National Defence Committee on Feb. 28th, 2012

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you. Your time has expired.

Mr. McKay, you have the last seven minutes.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

This is a particularly rich panel. Like others, I feel we could be asking questions all day long. Let me focus on Professor Bercuson, and then ask the others to chime in as appropriate.

My first question has to do with post-Afghanistan learning, Five Eyes versus NATO, and the utility of NATO. Some fight, some don't. Some say they'll fight, some won't, etc.

I'd be interested in your thoughts with respect to the emergence of Germany as the key country in the European Union. It's pretty obvious at this stage that the Germans, if not calling the shots, are certainly a major influence on all nations' budgets, including the French and other major NATO allies.

I'd be interested in your thoughts as to how you see that going in the near term.

[Prof. David Bercuson]

It reminds me of somebody who said, way back when NATO was being formed, that the whole point of it was to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.

That's certainly not the case anymore.

It's an anomalous situation because they do have extraordinary economic power for obvious reasons, but their military capabilities don't match their economic power. Further, you've already seen the beginning of some significant cuts in the German defence budget, and we're going to see more significant cuts in the German defence budget.

I think that Germany today is not in any way the nation that it was in 1945. This is a thoroughly democratic modern country. It's one that I'm glad we have a partnership with in Europe, and I think we need to try to expand that partnership as much as we can, recognizing that they have certain geostrategic problems that they have to deal with—like where they get their natural gas from, which is Russia—and they have the other sorts of economic issues that they have to deal with, which I think are fairly obvious and I don't have to go into here.

The other thing I've found—because my university has an exchange agreement with the German equivalent of the Royal Military College and we get students coming to do their graduate degrees at the University of Calgary from the German armed forces and so on through other exchange agreements—is that the extent to which pacifism has taken root within the German people is something that we, in this country, really do not understand. We complained during our active involvement in Kandahar that the Germans were not getting more active in combat operations, but as for the Germans, the whole issue was whether they were going anywhere near Afghanistan, let alone getting involved in combat operations.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

When you project it on a geopolitical basis, it's an interesting question. I think it's probably a question that hasn't actually been faced squarely because of the budgetary pressures on all of us, including, say, the U.K., which is just really taking a hatchet to their military budget.

My secondary and related question is about Putin. He is becoming quite bellicose, and do you think that is just a politician sounding off at election time, or is there actually some substance to it?

[Prof. David Bercuson]

I'm not an expert in Russian affairs, but it worries me because we talk about the potential of China, but for Russia, it's not potential. They have thousands of nuclear weapons, they have nuclear delivery capabilities, and they have expeditionary capabilities. It may be that he's simply playing to his base, as he sees it, going into this election, and playing the role of the Czar, the Russian nationalist, and so on.

I just don't know enough about Russian politics, but I do know that it's a potentially dangerous situation, a potentially unstable situation.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Pivoting, literally, it's clear from the Obama administration document that they've rejigged their thinking with respect to their orientation to the Pacific, and we had an admiral here last week at the Conference of Defence Associations, and he was talking about going from 55% of their fleet to 60%, or 50% to 55% of their fleet, oriented to the Pacific. He talked about things that you talked about. We don't control the Strait of Malacca and things of that in nature.

My sense is that it puts pressure on our own navy and our own military thinking in that we may have to, in effect, follow from being an Atlantic-oriented nation to more of a Pacific-oriented nation.

To both Admiral Garnett and Professor Bercuson, how do you see that strategically, and how do you see that operationally?

[VAdm Gary Garnett]

I think it's clear. David held up the U.S. document that they published in January, which says exactly what you've said, that they are shifting their main focus to the Pacific, albeit 40% or 45% residual U.S. forces—that's considerable—remain within the Atlantic and the Atlantic environs. But they do also say they're withdrawing more forces from Germany.

You might well ask yourself why they are still there. That's another question. Partly they're there for sustainment and infrastructure to support their forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere. They have a big footprint in Germany, with hospitals and infrastructure bases.

I think the shift to the Pacific provides an opportunity for Canada and the Canadian Forces to get more involved in what is becoming more the centre or the nexus of world power. David mentioned that in the mid-nineties, we actually had Canadian frigates—for the first time for any country—not just joining U.S. naval battle groups, but actually becoming integral to the battle group. In other words, a U.S. ship would leave when a Canadian ship joined. We were provided with the communications command and control, and information infrastructure to act virtually as a U.S. unit.

Why did the navy do that? The navy did that to upgrade, or to up-arm, ourselves to become a much higher level navy with that kind of capability and training by being part of the U.S. navy.

I think that has carried on in an even bigger sense in that in this coming RIMPAC, a Canadian admiral is the deputy commander of the entire operation. Australian admirals have done the same as well. So here we have a situation where in Afghanistan, Canadians have commanded U.S. forces—nobody else ever has—and at sea we have Canadians, and Australians in this particular case, commanding U.S. forces in the Pacific.

It's an opportunity, and it's one we're suited for. Our airplanes are now taking part in these operations in the Pacific, as are our army units. There's opportunity there, there's capability to do it, and it raises the profile of Canada in that global area.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

I just wondered whether Professor Bercuson had anything additional to comment.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

It's going to have be a very concise statement, because his time has expired.

[Prof. David Bercuson]

We've been an Atlantic country since our founding as colonies, French and British. What we need to understand is that the largest source of immigration to this country today is Asia. When you combine that with the new trading patterns that are emerging and our attempts to get into the Trans-Pacific Partnership, etc., there has to be a reorientation of the country to the west.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

We're going to go to our five-minute round, and I'll just ask witnesses to keep your comments as brief as possible so that as many questions as possible can be asked.

Mr. Opitz, you have the floor.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'll direct my first question to Professor Roussel.

I'd be interested in your comments on what you think the non-Arctic nations' real interests are in the Arctic, if you can elaborate on that.

[Prof. Stéphane Roussel]

There are different perspectives on it, but some, especially the European states, are framing the issue in terms of the environment. They're saying that we must manage the environment of the region, because there are some global effects. I don't know to what extent they are using it as an instrument, or whether it's a genuine concern for the environment.

Some other states could be interested in it. Spain is an example. It's surprising to find Spain as an observer at the Arctic Council, but the reason people in Spain are interested is because it's basically a fishing country. The fishery is an important part of their economy. If the fish stocks are moving to the north, which is possible in probably 40 or 50 years, they will have a strong interest in keeping it open and in reducing, as far as possible, the rights of the coastal states, to make sure that they have access to the resource.

You can say the same for some resources. Now it's a big “if” in the sense that we still don't know the map of the ocean floor. We're not sure exactly where the borders or the exclusive rights finish. Some states could have an interest in using the resources that are there. Other states, and my guess is that China is among them, could say that the Arctic will be a very interesting maritime sea route for maritime traffic. They want to keep it open to exploit it as a maritime sea lane. This could be another reason why they want to be there.

In general, we can say that there's a feeling, a sort of reaction, that they don't want to leave these five coastal states, or these eight Arctic states, with the exclusive right to manage the region. They want to be part of it, not because they have a specific interest there, but because they just want to keep their options open for the future.

This is why there's a broken line between some Arctic states—I say some Arctic states, because Denmark is not very active in that debate—such as Canada, Norway, and Russia on the one hand, and non-Arctic states, whose interests are clearly in conflict here. Some of them, such as Canada, want to keep more control over it, and non-Arctic states want to reduce that control.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

In the medium to long term, do you see some resource-based conflicts developing between Arctic states and non-Arctic states?

[Prof. Stéphane Roussel]

I don't see conflict, as some people are saying, such as a war or the use of force. I certainly don't see that. There's no reason for that to happen.

Exploiting these resources will involve a lot of investment, and those who are investing don't want to put their investments at risk. If there's a conflict, it will be an economic conflict. It's going to be an economic clash, but it certainly will not be an open conflict or an open war. I don't believe the very pessimistic scenarios that the Arctic is like the Africa of the 19th or 18th centuries, when every great power tried to take its share. I don't see it like that at all.

There will be some competition over investment, and over who is ready to exploit the resource. Russia seems way ahead of the others, but since their infrastructure is aging, I don't know if they will keep that position for a long time.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Some of that was echoed in Stockholm when I was there with Mr. Bevington, who was my partner at that Arctic conference. Your comments are very interesting.

Russia itself, I know, has been there since Soviet times, and they have had a huge presence in the Arctic, and I think it's fair to say militarily, as well.

Mr. Battiss, actually I want you to weigh in on what you think NATO's interests are globally in the Arctic.

[Samir Battiss, Lecturer, Canada Research Chair in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy, Université du Québec à Montréal]

Certain NATO member states would like to raise the issue of the Arctic within the organization. The conversation is not about war or anything of the kind. Actually, NATO is now moving beyond military and even political issues. Stéphane and I have written that it would be inappropriate for Canada for this subject to be addressed within NATO because Canada would be in a minority position.

I would also like to add that behind every non-Arctic European state is the European Union, with which Canada is conducting or has completed economic negotiations. Consequently, this may also be an opportunity for Canada to raise fisheries issues and other present and future economic questions in the Arctic.

NATO, as such, remains solely a forum for discussion on environmental, Arctic and energy issues. It has no prominent role for the moment. A new division on emerging changes has recently been created, and one section is entirely dedicated to energy issues. Some day, in 10 years, the issue of energy in the Arctic may be addressed within NATO. That is possible.

[Prof. Stéphane Roussel]

On NATO, one reason why NATO is talking less about the Arctic now than was the case two years ago is that the bell-ringer was Norway. Norway kept saying that the Russians were interested in the Arctic and it was a danger for them. Since they solved the conflict with Russia in September 2010, I think, now it's less urgent and they are ready to downplay it. Canada is opposed to having NATO involved in the region. The other motivation is less important than it was before.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you very much. Your time is up.

Ms. Moore, you have five minutes.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

I would like to take advantage of Mr. Battiss' presence to ask him a few questions about the concept of smart defence, which Mr. Lagassé, the researcher, told us about. The idea is to allocate certain types of operations among NATO's member armed forces based on their respective specialties, if I may put it that way, so that NATO is capable of responding to all types of operations, or at least the majority of them. In that way, we avoid the situation where one country is incapable of managing on its own. People are realizing that it will be increasingly difficult financially to maintain all these types of operations, even for the United States.

Do you think it would be desirable to move toward that kind of concept?

[Samir Battiss]

I don't know whether it is a good idea or a bad one. I am always somewhat reluctant to use the smart defence concept. It presupposes that we weren't doing anything smart before that. It's always a bit difficult—

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Let's disregard the name.

[Samir Battiss]

The concept of mutual support is more appropriate. Whether it is a good or a bad idea is not the question: I believe it's a necessity. The operations in Libya revealed, in particular, that only a few players among the member states, and they included Canada, were capable of providing a sustained effort. The smart defence idea has its equivalent within the European Union. I'm talking about the European Union because the majority of NATO states are European.

It's mainly in response to pressure by Canada and the United States that the Europeans are being led to engage in smart defence. They're doing it as part of what they call pooling and sharing, a concept already slightly more advanced than smart defence within NATO. It was adopted by the European Defence Agency, among others. The Europeans had to consider the mutual support concept, because, on their own, they did not have the capacity to plan an operation from start to finish. Only two NATO countries are really capable of doing that: France and the United Kingdom. And even they currently find it very difficult to do so.

Mutual support is a necessity. It's a good idea if you want to maintain a NATO that is capable of operating where it has to operate and where political leaders decide that it must. If I may take the liberty of making this comment, I would say that thinking has gone much further within another institution, outside NATO, which represents both the allied countries and NATO partner countries. I am talking about the Multinational Interoperability Council, in which Canada plays a very important role. It is doctrinal thinking in this case. Smart defence entails both a doctrinal aspect and a tactical aspect. The contributing countries include Canada, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Australia and New Zealand. There are also observer states. NATO is represented through the Allied Command Transformation. Its staff and the European Union are also represented on it.

For a number of years now, that institution has been considering this mutualization issue, that is to say the concepts of pooling and sharing and smart defence. As we have noted several times here, no state is capable of conducting an operation on its own. Coalition operations are therefore the rule. However, from the moment coalition operations are conducted, there is necessarily a pooling of capabilities. This is also a budgetary necessity, but not uniquely. Among other things, there are various types of knowledge scattered here and there. The Chicago summit should provide a little more impetus in that direction for all allies.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

When we began addressing this concept, we talked about the appropriate moment when discussions on the subject should go forward. We said that now was the ideal time, while a number of countries were involved in budgetary restructuring and major purchases. That is the case for Canada as much as for other countries.

Do you think now is the ideal time to do that, to move toward that concept, before making purchases that might not necessarily prove useful in view of the new vision we adopt?

[Samir Battiss]

Absolutely. I entirely agree.

This is the ideal moment since we are at a time when the polarity of the world is changing. The western nations—if we can use that term—have lost the ability to decide global affairs on their own. Consequently, based on what the western countries, as well as NATO members and their allies, want, we will have to see what we can do and what we want to do politically and with what equipment. At that point, we will be able to pool certain capabilities and know-how. We must not forget the know-how.

The time is right, and I suppose this will be launched at the Chicago summit.