Public Accounts Committee on March 30th, 2010

[LGen A. Leslie]

We all learn; we are all learning organizations. The intensity of the violence in Kandahar was unexpected.

Speaking of the RG-31, we will eventually have 75 of these vehicles in total. It is designed to replace some of the much more thinly metalled, not armoured, vehicles that we've been using for patrols and moving around some of our great friends from the civil service. It has saved a large number of lives. It was rushed into service without adequate training done in Canada, because people such as me made the decision that it was better to get it into theatre where it could resist the IEDs and blasts, and we'd catch up with training at a later date.

As for the actual number of lives it's saved, I could research that question, but of course it becomes, at a certain point, an educated guess. Nonetheless, it's literally in the multiple dozens, and I have not included the numbers of wounded we might otherwise have suffered—keeping in mind we have still suffered hundreds of soldiers wounded in that timeframe.

The light armoured remote weapon station, the LAV RWS, took a bit longer. In any land system the huge issue is the balance between firepower, mobility, and protection. In this case, of course, protection came to the fore and the LAV exceeded its weight budget, so a variety of engineering studies had to be done before it could be implemented.

The Leopard 2 tank has saved innumerable lives, and its main role now, as mentioned by the deputy minister and the ADM of materiel, is to take the hit. It goes down the road first, receives the blast, and, at the moment of truth, can assist our soldiers by firing on their objective with its main gun.

Of course, the armoured heavy support truck is probably the second most heavily protected vehicle in theatre, and arguably the most protected truck in the world in comparison with more lightly skinned logistics vehicles, in which we've had tragedies. We have yet to have a fatality in the armoured heavy truck, even though it's taken innumerable hits from IEDs and direct fire.

Does that summarize the issues, sir?

[Andrew Saxton, Conservative, North Vancouver, BC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you, Mr. Saxton.

That, colleagues, concludes the first round. We're going to go to the second round of five minutes each.

Ms. Dhalla, I understand you're going to be sharing with Monsieur Dion.

Ms. Dhalla.

[Ruby Dhalla, Liberal, Brampton—Springdale, ON]

I just wanted to say, first of all, thank you so much for coming before the committee. It's my first time here because I'm replacing Mr. Lee.

On the weekend, I had a chance to attend a deployment ceremony for 23 soldiers going to Afghanistan from my constituency of Brampton. They were quite excited, and as the lieutenant said, I think are looking forward to serving our nation and ensuring that the values we cherish and hold dearly are going to be upheld in Afghanistan.

In paragraph 5.48 of her report, the Auditor General recommended that both Public Works and National Defence examine some of the lessons learned in contracting, both for urgent operational requirements—which I believe Mr. Guimont touched upon—and the regular procurement process, to which they could be applied.

In its response, DND said it would have a full model up and running by March 31, which is tomorrow. I want to get a sense from the officials from National Defence and Public Works where you're at with that commitment made in the response to the Auditor General. What progress has been made?

The second question I want to raise is regarding some of the concerns that many Canadians have expressed with respect to another urgent situation that our country has faced, and that is Haiti. Have some of the lessons that have been learned, as identified by the Auditor General, been implemented by the Department of Defence in moving forward on the procurement contracts for Haiti?

Thank you.

[Robert Fonberg]

Thank you for those questions.

Let me just quickly begin with Haiti, and the general may want to make a comment on this. It's a very different kind of operation. Arguably, we were stood in very good stead by virtue of the procurements that had been made earlier in the decade, particularly the strategic lift aircraft that we had available, but also the ability of the Canadian Forces to deploy literally in a matter of hours. Within about 16 hours—and you probably know the numbers directly—we had Hercules tactical airlift in the air, on the way to Haiti. We had two ships in the water within days. You know those statistics. It wasn't so much that there were lessons learned about the procurement process around Haiti, in my view, although there were lessons absolutely learned around whole of government and how we work together to deal with humanitarian disasters or disaster relief, for sure.

My other colleagues may want to say something about that.

On the first question of the model being fully implemented by March 31--the action plan that we sent to the chairman and to the committee members through the chairman yesterday, I believe--the original recommendation was to have the lessons learned fully examined around the OR issue. We had hoped to have had that done by March 31. Tomorrow is March 31. We are now looking at a completion date in the revised plan, which has been tabled with you--April 30--to have that kind of review totally done. But in order to complete the review cycle and renewal of our project approval guide, we are looking still at about two years out to have that completely done.

Dan, I don't know if you want to say anything about the interim side of that process.

[Dan Ross]

Thank you.

I have just a couple of other comments. We have process modelled internally in DND and largely completed the portion with Public Works, everything right from the concept of a requirement that even may require some research and development right through to disposal, and we are looking at where we have excessive processes and long approval stages and so on. In fact, I don't think the department had ever done, in the last 10 to 15 years, the compendium in terms of rules and policies and regulations from a Public Works side, a Treasury Board side, and an internal departmental side. That is actually a very interesting piece of work.

In terms of the OR thing specifically, the vice-chief of staff has issued interim guidance and intends to brief the program management board in December. That will inform a broader review of these administrative processes within National Defence to move capital programs from beginning to end. So we're looking toward a significant report back in December, and, as the deputy said, within two years redesign it all and really have a fresh look at it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you very much, Ms. Dhalla.

We're going to go to Mr. Young.

[Terence Young, Conservative, Oakville, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

In Madam Fraser's report, the word “urgent” or “urgency”, or words around that, appear three times, and then in your report, Mr. Fonberg, you talk about timeliness. Obviously, we are talking about getting the right equipment without paying too much, with urgent speed. That's the key.

I look at this chart on page 24 of the report and it says the armoured patrol vehicle took five months from government approval to first vehicle being available in the field, and then the Leopard C2 tank took seven months, the armoured heavy support vehicle system took 16 months, and the light armoured vehicle remote weapons station took 32 months.

My question is this. How much additional time is time that you are looking at manuals and meeting with people from the manufacturers and kicking tires and making an administrative decision to decide you have the right equipment? What percentage of these figures should be added on for actual decision-making time, once you have made a decision in the field that you have a need?

Mr. Fonberg.

[Robert Fonberg]

Let me turn to my two colleagues. General Leslie started with these requirements processes often beginning with a tragedy. Let me just ask him to connect directly with my ADM Materiel, who will explain...that works for you.

[Terence Young, Conservative, Oakville, ON]

I'm talking about from the time you decide in the field you need new equipment to survive until you sign a purchase order, how much time does that take?

[Robert Fonberg]

Again, if the general sits down with his colleagues and decides there's a piece of equipment that will actually address or mitigate the risks we're facing in the field, and we ask him how quickly that gets into a discussion with ADM Materiel, how quickly the various options are identified, how quickly we work with our colleagues on a procurement process....

Do you want to just fill in that space?

[Dan Ross]

Perhaps I could start, Mr. Chairman, by taking an example of the armoured patrol vehicle, the RG-31. The vice-chief, and in fact the chief of program, had stated that as a key requirement, I believe, in December 2004, and we were at DND approval by August, contract award by October, and first delivery by March the following year. And that involved production, actually.

[Terence Young, Conservative, Oakville, ON]

So the decision-making process took nine months.

[Dan Ross]

It was about five to six months, including what's in the market, price and availability, both informally and formally.

[Terence Young, Conservative, Oakville, ON]

Okay, so you're working on a new fast-track procurement process, is that correct?

[Dan Ross]

That's right.

[Terence Young, Conservative, Oakville, ON]

You're in the middle of that. Did I hear you say it was going to be ready in two years, or was that something else?

[Dan Ross]

Actually, I said, sir, that we would brief our program management board in December this year.

[Terence Young, Conservative, Oakville, ON]

You don't have your process in place yet?

[Dan Ross]

We have an interim process in place.

[Terence Young, Conservative, Oakville, ON]

Okay. Did you find any methods or processes for urgent procurement available from any of our allies, a better process that shortens the administrative time to get the equipment in field faster, or did you just create your own?

[Dan Ross]

We're quite familiar with the British and the American processes. The British actually are slower; the Americans occasionally are faster. Mr. Gates has done some things for what they call the MRAP program that have been incredibly fast. He took an executive decision and directed large amounts of money to be done without competition, because they actually went out and bought mine-resistant vehicles from everybody. They just went and did it. That is extraordinary. They didn't require a competition because there wasn't consideration of which one had a better price or better vehicle; they were buying them all. But that's quite unusual.

I think our process here and what we achieved here is as good or better than anyone's.

[Terence Young, Conservative, Oakville, ON]

Moving forward, do you have a model that will allow you to shorten that time while still not paying too much and getting the right equipment? I'm just concerned with things sitting in people's in-boxes and out-boxes, and meetings, and all this stuff going on while troops are dying in the field. So for faster decisions that are the right decisions, do you have a model going forward, or are you working on one?

[Robert Fonberg]

If I can just say quickly, Mr. Chairman, we're absolutely working on it. I want to make sure that we don't leave a sense that the time and the process are necessarily because things are sitting in somebody's in-basket. Time actually is important often to get the challenge function right, to make sure we're getting value for money, and we're working together with our colleagues to ensure this, that whatever time actually is taken in the process it is time spent efficiently, time spent effectively. So waste of time or non-constructive time we're absolutely trying to take out of the process.

[The Chair, Liberal, Shawn Murphy]

Thank you very much, Mr. Young.

Back to Madame Faille, pour cinq minutes.