National Defence Committee on Nov. 18th, 2014

[VAdm Mark Norman]

I think that's a possible scenario. I'm not sure I would jump there yet. What I will say is we're already doing it. In fact, we have coast guard folks at sea with us in Operation Caribbe on occasion. We are aggressively exploiting the hospitality of the coast guard. We have officers deployed to the high north, the High Arctic, to get experience operating in ice. We have a really interesting initiative at a more basic level, in which we are co-crewing a number of rescue boats in 20-some stations across Canada, with coast guard and naval personnel working together side by side in the same crew. It is happening though maybe not to the extent that it could or should in the future.

What I was really leaning into was the fact that there are some great lessons and best practices to be learned with respect to how you maintain a platform that is forward deployed for a long period of time. I remind people regularly that forward deploying from Halifax to Nanisivik, which is where you then deploy from in the high north, is a farther deployment than is one from Halifax to Portsmouth, England, which people think of as being a long trip. There are some great opportunities for us to learn in terms of crew rotation and smaller crews. We're already practising some of that in our vessels today. We're looking at those lessons not just to look north but to look east, west, and south as well.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you.

Now for our third and final round, we go to five-minute slots, starting with Mr. Harris.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Chair.

I wonder if I could talk about the AOPS for a moment. I'm inspired by Mrs. Gallant's question about the Russian naval activity. Is the Canadian navy looking, from a strategic point of view, at engaging the Russians in a naval way in the Arctic, or, as we've been told by other officials of the Canadian government, do they not see a threat to Canada in the Arctic?

The corollary to that question is whether there is any role for the AOPS in such a scenario.

[VAdm Mark Norman]

AOPS is not being built or delivered to deal with the Russians. AOPS is being built to deal with our northern waters. Irrespective of any relationship we may have with partners in the Arctic Council, which includes Russia, or with anybody we may have disagreements with, including our neighbours with whom we occasionally have disagreements about territorial issues, the purpose of having a capability like AOPS is to have a naval presence in what is the largest maritime space in Canada. It is increasingly open to navigation. There is absolutely no question that it is a maritime theatre.

We see this as a strategic investment in the future of the north. In the same way that we continue to patrol east and west coasts, and we continue to engage our emerging partners in Central and South America, we see working with our partners in the Arctic Council. We see AOPS as a mechanism by which the government will exert sovereign control over Canadian maritime territory. We also see this as an additional tool in the government's tool box to help support the people of the north. As the north opens, it will bring a degree of security.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, sir. I think that covers the field.

Nanisivik was initially talked about as a naval station, but now its budget has been cut from $258 million to $116 million, essentially for refuelling for part of the year. How does that affect the ability of the AOPS to deliver a program in the north?

[VAdm Mark Norman]

The re-evaluation of the requirement for Nanisivik is a function of a variety of things, including ongoing development in that general area, which was not necessarily either predicted or known about at the time that Nanisivik was announced. There are other things going on up there that we can leverage, which don't necessarily require us to make the degree of investment we were initially looking at.

Obviously there are issues in terms of how much is enough with respect to the bare minimum capability. The navy had maintained that the minimum capability was to have a terrestrial refuelling capability, and anything beyond that would be nice.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

We're down to the minimum now.

In terms of the AOPS I understand there is something called the beartrap, which is another name of a helicopter haul-down rapid securing device invented in Canada, made in Canada, and used by other nations. But the AOPS won't be equipped with that for financial reasons, I'm told. Is that the case? Will that diminish the capability of the helicopter operating with the AOPS, particularly in some of the rough waters that Canada has?

[VAdm Mark Norman]

In answer to your specific question around the beartrap, that is a legacy system designed exclusively to support Sea King operations. The AOPS is not designed to support Sea King; it will be designed to support the Cyclone and other helicopters in the Canadian Forces inventory.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

You can't use that with a Cyclone can you?

[VAdm Mark Norman]

No. It uses a completely different arresting system and the new system is being engineered into the modernized frigates, which will be the first platform to operate the Cyclone.

But to your point specifically on AOPS, I want to address it because AOPS will be fitted with the next generation of arresting gear once that arresting gear has been fully engineered and tested. The first vessel will be fitted for the equipment and vessels two through six will be fitted with that equipment, based on the schedule that we have at the moment. Vessel one will be retrofitted with that new system once the engineering is finalized on what that new system is going to look like.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you.

Mr. Bezan.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Admiral Norman, I want to go back to what we were talking about in my previous line of questioning, which was dealing with the capability gaps and transitioning until the new vessels are in place. You talked about the human resources side and you talked about the Halifax-class frigates and the command-and-control structure that's capable in there. Could you finish off with the other classes of vessels and how we are moving forward in transition as well as the training?

[VAdm Mark Norman]

I was going to transition to the air defence capability of the destroyers, which I indicated. We've had significant enhancements built into the self-protection capability of the modernized Halifax class from an air defence perspective, significantly better than the Legacy class. In some ways it is more capable than the destroyers themselves with the exception of the missile system. We continue to operate the missile system in Athabaskan, which is the last remaining vessel of the class, so we'll keep that system alive.

As indicated in a previous response with respect to the replenishment gap, the options are on the table now to look at a variety of different approaches and the possibility of the combination of different approaches as we look at what I call smart scheduling through to the possible securing of a capability on the contractual or lease perspective from a key ally for a few months at a time. We could do this a few times over the next little while.

We're exploring some other options with industry potentially to look at how we can come up with a more sustainable, medium-term solution that would take us right through to the full operational capability of the Queenston class. That would be the early 2020s, probably 2021 or 2022, by the time we have the second ship and both ships are up and running. We'd be looking at something that might be able to bridge that gap completely. Those options are fairly well developed at this point. As I indicated, I am providing advice to the minister this week on some of those options and looking for direction with respect to how the government may want to proceed.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Thank you.

I want to follow up on some of the questions we had on national shipbuilding. We were talking quite extensively about the Arctic offshore patrol vessels. Can we talk about the new joint supply ships and their capabilities? Also when they come online and are seaworthy, how will the Canadian surface combatant stack up with other new modern vessels that you've seen from our allies around the world?

[VAdm Mark Norman]

I'm very conscious of time, so I am going to be as quick as I can.

I characterize the joint support ship and the legacy capability that it's replacing as floating Canadian Tires. They are floating Canadian Tires-plus, and what the new Queenstonclass is going to bring is the plus: the ability to replenish under way, to fuel both the ships and the helicopters, to provide ammunition supplies, and to deliver some humanitarian assistance, to embark people to supplement whatever type of mission we may have, and to be able to command and control forces ashore. There's a very modest capability to do that, but nonetheless it represents an incremental improvement over the legacy capability.

As it relates to the surface combatant, the way I would characterize it, if we look at the early discussions around requirements and design, would be as a hybrid of the traditional capabilities of a frigate and of a destroyer. We would look, in essence, at combining those two capability sets in a way that gives us a scalable and flexible response in a single platform. We would also add very robust war-fighting capabilities and also some of these incremental non-traditional, non-war-fighting—for operations other than war—capabilities, which, at the moment, are very difficult to deliver using our current legacy platforms. We see this as a vitally important capability that would provide real flexibility for government downstream.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you.

Finally, Ms. Murray, go ahead, please.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

I have four questions. I'm just going to whip them out so you can answer them and I won't take all the time asking them.

I do want to say though that given your statement on the critical importance of predictability in planning, the question I won't ask is what $10 billion in deliberate clawbacks to the capital budget and about 20% operating fund budget cuts compared with the defence strategy are doing to your ability to predict in planning, because I can guess the answer.

The four questions are these.

First, National Defence refused to give the Parliamentary Budget Officer a statement of operating requirements for the AOPS. Why is that?

Second, the AOPS were intended to be delivered already, starting last year. Now you've said it will be 2018 to 2025 given the delivery schedule. Could you update us on what the delivery schedule is expected to be currently and whether it will mean an increase in budget, a decrease in numbers, or a decrease in capability that will be delivered, as the PBO has identified the options?

Third, for the surface combatant project you were just talking about, there's been a seven-year delay. It was originally announced for delivery in 2012, and now it's 2019. I suppose that's just around the corner. The departmental performance report notes that a decision—an update—was anticipated for last month, but nothing was announced. Could you fill us in as to whether that's meant another delay in the schedule?

Fourth, I just want to build on the conversation about the supply ships. You yourself mentioned that replenishment capability is a big challenge. We're not able to depend on our allies because capacity is short there, so what is the plan to deal with this? Are you recommending that the government lease commercial or military vessels from other countries, as has been reported in the media?

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Mr. Chair, on a point of order, I'd just like to remind the committee again that we don't expect officials from the department or from the Canadian Armed Forces to comment on policy issues that might jeopardize their relationship with the minister. I believe if you look at page 1068 in chapter 20 of O'Brien and Bosc that is clearly laid out, and I suggest that you provide that type of direction to our witnesses.

I can't control what Ms. Murray wants to ask, but maybe she'd want to talk about why they went into a decade of darkness under the Liberals and saw GDP spending fall well under 1% and how they completely rusted out our entire navy, never mind the rest of the Canadian Armed Forces.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you.

Yes, Ms. Murray.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

On a point of order, Mr. Chair, I would like to point out that other members.... Mr. Norlock, for example, was asking the witnesses to make comments based on his questions about delivery of planes, of ground transportation, so I'm confident that my questions are about the naval program.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you.

I'm sure the witness is aware of the limitations on where he can go with his response, and I would invite him to follow that path.

[VAdm Mark Norman]

Ms. Murray, the good news, I guess, is that I can speak to three of your four questions.

Your first question is an issue of policy. Why the information requested by the Parliamentary Budget Officer was not provided is not in my purview to speak to.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Okay, thank you.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Out of order.

[VAdm Mark Norman]

As it relates to your questions around schedules, capabilities, capability trade-offs on the AOPS and CSC programs in particular, and then your follow-on question about the AOR gap, on the AOR gap I can't give you any more of an answer than I gave to Mr. Bezan. We're looking at a range of options. Some of them are more feasible than others. The advice to government has not yet been finalized, and I'm not really in a place to speak with any confidence as to what option may or may not be considered. We have a range of options, from basically scheduling as best we can to trying to work out a deal with our allies that can provide some short-term relief, up to and including the possibility of some commercial options that may be able to give us longer and more predictable access to a capability.

As it relates to the questions around the AOPS schedule, as I indicated, steel will be cut on ship one next summer or early fall on what are pre-production modules. Those modules would then be used to test the production systems of what is essentially an entirely new shipyard.