National Defence Committee on Dec. 4th, 2014

[Charles Doran]

Thank you very much for the question.

It is certainly the case that deterrence, everything considered and expensive as it is, is a lot cheaper than defence, and defence is a lot cheaper than trying to get a force out of a territory that has been occupied, such as that in Crimea.

As we look at specifics, and that's what you invited us to do here—as we look at the security, for example, of the Baltic republics and of Poland, both members of NATO—this issue that you raise is becoming very central. It's one thing to have a few troops who are available and who can be moved. As recently as this week, the Europeans have decided that they will get together a multilateral force of, I think, 3,000 troops. But what is so striking is how rapidly the Russians moved 20,000 to 40,000 troops to their border. They have a geopolitical advantage there.

There's another issue. What about heavy capability to back up the troops? If you have a heavy capability in place, it is a very effective deterrent, because no other actor would want to mess with that. But if that capability is not in place and the potential aggressor can move such a capability in very fast, I think we'd have problems on the eastern frontier.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

How much of that—?

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

Mr. Williamson—

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

Go ahead, please.

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

I was just going to share an anecdote. I was at a conference talking about energy and Ukraine, and one of the gentlemen in the room raised the question, what would Eisenhower do? He speculated that if Eisenhower were president he would build a liquefied natural gas export facility at Naval Station Norfolk with no permitting, just moving very quickly. He would make the announcement, and the Russians would understand that we were doing more than going after their banks; we were going to put in place the serious capabilities to help our friends.

I think sometimes the gesture is underestimated. Exactly as Professor Doran says, deterrence has to have a real meaning for people. I think we fail to send the right signals on consequences, not necessarily violent signals, but we have to send the right signals to people such as the Russians, who won't understand anything else.

[John Williamson, Conservative, New Brunswick Southwest, NB]

I think you're both absolutely right. It has struck me that we have not done enough in Europe both to highlight the seriousness of what Russia has done but also to prepare for the eventuality that they do more. It has been heartening to see that Europeans are now looking at Canadian oil more favourably. The Europeans were set to classify oil from the oil sands as being a dirty fuel that they would move away from, but in light of the situation in Ukraine, they reversed on that.

This brings me to Keystone. I believe Republicans favour it. When we have a new president in the White House from either party—let's hope from the Democrats—where is the leadership thinking going post-President Obama on Keystone?

[Charles Doran]

Well, this is a highly political issue and I respect very much the differing perspectives that governments and parties have on the environment versus energy. But as you may know from a footnote in my document, I debated down here the Keystone pipeline and I was in favour of Keystone against a very good lobbyist who was very prepared on the other side.

I think the time for Keystone has come, and I say that because of the changes in the leadership in the Congress and in the Senate. But I think what is also at issue here is that the whole set of discussions are becoming very complex. With the drop in oil prices, however long term that is going to be, that adds a new set of issues. With the question of what's going to happen to the technology in shale oil and gas, I must say that I recently became aware of some of the new work that's being done in Alberta in terms of mapping out the potential and so on. The potential is gargantuan there.

[The Vice-Chair, NDP, Jack Harris]

Could you wind that up, please, sir.

[Charles Doran]

I would say that the Keystone issues ought to lead to the right decision, which is passage of the Keystone pipeline.

[The Vice-Chair, NDP, Jack Harris]

Thank you, Professor Doran.

We now have, as the final questioner, Mr. John McCallum, on behalf of the Liberal Party.

[John McCallum, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

I just want to say that I certainly think Canada can work together with the U.S. militarily without losing sovereignty, because I think in the big cases of Vietnam and Iraq we didn't suffer any negative economic or other repercussions from saying no.

What I'd like to focus on is related to what you were talking about earlier, and that's the eastern front, or the Baltic states. One thing that would concern me is that the next front for Putin might be the Baltic states. The critical difference between them and Ukraine, of course, is that they're members of NATO and Ukraine isn't. That means there is the potential for article 5...and a NATO member to be attacked. I would think that if they did move in that direction, they'd do it subtly. It wouldn't be an all-out military invasion, but they could gradually assist the Russian-speaking people in parts of the Baltic states, and perhaps have some fake referendums, a little like Ukraine, and then it could fester.

I have two concerns over that. I'd like your assessment as to how important this is on two fronts. First, any potential direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO is inherently dangerous, obviously. Second, you were talking about how nimble Russia was in moving large numbers to Ukraine. I remember from 10 years ago, NATO was anything but nimble. There was talk of a big, rapid deployment force, but the ratio of tooth to tail was very low, and it was quite sclerotic. Maybe it's better now, but one of you said that NATO needs to be revitalized today.

I guess my concern is, first, the inherent risk of a confrontation with the world's other superpower, and militarily, nuclear, and second, the relative ability of NATO to act quickly versus what Russia has shown.

[Charles Doran]

I think, sir, you have summarized the nature of the dilemma there. The dilemma is that we should use deterrents more effectively, but to be able to do that we have to believe in our own defence, because you have to believe in defensive capability. The problem is that the United States has shouldered the greatest proportion of the burden over the years, but the United States is also very distracted in the Middle East, and I must say in Asia, as is Canada.

The real problem at this point seems to be how you get a convincing capability to the eastern front. Particularly in Poland, that means a heavy capability. The Poles are certainly aware of this problem, and the difficulty with the Baltic republics I think is even graver.

The issue to some degree is that the people who live in the area have to be the first to be concerned. They ought to be the ones coming to us to ask us to assist them after they have done as much as they can to help themselves.

I just attended a conference there titled “The Power of the Powerless Revisited”. I had to say to my European friends that they are not powerless; they are as rich and populous as any area in the world and they can spend more on military capability. If they do that, or if they use that capability more efficiently and more effectively, they could face down Putin as well.

So there's a problem here of who goes first, sequencing, as well as overall capability in place. At the end of the day, it probably doesn't matter because we need the capability in a convincing way, placed where it will act as a plausible deterrent. I don't think we have that at this point.

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

I would just add two things very briefly. First, three years ago we saw Estonia attacked by the Russians in the largest cyber-attack we've ever seen. This led NATO to establish a cyber-defence centre in Estonia. So we may not see a military attack. We may see a cyber-attack. The Russians will be creative, and we have to be prepared for that.

Second, since Ukraine we've seen the Government of Finland as well as the Government of Sweden reach out to NATO and talk about whether it would be possible for them to join an accession track. I think showing an interest in their interest, as Professor Doran says, should send a signal to Moscow that would be very useful. They are good allies potentially, good NATO members, and having them positioned right near the Baltics would be very helpful in the event that it came to blows.

[The Vice-Chair, NDP, Jack Harris]

Thank you very much.

I think we have finished all the rounds of questions, but we do have a little tradition here that the chair has the prerogative to ask a question if he wishes. I'll ask a general question.

Recently Ms. Gallant and I were in The Hague for a NATO parliamentary association, and we talked about the post-Wales discussion about arms spending. I had occasion to look at some of the absolute numbers for defence spending and discovered that the Russian budget, even though it has increased, the spending by the Russians on defence is about the equivalent of the total of Italy plus France, or Italy plus Germany, which granted is increasing quickly by the number you used.

I also was reflecting on a comment made by an analyst scholar to another PA meeting in Vilnius who said in talking about Russia and China that Russia was now a regional power acting as if it were a world power and that China was a world power acting as if it were a regional power.

Do any of those comments make any difference to your analysis? Obviously we are dealing with actors who are acting opposed to their relative strength. Would you care to comment on those observations?

[Charles Doran]

I'm very grateful, Mr. Chairman, that you brought up this issue of what I would call status. Status is back in international politics in a big way. Much of what Putin seems to be concerned about is status. For that reason, I would say it would be very wise for us not to stress that Russia is a regional power. It's a great power. It has a huge territory; it has enormous resources, and it has second-strike nuclear capability. That's enough for me. It's a great power, and let's treat it that way. But also let's urge that it assume its responsibilities in a serious way.

China is unfortunately, in my view, a country that is a growing or a nascent great power, but it has no region. It is in the centre of the new big power system, with Japan and Russia nearby and India coming up on the outskirts of the system. Half of the world's oil and so on is moving through those waters. All of us use those waters, and so the problem for China is it doesn't really have a region. It's in the centre of the system. It's going to have to adjust to that in some fashion. I noticed in the last week that its verbiage has changed—it has improved to my way of thinking—but we still don't know what that means for its actions in those areas.

One last thing, one of the problems for both of these states is that they would like to create spheres of influence. Spheres of influence are not compatible with the understanding of a liberal trade and political system. They're incompatible with it, so this issue of emerging spheres of influence is something that we have to discuss with them. We have to have a conversation about this and to make clear what our position is as democracies and defending the liberal and political trade order.

[Dr. Christopher Sands]

Mr. Chairman, I would just add very briefly, that it is really hard to compare dollars for dollars. When we talk about percentage of GDP and the NATO targets for at least spending 2% of GDP, one of the advantages that Italy, France, but especially a country like Canada, have is a good solid GDP and one that's been growing. Canada's figure would look much better if its economy were weaker, but thank goodness the economy is very strong. Russian numbers as per cent of GDP are impressive, but that GDP itself is not as impressive. While you can't necessarily compare dollars to force capabilities in a direct sense, that gives us some comfort that we can close the gap if we have the resolve to do so.

[The Vice-Chair, NDP, Jack Harris]

On those remarks, I want to, on behalf of the committee, thank you so much for taking the time to join us and for sharing your insights and expertise.

Professor Doran and Professor Sands, thank you for joining us. Your insights have been particularly useful to the committee.

Having said that, I'll ask for a motion for adjournment.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

I so move.

[The Vice-Chair, NDP, Jack Harris]

Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.