National Defence Committee on March 6th, 2012

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you, Professor.

Mr. Alexander.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

I have one question for each of our witnesses. I am very grateful to both of them for their remarks. Because we just finished with Professor Windsor, I will start by asking him about his expertise on IEDs and the effort to counter IEDs and the extent to which we have institutionalized lessons and become more ready to counter both the technical threat—the threat to life and limb from IEDs—and the political threat.

I'd just like to remind him of an interview he did with Maclean's magazine in 2007 when the death toll for Canada was still at 66, when he said:

Really, the Taliban's target when they killed Captain Dawe and his men....

—that was the group of six that had recently died. I think it was the largest group—

...was you, the media. This is because the focus of all western media is on deaths and casualties rather than on successful aspects of the mission, like our reconstruction efforts. As long as the focus is on deaths, the Taliban will look to the Western media as a secret weapon that they can manipulate to bring public opinion to a tipping point of fear.

It was to try to get countries to pull out.

Do you think we've learned the political lesson as well as the technical lessons about how to counter IEDs as well as we should have? Do you think we are readier to encounter them in the field?

[Dr. Lee Windsor]

Certainly the Canadian Forces are more prepared to deal with them. The amount of resources that have been put into solving this problem has increased. The new technologies and capabilities that have been made available are making great strides forward. But we haven't had that conversation in Canada about dealing with an enemy who deliberately tries to inflict loss as part of its strategic policy. We're not talking about IEDs in that fashion. We're talking about IEDs in Canada, all too often, purely in terms of capability, equipment, and technology.

We haven't had the wider conversation about strategy in a counter-insurgency, and how IEDs are not new. The armed forces have used various explosive traps to deny mobility to the opposing force since things have been able to blow up. That's why the Canadian Military Engineers of the Military Engineering Branch exist.

So I think that while the Canadian Forces have reacted to the emphasis on that particular type of weapon system employed by the opposing force in Afghanistan, the rest of the country, as a whole, has not caught up.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Admiral Murray, I have a question for you.

You mentioned the core missions of the Canadian Forces, as described in Canada First. One of them, of course—I believe number 5—is to lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period. That can, of course, be leading in a coalition, as we almost always do, but it can also be leading alone when others are unwilling to act.

When you were Acting Chief of the Defence Staff in late 2006-07, we had one of the few cases when Canada acted alone in the Great Lakes region to deploy, in the end, just over 300 troops, out of 1,500 offered, in a situation were refugees were prevented from moving, and so forth.

Based on your experience then, and everything you've seen until now as deputy minister and in your many roles in government, do you think we are more ready, less ready, or as ready as we were in 1996 to lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period?

[VAdm Larry Murray]

I could say something facetious, like we couldn't be less ready, but I won't.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

I was hoping you would say that.

[VAdm Larry Murray]

I would like to just say a word on the IED thing, because I think that story is an incredible story. It's probably too sensitive still, too classified to be told, but the story of the Toronto coroner's office, the defence scientists, and everybody who has been involved in that, is a classic case of why the term “tooth to tail” is a really dodgy expression that should be avoided, because where's the tooth and where's the tail on the IED story? It's an amazing story, and hats off to the Toronto coroner's office and everybody involved in that.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Admiral, just for your information, as a parenthesis, this committee has been to Defence Research and Development Canada and has heard part of the story—an important part.

[VAdm Larry Murray]

Great.

For a number of years, I was asked back to the Staff College on one of their case studies on the Great Lakes region story. The problem with that story is that the problem got resolved. We had a mission, we had constraints, and we had buy-in from allies, but then the problem got solved before the mission actually went out the starting gate, which made managing it to the conclusion kind of fascinating.

Having said that, to say that Canada was ready then to lead an operation of that nature.... I'm not just talking about the Canadian Forces. I go back to my comments about the Manley report, the government response to it, and the whole-of-government approach around Afghanistan. We are leagues ahead of where we were there.

I would also say that I used to think this was a pretty low probability anyway—and it's not necessarily a high probability—but I'm not sure the Australians expected to find themselves leading the operation in East Timor. I think Canada needs to pay attention to it, actually, and part of the reason why I think the lessons learned out of Libya and Afghanistan need to be applied to that question is so that Canada is ready.

I think we are significantly more ready today. The challenge is that if the world unfolds and we don't find ourselves in that scenario, and people move on—not just in the forces but in all these other government departments—and we lose all the stuff that we have gained in the last 10 years, or certainly 7 or 8 of the 10 years in Afghanistan, it would be a huge loss to Canada's ability to lead an operation of the type you're talking about.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Your time has expired.

Mr. Storseth, you have the floor.

[Brian Storseth, Conservative, Westlock—St. Paul, AB]

Thank you very much.

Thank you for your presentation.

To follow up on that last comment, how good a job do the Canadian Forces and Canada do in retaining some of that institutional knowledge within the staff colleges and places, so we can still access that? I know from my riding that we've got men and women who had key roles in Afghanistan at different levels of command, as well as in Libya. How good a job do we do in keeping them even after they're ready to retire?

[VAdm Larry Murray]

Within the forces we're doing a much better job. Are we doing a good enough job or not? The professor may have insight into that. Certainly, the staff colleges have been an area of great investment in recent years, both in terms of the course at the major level and the more senior “baby generals” course, with colonels and one-stars and civilian equivalents. The really good news is that I talk to that latter course each year, usually networking in Ottawa. What I was really struck by in the last year or two is that there has been a much better presence of serious players from other government departments, including DFAIT, the RCMP, and so on. That's essential.

I would say the forces do a pretty good job. The forces are used to—like most major police organizations in the country—after-action reports and all of that stuff, but I think they're doing a better job of institutionalizing it now. I would say we're still at the starting gates in terms of whole-of-government, which is why the Afghan task force and all of that is so critical. That would be the first time, in my memory, that we've actually had the opportunity to work our way into something that was working on the ground and in Ottawa. We really need to make sure we don't lose that, because it's not in the culture of most other government departments.

[Dr. Lee Windsor]

I would follow it up very briefly by echoing Admiral Murray's view that the lessons learned review process has always been part of the basis of armed forces organization for a modern professional military force. The particular offices that carry out this work have been resourced very effectively in the last 10 years. Afghanistan is an issue that's tracked well. Perhaps one of the problems we have is that for the period of the 1990s, in which there were a great number of missions in a wide variety of places across the world, we know very little about those. We've remembered very little about those, partly because of a major demographic shift in the nature of personnel in the Canadian Forces. The people who were there on those missions have retired. We probably do need to make a major effort to undertake historical research on the nineties before the memories of those individuals who were there, like Admiral Murray, are lost.

[Brian Storseth, Conservative, Westlock—St. Paul, AB]

I have a question for you gentlemen on interoperability. Oftentimes when people talk about interoperability they think about other nations. For example, up at the air weapons range at Cold Lake there are always joint operations every year. One of the things I've learned in my relation with the forces is that interoperability within the CF itself is critical to maintain that high level of performance.

How good a job are we doing maintaining that? How big a role do some of our training facilities such as Wainwright, Cold Lake, and other training facilities...? How good a job are we doing overall when it comes to this?

[VAdm Larry Murray]

I'm no longer a member of the forces, but my observation would be that they have come an awfully long way. One of the things that was a little bit bemusing was around 1990, at the time of the Gulf War. We had been a unified force since 1968. People assumed we were joint and everything else, but in fact the three services had operated quite separately, generally, in the Cold War scenario. Other than at staff college or at the occasional training around a humanitarian relief operation, or whatever, we didn't meet each other.

It was really only in the nineties that we did start to become joint, and I would say that one of the fallouts that I mentioned earlier was that we learned a lot in the nineties. In fact, there is a great deal in the 1990s with the Canadian Forces, and the folks who are members of it can be extremely proud in terms of what was achieved in very difficult circumstances. But I would say in the sole area of joint post-September 11, the operations in Afghanistan, the operations in Libya, it's second nature now. It really is.

There is not the kind of...how would I say this? “Joint” used to be the afterthought. Now you'll find the commanders of the army, navy, and air force really working at being truly joint, and it is a challenge, actually. It's definitely a challenge, and we're probably not there yet in a technical sense, but they're certainly there in a procedural sense now. And they've done a lot of it in recent years.

So I would say that it will always be a work in progress, but we're in pretty good shape and continuing to make progress. That is my assessment from a little bit afar.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you. Your time has expired.

We're going to go to our third and final round, where each party gets one last five-minute question.

Mr. Kellway, you have the floor.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I wanted to return to my line of questioning around the issue of balance, if I can follow that from earlier.

We've had folks come before the committee—I should call them witnesses—to talk about those first four missions as no-fail missions, that whatever we do, we have to do that stuff and we can't be in the position to fail at any of that. But others have offered the opinion that 5 and 6 are really, in a sense, more discretionary, and it's a matter of policy, and the term about projecting your borders and how far one projects the borders of Canada around the world is really what determines whether we're going to have to be ready for those types of missions. If we're not projecting our borders around the world, that seems to me to impact this issue of balance, Admiral Murray. I was wondering if you could pick up on your thoughts about balance from where we left off. Others have even said we can't afford to be combat ready across all three elements of the forces.

You used the language that this isn't a hypothetical list. I guess I'm asking if it is an inevitable list, that we're going to have to be engaged in these kinds of battles. If it's not inevitable, then can't we look at our forces and think about balance differently, about having priorities, perhaps, between being combat ready in different elements of our forces?

[VAdm Larry Murray]

I think the only thing discretionary about the latter two missions is that it's up to the government of the day to decide whether or not to commit the Canadian Forces. I can't think of any government of ours that would want to be unable to respond to some kind of awful scenario on the international scene that required international multilateral engagement and would have to say, “Sorry, but we decided that we're not going to be able to do that, so we'll send money,” or something like that.

I think it comes down to our being a credible nation. Let's say Haiti had some potential for organized violence in addition to the earthquake. I don't think that a government in this country would last very long by failing to respond the way Canadians think Canada should respond in those kinds of situations.

In most places in the world today, when we send Canadian Forces in, there are bad actors in the vicinity who have high-tech weaponry and may even possess small submarines. Who knows? Committing the Canadian Forces abroad these days means they have to go with the ability to be combat capable.

Trying to decide whether you have an army or a navy or an air force is a mug's game. A look at the number and diversity of missions that a range of governments have committed the Canadian Forces to since 1989 leads me to conclude that the best approach is a balanced one, and that this must be adjusted on an ongoing basis if you find yourself in an Afghanistan or someplace like that. It would be wrong to put real options off the table so that Canada couldn't respond if it had to.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

Dr. Windsor, do you have any comments on that?

[Dr. Lee Windsor]

No, I agree completely.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

In this committee, we talk a lot about joint missions and the necessity to cooperate with allies, NATO and the rest. Does this issue affect your perspective on balance? Is it necessary to have fully combat-capable forces across all elements? We have an enormous shipbuilding exercise under way now. Can Canada's contribution be a niche contribution in multilateral efforts?

[VAdm Larry Murray]

I'm not suggesting for a minute that Canada should have aircraft carriers or that we need divisions of troops. We need the joint and special forces, though. They are essential capabilities. To some extent, the task is to try to figure out what are those credible, affordable niches?

The navy has ended up being a frigate, small-submarine navy. The army is not a division but has combat arms units and could get to a brigade, group, or division level if it really had to.

I'm not saying we're all things to all people and we have everything, but we have to have those five capabilities in order to put a credible response in place. We need to be able to respond to the possibility of leading an East Timor-type scenario, and that means you better not forget about the joint capability of the Kingston headquarters or your ability to inter-operate with nations of like minds. It's a challenge. It's an art, not a science.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. McKay.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses. You offer some very thoughtful comments.

Possibly one of the most significant strategic developments in the last few weeks and months has been President Obama's pivot towards the Pacific, and generally where the Americans pivot we will follow. If you put that within the context that a lot of our NATO partners are broke or near broke, if you put that in the context that, as Professor Bercuson said, the not broke member is Germany but they have a deeply held value of passiveness, and given President Putin's somewhat bellicose ways of late, it strikes me that we are going to almost necessarily be reorienting away from the Atlantic and more to the Pacific, and indeed up to and into the Arctic, for the foreseeable future.

If in fact that's a valid working premise, how do you see a study of readiness addressing that change in strategic reality and planning?

I was rather hoping the navy guy would go with that first.

[VAdm Larry Murray]

I think it's a really good question. Certainly it's something that the forces and I think Canada, at some level, have been struggling with for some time: what is the way to the Pacific? Certainly the navy was rebalanced with the Canadian patrol frigates, the submarines, to try to have a more significant naval presence on the west coast than we had previously, relative to the size of the nation. Because we are a Pacific nation, that's not new for Canada. So how do you strike that balance?

The Arctic question is an intriguing one as well because it's one where readiness in a Canadian context in the Arctic does mean the kinds of investments that are being talked about or implemented around naval patrol vessels and so on. But it also means that interdepartmental capability being maximized, which I spoke to earlier. The Canadian Coast Guard has a tremendous presence there, with seven ice-breakers up there every year, kind of on an ongoing basis. Are we maximizing that investment? We're certainly maximizing it from a scientific and other points of view, but are we maximizing it from the perspective of a Canadian sovereignty scenario? Are they doing enough hydrographic science and fisheries patrols? Is there a need for the RCMP as well? It cries out to some extent for kind of a whole-of-government approach big time. That, in my view, will be necessary as the naval and other capabilities of the Canadian Forces come into play. In other words, it's going to be essential to integrate those four to six arctic patrol vessels with the coast guard fleet.

I think the exercises that have been going on in recent years, on a very regular basis, and the significant presence of the government in the Arctic in the last while, are quite helpful in all of that. I think the Arctic part of the answer is a much more significant interdepartmental collaboration, cooperation, and working together in a meaningful way with the vehicles we have, which include vehicles that aren't all belonging to the Canadian Forces.