Public Safety Committee on May 17th, 2022

[Paul Chiang, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Thank you so much.

An article was published on CIGI's website on May 16 recommending that states “adopt national policies to defend against threats to space-based assets and applications” that are vital to national security, “such as communication satellites”.

What recommendation do you have for this committee related to the protection of space-based applications?

[Aaron Shull]

It's much of the same, right? We need to put a national strategy in place. The issue is that most countries don't possess kinetic forces that can hit satellites. Even fewer possess forces that can hit satellite to satellite. What it means is that, practically, we're going to be using cyber-capabilities to mess with each other's satellites. There is a large gap there in terms of the governance and the application of the law. Most international law applicable to space was written in the sixties and seventies. The world is different.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much.

I would now like to invite Ms. Michaud to begin her six-minute slot of questions.

It's over to you, Ms. Michaud.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the witnesses for joining us.

I will first go to Mr. Leuprecht.

You cowrote an article in La Presse in March.

In it, you said that, for some 20 years, instead of getting involved in international policy, our Canadian governments have rather dithered and focused on rhetoric, so words spoke louder than action. You said that this kind of an approach speaks to deficiencies in Canadian defence policy and diplomacy.

You also said that,

to regain its standing in allied and multilateral institutions, Canada has to deliver on real capabilities, such as robust expeditionary capacity, ballistic missile defence, the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD, and the creation of a standalone foreign intelligence agency.

I would like you to elaborate on those suggestions. I would also like you to talk to us about the fact that the Canadian government recently announced it may want to join the American missile defence shield.

Do you think that this is a good idea and that the government should do it quickly?

If so, you think it was a mistake not to have done it earlier?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

My comments show that, for two decades, the government has neglected investing in the Canadian Armed Forces' basic capabilities for the defence of the continent. That is clearly important, as a state's primary objective should always be its security and its citizens' security. We should also consider that the security of North America is an investment in NATO. If the United States is not secure, that reduces its kinetic and nuclear deterrent capabilities with respect to our allies and partners, in Europe and elsewhere.

As for the missile defence shield, the situation has been contradictory for a long time. Canada is part of that kind of a shield in Europe, but it is not part of the same shield in North America.

Why would it join that shield? Because missiles in North Korea, and soon in Iran, will have the capacity to reach the east coast of North America within a predictable time. If countries can launch missiles, they can limit our ability to make sovereign democratic political decisions.

If we make a decision that makes another state with missiles uncomfortable, they can threaten us with their missiles. Under those conditions, we won't be able to implement sovereign democratic decisions. So we will limit Canadians and prevent the government in power from making decisions that are in line with Canada's fundamental values and interests.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

You talked about additional investments in NATO. We know that Russia invaded Ukraine at a time when there weren't really any talks or opportunities for Ukraine to join NATO, but we also know that, in the past, the fact that countries around it were becoming members of that organization was a concern for Russia. Sweden and Finland are now asking to join NATO. Through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada is saying it wants to be the first country to accept those candidacies. Should Canada worry about reprisal from Russia if countries like Sweden and Finland were to join NATO?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

There is always a risk of horizontal or vertical escalation by Russia, either toward Ukraine or toward allied or partner countries. The relationship with Russia is definitely difficult. We have to remember that Russia is a threat to our interests not only in Europe, our second strategic partner in terms of importance after the United States, but also in the Arctic, which requires considerable investments, as you mentioned, in NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and in other organizations.

Relations with Russia will be difficult over the coming decades. However, we must also remember that this conflict is with Russia's current regime, and not with the Russian population. Russia has a new generation, younger than me, which is much more western-friendly and is not unhappy about the Cold War ending or the fall of the Soviet empire. So I think that, over the next 25 years, there will potentially be rapprochement with Russia, but that we will probably be in a situation until then where Russia will continue to threaten all NATO members, as well as the established international order since the signing of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Helsinki, in 1975.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

I don't have much time left.

Concerning the threats Russia means to continue making against NATO members, is Canada sufficiently prepared to deal with reprisals, be they cyber-attacks or other types of attacks?

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

I'm sorry. We're out of time, Ms. Michaud.

We will go to Mr. MacGregor with a six-minute slot. That will take us through the first round of questioning.

Mr. MacGregor, the floor is yours.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

You know, it's striking to me, with the Russia study that we're currently engaged in, how much of a crossover there is with our recently concluded IMVE study—especially foreign state actors' roles in helping sow disinformation. If you're causing that level of disturbance within a country's internal politics, of course it's going to cause a great amount of distraction.

Mr. Shull, in your opening remarks you talked about automated traffic and how we really need to step up and go after the bots. Ultimately, what I'm interested in as a parliamentarian is producing a comprehensive report with some solid recommendations for what the federal government can be doing.

Can you maybe expand on that and provide a specific recommendation on what you want to see the federal government do with regard to going after bots? We know from our previous studies that they help amplify a lot of that disinformation we heard about. Bots and troll farms are really trying to push all this stuff, which is causing a lot of havoc in our internal politics.

[Aaron Shull]

Sure. I mentioned two things, but let me go into them in greater detail.

For the purposes of clarity, a troll is a person and a bot is a robot, but they work together. The trolls control the bots. There are actually what they call “cyborgs”. That's when trolls manipulate bot armies and redirect them.

The point I was making earlier was that the troll wants to get paid. Make it harder for them to get paid. We've already got the system in place through the sanctions. You have proof of concept there. No one wakes up in the morning with a sense of civic duty to run a troll farm. They want to get a paycheque. Make it harder for them to get that paycheque and that will lower the amount of amplification that takes place.

The second thing we talked about is that there's no widely received definition of what is a “bad” bot. We have to work with allied states to determine what that is. Then we have to put in place a mechanism, through collective action, to both leverage those sanctions and then go after the technical architecture. Work with the Internet governance agencies. There's something called ICANN, but I won't get into the details of that right here. Go after the technical architecture and make sure that the big farms don't resolve.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

We need to make sure that social media companies are accountable as well because a lot of this is happening on their networks.

[Aaron Shull]

Yes, absolutely. That's table stakes. You have to make sure they're paying attention to that as well.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Perfect.

As a parliamentarian, in my time on this committee, I'm growing increasingly dissatisfied with Parliament's role in national security. I think we are too deferential to the executive branch and to the national security agencies, and I'd like to see Parliament take a more robust role in this conversation.

If you compare that with the United States Congress, their House and Senate intelligence oversight committees are very actively involved in what the CIA is doing on a weekly basis.

You and Dr. Wark were talking about this need for a strategic plan, a Canadian national security strategy. In terms of Parliament's role, if you look at the statutes that govern the RCMP, that govern CSIS, and the way CSIS and CSE work together—because they're in two different wheelhouses—do you have any specific recommendations on what we can present to the Minister of Public Safety in the next big chapter and what particular statutes Parliament needs to look at and reform to bring us up to speed in the 21st century?

[Aaron Shull]

Even before we get into a legislative review, number one, we can table an annual threat assessment in Parliament, and number two, we can have an annual discussion of intelligence priorities. Like you, I very much view Parliament as having a central role in this because Canadians need to know, right? There's not a dinner table in this country that hasn't been affected by national security, the pandemic, cybersecurity.

Now we're the closest we've ever been to a major global conflict since the end of World War II. This affects Canadians, but we don't talk about it enough, so I think another role that Parliament could play, outside of the legislative mechanisms—and there are things we could talk about specifically there—is having that national conversation, advancing it with your constituents and making sure that people understand that national security affects them.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Dr. Wark, do you have any additional thoughts on that? Also, do you have any comments on budget 2022's increase to CSE's budget and what that's going to help do for our capabilities in this arena?

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

Thanks, Mr. MacGregor.

Through you, Chair, I think additional resources for CSE are welcome. It's always important to track how those resources are spent, of course, and that's a role that parliamentary committees can play.

The challenge for Parliament in the national security space, it seems to me, is that parliamentary committees can have a major impact on the sort of broad framework and governance and strategic issues. However, it's difficult for a standing committee of Parliament to get into the details of intelligence and national security, because of the lack of access to classified information and classified briefings. That's a role that can be played by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, as Parliament intended. I would just say in passing that I'm pleased to see that the committee is back up and running. I think it deserves Parliament's support in the future. The interplay between NSICOP and parliamentary committees is an important one that wasn't really clarified when NSICOP was established, and I think that would be an area to talk about with your fellow parliamentarians who happen to sit on that committee.

Thanks.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much.

Colleagues, we now move into a second round of questions, and to lead us off, we have Mr. Lloyd.

Mr. Lloyd, you have the floor for five minutes, whenever you're ready, sir.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question is for Mr. Shull. Are you aware of my former colleague Kenny Chiu's private member's bill before the last election to establish a foreign influence registry in Canada,?

[Aaron Shull]

It rings a bell. I couldn't cite a chapter and verse right now, though.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Are you aware of other countries that have foreign influence registries, and do you have a comment on whether or not they're useful tools?

[Aaron Shull]

I think it depends on how you scope it, and I appreciated your questions to the previous witnesses.

I'm not an expert in it, so I don't want to steer you in the wrong direction, but I think that, obviously, foreign influence is a bad thing. We have to be on top of it, but there are different ways of approaching it.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Maybe I'll flip over to Dr. Leuprecht because one of your recommendations was dealing with foreign actor laws.

Can you comment on the foreign actor registry? Are you familiar with it from before the last election?

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Both the United States and Australia have these. One of the things that it avoids is having people showing up in front of Parliament under spurious conditions, for instance, and not realizing that these are actually entities that are effectively paid for, or otherwise resourced or tasked by a foreign government, so I think certainly it helps to enhance the ability to distinguish what effectively foreign agents....

I think there are a number of other things that we could do—

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Is it a useful tool?