National Defence Committee on April 10th, 2014

[George Petrolekas]

I have one thing on that, and I'll let Ferry, obviously, go on this one.

When you were talking about security and whether we should be doing peacemaking, peace-building, or whatever the case might be, one of the no-fail missions for the Government of Canada and for the Canadian Forces is that if Canadians get into trouble overseas or if something breaks up, you will require us to go and do a non-combatant evacuation. Whether that be in Libya or whether that be in Syria or wherever that might be, that is something we have to do, and that is related to combat power and that is related to projecting force.

[Ferry de Kerckhove]

In fact, I was going to say, having done the Egyptian evacuation mandated by the Prime Minister and having sent half of my staff to Libya to do the evacuation of Canadians from Libya, I can tell you that I agree entirely. This is something that we have to have the capability to do. There have been a lot of lessons learned from the experiences in both Egypt and Libya, and we've managed to come out of it unscathed, but in terms of the effectiveness of how we did it, I have some solid questions. I will let the government respond to those.

You've covered a very wide waterfront. I think one of the big issues is, first of all, that the internal security of Canada in the broad defence and security sense is definitely through the defence perimeter with the United States. That's no question, and I think it remains a fundamental priority.

However, Canada cannot afford not to have what we refer to as an expeditionary capability. That's where some of the choices have to be made. For instance, we've been reasonably successful after the events in the Philippines with DART and all of that, but there are greater capabilities that have to be built around that.

As well, today peacekeeping has become increasingly somewhat of an older concept as opposed to peace-building—

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Norlock]

Sir, we'll have to wait until the next question, because we go over to Madam Michaud.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Thank you very much and congratulations on being elected as chair of this committee, Mr. Norlock.

I thank the witnesses for their presentations, which were very interesting. I greatly appreciated your comments on the military ship procurement process. I represent the riding of Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, right next to Quebec City. The Lévis shipyards were not included in that procurement process. So we were penalized as well.

I would like to talk a bit more about the delays in the military procurement process and on how prepared our Canadian Armed Forces are. You talked about one of the main risks for Canada in 2014. The first page of your report says: “Absent a better financial structure, the Canadian Armed Forces risk becoming limited to continental defence with reduced expeditionary capability”.

You started talking about the issue, but I would like you to elaborate on it, because we know that all three of our services have problems. I am referring to ships, army trucks and fighter jets, which have not been replaced yet and who knows when they will be.

Could you talk about the concrete impacts of all those delays on the military procurement process and the state of preparedness of our armed forces?

[Ferry de Kerckhove]

I think there is a fundamental issue. The more the procurement is delayed, the more expensive it will be for us to buy the equipment and the fewer resources we will have to prepare our forces, in terms of training, staffing and basic equipment. That is the tragedy. The more we wait to make major purchases, the less we will be able to train our people and make decisions. As George said earlier, how can we use our reservists? Our reserve force could be used much more effectively, which we have described in detail in our report. In fact, the reserve is one of the fundamental components of our defence capability. In my view, that is where the government's decisions are lacking.

Let us be clear. Decisions related to equipment spending are very difficult to manage around the world. There are always delays. However, I see that other countries seem to do a better job than we are. Take, for instance, France and Australia. I think they have a well-defined policy. Why is it effective and why is it more profitable when their resources are only slightly better than ours? Because they had white papers and in-depth studies that enabled them to make real choices. That is the shortcoming I criticize our government for.

[George Petrolekas]

I can give you two concrete examples.

This year, the number of flying hours for F-18 planes is being limited. I forget the exact number, but it is about 6,000 or 7,000 hours per plane. Since there is no specific date for the purchase of the new generation of fighters, we are trying to extend the lifespan of the existing F-18 planes. The only way to do so is to reduce the flying hours and to take the pressure off the planes themselves. As a result, we avoid manoeuvres under heavy acceleration.

Furthermore, the army has withdrawn approximately 50% of the B fleet, the support trucks, because there is no specific date for the purchase of new trucks. Fifty per cent of the trucks have been withdrawn, leaving only the other half in operation.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Thank you.

Based on your testimony and clarifications, my understanding is that the most significant recommendation that you would make to the government and that could be included in our report is that a white paper be produced and a strategy be determined quickly.

[Ferry de Kerckhove]

That is the first recommendation we listed. It is our first fundamental recommendation. It reiterates what we previously said last year.

[George Petrolekas]

Tell us what you want.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Thank you.

How much time do I still have, Mr. Chair?

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Norlock]

You have 15 seconds.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

I hope I will be able to ask you other questions. In 15 seconds, I will not be able to address the topics I would like to cover, but I thank you. The information was very complete.

[George Petrolekas]

As Mr. Harris said, perhaps next time.

[Ferry de Kerckhove]

Feel free to call on us any time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Norlock]

Thank you very much.

Go ahead, Mr. Daniel, for five minutes.

[Joe Daniel, Conservative, Don Valley East, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

I'm pleased to see that you're in the chair and we're not voting to do that. Thank you, witnesses, for being here.

My question is related to the Arctic. In your report on the strategic outlook for Canada, you indicated that Putin's 104-point foreign policy doctrine is a declaration of difference bent on establishing Russia as one of the influential and competitive poles of the modern world.

As Russia is an Arctic state, do you believe that Russia's recent foreign policy moves should be a cause for concern for Canada and Canada's interests in the Arctic? How do you think the CAF and the Government of Canada should be reacting in the Arctic?

[Ferry de Kerckhove]

First of all, with regard to this foreign policy document, I've served in Russia, so I know Russia and I still speak the language.

It only underscored what I had always thought, even when I was there. I can tell you that with regard to what happened in Crimea, I actually wrote—and it must have been classified at the time—that it was going to happen, but Yeltsin didn't do it, and he was very heavily criticized. Putin has seized the opportunity to do so.

There are some concerns over how far Russia will go, but there is no question that a man who deplores the downfall of the Soviet Union and is putting pressure at the frontier is trying to establish as much control as he can on the “stan” republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Turkmenistan, and the lot. It's a worry. It depends how you go about it, and if it's economic, but the way Putin does it is very worrisome.

Russia, in my view, in a perspective over the next five to ten years, will do more so because it is a waning power, and it's dangerous. It's a bit like a sun becoming a red star and in fact it multiplies its distance. I'm worried about that, because there is a sense that demographically and otherwise, other than its hydrocarbon capacity, it's not a full-service superpower. Because of that, I'm worried about its reaction, and I'm also worried about the Putin approach to it.

Suprisingly, I'm much less worried about the Arctic itself, because I think that's an area where there is no choice but to cooperate.

[Joe Daniel, Conservative, Don Valley East, ON]

Okay.

Are there any other comments?

[George Petrolekas]

I think Ferry has covered everything.

The only thing I would wish to add is that we have to be very careful how we encounter him. He's certainly played the best of a bad hand that he's been dealt.

The only thing I would ask all of you to consider is how we, as the west, respond. It has everything to do with how other nations will take our security guarantees in the future. I'm certain the Israelis are looking very carefully. I think the Chinese are looking very carefully. The value of our word and the value of our guarantees have much to do with what is to come.

[Joe Daniel, Conservative, Don Valley East, ON]

Okay. Thank you.

I'm still on the Arctic here a little bit.

Obviously the Arctic has huge natural resources that are available, and that aspect has to be an attraction to anybody to try to get into that position there.

Through the national shipbuilding procurement strategy, we will be making major investments in the Arctic, namely the Arctic offshore patrol ships. Do you feel this is an important investment for our Arctic capabilities?

[George Petrolekas]

There are a couple of things, and I'll let Ferry get in on this, too, obviously with the Russian stuff.

I do not think there is a military threat to the Arctic, even though there are natural resources there. There might be points of friction, but I don't think there is a military threat there. I believe I'd be quoting him accurately, but I think General Natynczyk once testified that if he ever got a phone call that there were Russians in the Arctic, it would probably be a phone call to send search and rescue, so let's not create a military gap in the Arctic that really doesn't exist.

There is an importance to whether those ships reside in the navy or in the Coast Guard. There is an importance of that investment to present Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, if for nothing else but to enforce our pollution regulations, to enforce the pristine nature of that place and not have it destroyed.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Norlock]

Thank you very much, sir. We'll have to cut you off there for later.

Go ahead, Monsieur Larose.

[Jean-François Larose, NDP, Repentigny, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations on your nomination.

Thank you to our witnesses.

I would also have about a million questions. I've read quite a bit on the future of G-Zero in international politics. My question is more about our ground defence and our sovereignty concerning reserves.

If we step back to before deployment in Afghanistan, we were already in a poor position of equipment and deployment. I've looked a lot at what goes on in the States with the governors and the relationships that they have on deployment, which is state forces, but also what replaces them and all the laws that exist.

How do you perceive the transformation of our reserves here? What direction could it take to be more efficient in procurement, equipment, deployment, and training, and what kind of impact would it have? On an international scale, before you answer all those questions, what is the perception in our relationship, on our disorganization? I'm sure we're not the only ones noticing that we don't have a white book on decisions, so that is projection?

[Ferry de Kerckhove]

I'll just speak on the perception, because I think George knows far more about the reserves, and we've made some very specific recommendations.

I talk to a lot of analysts from abroad, and they're perplexed. They're perplexed that a country of our size, a country of our importance and a country of our geography, is not a country that really does produce that kind of document.

We look at Australia, to which we compare ourselves very often. The Australians, I'm sorry to say, have it right. They have it right and they've had some trying choices. They've had some difficulty and all that, and they have really bitten the bullet. They've had a white paper. They've got a full defence policy and all that, and you know what? Thanks to that, they're much more effective.

People do ask us why our government, particularly with our huge geography and our presence and our past contribution, can't do that. That's the perception that they have outside. I can't change their perception until our government does it.

With regard to reserves, George, maybe you want to speak, because we've been very vocal on our reserve forces.

[George Petrolekas]

As you've read, obviously, the air defence of North America is primarily conducted by reserve squadrons in the United States, the Air National Guard squadrons. The primary disaster response resides in national guards, which are controlled by the states but can be federalized at any particular time. It is really political willpower at some point, and the history of this country of late has almost institutionalized a disrespect of the reserves. They are there when we need them, and they make up 20% of missions when we go overseas, but that roughly 24,000-person force, also equipped, could deliver far more effect in this country.

When we look at the United States as a comparison, the argument has always been why we can't do it. There's always an argument: we don't have enough money, we don't have enough troops, reservists don't have enough time to train, and so on and so forth. Well, we should turn that around, and instead of saying why we cannot adopt that model, we should just find a way that we can. That's actually political willpower, and it has to be driven into the department from outside.