No, the pain is still too immediate.
Mr. Chairman, in light of the previous votes, I'll be brief and explain the nub of this amendment. The NDP suggests that there be a sunset clause whereby the act would automatically dissolve at the end of a three-year period unless both Houses of Parliament passed a resolution to continue it.
Now, this is a stand-alone amendment, but it also was intrinsically linked to the NDP's proposal that we have an independent reporting process that would take a baseline human rights, labour, and environmental snapshot, and then involve monitoring over the next three years. That would give parliamentarians in both Houses the data that I think we would need to basically evaluate the result of our work here.
I would point out that Mr. Keddy may be correct in that there may be some monitoring provisions built into the agreement, but those monitoring agreements really occur at the government-to-government level and at the monitoring level. That's a fair point, but the purpose of the scheme that the NDP has put forward would allow that monitoring to be done independently and be put back before parliamentarians and this very committee.
When we pass a bill and do the kind of in-depth work that we're doing in listening to the testimony and doing this clause-by-clause consideration of the bill, I think it's our responsibility as parliamentarians to have that information come back to us to inform us whether or not our objectives in passing this act are in fact being met.
The sunset clause is part of that. It would put teeth into the Canadian commitment to defend workers' rights and the environmental progress that I think we all want.
Now, as for the signing of the free trade agreement between the U.S. and Jordan 10 years ago, the evidence before this committee established that it did not propel the promised changes in workers' rights. It has brought media attention and political pressure, and we believe that this has helped propel some areas of improvement. So we think Canada should be learning from that experience of the United States and should be using some different mechanisms that may also act as pressure points on Jordan, to help it realize how seriously Canada takes the improvement of workers' human and environmental rights as we link them to trade.
I think it's fair to say as well, and I give the government credit on this, that the fact the agreement addressed labour, environmental, and human rights signals to Jordan that these issues are of importance to the Canadian government and Canadian people. But without having some sort of explicit escape clause, some sort of term, some sort of ability to review this act, I think the teeth are not really there to signal to Jordan that we're serious about improvement—and not improvement over decades but starting immediately and in the short term. We think three years is a good enough time to determine if Jordan does in fact make progress in those three key areas.
I would also point out that this agreement can be extended simply by a resolution in the House of Commons, and by the Senate, so it retains democratic and parliamentary control over this agreement. I would argue that this is the kind of creative and effective improvement to our trade agreements that would actually improve their efficacy and also make them more accountable in reaching what we all agree are their objectives.
I'll conclude by saying, Mr. Chairman, that if we believe that signing these agreements with countries like Jordan improves labour and human rights, and environmental standards—and that's what we're hearing—and if we say, as the government does, that engaging in trade with these countries is the way to do that, then having an effective mechanism to keep pressure on the country with whom we are trading to meet those very objectives, at the risk of having that preferential trade status revoked, is nothing more than having the courage of our convictions. It is smart bargaining. It's effective bargaining.
In the corporate sector, in the commercial sector, nobody would ever sign an agreement that was open-ended. There are terms for the end of contracts, which put the prospect of renegotiation on the table. They keep parties motivated, because they're invested in the objectives of the deal, and there's a risk of having the deal cancelled if the objectives are not met. When we sign an open-ended trade agreement that doesn't have that standard in it, it's less effective as a result.
Once again, I would think it's prudent and smart commercial practice. It's smart and effective governmental and parliamentary action to have a review mechanism in this agreement and an ability to have a snapshot of this after a certain reasonable period of time, and to cancel it if the objectives are not being met.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.