National Defence Committee on Nov. 20th, 2006

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Hiebert.

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for returning to this committee again.

During your presentation you talked about how the Taliban are seeking to prevent reconstruction and humanitarian aid, prevent meaningful interaction with locals, and undermine the improved sense of security as a result of Operation Medusa. That particular phrase, “undermine this improved sense of security”, stood out for me during your presentation. We must be succeeding. If there's an improved sense of security, what is it about Operation Medusa that has provided that? How is it evident? What are the tangible consequences of this improved sense of security?

On a very much related question, you also mentioned that there's been a decrease in attacks in recent weeks. Perhaps you can provide us with some explanation as to why there's been a decrease since your last briefing--very similar questions there.

My third question has to do with the Afghan National Army. You mentioned there are 30,000 in it at present, but it's going to take a number of years until it is self-sustaining. What does that self-sustaining Afghan National Army look like? Is it simply a matter of the number of soldiers, or is it a sense of readiness, technological ability, or better equipment? What are we looking to achieve? How will we know when we get there?

[BGen A. J. Howard]

When we look at our particular activity in Regional Command South, this time last year there were no ISAF/NATO forces in the southern region. I think our ability to deploy into the four provinces--the British, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Americans, and all our partners there--simply didn't exist last year. So starting in January we began a deployment into the area. We took over from a very thinly spread American force and moved down there. The Taliban essentially said, you won't be here by the end of the summer; we will have convinced you to leave by then. And we're still there.

I think Operation Medusa showed the local Afghans that we're prepared to help them, that we're not just going to turn and run at the first sign of trouble. We are there to support the local Afghan government and certainly the national Afghan government, and we need to show a little bit of steady resolve. I don't wish to underplay at all the challenges that are ahead of us in the coming weeks. It is still a challenging and dangerous environment, but I'm hoping that with the ADZ concept we'll be able to make some great inroads and progress. It's very difficult to predict what will occur in the future, but we have shown that we have a little bit of resolve.

We need to show some patience. We are there for the long haul to try to help the local Afghan government.

I'm sorry, what was your last question?

[Russ Hiebert, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock—Cloverdale, BC]

It had to do with the state of readiness of the Afghan National Army.

[BGen A. J. Howard]

Certainly our intent in any Afghan compact is to work toward a military that can provide security. So when you take a military force and ask how it can be effective, it has to be able to win the confidence of its government and people that it can actually handle security aspects.

It's a very complex undertaking. I don't think you can tie it solely to numbers. The Canadian force is a small force, but I think it has the confidence of its country. It's not necessarily built to cover the whole country, but it has great capability.

So you need sufficient number of people. I can't sit here and tell you exactly what the number is; that wouldn't be fair of me. The Afghans will decide on that. It does need to have a competent command and control structure. The individuals within the organization professionalizing it is certainly a step. It will need a measure of technology so it can survive on its own, and that's certainly the next step to take forward.

I think there is a complicated regime, but how do you build it? You build it the way we're doing it now. You start with the battalions, increase the number that are there, get a little bit of critical mass going, and then professionalize it. So we've done the basic training in Kabul. The battalions go down into the local areas, and then our observer mentor liaison teams, for example, work closely to really professionalize the troops that are there.

They're having great success when they're partnered with us. We bring them enhanced communications and a little bit of our own knowledge and know-how to allow them to succeed. I think they have difficulties when they're on their own. It's a bit of a work in progress.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you.

It doesn't look like we're going to have time to give anybody one more shot, so if the committee will let me, I'll finish up in the last minute or so.

On the decline in active assaults, does that mean there's a general lessening of the activity of the Taliban, or are they out there somewhere doing something else that's detrimental to what we're trying to achieve? Mortar attacks are down, so is that indicative that there are fewer of them and they're backing off, or are they out there subverting the populace in another way?

[BGen A. J. Howard]

My ability to predict what's going to happen in the future is normally wrong, so I have to be careful with this. Certainly the trend we've seen in the last couple of weeks is toward diminished activity. Is it related to the weather? There's probably a bit of that. Did we succeed in the Zhari and Panjwai areas? Yes, it probably has something to do with that.

Some religious holidays have recently concluded within the area. Certainly the Taliban themselves are noticing some improvements throughout Afghanistan itself, so a number are involved in Peace through Strength, which General Gauthier described before. So I don't think there's any one reason, but I don't think we should underestimate that it will continue in the future. My hope--all soldiers' hope--is that it has diminished a bit, but only time will tell.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much.

That concludes the time allotted. We look forward to your next visit. As we go through this, I guess we'll all get better at receiving and appreciating the briefings. Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

I call the committee back to order for our second portion.

I would like to welcome General Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff. It's a pleasure to have you here. We look forward to your comments. As usual, you'll have time to bring us whatever information you have, and then there will be rounds of questions. We're here until 5:30, if you can stick with us that long.

The floor is yours, sir.

[LGen Andrew Leslie, Chief of the Land Staff, Department of National Defence]

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased to be here, before this Committee, today. On behalf of our soldiers, I would like to thank you for your interest, and for your support of the Army.

It is important for our soldiers to know that members of Parliament, on behalf of all Canadians, support them in their vital work.

Our current operational focus is of course the mission in Afghanistan. So I'll use these brief introductory remarks, mainly in the language of Molière, to address some of the issues arising from that mission. I will then be pleased to answer any questions you might have.

The role of the Army is to produce combat-effective land forces ready for deployment in accordance with decisions by government or the Chief of the Defence Staff. We carefully analyze our commitments on a regular basis, and conduct simulations for each operational force we plan to deploy.

Mr. Chairman, we will fulfill the requirements of our mission until 2009. Our planning and our managed readiness system have enabled us to respond to the additional demands placed upon us as part of the enhancement to Task Force Afghanistan announced in mid-September.

I also want to stress that it is not easy for us to fulfill the requirements of our mission. As committee members are aware, for a number of years, the Army as maintained a very high operational tempo with an insufficient number of soldiers. We are therefore very happy to be able to increase our strength, and we are looking forward to the day that our soldiers will lead lives where deployments, various tasks, training and time spent with their families will be more balanced. That will not happen overnight. It will take years for the Army to totally recover from the long period during which it had to be prepared at all times and with seriously reduced strength to meet the demands of continuous overseas rotations, while fulfilling its obligations here at home.

Mr. Chairman, I now want to go into greater details on some personnel related issues. While we are able to honour our deployment commitments, we are unable to increase our strength quickly enough, and this is a source of some stress. We are therefore putting some solutions in place that will help fill in the gaps until the recruits have been integrated into the field forces.

One of the situations where there is considerable pressure is the one facing our senior non-commissioned officers. These men and women are the spearhead of the Army. We ask them to lead our soldiers in operations, to train them in combat schools, and to carry out very important duties, even though there are simply not enough of them.

Paradoxically, increasing our strength in the Army is amplifying the problem. We will need an even larger number of these highly qualified soldiers to train recruits as they integrate their units and take specialized courses. We have identified a certain number of areas where civilian contractors can provide basic courses, thus freeing up our NCOs and soldiers for more demanding duties. These changes are being made as part of our highly effective training capacity enhancement program.

For example, civilians can replace NCOs in training soldiers requiring to manoeuvre vehicles on streets. They can also teach the basic skills required for operations in mountainous terrain, some parts of our communications training, as well as how to operate the turret on a LAV, for example.

In addition, we currently need role players to play Afghan civilians during exercises at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre in Wainwright, Alberta.

It's a unique initiative in which these Afghan civilians, Canadians, are doing those roles they know so well, replicating the circumstances that our soldiers will face overseas.

Then we can replace the soldiers whom we would usually call upon to play the role of Afghan citizens by Canadian civilians hired under contract. I must stress the fact that we are not asking civilians to teach combat techniques. These techniques are always taught by competent members of the Army.

Mr. Chairman, we also use more Army reservists. Thus, within the framework of the program called the Pool of Instructors for Individual Training, we hire class B reservists to deliver a part of the individual training. This program should free up some 400 members of the regular forces who could be assigned to other tasks during the coming year.

Moreover, we were recently authorized to hire another group of 1,000 to 1,500 class B reservists, part-time and full-time. It will not be easy to motivate that many to serve us full-time because many of them have demanding jobs in civilian life and because others prefer to serve only on a part-time basis. But if we succeed in gathering enough people, we would have partly solved our current shortage of personnel.

We must also deal with the fact that our establishment chart in peacetime does not match the structures that we are deploying within the framework of operations such as the one in Afghanistan.

Another problem we face is that our peacetime establishment does not match the structures we deploy in operations, such as in Afghanistan. For example, an infantry company here at home is usually 100 to 110 soldiers. The companies we have in theatre are about 145 to 150 strong. That means when we stand up an infantry company for deployment, we have to draw on at least two other companies, thereby essentially attenuating the established structure within the battalions and brigades.

I have directed that our peacetime establishment here in Canada be restructured to mirror how we form up our operations. A regular field force structure will migrate towards one that would be based on three brigades and nine, perhaps ten, infantry-based battle groups. These brigades and battle groups are to be organized, trained, and equipped just as they will deploy in operations.

Incidentally, following its rotation in Afghanistan next year, the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment will be designated for a five-year trial as a standing battle group. I just saw them on exercise in Wainwright. They are getting fully prepared for the tasks that lie ahead of them in February.

The planned restructure to mirror force posture in operations will take some time to achieve, but we're starting the process now. Indeed, we started a couple of months ago.

The issue I've just raised is mainly a structural problem. However, it is exacerbated if, in order to form a company for Afghanistan, we are forced to draw on two or more companies that are hollow or are well below strength. This is sometimes the case today, and will only be resolved once we've added the new personnel that the Government of Canada is sending our way. These personnel have already started to enter our ranks.

Members of this committee will know that the army continues to undergo a major transformation that will enable us to meet the challenges of this young century. Because of the acute demands of operations in training, however, some parts of transformation may have to be slowed or somewhat delayed. Other requirements or tasks may also be delayed. Accordingly, I have directed that operational requirements must and shall take priority over some of these subsequent activities.

To summarize the situation, Mr. Chairman, we're going to do all we can to meet our operational commitments right up to 2009 and beyond. Unfortunately, it is impossible to grow the army quickly enough to eliminate all the many problems we face, causing us some stress. I'd be more than willing to discuss some of these details with you.

The problems we now have will ease as the army grows. Unlike previous army commanders, I can look in you in the eye and tell you that we're growing. We're applying some creative solutions that will help us reach the point where we will fill all personnel requirements without resorting to stopgap or special interim measures such as those as I've already alluded to, the 1,000 to 1,500 reservists brought in for a couple of years.

Finally, I'd like to turn briefly to the question of equipment. The way in which we acquired equipment during the Cold War period--for instance, it could take up to 15 or more years from the time we identified a requirement until the time the equipment entered service--is no longer viable. In today's strategic environment, speed and flexibility are paramount. I know you will be pleased to know that we've enjoyed some notable successes in Afghanistan, and indeed across town, in this regard.

Several successes spring to mind. I'm a gunner, so I'll bring to your attention the M-77 lightweight artillery howitzer that was acquired and put into service. From the moment the requirement was identified until it was in action against the foe, it took four months. There are others, of course--much smaller unattended aerial vehicles, used for reconnaissance work, and the armoured patrol vehicle that General Howard referred to.

That said, we must of course be careful to ensure that what we buy will serve a requirement in the army for many years to come. If we buy in a hurry too often, we wind up with that which is available rather than that which will serve our particular requirements for the foreseeable coming decades. But in cases where we have identified a pressing requirement, we're now a great deal better at getting kit into the hands of the soldiers in the field quickly, thanks to a whole bunch of senior officers, civilians, members of government, members of opposition, and indeed the whole town putting their shoulders behind the wheel and pushing to get the right kit to the soldiers, giving them enhanced levels of protection and security.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to remind the committee that everything we have done, everything we do, is to set the soldiers up for success. We're very proud of the way they're conducting themselves in Afghanistan. They are serving with great courage and skill to ensure that the Afghan people can rebuild their lives, their communities, and their country after so many years of war and brutal Taliban rule. I am confident that we can count on you to support these outstanding young Canadians, who are conducting themselves with great distinction and to international acclaim.

Merci, monsieur. I am now more than ready to respond to any of your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you, sir.

As you know, we've been out to CFB Petawawa and CFB Edmonton, and we've talked to some soldiers. It's been very worthwhile for us to be able to do that, and we appreciate the cooperation we've had on those bases as we've gone out.

Just before I get into the first round of questioning, I want to say there were two things that came up when we were talking in Edmonton in a round table with some folks who had just come back. They're not big equipment items, but they need decent shoes, so could you do something about that for them? They also need some kind of modular vest so that they will have an opportunity to suit up for the day they've got ahead of them.

I don't know if you've addressed those issues or not. We can talk about tanks and Ilyushins and all kinds of things, and C-12s and whatever, but shoes seemed to be important that day.

[LGen Andrew Leslie]

Mr. Chair, the soldiers are always right. I'm serious.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

I hear you. I agree.

[LGen Andrew Leslie]

And by the way, once we've put the equipment into their hands and they get to try it and use it, we encourage a culture of spirited and passionate debate.

I've just returned from Afghanistan and Wainwright, and I keep in very close contact with your army, which I have the privilege to lead right now. And trust me when I say that an increasing number of soldiers have come up and made those two points very clear. They are not shy.

We have a large number of boots, and you'll forgive me if I don't mention the specific types because then whoever made them will yell at me afterwards. I would say most of the types of boots--we're talking about the tan desert boots for the soldiers--are pretty damn good, but there is one particular brand which is a pain in the foot, absolutely. It's not good, and so we're going to do all we can to replace that right away. You can follow up, at your discretion of course, but we're on top of that one.

The modular vest was designed. It was recently introduced. As a matter of fact, we're still in the process of introducing it. It was designed for circumstances that perhaps were predominant two or three years ago. An enormous amount has changed.

Accordingly, C Company of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry has been given a chunk of cash by me to go out and try out two or three different modular systems. The single best exemplar we have of how to do it right will be the young men and women who are using this stuff in combat operations.

However, having said that--and I don't want to sound like a bureaucrat, because I ain't one--it will still probably take a year or two to try to get a better modular vest in the hands of the soldiers because of the scale and quantities that are involved. Having said this, I've heard opinion from a large number of soldiers, each of whom has a particular vest in mind. Through you, I would like to remind all members of the army that we are an army, and they will actually wear the issue kit unless we say otherwise.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

It's good to know that you're aware and that you're moving forward on those issues. We appreciate that. Thank you, sir.

[LGen Andrew Leslie]

Thank you for bringing them up.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Okay, let's start the first round.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you, General, for being with us.

I have two questions. I will ask them both, and then you can answer.

The first question is with respect to the comments you made about the army being stretched, and how you intend to use more reserve personnel if you can get your hands on them. I have a very specific question. When the extension of the mission to 2009 was introduced in the House, we were not given any forewarning, other than 48 hours or 96 hours, I believe. Were you? Were you or your predecessor in this position consulted to determine whether or not you could meet the changing needs, particularly of the army—the infantry and the like—if the mission was extended to two years, with combat being at the centre of it? That's the first question.

The second question is with respect to the reduced number of IEDs and attacks and the like, which is a good thing. My question is this. General Howard said there could be several reasons why this is happening. It could be the winter. It could be, according to him, the recent defensive stances of the forces, which he mentioned early on in his presentation—I'd like to know what that means, as I wasn't able to ask that question—and perhaps partial success in Panjwai.

The question I also have is whether or not it is related to the change in the focus of the mission. Despite what General Howard said, I've never heard of ADZs, and I've been defence critic for several months. I've been reading up on and following all of the comments that have been made in the press. Is this related? Is the reduction in the number of attacks, a reduction that is actually welcomed, related to a change in the focus and in the practice of the military on the ground? Are there fewer patrols? Are there fewer patrols in different areas where there were more patrols before? Are we seeking or hunting Taliban less than before? Have we changed the focus of the mission? If so, on whose orders? That's the question. If we have changed the focus, that would be great. I'd welcome that, but the question is very important.

Thank you.

[LGen Andrew Leslie]

First and foremost, I was not the army commander at the time the decision was made to extend the mission. My remit is to bring them in, through the good work of Chief of Military Personnel; to grow them in terms of culture; to train them; to work with a whole bunch of folk across town to equip them; to ensure that they reflect the army and the Canadian Forces ethos; to supervise their training activity; and then, at certain stages in their process, to give them a really cold, hard look as to whether or not they're ready to go off and do that which the Government of Canada wants them to do. To do that, we have an army-managed readiness system that is extraordinarily complicated, as you might anticipate or imagine, for an organization that, between the regulars, reserves, and soon-to-be the Rangers, is about 45,000.

The conveyor belt that leads us to actually generate battle groups, based on six-month deployment cycles, started many years ago and goes forever into the future. The variable that causes stress on the army is the size of the commitment--the actual number of soldiers it's sending overseas, and that which they're doing.

The reason I'm taking a bit of time to answer your question is, of course, that it asks three interwoven and complicated questions.

Vis-à-vis the numbers of soldiers we're sending overseas to do specific activities—and of course General Howard has already briefed you and you know far better than I—like security, development, and capacity building, we are sending more assets out to do security, development, and capacity building than we have in the past. In terms of the numbers and the ability to sustain and generate these forces, about half of the army's strength is currently comprised of reserves. I have visited many of the reserve brigades, many of the reserve units. There is an increasing enthusiasm for those great young folk to come and join us in the good work we're doing not only in Afghanistan, but also at home.

With regard to the reduced number of improvised explosive devices in attacks, they are made up of fairly crude technology, and of course that countryside is shattered by now close to thirty years of tragic war. Indeed, if you look at their sweep of history for the last two millennia, it has only been at rare times when that part of the world, as crossroads of empire, has not been subject to a variety of incredibly tragic circumstances. They need angry young men to operate those rockets, those shells, those mines that are buried in the roads or carried in vehicles or set up in mud-walled fortresses beside transit routes.

The result of Operation Medusa was the elimination of a significant number of those who operated close to Kandahar. I submit to you that one of the reasons we've seen fewer attacks in the short term is that the opposing forces have essentially now been knocked back on their feet. That does not, however, mean they are out. I think that over the course of the subsequent weeks and months there's a probability that the number of attacks could grow.

With regard to the Afghan development zone, it's an idea, an intent that was circulated first amongst NATO partners. I know that way back in 2003, when I was the Canadian mission commander in Kabul and I was discussing such issues with Mr. Brahimi, who was the special representative of the Secretary-General and arguably one of the world's great men.... Way back then, the idea was articulated as essentially being a bubble of development activity below that of the PRT. For example, in Afghanistan, we have one PRT—provincial reconstruction team—and you know it's in Kandahar. In the province itself, there would be five or six focus areas for development work. So that idea has always been extant. I just haven't seen it articulated in any coherent form until the last five or six months.

Such activity has already taken place in the provinces of Gardez, Badakhshan, Mazar-e Sharif, Hirat, Helmand, Khost, and now Kandahar. I would argue that it's a positive sign. It gives an area of focus for reconstruction work to occur. But keep in mind, of course, that the real reconstructors are not the soldiers. Those are the great folk from CIDA and the various international organizations, like the World Health Organization and the United Nations.

Sir, have I answered all three of your questions?

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Not completely, but—

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

We're out of time.

[LGen Andrew Leslie]

I beg your pardon.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

That's fine. I believe you've touched on them all.

But we're moving on to Mr. Bachand for seven minutes.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome General Leslie. This man saved my region during the 1998 ice storm. Each time I have the opportunity, I am proud to say it and I thank him for it.

Just now, you mentioned the civilian contribution. More and more people are wondering about privatizing the military. By “privatizing”, I mean that a certain number of tasks would be given to private sector. A short while ago, we had a major debate on the supply chain. I do not think that you are talking about the supply chain. I often meet companies like ATCO Frontec that do an enormous amount of work on the theatre of operations. I do not know how far you want to go with this. Some people are beginning to say that even some security patrols would be given to private sector to ensure that we can free up the largest possible number of soldiers. You would not have the human resources required to deliver all the services you offer over there. Could you give me an idea of what is meant by privatization? Do you want to go further than ATCO Frontec that is involved in construction and pitching camps, etc.? Can this go as far as security patrols or even the supply chain?

[LGen Andrew Leslie]

Thank you, sir. With your permission, I will answer in English because I am rather tired. I was in Wainwright and in Kandahar a few days ago.

With regard to privatization of certain activities within the military, when it makes sense to do so and it's only a function of money, then I am absolutely in favour of it, so that we can free up soldiers to do the soldier activities for which they're trained.

Let me use the example of the mechanics who are currently working at CFB Valcartier. As you know, the outstanding soldiers of the

The 22nd Regiment are preparing to deploy next August. Mechanics from Valcartier will leave with their buddies.

Does it make sense to insist that they continue to work on vehicles that are not directly related to getting the soldiers ready to go out the door and then to having them go with those vehicles overseas, or do we turn that maintenance contract over to some great folk downtown who can fix the school buses, the non-deployable trucks, the transport vehicles, etc.?

With regard to security patrols for overseas missions—in other words, with the blurring or the potential blurring of having civilians doing military-like activities overseas—I will offer you a personal opinion. I am absolutely against it. My reasoning, based on my own academic work, is that the rule of law for military soldiers is very clear. We work for you. We follow your laws and we reflect your ethos, your ethics. When you have military contractors carrying weapons in hostile areas, the possibility of tragedy and the blurring of distinctions becomes acute.

For those nations that decide to do so, that is their business. But as far as I know, the Government of Canada and, indeed, the armed forces of Canada have no intention of employing military contractors in such a capacity.

I know that was not your question.