A lot of this is highly classified, so they don't tell us academics.
But what I would say to you is that in the North American and the traditional NORAD aerospace warning assessment mission—integrated tactical warning and attack assessment—the primary mission, based upon by and large relying on American assets, is to take a look at that threat environment, the aerospace threat environment, and assess whether or not Canada or North America is under attack.
That information then is transmitted to the national command authorities. In the air world, the person who's in command of that mission is also in command of the air response. It operates through standard operating procedures that have been developed and honed over decades and decades.
The maritime warning, however, doesn't work that way, and this is one of the reasons why we're going to look at this. NORAD gets the picture from the United States, the American maritime domain awareness picture and a Canadian picture, and we think that it sort of puts it together into a North American picture and then makes an assessment.
Where, then, does the assessment go? Well, it should go to the national command authorities or the particular actors involved in the responses. But as for how that works relative to the Canadian Joint Operations Command, the American command, the unifying command structures that exist, the issues of the Coast Guard in the United States and the U.S. Navy and the 500-mile limit between the two, where the line is drawn—everything from the land out 500 miles is Coast Guard and everything beyond that is U.S. Navy—that is an open puzzle right now.