Of course, Rob paints an interesting picture of Russians sort of bristling with these new investments, these new subs. When were the keels laid for those subs? It was in the late 1990s for some of them. It's taken a long time for them to realize a very modest fragment of a recapitalization program and their northern fleet is still a tiny shadow of its former self during the Cold War.
So all of this incredible growth as you're describing in terms of budgets is also mirrored in terms of their capital assets. The Russians are a shadow of their former self. In some ways I'm more concerned if Russians do nothing, because in the absence of feeling like they can defend themselves, they might take brash actions for fear that they're going to be vulnerable.
In essence, modest Russian defensive capabilities that stabilize the situation and give them the confidence that they have an effective deterrent is not antithetical to the presentation I'm making to say that the Arctic is on a trajectory and has been since the end of the Cold War towards greater peace. In fact, the Russians undertaking modest investments in defence, if that appeals to a domestic audience in Russia, can lead to the desired end state of a stable, secure Arctic and circumpolar world.
Frédéric Lasserre wrote a very interesting article with a colleague that appeared in the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies a few years ago where he belies the myth that Rob is suggesting to us of an Arctic arms race. He traces when a lot of the Russian announcements were made to show that a lot of their real capital investments were announced long before the Arctic racheted up in terms of its international profile. So, in essence, questioning this whole idea of an arms race is something I think is very much open for discussion or debate.