That's an excellent question, and the short answer is that if we were bankers and not industrialists, the one-to-one formula would probably be okay. But the real issue as we get into it is that it's an issue of quality over quantity when it comes to “offsets”—as they're known around the world—or IRBs here in Canada.
That gets us back to the industrial strategy argument very quickly, as every IRB or every offset is not equal. Without degrading in any way the industrial capacity that currently exists, if we manufacture rivets, for example—a very noble job if you're manufacturing them—versus spending the same dollar on a job creating software and source code for very advanced military systems, perhaps with commercial applications, I think one would conclude that the latter might have a greater and longer-term sustainable impact on the economy.
So while the 100% IRB requirement is a strategy, if we look around the world to India, Israel, the U.K., and Australia, just to name a few countries, they have moved away from purely quantitative strategy and have looked at the qualitative side. India, for example, has said that it wants 35%, not 100%, because the technologies involved are in the areas of the economy that are important to it. India is running the biggest international fighter aircraft competition in the world right now, and the whole issue is about what they will get for that 35% condition that the Indian government is placing on the bidders. That's where the battle is going to be won or lost, and it's very clear that they have very defined national interests in certain areas, such as strategic communications, surveillance, and so on. They have an industrial strategy and they have concluded, rightly or wrongly—and we believe rightly—that it has a much a bigger and longer-term, or longer-lasting, impact on the economy than the status quo.