National Defence Committee on Dec. 4th, 2014

[Charles Doran]

Yes.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

You were mentioning that the maritime NORAD will be used to monitor ships, vessels, etc., on the surface.

I'm just asking you about submarines. You also mentioned China as a rising power, blue-fleet submarines. Going a little bit south of Bering Strait we arrive in the Pacific area where China is flexing its muscles in the Scarborough shoal, claiming islands in Japan, and building a significant submarine fleet.

We saw from experience in the Second World War that a U-boat came, and they were fixed on the St. Lawrence River right in the Atlantic. Now this is 60 or 70 years later.

Canada has one submarine on the Pacific coast on active duty. I don't know how many the Americans have, but the Chinese have 70.

How will maritime NORAD be capable of monitoring these creatures under the sea? I understand that you can monitor what is up on the surface. You can monitor the movements. But under the sea is a completely new story, a new element.

I know the United States has the key vote towards changing the interests of the people of the south, of the Pacific, but what does submarine warfare, let's say, bring to the equation in terms of threats?

[Charles Doran]

Well, I think you're absolutely right that submarine warfare is something that has to be studied very, very carefully. If you look at the history of both World War I and World War II, submarine warfare was a pretty central issue, although at the end of World War II it was countered pretty effectively with the technology that was available.

I would also point out two other things that generally support what you're saying. There are various techniques used on the seabed and so on from satellites to reinforce the work of maritime NORAD in observing what in fact is happening in these waters.

Also, China, as you said, has 70 submarines. Most of them are diesel submarines, which are very quiet, and they serve the purpose very effectively in the South China Sea and East China Sea, but they're not blue-water submarines. Once they begin to develop nuclear submarines with long-distance capabilities, blue-water capabilities, then, in fact, they are going to be a serious potential threat. I have no doubt that over time this will be an objective: to develop such submarines and, in fact, deploy some of them in the Arctic.

As we know, China has at least one icebreaker, which is pretty remarkable for a state that isn't directly on the Arctic. I think this is based on some reasonable concerns they have. They want to try to shorten transport times and so on from Europe to Asia, but they are also very interested in the resources, and ultimately, they're going to be very interested in the security situation.

I think it is very appropriate for you to introduce this into the discussion.

[Corneliu Chisu, Conservative, Pickering—Scarborough East, ON]

I have another question related to these two countries that I was discussing, Russia and China. What about the military cooperation that is starting to develop between these two powers? It's an uneasy cooperation, but we have seen signs of this, so it could be a future threat, a kind of Moscow-Beijing axis.

[Charles Doran]

There's no question that the so-called authoritarian states could in fact form an alliance, even a tight alliance, against the democracies. Such a development would be very bad. In fact, there's historical evidence that the same kind of thing, for example, preceded World War I.

Now, the initiative seems to be on the Russia side, because of the sanctions that have been used against it and because of, in fact, the response to its actions in Ukraine and Crimea and elsewhere. The Chinese are interested in access to Russian technology, the best weapons technology that the Russians have. That's kind of the trade-off. So far, I don't think we see a tight alliance relationship; rather we see discussion and coordination. That's something to be watched. If such an alliance were to emerge, I would say it would be a bellwether of difficult times ahead.

[The Vice-Chair, NDP, Jack Harris]

Thank you, sir.

Mr. Bezan, you have an opportunity to continue your discussion with our witnesses. You have five minutes.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I just want to point out that my friend and colleague Mr. Chisu not once today mentioned that he is a retired engineer with the Canadian army and that he knows these things.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

And he's the only member of Parliament to serve in Afghanistan.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

And he served in Afghanistan. That is true. He did.

Anyway, ladies and gentlemen, let's continue on in this talk. You talked about jointness, about having more collaboration and cooperation between Canada and the United States, especially in the realm of national defence and national security.

As you know, we've had one organization around even longer than NORAD, which is the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. They're meeting next week here in Ottawa. I'm hoping to be able to address them, unless votes on Monday night hold us in the chamber too long.

Can that organization be improved on? What other organizations or relationships are we talking about?

Professor Sands, in your opening comments you referred to having more jointness.

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

Yes, absolutely, sir.

I think one challenge is really bringing in the more civilian side of the security apparatus. That's where the intelligence may be. That's where the need for action may be. There has always been a cultural difference between military and civilian law enforcement. The attitudes are different. The closeness to the citizenry is different. I think that's going to be a difficult bridge to cross.

In the 1980s, when we began doing inter-service cooperation, there was such pride in the navy, such pride in the army, let alone the air force, that it was hard to bridge those cultural gaps. The way we did it was through a lot of joint exercises, a lot of joint training, and a lot of war-gaming. I think where we could do a lot is simply having people on both sides of the law enforcement and military divide in both countries, sort of a four-box matrix, begin working together in test exercises, getting to know each other, and developing some trust. The gear, the equipment, and all those things follow, but you need to do that.

Where governments have created the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the Military Coordination Commission, we have structures for this. With local law enforcement, at best we've been able to do integrated border enforcement teams, so we have a much weaker infrastructure there. There's a real opportunity to perhaps bring in, through fusion centres—we have set up a number of them—some of the military and civilian forces together to get them training, talking to each other, and understanding each other's cultures.

Maybe the bridge for that is going to end up being the border people. Many of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security border hires we've made since September 11 are veterans who have come from a military background and are now doing something more in the civilian space. They are people who understand both cultures. They could be a good bridge for us in trying to link these communities together.

[Charles Doran]

I agree that jointness is important.

I'm just going to say something that everybody on this committee knows so well, but I think it's important to remember. That is, inside NORAD there's a kind of cooperation in the offices on the watch that is unparalleled, as far as I know, between any two sovereign independent nations in the world. That's an extraordinary standard. The problem is to then try to translate some of that into other areas.

I would say that one thing we can do is help our friends inside NATO move in the same kind of direction so that the burden isn't just on Canada or on the United States in various interventions and so on. Now is a good time for this because the Europeans are beginning to see how much they've fallen behind in terms of their capabilities relative to some very real threats very close to them. If we can help them with interoperability, to use that famous word, we ourselves will in fact benefit from this.

I think NATO is really in need of some reinvigoration at this point.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

I have a final comment I'd like to leave you with and have you provide feedback on. You mentioned sequestration and reductions in defence spending in North America. Comparing it to the Russian increase of 18%, which brought them back up to about 4% of GDP—and President Putin made his comments earlier today in his address to the nation. However, he's saying they're going into difficult economic times. There were forecasts, even before that speech, showing that they'd fall back down to about 3.7% of GDP spending by 2016. I know that neither of you is a great expert on the Russia front, but with the weaker ruble and the falling oil prices, in your opinion, will that take some of the heat out of their aspirations for increased aggression, not only in Ukraine but in the Arctic as well?

[Charles Doran]

The argument is that economic sanctions will in fact constrain the Russians from meddling in places like Ukraine, Crimea, and Georgia. We all hope that is the case.

I would just say that there's another low possibility alternative that should worry us a great deal. Prior to World War II, the United States used sanctions very effectively against Imperial Japan with very bad results. What one needs to do is have a deterrent in place that is convincing and compelling, and then one needs to use economic sanctions as a further source of leverage. If one just relies on the economic sanctions and you don't have the deterrent in place, you can sometimes see some very bad results.

I trust that will not be the case with Russia in this instance, but it's something we have to be concerned about.

[The Vice-Chair, NDP, Jack Harris]

Thank you very much.

We now have completed two rounds. There seems to be time and if the witnesses are willing to do it, we'll have a final round of one from each party, for five minutes each, commencing with Mr. Brahmi of the New Democratic Party.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would now like to go back to the budget.

Professor Doran, you indicated at the beginning of your presentation that we should invest more in North American defence overall. Are there any practical examples of potential NORAD services or aspects that are already affected or might be affected by budget cuts, whether on the American side or the Canadian side?

[Charles Doran]

The tone of your question is that in fact there will be further cuts. I don't know whether that's true. That may be the case. I hope, and I'm sure you hope, that will not happen.

The real issue that you are raising is, how can we make use of the capability that we have now more effectively, and how can we add to that capability in the North American context?

I think that's a very central and very good question. It seems to me that one of the problems we're going to have is to figure out how to deal with the possible dispersion of weapons of mass destruction on shipping, for example, entering our ports. How can we in fact know about these kinds of problems in advance before they get to the coastlines and before they get to our ports? To do that kind of surveillance I am certain requires a considerable input of new technology.

I think there are areas of practical improvement that we could make in this NORAD context that would be helpful in a very concrete and convincing way to the citizens of both Canada and the United States.

[Tarik Brahmi, NDP, Saint-Jean, QC]

Professor Sands, in your opening remarks, I noticed that the second point that you stressed was the importance of expanding joint operations. In your view, the level of integration of the Canadian Forces and the American armed forces under NORAD is very effective.

I realize that this is not your reality, but if you put yourself in Canada's shoes, is there not a risk that Canada may well lose some of its sovereignty? There are two aspects, the materiel and the officers, which are increasingly integrated with the U.S. Given that those two aspects are more and more integrated into the North American defence, if a government did not want to participate in certain operations, would there not be a risk for Canada of losing its sovereignty? Could telling our American friends that we do not want to participate in such and such an operation pose a problem? The government may change and have a different position on Canada's involvement abroad, particularly in the Middle East.

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

Absolutely. One of the things that we've seen over the history of NORAD is Canada's ability to say no. We saw it with regard to missile defence, which was discussed earlier. Canada chose not to incorporate that. Many people, including many people we both know, said it might be the death of NORAD if Canada didn't participate in ballistic missile defence. The threat and warning systems wouldn't be as valuable and we would have to wrap up NORAD. Yet we didn't. In fact, Canada was able to say no.

We've seen Canada being able to say no to missions in Iraq, but say yes to Afghanistan, and no to Vietnam. Even in the case of the Bomarc missile crisis, Canada said yes to a missile, and then had second thoughts because of the nuclear tips, and we worked that out. I think there's a great respect in the U.S. for Canadian sovereignty, for Canada's ability to say no. I think there's an expectation of courtesy and consultation because we are, after all, supposed to be friends. But within that context I don't think jointness necessarily prohibits your ability to act independently. But that is often raised, and I do understand the sensitivity.

[Charles Doran]

Could I just add a quick footnote.

This word “sovereignty” is a big word. It's used in many contexts. But what I think Canadians ought to understand is that while they have an absolutely legitimate concern about their sovereignty and their independence, essentially because they're the smaller partner, what they must realize is that there are groups in the United States, powerful politically, who raise serious questions about loss of sovereignty in dealing with Canada. So this issue in fact runs in both directions. What is remarkable is how the two governments have been able, while respecting the preferences of citizens on both sides of the border, to do what practically is necessary to have jointness. I think that's what we need to keep working on.

[The Vice-Chair, NDP, Jack Harris]

Thank you, sir. That's an interesting insight.

We have Mr. Williamson now for the Progressive...oh, I thought I saw “Progressive Conservative Party”, but no, it's the Conservative Party.

[Some hon. members]

Oh, oh!

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

You're dating yourself, Chair.

[Some hon. members]

Oh, oh!

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Dr. Doran, I shall follow up on comments you made with respect to Russia and sanctions, which I thought were very interesting. You also raised the question of deterrence. What do you have in mind there? I ask this because of course we've had sanctions in place, and I think the west—Canada and the U.S. in particular, and Europeans as well—have taken a tough line on what has happened there. But we've also seen a commercial airliner blown out of the skies with really no repercussions. If a state is prepared to do that and gets away with it, I'm curious to get a sense of what you might have in mind, because I think you're on to something. If you have a sanction that could result in a backlash or aggressive action, you need to think ahead and prepare for it.

Could you expand on your thoughts a little bit?