintain a consolidated speaking list.

We have with us today, from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Rob Stewart, deputy minister, international trade.

DM Stewart, you will have up to five minutes for your opening comments. Welcome to PROC. We pass the floor over to you.

11 a.m.

Rob Stewart Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Thank you, Chair, and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

Since late last year this committee has been looking at foreign interference in Canada's elections, and I commend your commitment to this important issue. Ensuring that Canada's elections remain free and fair and Canadian is a critical part of keeping our democratic processes legitimate, credible and trustworthy.

I am here today to speak to my time as a member of the panel entrusted with administering the critical election incident public protocol, which is a role I occupied while I was deputy minister of public safety during the 2021 general election.

Madam Chair, before I begin, I wish to reiterate what has already been said in this committee by me and other witnesses in both 2019 and 2021. The panel concluded that foreign interference did not impact the integrity of the general election. However, we know that threats to democracies such as ours are real. To ensure Canada is in the best position to combat such threats, the government introduced its whole-of-society plan to protect Canada's democracy ahead of the 2019 general election. The critical election incident public protocol is a key initiative in this plan.

The protocol establishes a process by which Canadians are informed in the event of an incident or series of incidents that impact Canada's ability to have a free and fair election during the period that the caretaker convention is in effect. The protocol is administered by a panel of five senior public servants. The panel is entrusted with exercising significant judgment and draws on information and intelligence sources from within and outside the public service in determining whether an incident or series of incidents meet the threshold for public announcement. This determination would be made on a consensual basis.

The threshold for public announcement by the panel is high and is considered to be a last resort. It is a last resort since the protocol, and the threshold outlined in it, must be understood within the wider context of Canada's federal election security infrastructure. During election periods Canadian laws apply, and Canada's national security and law enforcement agencies continue to carry out their mandates. Elections Canada independently administers the Canada Elections Act, and the commissioner of Canada elections investigates and enforces breaches of the act. Political parties, candidates and media engage in democratic debate and are in a position to engage in fact-checking or bring to attention false narratives circulating in the media or online.

The protocol does not replace Canada's laws or national security agencies. The information the panel relies on to inform its discussions and deliberations can come from a variety of sources. In 2021, the panel received briefs from the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, SITE, which consists of the Communications Security Establishment, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the rapid response mechanism at Global Affairs Canada.

It is important to understand that although the SITE task force comes together to brief the panel, the agencies may also directly inform an affected party of an incident. As this committee is aware, there is always a baseline threat of foreign interference occurring in Canada. Our national security agencies continually work to combat and address the threat to keep Canadians safe both outside and during the election period. The protocol is one of a larger system in place to protect Canada's elections, and it must be understood within this context.

Thank you, Madam Chair, for the opportunity to talk about the protocol and the role of the panel in the 2021 general election. I welcome your questions.

I would be happy to answer in English or French.

11:05 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

Thank you very much, Deputy.

We appreciate your having worked with the clerk and our team to find the time that worked for your schedule and making yourself available.

We will start with six-minute rounds, starting with Mr. Cooper, followed by Mr. Gerretsen.

Mr. Cooper, you have six minutes—through the chair.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Stewart, for coming back to committee.

Mr. Stewart, you were the recipient of a May 2021 issues management note from CSIS indicating that the member of Parliament, Michael Chong, and his family were being targeted by the Beijing regime. That issues management note had been sent to you in your capacity as deputy minister of public safety, as well as Bill Blair, the then minister of public safety, who is now the Minister of National Defence, and his chief of staff.

Further, you were the recipient of a July 20, 2021, CSIS intelligence assessment further indicating that MP Chong, as well as at least two other MPs, were being targeted by the Beijing regime.

Despite this, MP Chong was kept in the dark for two years, resulting in what is now before this committee upon the Speaker of the House's finding of a prima facie question of privilege.

Let me begin with the issues management note. On what date did you read that note?

11:05 a.m.

Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Rob Stewart

I am unable to answer that question in specificity. I would tell you that, in the river of intelligence that crossed my desk, it could have occurred at any point in time subsequent to when it was written.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

The issues management note was not any piece of intelligence information; according to the CSIS director, an IMU is something that is flagged as something of high importance.

Did you read that note, yes or no, as a starting point?

11:05 a.m.

Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Rob Stewart

Again, I do not recollect reading it, but I think I would have because I saw a lot of intelligence.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

You would have seen that. Would that have been in May 2021?

11:05 a.m.

Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Rob Stewart

In all likelihood.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

Do you have any recollection of briefing Minister Blair about the IMU?

11:05 a.m.

Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Rob Stewart

I did not brief Mr. Blair about the IMU.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

You did not brief him. Why did you not take it upon yourself to brief Minister Blair?

11:05 a.m.

Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Rob Stewart

The intelligence moves in the system through various channels, and one of the channels that it moves through inside the Department of Public Safety is to the minister separately from the deputy minister.

In the context of our discussions with CSIS is when issues management notes are generally raised, not by me.

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

The issues management note was sent to Minister Blair directly. Minister Blair, when he appeared before this committee, made the incredible assertion that the director of CSIS had made “an operational decision” not to share the IMU with him despite the fact that it was sent to the minister via the top secret email network and Minister Blair didn't see it because he didn't have the log-in credentials to the top secret email network. Nonetheless, he made the assertion that the director of CSIS had made an operational decision not to inform him.

When Mr. Vigneault, the director of CSIS, appeared before this committee, he flatly said that wasn't so, that he had every intention of the minister seeing that IMU. In fact, Vigneault stated, “I conveyed the information to the Department of Public Safety along with the very specific directive to forward it to the minister.”

Do you recall or are you aware of any operational decision not to inform Minister Blair?

11:05 a.m.

Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

11:05 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

Thank you for that.

Were you aware that Minister Blair did not have access to the top secret email network? Can you explain why, after 18 months into the job, Minister Blair and his chief of staff would not have had their log-in credentials?

11:10 a.m.

Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Rob Stewart

It would not be the fact that, in the normal course, a minister or their staff would have access to the system. The access is tightly controlled and generally run by bureaucrats.

The way the intelligence moved through the department was in paper form, so I would receive briefing binders on a regular basis with the contents of intelligence produced by various systems, because we have more than one.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

But the IMU was, in this instance, sent by email, and it was sent to Minister Blair. Can you explain how it is that he didn't see it?

11:10 a.m.

Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Rob Stewart

I would not believe that it was sent by email, to be clear. It would have been sent on one of our top secret systems, and it would have been downloaded, printed and then packaged for Minister Blair. That would have been the normal course.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

I'm going to ask you now about the July 2021 memo from CSIS.

On what date did you read that memo?

11:10 a.m.

Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Rob Stewart

I'm sorry. Again, I cannot answer with specificity. The volume of intelligence, and I really have to emphasis this point, is very large.

11:10 a.m.

Conservative

Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB

There is a large volume of intelligence, but this was a matter that is about as serious as it gets involving the targeting of a sitting member of Parliament, and it was not any memo that was sent; it was an IMU initially in May 2021, and in July 2021 followed up with another intelligence memo.

Would you at least concede that you cannot recall seeing the latter memo? You thought you read the first one, but you said you didn't talk to the minister about it. Michael Chong was left in the dark, and that amounted to a complete breakdown in process as far as what should have happened that didn't happen is concerned. Would you concede that?

11:10 a.m.

Deputy Minister, International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development

Rob Stewart

My comment on your question, Mr. Cooper, would be that there are many people in Canada who on an ongoing basis are being targeted by foreign interference. It was not my job to inform them. There are processes and ways of doing so. In this instance, I was not tracking what other people were doing.

11:10 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger

Thank you.

I would like you, at a later time, and I'll provide you time if you would like it, to reiterate the other point that you were trying to make but you were not able to make. Perhaps you could keep that written down somewhere as I think it is important for the work that we're doing.

Mr. Gerretsen, six minutes go to you.

October 19th, 2023 / 11:10 a.m.

Liberal

Mark Gerretsen Liberal Kingston and the Islands, ON

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr. Stewart, for being here.

I want to jump in a little bit to the exchange that you just had with Mr. Cooper. You mentioned it a number of times. You said a “river of intelligence”. You talked about “a lot intelligence”. The picture that's trying to be painted here by my colleagues on the other side of the table is that a memo shows up on your desk. It's unique. You don't often get memos. It's sitting there. You read it, and then you say, “Oh, I don't need this,” and throw it in the shredder.

Can you tell us a little bit more about the river of information, about how the process works, about how much you're getting on a daily basis?