I would agree with you that those sets of procurements you outlined were successes, but I think the important thing is to look at those and look at exactly what lessons you can take away.
Regarding the first two for airlift, I would argue, as would most of the people you talked to about this, that those are relatively unique, because those were requirements for which there were very few actual suppliers, and given the timelines as well as the ongoing operational imperative in Afghanistan, we didn't really have that many options. So I wouldn't look to those in particular as being a model you could replicate in very many other places.
The C-17s are probably the only pieces of major military equipment that Canada has legitimately bought, and ever will buy, off the shelf, because we usually make modifications.
The second batch for Afghanistan was also very successful, but I think that was very much driven by the wartime imperative. Essentially the defence requirement, almost explicitly, and no other consideration besides fielding equipment as quickly as possible, delivering it immediately to troops in need, was the only driving factor.
After all of those procurements that you mentioned happened, there was sort of a reaction within the rest of the bureaucracy such that, for very good reasons, the normal departmental imperatives at Public Works or Industry Canada were not followed through on. Now we're seeing a sort of recalibration such that considerations beyond purely defence issues are now exerting more influence over the system, which is part of the dynamic.
What was your question about shipbuilding?