National Defence Committee on Sept. 20th, 2006

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Yes, Monsieur Bachand.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I could support the motion, but I need some convincing arguments. In my opinion, the situation in Afghanistan demands our urgent attention. Furthermore, our committee deserves some respect. It's work is very important and that's something the Minister needs to acknowledge. We're not looking to cause a major disruption. We're looking for answers and looking to address a major, urgent problem. I'd like these two points to be made clear in our letter or request to the Minister.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Let me say I have confidence that the minister fully respects the committee and the work the committee is doing, having also been a member of this committee prior to his current responsibilities.

Mr. Hiebert.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

I would just suggest that if you wanted to contact him informally, that would be a more appropriate measure, instead of asking this committee to pass a motion that would require 24 hours' notice and what have you. Perhaps in your capacity as chair you can make a request to the minister's office to evaluate his schedule a second time.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

That's an excellent suggestion, because it does save us the 24 hours. Thank you for bringing that to our attention. Again, it shows the good intentions.

Mr. Dosanjh.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Well, you could do both. We could pass a motion, but in addition to the motion, you could take it upon yourself to send a note.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Sure, and that's accommodating both sides, if we're all in agreement.

Do we need to vote on it? We can vote on it, or do we move forward with those two suggestions?

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

I think we have some suggestions on the table. Perhaps we can proceed with the informal request, and if there is a need to move beyond that, then we can proceed with the motion if that in order. I think taking this one step at a time would be an appropriate measure. We're not dealing with a minister who is seeking to avoid this committee, so let's give him an opportunity to evaluate things, and let's try to avoid getting a little bit heavy-handed in how we deal with this situation.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

I appreciate that. I don't think we're trying to be heavy-handed; I think all we're trying to do is do the best we can to try to persuade the minister. I think the chair can be in touch with the minister, in addition to the motion. The motion does no harm. It is not as if he's being cited for contempt; the motion is simply a formal way of trying to persuade the minister to reconsider.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

I think that's the formal procedure, if I may just emphasize that, in terms of the motion, but on your behalf I will approach the minister tomorrow if he is in the House. I don't know his schedule, but on your behalf I will approach him personally and through our clerk as well.

I see an accommodation here for time constraints. We can use both approaches--unless there's a vote. The chair is at your pleasure. We can vote on the motion or we can move forward with unanimous consent. However, we have a motion on the table in terms of the request and we have your proposal as well. Let's move forward on this, because we also have witnesses with whom we want to spend as much time as is needed.

Do we need to vote on it?

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

You can't without 24 hours' notice.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Mr. Dosanjh.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Are you suggesting we need 24 hours' notice for the motion? Is that what you're suggesting?

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

To vote on the motion.The rules state that you have to have 24 hours' notice to vote on a motion.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

I hereby give that notice, and we can vote the next time.

[Joe McGuire, Liberal, Egmont, PE]

I think we've had a motion and we voted on it. You may want to reiterate. It's kind of redundant. I think we had a motion at the last meeting.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

We did. I'm just trying to go back through the notes of the previous meeting on Monday. But if I recall, we did pass the motion, we put in the request, and the response back from the minister's office was that he could not make himself available before mid-October. So technically speaking, we addressed that motion, which brings us back to reintroducing the motion, which would go back into the 24-hour period. If I'm out of line here, I'll ask to be corrected.

Okay. As the clerk has informed me, you're correct that the 48 hours' notice is required for a substantive motion to be considered by the committee, unless the substantive motion relates directly to business then under consideration, and that the notice of motion be filed with the clerk of the committee and distributed to members. That means we don't need 48 hours' notice on this specific request, as has been clarified by the rules of the committee.

So we can now move forward with the motion that is before us. As I said to you, colleagues, my sense is that nobody around the table is trying to be heavy-handed, but as I've heard from both sides, these are unusual times, difficult times. The minister, I know, is interested in coming before the committee to brief us and give us updates.

It would seem there's no consensus, so I'll put the question on the dual arrangements.

(Motion agreed to)

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

We will then notify the minister on the dual arrangements that we have.

The next piece of housekeeping is very brief. You've all been notified that we're going to be visited in Canada by the Minister of Defence from Croatia on October 9. They've been requesting that if our committee or whoever is available...I know that's break week, so the House is not sitting. Perhaps you can let us know within the next 24 hours if anybody's available on October 10 to be here in Ottawa to meet the minister. Kindly let us know as soon as possible. Look as your schedules--we surely know what we're doing a couple of weeks from now--so that in all fairness we can notify the minister.

That concludes the housekeeping. We'll introduce our witnesses.

I'm pleased to have with us here today as witnesses from the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, which is the order of the day, from the Conference of Defence Associations, Lieutenant-General Richard J. Evraire, retired, who is the chairman; and also Colonel Brian S. MacDonald, retired, senior defence analyst. We also have with us, from the Royal Military College of Canada, Dr. Sean Maloney, associate professor of history.

Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. We look forward to hearing your presentations. We normally have 10 minutes per individual, as I recall. If we can follow the previous pattern we used when I chaired, we'll go to each one of you individually, and at the end of your presentations we'll go to questions, if everybody still agrees with that format.

I don't know if you've drawn lots as to who's going to go first, but I have on my list Mr. Evraire. Should we start with you, sir?

[Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire, Retired) (Chairman, Conference of Defence Associations]

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will make a presentation, and Colonel MacDonald will assist me in responding to questions at the end of the presentations.

Mr. Chairman, the Conference of Defence Associations is grateful for this opportunity to comment on Canada's military commitment to Afghanistan.

This presentation of the CDA will deal with five topics: criteria for assisting the ISAF, the international force mission's effectiveness, a paper on which is included in the background information we have provided your committee; the ISAF concept of operations; a word or two on an assessment of the success of ISAF operations to date; comments on the relationship between the Canadian mission's combat operations and efforts in reconstruction; and to conclude, a comment on the state of personnel and equipment of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, the CDA believes that the ISAF mission, and Canada's considerable part in it, is an honourable undertaking being conducted with the utmost professionalism by the Canadian Forces, and that it will be considered to have been effective and successful if and when the campaign of terror being waged by the Taliban and their extremist allies fails; if security is restored to the point that ordinary Afghans enjoy personal liberty and freedom from fear; if the Afghan army and police become effective in ensuring security; if the country's market economy begins to flourish; if the central Afghan government control spreads throughout the country; if human rights are respected; if significant infrastructure development programs are under way; and if the elements of a made-in-Afghanistan democratic system of government spread to all parts of the country.

It is obvious that achieving the foregoing objectives is a phenomenally complex and difficult undertaking. Nevertheless, the CDA believes the absence of any one of the above criteria would put the successful completion of the ISAF mission in doubt.

The mission of the NATO-led ISAF is to conduct military operations in order to assist the Government of Afghanistan and the international community in establishing and maintaining, with the full engagement of the Afghan National Security Forces, a safe and secure environment that will allow the government to extend its authority and influence, hold free and fair elections and thereby facilitate Afghanistan's reconstruction.

From its inception, the ISAF's mission has consisted of five phases. Phase 1 is the assessment and preparation phase, including operations in Kabul, which are now completed. Phase 2 involves geographic expansion. It should be noted that in October 2003, the UN Security Council authorized the expansion of the NATO mission beyond Kabul. In October 2004, NATO deployed forces to the North and in September 2005, to the West. It also bears mentioning that expansion to the South was completed on July 31, 2006, that is a scant six weeks ago. Phase 3 of operations, the stage in which Canadian Forces are presently engaged, is a stabilization phase. Phases 4 and 5 will be ones of transition and redeployment.

Canadian Forces were recently deployed in Kandahar province with the launching of phase 3, the stabilization phase. However, the ISAF has been engaged in the North and West much longer than in Kandahar province, and in these districts, a relatively high level of stability has been achieved, which gives us reason for a certain amount of optimism.

The September 12, 2006, executive summary of the Afghanistan opium survey, published on an annual basis by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, is the most authoritative source in the world on the opium and heroin trade in Afghanistan and is an excellent independent and empirically verifiable source from which the progress and success of the ISAF operation can be measured. It is also a source of robust indicators of changes in opium production and of the level of security, both of which are themselves useful indicators of the degree of success, on a regional basis, of the ISAF stability operations. The report indicates that most of the provinces and districts of the north and west are identified as low risk in security terms, whereas the south, where ISAF has been in place for only six weeks, has a much higher proportion of provinces and districts assessed as high or extreme risk.

Another measure found in the UNODC report is the change from 2005 to 2006 in the total area under poppy cultivation. While the geographical boundaries of the various regions used in the report do not exactly parallel the ISAF regional boundaries, they are close enough to allow for meaningful inferences to be drawn. We find that the area under cultivation in the north declined by 20% on a year-over-year basis, whereas the area under cultivation in the south shot up an alarming 121%, though interestingly the area under cultivation in Kandahar province, the province which is the responsibility of the Canadians, declined by 3%.

From these two indicators identified in the recent UN report on opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, namely the area under cultivation and the level of security in each province, we conclude that ISAF operations in the North and West have been moderately successful. We believe it is reasonable to expect similar results in the South.

A critical problem for the Afghan government is the huge disparity between governmental sources of income and those available to the drug traffickers.

The UNODC Summary Findings of Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 2005 reports that the total export value of opium to neighbouring countries amounted to $2.7 billion. Of that sum, the farmers received $560 million, whereas the drug traffickers retained $2.14 billion, or about 80% of the total export value. Since Afghanistan's GDP for that year was reported to be $5.2 billion, opium exports stood at about 52% of GDP.

Set against that is the Afghan government's revenue base. The Asian Development Bank's key indicators of developing Asian and Pacific countries for 2004 shows the total revenue of the Afghan government in that year as $652 million, or about 5.2% of GDP.

In 2005, opium production in the southern region amounted to 43% of total Afghan production and will have provided drug traffickers in the south with an annual income of about $900 million. In 2006, the UNODC reports that the south will account for 61% of total production. If export prices remain similar, this would put approximately $1.9 billion in the hands of the drug traffickers.

It is, we believe, self-evident that the great disparity in financial resources between the drug traffickers and the Afghan national government would somehow ensure the complete overthrow of Afghan's national government forces in the south.

If the ISAF were to withdraw, the country would quickly pitch back into civil war, which at best would lead to a decline in regional warlord control, and at worst would see the coming to power of a neo-Taliban structure financed by the drug traffickers. Afghan would evolve from an narco-economy to a narco-state. To those who recommend that we cut and run, understand that they are favouring the return of a terrorist Taliban-al-Qaeda regime over the admittedly difficult birth of a fledgling democracy.

Reconstruction in Afghanistan is simply not possible unless a relatively secure and peaceful environment exists in which Canadian aid and development agencies, other NATO nations and numerous other countries around the world can set about to rebuild or build anew the infrastructure needed for a market economy to flourish. Given that from the beginning of Canada's involvement, the nature of military operations against the Taliban and their allies has constantly evolved, and Canadian Forces have of necessity modified their methods of operation and their inventory of military equipment, the CDA recognizes and acknowledges the professionalism of Canada's troops and their commanders. Canada's military has been able to accomplish its mission, a sine qua non of future reconstruction in Afghanistan.

It must be remembered, however, that the state of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan and their capacity to accomplish their assigned mission within ISAF needs to be viewed within the larger context of their ability to help meet and fulfill Canada's other international obligations, as well as its domestic and continental North American obligations.

This is why the CDA continues to encourage all decision-makers to accept that we are today living in an insecure world in which defence and security preparedness, aimed at providing citizens with a safe and secure environment, is the single most important responsibility of government.

It therefore is essential that the government continue to meet its obligation to the men and women of our Canadian Forces by providing them with the necessary levels of trained personnel and the appropriate equipment they require to pursue and successfully accomplish the missions assigned to them.

The CDA therefore views the recently announced addition to the CF ISAF mission of a tank squadron, an infantry company, combat engineers, and other elements as a prudent and commendable response to the needs of the mission as articulated by the commander responsible for the operations, who constantly assesses the evolving situation in his area.

Such decisions will provide a significant improvement to Canada's ability to meet its current mandate in Afghanistan.

In the same vein or for similar reasons, the CDA also applauds the stated intention of the Government of Canada to take significant steps to deal with the recapitalization of Canadian Forces' strategic and tactical lift capabilities.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your attention. Retired Colonel Brian MacDonald, an analyst with the CDA, and I will both be happy to answer your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Thank you for the presentation.

We'll go to Mr. MacDonald.

[Colonel Brian MacDonald, Retired) (Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations]

Mr. Chairman, as General Evraire has remarked, I had a hand in the drafting of this, so I will not present an independent testimony. I will assist General Evraire during the course of any questions the committee may have.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Thank you. We look forward to your responses--in person, not just on television, which is very interesting. It gives us more time, actually, to put in more questions.

Mr. Maloney.

[Dr. Sean Maloney, Associate Professor of History, Royal Military College of Canada]

I've been asked to make myself available for questions on the current state of operations in Afghanistan, so I'd better provide you with some of my background.

I'm a military historian. I currently teach contemporary warfare at the Royal Military College. I have travelled to Afghanistan annually for the past four years, starting in 2003. I've observed Canadian and coalition operations for the following organizations: pre-NATO ISAF; American operations during Operation Enduring Freedom; NATO-ized ISAF, including the provincial reconstruction teams in the north; Canadian PRT operations in the south; and most recently, this summer, task forces Aegis and Orion and the PRT, which are the collective Canadian operations in the south.

I have a variety of conceptualizations on how the war has evolved and how it's being fought, which I can make available to you. I can make comparisons between various techniques and operational evolution in the theatre. I can provide you with some insight into the threat situation, or what our enemy may be thinking.

I won't proceed beyond that; I just make myself available for questions.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, John Cannis]

Thank you very much, Mr. Maloney.

We'll go to questions from the committee members. I would just remind members that it's seven minutes each in the first round, questions and answers. We'll try to get as much in there as we possibly can.

Mr. Dosanjh.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you.

Let me ask my first question of perhaps Mr. MacDonald, or Mr. Evraire.

You said that in terms of the deployment of tanks and engineers and the like, the additional deployment is being done at the request of the commanders on the ground, as it should be, based on operational advice. Obviously it's required for the safety and security of our troops, and that's always job one. But I want to ask you a question with respect to what impact that would have on the hearts and minds question.

I read Mr. MacDonald's comments that hearts and minds can flow in different directions. That battle can take many contours. Obviously, while tanks provide security and safety for our troops, they are not known for reconstruction or development. They're usually known for blasting and demolition and destruction. From your perspective, as a military person, how does that impact on the issue of hearts and minds?

Then perhaps Mr. Maloney can follow up, based on his knowledge of Afghanistan, on how that might impact the feelings of the Afghanis we're trying to win over. Ultimately, if we want stability and security in Afghanistan, in addition to military presence we have to have a lot of development, and a lot of peaceful development, if we can ever get there.