Yes. Thank you very much, colleagues, and Mr. Chair.
I'm pleased to be here with Laurie Wright to speak to you about the declaratory provisions to the Supreme Court Act proposed in division 19, part 3 of Bill C-4, and the Economic Action Plan 2013, No. 2.
Colleagues, these declaratory provisions have been introduced to clarify the most basic criteria for appointment to the Supreme Court and are the same regardless of the appointee's province or region, and to ensure that any future government can continue to draw from the ranks of the most talented and experienced jurists who currently sit on Canada's federal courts in filling vacancies on the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court of Canada.
Mr. Chair, esteemed colleagues, I am hopeful that public consideration of these provisions in Parliament will also help the public to better understand the work of the federal courts and remove any doubt as to the eligibility and suitability of its judges for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada, including as members of the court for Quebec.
Colleagues, in the government's view, the eligibility of the federal court judges to fill any vacancy on the Supreme Court should not be in doubt. It is solidly supported by legal opinion prepared by respected former Supreme Court Justice Ian Binnie, which itself was supported by his former colleague, the Honourable Louise Charron, as well as by noted constitutional expert, Professor Peter Hogg.
However, as you are no doubt aware, Mr. Chair, colleagues, despite the weight of legal expert opinion, some have continued to question the eligibility of federal court judges for appointment to the Supreme Court, particularly as members of the Court for Quebec. In order to resolve this critical matter as soon as possible, the government is proceeding on two fronts.
As you know, the matter is referred to the Supreme Court of Canada to confirm, first, the meaning of the statute, and second, Parliament's authority to enact legislation that requires that a person be, or has previously been, a barrister or advocate of at least 10 years’ standing at the bar of a province as a condition of appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, or to enact the declaratory provisions under consideration here today before you.
On the other front, the Economic Action Plan 2013, No. 2 was determined to be the most expeditious and most efficient way of introducing declaratory provisions and ensuring that they are enacted on time to guarantee that federal court judges can be considered in the process of filling upcoming Supreme Court vacancies, the first of which arises next April.
These declaratory provisions clarify—without making substantive changes to the existing law—that individuals with at least 10 years at any bar in Canada, including the Quebec bar, at any time during their career, are eligible to sit on the Supreme Court of Canada.
It's very straightforward language.
Mr. Chair, I would like to stop here for a moment and make the point that it may appear a bit technical, but it is of central importance to this committee's consideration of clauses 471 and 472 of Bill C-4. The provisions that these clauses introduce differ in quality and, consequently, in effect from the types of statutory amendments generally considered and debated by Parliament or by a committee such as this. These provisions are declaratory in nature and, as such, they do not amend the Supreme Court Act in the way that a standard statutory amendment would.
Typically, statutory amendments enact new provisions or change existing provisions in a way that makes the result different in substance from the provisions they would replace, modify, or amend. The nature of the proposed declaratory provisions is to explain the proper interpretation of the law from the time it came into force and effect.
Essentially, it is language that adds to the meaning in a way that will bring about greater understanding.
The Supreme Court of Canada recently explained the impact of declaratory provisions in its 2013 decision in Régie des rentes du Québec v. Canada Bread Company Ltd. The court stated in that case:
The interpretation imposed by a declaratory provision stretches back in time to the date when the legislation it purports to interpret first came into force, with the effect that the legislation in question is deemed to have always included this provision.
In keeping with the purpose of a declaratory provision, clauses 471 and 472 confirm the basic requirement that judges must meet to be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada. These provisions will make it clear that the current wording of these sections does, in fact, allow for judges of the Federal Court to fill Quebec vacancies on the Supreme Court of Canada, as long as at some point in their legal career they had been members of the Quebec bar for a minimum of 10 years. This ensures that current and former members of the Quebec bar are treated in the same way as current and former members of any other province. So it is to keep consistency and parity with all provincial bar associations.
I should explain, Mr. Chair, that the wording of these provisions has changed very slightly over the course of the past century as a function of legislative revision and consolidated exercises performed for all federal statues. However, there have been no substantive changes. We're talking about changes here after a considerable period of time for the purposes of clarification.
Successive pieces of legislation empowering Parliament have established that any changes that occur during these revision exercises are not intended to be substantive. The rule reflects an important principle. Given Parliament's role in enacting the laws of Canada, it should be inappropriate for mere housekeeping matters to change the law.
This principle is reflected as well in long-established rules of statutory interpretation that routine statutory revision and consolidation do not result in substantive legislative amendments.
That's what we're talking about here today. It is not a substantive change but a declaratory statement to clarify existing law.
Mr. Chair, I want to point out as well that the appointment of federal court judges to the Supreme Court of Canada is in no way novel. Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein, a current and esteemed member of the court, was a member of the Manitoba Bar, appointed to the Federal Court, then to the Federal Court of Appeal and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court of Canada in 2006. Before him, Justices Frank Iacobucci and Gerald Le Dain, both members of the Ontario Bar, followed the same route to the Supreme Court.
It should be neither surprising nor unexpected that Supreme Court vacancies have in the past been filled from the ranks of Federal Court judges. This is not without precedent.
Experience in the Federal Court enhances rather than negates a long-time advocate's qualification to serve on the Supreme Court of Canada. I say that because the Supreme Court regularly hears appeals from decisions of the federal courts. In 2012 alone, the Supreme Court heard 10 appeals from decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal, as compared to 15 from the much larger Court of Appeal of Québec.
As I mentioned at the outset, Mr. Chair, it has been suggested in particular that judges of the Federal Court ought not to be appointed given the requirement under section 6 of the Supreme Court Act that three of the nine judges of the Supreme Court be appointed from Quebec.
The argument is that since Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction where the Quebec civil code applies, only those who practise law in Quebec at the time the appointment must be filled or who sit on a Quebec superior court are qualified. However, Mr. Chair, this argument is demonstrably without merit, not least because it reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the work of the federal courts.
Let me explain. Judges of the Federal Court have jurisdiction over a wide and diverse area of law, and the principle of bijuralism means that they must regularly apply federal law in accordance with legal rules and principles in force in the province from which it arises.
For matters arising from Quebec this means that judges of courts, like the Federal Court of Appeal, must routinely interpret Quebec's civil code in deciding matters arising in complex and diverse areas such as tax law, copyright, and bankruptcy. That is why, like the Supreme Court Act, the Federal Court Act requires that there be a minimum number of judges on the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal who have also been members of the bar from Quebec at any time. There are ten on the Federal Court and five on the Federal Court of Appeal. In essence, it's the same type of composition. There is mandatory membership on the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal from Quebec.
The object of this statutory requirement is precisely the same as that of section 6 of the Supreme Court Act. It is to ensure that those courts have the requisite bijural capacity to deal with matters that arise from both civilian and the common law systems that define our system of administration of justice. To exclude the eminent Quebec jurists appointed to the Federal Court in satisfaction of such a requirement for consideration for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada, and satisfaction of an essentially similar requirement, evidently makes no sense. Indeed, it could only serve, in my estimation, to weaken the guarantee provided by section 6 of the Supreme Court Act.
Moreover, as the Hon. Robert Décary, former justice of the Federal Court of Appeal, has recently and eloquently observed (in La Presse on October 25, 2013), to suggest that a judge of the federal courts trained in civil law does not have the level of expertise in civil law that section 6 is intended to protect is to ignore the practical reality of Canada's, and the world's, legal landscape. In his words, Quebec's civil law:
…has made its mark in the world. It borrows from common law and it lends to common law.
Which lawyer or judge in Quebec can claim today to live exclusively in the world of classic civil law? Divorce law is federal. Our administrative, criminal and penal law is Anglo-Saxon in inspiration. Commercial law is increasingly international. Human rights are global rights.
In addition, Mr. Chair, and to conclude, taking a restrictive interpretation of section 6 of the Supreme Court Act would exclude not only judges from the Federal Court but also many other candidates from appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada. For example, judges of La Cour du Québec would be excluded as they are neither judges of the Superior Court or the Court of Appeal, nor are they currently advocates. This restrictive interpretation would lead to an absurd result that has been noted by other constitutional experts. Later this morning, I understand, you'll hear from Professor Benoît Pelletier. In an interview on Radio-Canada on October 23, he stated:
The interpretation that prevails, I believe, or should prevail, when one looks at the spirit of the provision is that you just need to have been a member of the bar for 10 years, but you do not have to still be one today.
Mr. Chair, by taking this legislative step and also by referring this question to the Supreme Court of Canada, our government is defending the eligibility of members of the bar in all provinces and territories to sit on the highest court of the land. Members of the Quebec bar should be, and are under law, treated the same as lawyers in other provinces and territories in Canada.
Our government looks forward to a prompt, conclusive resolution of these questions ensuring the continued eligibility for appointment to the Supreme Court of eminent jurists of Canada's federal courts. This could only help ensure that the Supreme Court will maintain the long tradition of independence and excellence that has made it the envy of both the developed and developing democracies.
Mr. Chair, I thank you for your indulgence.
I'd be pleased, of course, to answer your questions.
