National Defence Committee on March 6th, 2012

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

I call this meeting to order.

Good morning, everyone.

We will continue with our study on readiness. Joining us today from the University of New Brunswick, we have Lee Windsor, the deputy director for the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society. From the Public Policy Forum, we have retired Vice-Admiral Larry Murray, who's the chair. I welcome both of you to the committee, and we look forward to your input into this very important study that we're doing.

Dr. Windsor, please give us your opening comments.

[Dr. Lee Windsor, Deputy Director, Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society, University of New Brunswick]

Distinguished and honourable members, Admiral Murray, it's a privilege to be asked to appear before you and participate in this important discussion on Canadian Forces readiness. Please excuse my lack of proficiency in French and inability to converse with you competently in both official languages.

I speak to you today representing the Brigadier Milton F. Gregg, VC, Centre for the Study of War and Society, or the Gregg Centre for short, at the University of New Brunswick. The broad purpose of this centre is to study the cause, course, and consequence of war in history and in the world today. A subset of that mandate is to study the Canadian army's past, present, and future. In this we are closely partnered with the army's combat training centre in CFB Gagetown.

That partnership involves the Gregg Centre faculty members in professional development for both the field force and for training units. Our program of research includes, but is not limited to, ongoing projects concerning Canada's mission in Afghanistan, the era of violent peace and stability missions during the nineties, and the Canadian Forces in two world wars. There are other projects as well, but these are the ones I am directly involved in and best able to comment on today.

The common thread linking Afghanistan through to the 1990s and of course the world wars is that Canadian military forces in all three of these particular periods operated as part of a larger coalition of allies, joined for a common purpose. They also include what in today's terms we label whole of government, or the comprehensive approach, or, alternatively, they are operations with joint inter-agency, multinational, and political dimensions.

I should add that our faculty members, including me, are military historians by training and discipline, and therefore we bring a historical, evidence-based approach to the study of operations and readiness. For example, back in 2006-07, the Gregg Centre undertook a focus project on Canadian army operations in Afghanistan by studying the training, deployment, and return home of one rotation, Task Force Kandahar. The result was essentially a short history of one tour of duty. That study, along with subsequent research into how events unfolded from 2008 on, informs what I have to say today.

In today's era of technologically sophisticated warfare, I understand that the issue of military readiness almost always defaults to equipment. I submit to you today that the most important elements of military readiness I have observed, the ones that define more than any other factors whether a unit can succeed in its mission and win on the battlefield, are training and education. These two distinctly intellectual preparations create both the will and the mental capacity to solve whatever problem there is that must be solved in order to accomplish the mission. Training and education are equally important for both officers and non-commissioned members.

Canada's military past contains many examples of well-trained units led by well-educated officers who found innovative and sophisticated ways to achieve their mission, even though they neither had the perfect equipment nor enough resources to guarantee success. I'm not arguing that investing in training and education is a replacement for good equipment. There are plenty of other examples of Canadian units paying too high a blood price for being under-equipped and outgunned in a fight, but I am arguing that the best ships, aircraft, and armoured fighting vehicles are only as good as the minds that operate them.

I mention training and education in the same breath because they are inseparable in providing Canadian Forces members with both the practical skills and the critical thinking ability to solve military problems. It is important to consider the value of training and education this year, as the Canadian Forces come to grips with the belt-tightening we all know is coming. Difficult choices need to be made about what people, institutions, capabilities, and equipment are essential to maintain the level of defence readiness Canada needs and which ones should be cut to lower costs.

If the last 65 years are any indication, the national tradition in times of peaceful budget reduction is to reduce training and education allocations to maintain funding for major equipment purchases.

In the years since the Second World War, the rising costs associated with keeping up the rate of military technological advance create a reality we cannot avoid. But the people who man those systems must always be upheld as the most important investment. It may take 10 years or more to get a warship from the drawing board onto the high seas, but as I always tell my students in the classroom, it takes 35 to 40 years to build a skipper, it takes 22 years or more to produce a high-quality infanteer, and it takes 30 years to create a seasoned professional section commander or petty officer. The training and education institutions and establishments across Canada that produce these high-quality personnel have never been so sophisticated. As in 1914 and in 1939, the necessity of this most recent war and the risk that failure means death forces them to be excellent.

I submit to you today that in the world we live in, where the nature of the threats to Canada's global security are uncertain, never has the need for well-trained and well-educated soldiers been greater. Our search for the essential ingredients to the Canadian Forces readiness must therefore include those components of training and education establishments that have proven themselves in the last 20 years in which the Canadian Forces have been in or at war on our behalf.

On the educational side, these include the Canadian Defence Academy, the Royal Military College, and the Canadian Forces College, as well as linkages to supporting civilian universities and colleges.

On the training side, I am most familiar with the army case. In this respect, the land forces doctrine and training system and the various schools that form the Combat Training Centre are the critical pieces that produce high-quality individual soldiers and leaders. Those individuals are then assigned to field force units to train collectively as a team. Historically, one way to reduce budgets has been to cut costs for that individual training system in the hope that skills can be learned when a particular member reaches their regiment, squadron, or ship. On the flip side, wartime requirements often tip the balance in favour of that collective training, the idea being that individuals not qualified for their jobs can be trained into them or weeded out as the unit collectively goes through its high readiness training cycle immediately before action.

Arguably the best way to maintain readiness for whatever the Canadian Forces face next, though, is to produce better qualified individuals before they are assigned to their units. Those individuals will then be able to be prepared more rapidly and mobilized more rapidly on short notice for surprises, be they the Libyan uprising, be they a suddenly violent counter-insurgency in Kandahar, or be it Germany's invasion of Poland.

I'd like to close by identifying two particular training and education areas that I believe the Canadian Forces can use more of. The first is military history, a bit of self-promotion perhaps. I'm aware that the Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs is looking into matters related to commemorative events for great Canadian wartime achievements. Certainly, Canadian history is important for national public education purposes. However, the study of military history and placing a priority on research into our distant and recent military past offers an inexpensive way to maintain intellectual readiness for what comes next.

The second new training and education priority that requires deeper commitment from several departments—and I know there is one member of this committee who has some experience with this particular matter—is to create opportunities for Canadian Forces members to train and interact alongside DFAIT and CIDA officers. Few people know it, but Sicily, Normandy, Somalia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan all teach us that Canadian defence and foreign policy is more effectively implemented when combat leaders work in concert with civil affairs operators, diplomatic envoys, and aid workers.

Different professional cultures exist between these groups, which makes collaboration difficult. You've probably heard this message before. Improving cooperation between these entities can only happen when Canadians serving in the four military and civilian assignments are trained and educated to understand that together they can build a better world for all humanity. Indeed, they have performed this feat in the past.

Thank you for your time.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

That was exactly 10 minutes. Thank you, Dr. Windsor.

We're going to move on.

Admiral Murray, you have the floor.

[Vice-Admiral, Retired) Larry Murray (Chair, Public Policy Forum]

Thanks very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to appear as a witness today.

The Standing Committee on National Defence has made a significant contribution to Canada's defence and security over the years, and it's a real privilege to be here to provide input in support of your ongoing study on maintaining the readiness of the Canadian Forces.

I must note at the outset that I am not appearing today in my capacity as an external member of the National Defence Audit Committee, and the comments I express represent my personal views as a private citizen.

The current Canada First defence strategy, or CFDS, includes a requirement to deliver:

...a balanced, multi-role, combat-capable force that will give the Government the necessary flexibility to respond to a full range of challenges in the years ahead.

Meeting that CFDS stated requirement is essential to Canadian defence and security.

In my opening remarks I will elaborate on what that commitment means with respect to readiness, which is defined in the CFDS as:

...the Canadian Forces' flexibility and preparedness to deploy in response to Government direction. It encompasses the resources needed to maintain equipment, conduct training, and prepare units for operations.

Readiness is one of the four military capability pillars described in the CFDS, with the other three being personnel, equipment, and infrastructure.

Returning to the commitment for a balanced, multi-role, combat-capable force, I will now outline some key aspects of what balance, multi-role, and combat-capable require with respect to the readiness of the Canadian Forces.

First, balance is multi-faceted and must include balance among the four pillars themselves, balance among the navy, army, air force, and joint and special forces capabilities of the Canadian Forces, and balance in terms of the readiness levels among and within our various Canadian Forces capabilities and units.

Achieving the various types of balance I'm talking about is an art and not a science, and it requires a good deal of well-seasoned, professional judgment of exactly the type that has been acquired and amply demonstrated by the Canadian Forces in the past decade.

Balance is also a somewhat theoretical, ongoing goal, which must be adjusted from time to time based on actual operational and fiscal realities. For example, a combat mission on the ground in Afghanistan necessitated that a particularly high priority be assigned to the readiness of army combat arms units, air force tactical helicopter capability, and so on.

In terms of the four pillars, balance between personnel and readiness requires enough funding to ensure adequate individual and collective training to enable the personnel on strength to achieve useful and meaningful readiness levels. Stated somewhat differently, the number of personnel in uniform must be in balance with the resources available to make them effective, trained members of the Canadian Forces.

In terms of equipment, it must be modern and able to fight and win on a complex and very challenging 21st century battlefield. In today's highly technological age, no amount of training—even of world-class personnel like the Canadian Forces is blessed with—can overcome the limitations of outdated, obsolescent equipment, which cannot match that of a well-equipped opponent. Unfortunately, modern weaponry is readily available these days to any state or non-state player with enough money.

In addition, given that funding and other resources are and probably always will be limited, it's essential that every possible effort be made to replace obsolete equipment, which is extremely expensive to maintain and operate and which usually brings quite limited operational capability to the readiness equation, despite the huge costs. The venerable Sea King helicopter, which has done yeoman service since before I joined the fleet in the late 1960s, is a classic example of this problem.

Similarly, there must be balance between investments in infrastructure and readiness. Infrastructure location, capability, and cost all impact directly or indirectly on readiness. Useful infrastructure must be adequately maintained, and unnecessary investment in old, outdated infrastructure of limited utility or operational value must be minimized, particularly in the resource-constrained environment facing Canada and the Department of National Defence today.

As noted at the outset, and as has been evident in the diversity of Canadian Forces operations globally since the end of the Cold War, there also must be balance between the navy, army, air force, and joint and special forces capabilities of the Canadian Forces. This is essential if the government is to have the flexibility to respond to the full range of possible operational requirements in the dangerous and unpredictable world in which we live.

The recent and almost concurrent need to conduct a whole-of-government, counter-insurgency combat role in Afghanistan while mounting a major short-fuse humanitarian relief operation following the devastating earthquake in Haiti, or commanding and contributing combat-capable naval and air forces to the NATO mission in Libya, illustrate why over-investing in the readiness of one capability at the expense of others would be a very high-risk strategy for Canada.

My final comment with respect to balance relates to the need to have adequate resources to ensure that no one component, unit, or group of Canadian Forces members is retained at high readiness or on operations without adequate relief. This has occurred sometimes in the past in the Canadian Forces and among our allies and is ultimately a recipe for personnel burnout, retention problems, and reduced operational effectiveness.

The Canadian Forces are renowned for their exceptional professionalism and remarkable can-do spirit. However, when it comes to readiness, less investment means less readiness, which can translate directly into reduced tasking flexibility and operational tempo, with much slower operational response times in areas of low readiness.

To some extent, my comments have incorporated many aspects of what I would say about multi-role. For example, ensuring a good balance between the readiness levels of the navy, army, air force, and joint and special forces capabilities guarantees to a considerable extent a multi-role-capable Canadian Forces.

However, the diverse nature of the six missions assigned to the Canadian Forces in the Canada First defence strategy also highlights other aspects of their multi-role requirements.

Briefly stated, the six missions include: conducting daily domestic and continental ops; supporting a major international event in Canada; responding to a major terrorist attack; supporting civil authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster; leading or conducting a major international operation for an extended period; and deploying forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for a shorter period.

This is not some hypothetical list. During 2010, the Canadian Forces effectively executed four of these missions concurrently.

In addition to traditional military requirements, it is clear from this list of assigned missions that multi-role for the Canadian Forces must include readiness to support other government departments and provinces as well as law enforcement agencies and emergency relief organizations in Canada and abroad.

Maintaining combat capability is the final and overriding requirement for the Canadian Forces stated in the Canada First defence strategy. In today's world, Canadian Forces units and personnel deployed abroad in harm's way must be combat capable.

Canada's military operations since 1990, and in particular for the past decade, have provided the leadership of the Canadian Forces with invaluable combat experience and the ability to assess in practical and credible terms the training, equipment, and support requirements necessary to achieve the high readiness essential for continued success in combat.

This expertise will be critical in the coming months and years as CF transformation progresses and the government, DND, and the CF strive to continue to implement the Canada First defence strategy in a manner that ensures the delivery of a balanced, multi-purpose, combat-capable force, notwithstanding budget constraints in the near term owing to the global economic crisis and its impact on Canada.

Finally, I would emphasize that the selfless pride and commitment of the members of the Canadian Forces, together with their superior readiness, is based on the confidence they have that they and their families will be cared for if they are killed or injured in the service of Canada. Thus, I can not overstate the importance of the Department of National Defence's commitment to support ill or wounded Canadian Forces members, veterans, and their families, including the families of the fallen, with dignity, compassion, and generosity.

Recent investments in casualty support programs and health care as well as in improvements to the new Veterans Charter are essential in that regard and must continue.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would now be pleased to join my colleague in trying to answer the committee's questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate that insight.

Mr. Christopherson.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Chair, and my thanks to both our witnesses for attending today. We much appreciate it.

Both of you made reference to the upcoming budget and the pending cuts. I wanted to get your thoughts on the notion that the budget will be coming before readiness is concluded. I'm assuming that the government has not yet decided on readiness. Otherwise, everything we're doing would be moot, and I know the government wouldn't do that to a standing committee. Therefore, I have to conclude that readiness is not yet finalized. Yet the budget cuts are going to start.

By making cuts before we know what readiness looks like, do you think we might have to tailor readiness to the dollars available, which practice has been a problem in the past, as opposed to determining what readiness means and then ensuring that the dollars are there to back it up?

I would say as an opposition critic that there's an argument to be made that the government is putting the cart before the horse. I'd appreciate your thoughts.

[VAdm Larry Murray]

Thanks very much for the question.

As I said at the outset, I think the Standing Committee on National Defence and the joint committees of this body have made a huge contribution to defence over the years. But I don't believe that the government of the day or the Canadian Forces of the day have stopped doing business as usual awaiting a committee report.

Certainly readiness is a work in progress. It's always a work in process; it's a dynamic. I presume that the Chief of Defence Staff and his senior leadership sat around this morning and kicked around questions in their morning operational thing that would impact on readiness. The world changes. Libya changed the focus.

In my view, readiness is always a work in progress, and it would be surprising if the government held off on a budget awaiting the wisdom of a parliamentary committee. I'd be very surprised if the government didn't act on the report of this committee on readiness, because it's always a work in progress.

That's the way I see it unfolding. I don't see the two being out of step with each other.

[Dr. Lee Windsor]

I would like to add one point.

From what I've been able to observe on the army side of things, a great number of the budget increases we've seen have been driven by wartime necessity; therefore, we are currently entering a period of post-war retooling as we've seen in the past. A great number of officers and the senior leadership of the Canadian land forces understand that to meet wartime demands.... Some institutions, some capabilities, are created very roughly, not necessarily without thought, but without the time to do the kind of review that can normally be done in peacetime when time is available, because equipment needs to be made available to people.

So there's an awareness among many of the officers I've spoken to that it is time to take a look at moving into the future with new kinds of equipment in a more efficient fashion. That includes taking a look at what types of specific military capabilities were developed for the mission in Afghanistan, which of them were purely mission-specific for that task and will not serve any purpose in the future, and which new kinds of ideas and capabilities make good sense and should be institutionalized, given what's likely to happen in the future.

That process, as Admiral Murray suggested, is what armed forces do. So I can safely say I'm comfortable that the senior leadership at least understands that some degree of reduction is necessary.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Admiral, you mentioned in your presentation on the third page, second paragraph from the bottom:

My final comment with respect to “balance” relates to the need to have adequate resources to ensure that no one component, unit or group of CF members is retained at high readiness or on operations without adequate relief.

We know that any supplement or relief to the regular forces is the reserves. We've heard from numerous people that the expectation among people with experience in this area is that one of the first areas to be cut, because it's the easiest, is the reserves.

If one accepts that you need the reserves.... In the last 10 years, without the reserves we wouldn't have had a Canadian armed forces. If you removed the reservists from the equation, we wouldn't have had the standing armed forces we all thought we had. The reservists were critical.

Coming back to the budget, I hear what you're saying, Admiral, that no government is going to wait for a mere committee. I accept that. But I did preface my remarks by saying that I assume the government hasn't finalized their readiness; otherwise they would be having us chase our tails here, and I know they wouldn't do that to this committee.

Without a sense of what the ultimate plan is in the budget, the low-lying fruit to cut is the reservists, because that would do the least amount of damage right now. But it would immediately impact readiness, particularly as you were saying, Admiral, that we need to make sure no one group or individual members are stretched beyond their abilities when they're standing at high readiness.

Give your thoughts on some of that, Admiral—and Dr. Windsor too, if you have any comments.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

I'm just going to limit this to Admiral Murray, because your time is running out.

Admiral Murray.

[VAdm Larry Murray]

Thanks very much.

I didn't use the term “mere” committee. I think this committee is extremely important, and I mean that.

The question of reservists is a huge question. There's no question that through the 1990s both the regular forces and the reservists did get overstretched. That's what I'm referring to here. As well, early on in his days as commander of the army, Rick Hillier concluded that the army had been in a state of overstretch and that it was time for a time out. I would apply that to what I have here. Certainly in the context of some of our allies, I'm not sure how some of them keep going. When one looks at some of the budget cuts in some of those countries, it's very sobering.

In terms of the reservists, I think I would await both the budget and the defence minister and the Chief of Defence Staff to see where they actually land. I'd be surprised to see a reduction in reservists. I think the change that may happen post-Afghanistan, as recommended in the Leslie report, and presumably you know that it's being looked at, is some reduction in full-time class B reservists, because the need has decreased with the move from the combat mission in Afghanistan. I'd be very surprised if there were a change in the traditional class A reservists.

I also think that through the 1990s and in Afghanistan, all the services learned a very great deal about the tremendous capability value of the reservists. I would presume that as part of CF transformation and some of the lessons learned that my colleague was talking about, we would be looking at trying to ensure that the reserves stay vibrant and that the lessons learned from Afghanistan and other recent missions get rolled into them. I'd be very surprised if there were a change in the reserves following from the budget.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Time has expired.

Ms. Gallant, you have the floor.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and through you to our witnesses.

The NATO forces in Afghanistan adapted to changing circumstances and changing enemy tactics. Examples of this include the increased use of UAVs and ISRs and a shift away from land transportation to Chinook choppers to transport soldiers. In your opinion, how important were these changes to the success of the mission? What lessons can be learned and derived from the way NATO forces, and especially the Canadian Forces, adapted to overcome the challenges?

[VAdm Larry Murray]

I'll start.

One thing I would say, in case my colleague doesn't, is that in part, the flexibility, agility, and ability to move and be nimble was actually from the training and education aspect Professor Windsor was talking about. It didn't seem that way at the time, but I would say that arguably, in terms of the lasting impact of the reform process in the late 1990s—the 100 recommendations to the Prime Minister and so on—the emphasis on professional development and training and all that entails, forces wide, for officers, senior NCOs, and others, was key. That particular area is one that has paid huge dividends in recent years in Afghanistan and in Libya. It really does need to be protected.

The other point I would make is that some of these technological advances are absolutely huge. I was in Afghanistan in January 2010. I found it amazing that the small UAVs, operated out of a little shed in the back of Kandahar, were essential to foot patrols going out in bandit country in southern Kandahar. The troops really relied on them. So a number of these technological advances really are extremely important.

Maybe I'll stop there.

[Dr. Lee Windsor]

Without question, all of the assets that you've described have proven invaluable in saving lives and helping to accomplish the mission itself, but always in concert with the fundamental skills that exist within the Canadian army, the skills acquired conducting a range of peace-building missions that look a great deal like Afghanistan in the decade prior to the deployment to Kandahar.

From what I've been able to observe, the increased capacity to see into all places in Kandahar province.... I've been in the room when a UAV has saved a life and contributed to terminating a life that would in turn create an operational effect that contributes to victory—and for a comparatively small amount of money, which is I suppose one of the striking pieces about this.

In many respects, the answer is obvious to many: these new kinds of assets are some of the very ones I was referring to earlier—they are new to Afghanistan but are not specifically useful only there, and they are the capabilities and assets that we want to retain for whatever comes next.

It's also revealed a great deal about the value of one particular branch of the army that I think had been one of those ones that, in our referring to the issue of balance, had fallen into the dark corners of the Canadian Forces, and that is the artillery. The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, both regular and reserve, provides the kind of training that can produce soldiers qualified to handle this sort of equipment, partly because the motto of the Royal Canadian Artillery is “Ubique”; they are everywhere. They are trained to control the battle space in all its dimensions and in every aspect, from one corner to the other, and to be able to see into all dimensions and all aspects of it. They provide timely information to commanders that will enable them to make informed decisions about how they should apply fire, how they should manoeuvre, or how they should conduct a negotiation with a key leader.

Therefore, the people—and I come back to my opening remarks—who man the UAVs and the ISR capability are largely gunners. It has raised new questions about the importance of maintaining the artillery profession of the Canadian army still at the forefront of the army of the future.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

If Afghanistan and Libya are any indication, it appears that any future Canadian missions abroad will be as part of a larger, multinational NATO-led mission. How then do the allied partners work in unison to ensure that there is operational success, and how important is interoperability, especially as it relates to equipment?

[VAdm Larry Murray]

Again, I could give a long answer or I could say it's essential. It's essential. One of the great benefits of NATO is the protocols, the processes, the shared tactical approaches, the equipment, the interoperability of that equipment—it’s actually transferrable globally and provides the foundation for an effective multinational response to a crisis somewhere.

Without that, the world is left with more and more scenarios where it's the U.S. or it's NATO, and unilateral U.S. action obviously generates a whole bunch of other issues that are much better done within the framework of a multinational body.

I would also say that within the Canadian Forces over the years there have been wise decisions on interoperability. In many cases where the equipment was going downhill, we generally focused pretty heavily on trying to maintain interoperability, particularly with the Americans and particularly within NATO, and that has paid huge dividends.

Many of the command opportunities that Canada has had in multinational operations in recent years simply would not have happened without not only the expertise of organizations, like-minded nations within NATO or like-minded nations outside NATO, many of whom are NATO members, but the knowledge a Canadian commander brings to the table, and also the technical ability to operate effectively together from a command and control communications and intelligence perspective. So there's a trust thing as part of that interoperable aspect.

I'll stop there.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Give us just a very brief response, Professor.

[Dr. Lee Windsor]

The only thing I'd like to add to that is that I would argue that Canada has never operated alone, with the exception of its response to the 1885 rebellion. It's inherent in the structure of the Canadian Forces to operate in concert with our allies; therefore, it's ingrained in all aspects of Canadian Forces command and control or procurement structures to think about how our field units will operate with our allied partners. It works very well.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you.

We're going to move on.

The last of the seven-minute round goes to Mr. McKay.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you both for coming.

In the last couple of weeks I had the great privilege of listening to a couple of presentations by Lieutenant-General Bouchard, who, I suppose, is on the pointy end of readiness. Certainly, in terms of experience among our military leadership, he's probably as ready as anybody. He talks about leading the force in 2011-12, and his comments strangely echo yours. He talks about cultural sensitivities when you're leading a coalition force. He talks about military limitations. At any given time, he may have had 80 or 90 planes that he was supposed to be able to call on, and in fact he had 40 or 45 that he could call on. It was the same with the boats: he may have had a fleet of 10 or 12, but in fact only 5 or 6 would actually be useful. He talked about differing mandates among governments.

The other interesting observation he made was with respect to the various levels of secrecy among the allies: that the intelligence that is gathered is not always shared; that literally, during the first part of the bombing runs, they were using Google Maps to figure out where they were going to be bombing. All of this leads him to a conclusion about “agility of mind”, which speaks to both of your points, really, Professor Windsor: knowing your military history, but having, if you will, the intellectual training that's required in order to lead.

You made an interesting observation with respect to the interoperability, for want of a better phrase, between DFAIT, CIDA, and the CF. There are some limitations among those three silos, and I'd be interested in your thoughts with respect to that point of interoperability.

The second I'd be interested in is what advice you would give the CF with respect to changes in recruitment, if any, given that “agility of mind”, if it's really important in 2011-12, is going to be even more important going forward.

The third is with respect to General Leslie's report, in particular the issue of “tooth” and “tail” and all of that sort of stuff. At this point, neither the CDS nor the minister has chosen to respond to General Leslie's report. Were you given the opportunity, what would you suggest to both the CDS and to the minister with respect to picking up on some of General Leslie's recommendations?

[Dr. Lee Windsor]

I'm not terribly comfortable responding to the third question, because I don't know that I can offer up any important insights. But on the first two, I have some ideas that may be of use to the committee.

On your first question, the issue of interoperability between the Canadian Forces and other government departments is a far bigger problem than the problem of being able to operate effectively with our NATO allies. The Canadian Forces have a long tradition of conducting multinational exercises, officer exchange programs, and joint training programs, with staff officers being sent abroad to other NATO partner countries. The problem is not there. The problem is certainly in trying to find ways to improve the cultural barriers that exist between the Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Canadian Forces.

At the times we have seen in the last 20 years when those three departments have worked well together, it has been, I think all the persons involved have suggested, because of the personalities involved at the time. Those individuals managed to work well together; the departments didn't work well together because they were structurally organized that way.

The greatest barrier seems to be in their approaches to military planning and their outlook on time and space and how long it will take to deliver on any given project. The Canadian Forces are by necessity focused on being able to create plans and deliver operations on a very short turnaround. Foreign Affairs operates on a horizon wherein effects are delivered over six months, a year, or two years; CIDA certainly over many decades.

I suppose the only one of those three organizations that has sufficient size to be able to send its senior officials on a focused and organized professional development program is the Canadian Forces.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Let me interrupt you, because the chair is going to yank my chain in a second.

I want to bring Admiral Murray in on this conversation, because he's going to see it from the military perspective. I think you're onto something. I'd like to drive to a conclusion as to how you structurally get over that interoperability hurdle, as opposed to being dependent upon the personalities involved.

[Dr. Lee Windsor]

There have already been some good recent strides towards solving the problem. I think all parties involved—anybody who has done a tour of duty in Afghanistan, in any of those three departments—understands that this is a problem. The solution is to try to create more opportunities for these people to train and learn together.

The challenge is that the numbers of personnel available in Foreign Affairs and CIDA just don't exist to be able to detach people from their duties long enough to go on some of the longer training and development programs the Canadian Forces have available to them, such as the Canadian Forces College joint command and staff program, which lasts for one year in Toronto.

I think the solution is to create opportunities for shorter periods of joint training and education—more professional development seminars, more cross-departmental communication. The need for this has been promoted by many people for a number of years.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Vice-Admiral Murray?