National Defence Committee on March 9th, 2015

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

Thank you.

I assume that the delays in the delivery of Arctic and Coast Guard offshore patrol ships have repercussions on Canada's capacity to provide information in the case of maritime warnings.

Can you tell us about those potential repercussions?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

Are you asking about the impacts of having provided maritime warning?

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

No. I am talking about the potential repercussions of delays in the delivery of Arctic and Coast Guard offshore patrol vessels on Canada's capacity to participate fully in NORAD operations when it comes to issues like maritime warnings.

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

In the maritime domain we don't really suffer big delays, because the ships travel fairly slowly, so we have the time to connect, collaborate, and process the information with more time than the air domain does, where things travel much faster. The delays I'm talking about in my testimony here have not significantly hampered the operations.

[Élaine Michaud, NDP, Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier, QC]

That's not quite what my question was about. I think there was a problem with the simultaneous interpretation, but I will move on to something else.

The Canadian and U.S. governments are currently conducting an analysis on the future of NORAD to identify threats and challenges facing the two countries. Can you give us more details on the timeline and the findings of that analysis to date?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

I think I understood your question perfectly this time.

The NORAD strategic review was completed in December. General Jacoby signed it on December 3, and it was sent to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Currently, the Department of National Defence in Canada and the Department of Defense in the U.S. are analyzing our recommendations, and now the ball is in their court as to where NORAD will go with it.

The aim of the exercise was really to institutionalize NORAD in its own right so that we can enunciate risks and issues and then help our two governments decide how they want to mitigate those risks.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you.

Mr. Bezan, go ahead for five minutes, please.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

General Parent, it's good to see you again. I appreciate the time we got to spend down in Colorado Springs with you and General Jacoby and I also appreciate the hospitality. Unfortunately, since that time two years ago, our committee has changed quite a bit and only a couple of us who got to go on that tour and have those very informative briefings are still here.

In your opening comments you mentioned North Korea and the possibility of it having ballistic missiles now that it's had a successful space launch. When we were in Colorado Springs, there was a simulation of the United States defending against a ballistic missile. As things seem to be changing with North Korea and other state and non-state players and with weapons of mass destruction, how are all of those things challenging North American airspace and how do they affect NORAD? Can you talk to how, for a Canadian commander in NORAD headquarters, things play out when the U.S. decides to implement or needs to implement ballistic missile defence?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

Thank you for your question, sir. It's good to see you again as well.

There are various stages in a ballistic missile engagement. The first stage is the intelligence and warning, or the indicators and warning. When a cycle of provocation is initiated, at the onset I may or may not be in the room for those discussions if it will involve ballistic missile defence. It's very much dependent on how the theatre in charge of North Korea, the Pacific command, decides to disseminate the information as releasable to its allies or as U.S.-only information.

Once a missile is launched, the missile warning mission is done by NORAD. The missile is launched and we have infrared signature from that missile. NORAD processes that missile. I'm fully involved and the NORAD personnel are fully involved. Once it gets into outer space and the object is cold and can be engaged by ballistic missile defence, we will not leave the room. We will still be involved by virtue of doing the missile warning, but we have no voice in the deliberations, the tactics, or on the decision cycle to engage or not engage that missile. USNORTHCOM does that engagement.

Once the engagement is done, if it passes.... The only way to figure out if it's a success or a failure is in the detection. If there is no re-entry of these objects detected, then it's probably a success. If there's a re-entry, it's for NORAD to characterize all re-entries back into the atmosphere, and then the NORAD chain of command is involved again. If it's armed with a nuclear weapon, NORAD again is in charge of disseminating and processing nuclear detonation worldwide. There is a change in the chain, in what we call the kill chain of that ballistic missile, between NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and back to NORAD.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

What type of timeframe are we talking about when those decisions have to be made?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

Minutes.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Let's say that North Korea, or Iran, or some other state player has launched a missile towards the North American continent. What's the probability of it coming through Canadian airspace?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

First of all, on its capability and intent, by launching a three-stage rocket, they have demonstrated the capability of touching pretty much anywhere in North America. As far as intent goes, North Korea is seen as an unpredictable regime. We have very little information on its intent.

I think I missed the last part.... Yes, on travelling towards Canada, most trajectories overfly Canadian territory in coming from North Korea.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Okay.

How much time do I have?

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Be very brief, please, Mr. Bezan.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Just for clarification, when NORAD headquarters is fully staffed, what percentage of the personnel is Canadian and what percentage is American on any given shift?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

In a command centre?

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

Yes.

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

I would say generally about 25%.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake, MB]

They're Canadian?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

Yes, Canadian. We have personnel in all domains except at the ballistic missile defence domain.

[The Chair, Conservative, Peter Kent]

Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Bezan.

Mr. Harris, I believe you wanted to be given these five minutes.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Yes, I'll have a question and then I'll pass it on to Mr. Brahmi.

On the BMD front, General, we're hearing all sorts of information about the intentions and otherwise of dealing with Iran as a potential nuclear threat. The Israeli leadership thinks that allowing them to develop that should be pre-empted, potentially militarily. The American government, of course, is dealing with it in diplomatic terms at the moment. I see that as obviously taking the threat seriously. I don't hear anything about Korea and North Korea, but I don't seriously think that the United States would allow North Korea to actually become one and have the capacity to effectively deliver a system of this nature.

Is any of that taken into your consideration or deliberations, or are you not party to any of that discussion either?

[LGen J.A.J. Parent]

What I'm inferring from your question is whether or not the system is effective against North Korea.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

That's another question, and I know there's evidence to suggest that is the case.

I'm just asking whether you seriously believe that the American government would allow Korea to actually have the capability to be a threat, given the instability of the government.