Evidence of meeting #59 for Science and Research in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was universities.
A recording is available from Parliament.
3:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Lloyd Longfield
Thank you to all for joining us.
This is meeting number 59 of the Standing Committee on Science and Research.
Today's meeting is in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. We have members in the room as well as online. In either case, please wait to be recognized by the chair.
I welcome Larry Maguire and Eric Melillo from my old neck of the woods, Lake of the Woods and Manitoba.
Also, we have Darren Fisher from Dartmouth joining us.
3:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Lloyd Longfield
Well, he's at least on the screen, but now Lena is here. She just tabled a bill, I understand.
We're multi-tasking and we're all here in our places.
Thanks, Darren, for temporarily filling in.
When you're not speaking in the room or on Zoom, your microphone should be turned off or muted. For those on Zoom, for interpretation you have a choice at the bottom of your screen of floor, English or French. In the room, you can use the earpiece and select the language of your choice.
Although this room is equipped with a wonderful audio system, we can have feedback. If you do have any earphones, please keep them away from the microphone so that our interpreters don't get that dangerous condition happening in their headphones when they get feedback.
All witnesses have completed the required connection tests in advance of the meeting.
I think we're ready to get started.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3)(i) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, June 6, 2023, the committee commences its study of the use of federal government research and development grants, funds and contributions by Canadian universities and research institutions in partnerships with entities connected to the People's Republic of China.
Yes, we need a shorter version of that title, but it is my pleasure to welcome our witnesses today.
We have, from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Nicole Giles, senior assistant deputy minister, policy and strategic partnerships, as well as René Ouellette, director general, academic outreach and stakeholder engagement.
From the Communications Security Establishment, we have Samantha McDonald, assistant deputy minister, innovative business strategy and research development, and Sami Khoury, head of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère, associate assistant deputy minister, national and cyber security, and Lesley Soper, director general, national security policy.
Each group has five minutes. We'll start off with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, please.
3:45 p.m.
Dr. Nicole Giles Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Good afternoon, Chair and members of the committee.
It's an honour to be here today and to contribute to this important discussion.
Foreign governments engage in espionage and foreign interference activities that target Canada and Canadians to advance their own interests at our expense, in order to gain a geopolitical, economic, military or strategic advantage.
In doing so, they covertly seek to sow discord and disrupt our economy and the ingenuity of the academic sector. In many cases, clandestine interference activities aim to support foreign political agendas or deceptively influence Canadian policies, research centres, democratic processes or representatives.
Unfortunately, Canada's fundamental institutions are active targets of foreign interference activities. Academia and the research sector are, sadly, no exception. On university campuses, foreign states, including the People's Republic of China, seek to exert undue influence covertly and through proxies by harassing dissidents and suppressing academic freedoms and free speech.
Foreign interference and espionage in academia can take many forms, from covertly influencing research agendas or peer-review processes to engaging in funding arrangements, where details about the source of funds are deliberately obscured or misrepresented. Common techniques can include blackmail, coercion, illicit financing, intimidation and disinformation. They also include theft of intellectual property, preventing its future monetization and thereby harming Canada's overall economic development. These activities are increasingly used by states such as the PRC to exploit Canada's innovation and commitment to research partnerships.
The good news is that we can protect research in Canada through education and knowledge transfer to increase resilience in the face of foreign interference and thus ensure that government investments are not used to advance the research of hostile states. It also includes measures to ensure that our intelligence community's toolkit, policies and authorities remain up to date and enable us to deal with an ever-evolving threat.
The interests of Canada's adversaries were once limited to competition between governments. The priorities of threat actors today have widened to include Canada's advanced research in emerging technologies and big data. The result is aggressive targeting by some foreign states of institutions and individuals beyond the Government of Canada.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, has produced thousands of intelligence reports and provided details about these threats.
In order to raise awareness, CSIS has reported on this and other forms of foreign interference in our annual public report—we have copies—and we have published several tailored unclassified reports, including the snappily titled “Foreign Interference and You”, which was developed for all Canadians and community groups, as well as more publications specifically for universities and the research sectors, such as “Protect Your Research”, which are available in multiple languages. These publications have been accompanied by extensive outreach and awareness-raising efforts aimed at building resilience through our stakeholder engagement program.
Foreign interference remains a recurring problem, and it has grown in scope and complexity in today's digital age. What's more, new technologies such as artificial intelligence will only exacerbate the problem. Protecting Canada's national security is a team effort and requires action from the whole of society.
CSIS is a committed partner in this effort, and our team of dedicated and talented professionals are working hard to keep Canadians safe, secure and prosperous.
We will be very pleased to answer your questions.
Thank you.
3:50 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Lloyd Longfield
Thank you very much, Dr. Giles.
Now we'll go on to CSE with Sami Khoury.
3:50 p.m.
Sami Khoury Head, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, Communications Security Establishment
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair, and thank you for the opportunity to appear today. My name is Sami Khoury and I am the head of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, also known as the cyber centre, within the Communications Security Establishment. I’m joined by my colleague Samantha McDonald, assistant deputy minister of the innovative business strategy and research development branch at CSE.
For those who may be unfamiliar with us, the Communication Security Establishment, often referred to as CSE, is Canada's national cryptologic agency, providing the government with information assurance and foreign signals intelligence.
The cyber centre is part of CSE and serves as a unified source of expert advice, guidance and support on cybersecurity operational matters. The cyber centre works very closely with Samantha’s branch at CSE in the fields of cryptography, cybersecurity, vulnerability research, high-performance computing, data science and artificial intelligence.
Partnership is at the very core of what the cyber centre does, because ensuring and strengthening Canada’s online security is a responsibility shared by stakeholders across the country.
We work in collaboration with Canadian businesses, critical infrastructure, law enforcement, and external partners like researchers and academia to raise Canada’s collective cyber security bar.
A significant component of this collaboration involves sharing important information with Canadians and Canadian businesses about the cyber-threats Canada faces.
Informed by our classified sources, we release public reports like the National Cyber Threat Assessment, also known as the NCTA.
One of the most prominent of these threats is state-sponsored cyber-threat activity against Canada, which is a constant and ongoing threat. In the 2023-24 NCTA, we shared that state-sponsored threat actors engage in commercial espionage, targeting intellectual property and other valuable business information. They do so with the goal of sharing stolen information with state-owned enterprises or domestic industry in their home country.
We reported that over the next two years, Canadian organizations with information of value to foreign states will almost certainly continue to be targeted by malicious cyber threat activity from state-sponsored actors.
While we assess that the state-sponsored cyber-programs of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea continue to pose the greatest strategic cyber-threats to Canada, we also know that cyber-threats can come from anywhere at any time. Consequently, CSE takes a country-agnostic approach, focusing on combatting the cyber-threat activity Canada faces—
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Lloyd Longfield
Can I just pause you? We have the French on the English translation. We need to get the channels fixed.
Okay, let's give it a go. I put you on pause and now I'll start you again.
3:55 p.m.
Head, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, Communications Security Establishment
It's from where I stopped, I suppose.
3:55 p.m.
Head, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, Communications Security Establishment
Consequently, CSE takes a country-agnostic approach, focusing more on combatting the cyber-threats Canada faces than on the region from which such threats originate. Canadian organizations need to be prepared to defend against all emerging cyber-threats, regardless of whether it's a state or a non-state actor.
At CSE, we see firsthand how rapidly these threats evolve, posing new challenges for cyber security and defence.
Emerging technologies like quantum computing and artificial intelligence are constantly changing the landscape of how we defend ourselves against cyber-threats. These emerging digital technologies, which can be used for either good or nefarious purposes, are the valuable currency that state and non-state competitors are trying to acquire through various means.
This demonstrates why it is critical for Canada’s academic and research organizations to implement effective security controls to ensure their intellectual property is protected as securely as possible.
CSE is constantly working to improve Canada's defences against these evolving threats. In July 2022, CSE and other national security partners began the national security review process under the new “National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships”, which aims to safeguard Canadian scientific research from actors who pose a threat to Canadian national security.
We invest in our partnerships, working closely with our trusted partners to fulfill our mission and protect Canada, and actively collaborate with researchers and academia to solve unclassified cyber security problems.
At the cyber centre, we also provide tailored advice and guidance to a number of stakeholders, including Canadian research organizations, on how to protect their valuable information.
In closing, I'd like to highlight that October is Cybersecurity Awareness Month. Every October, CSE runs the Get Cyber Safe campaign in support of cyber-month. It's an internationally recognized campaign designed to promote public awareness and understanding of cybersecurity. The theme for cyber-month 2023 is “Step up your cyber fitness”. It's all about the ability to identify, react and respond to online threats by taking things one step at a time. Each week throughout the month of October, Get Cyber Safe will share simple steps to help Canadians stay safe online.
Again, I thank you all for the invitation to appear today to testify on threats to research and intellectual property. We look forward to contributing to this important conversation and sharing more about how CSE and the Cyber Centre help protect Canada and Canadians.
3:55 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Lloyd Longfield
Thank you very much.
Now we'll go over to the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.
October 23rd, 2023 / 3:55 p.m.
Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security , Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
Thank you, Chair.
Good afternoon, honourable members of the committee.
My name is Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère. I'm the associate assistant deputy minister for national security and cybersecurity at Public Safety. Research security is part of the portfolio that I oversee.
I'd like to thank you for inviting me here to speak on such an important issue affecting Canadian research.
I would also like to thank the honourable members of this committee for conducting this study, which comes at a most opportune time. I can say with certainty that Public Safety Canada will be following the work of this committee very closely over the coming months.
I'd like to begin my remarks by stating that Public Safety has been working on research security in one form or another since 2016, with the development and delivery of the safeguarding science workshops.
As part of these workshops, experts from Public Safety Canada, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Global Affairs Canada, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and the Public Health Agency of Canada are travelling together across the country to deliver targeted workshops on how researchers can best protect their work and intellectual property from external threats.
These workshops were given to universities, to private labs and even to other federal departments. Since the pandemic, the team responsible for administering them has been revamping the way it is offering them so that they can be given to a much wider audience and so that the sessions are more tailored to the specific needs of the researchers they are being presented to.
However, it seemed clear that certain foreign governments were working to steal Canadian research in order to support their own economic and political goals.
That is why the government released “National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships” in the summer of 2021, to further improve the government's security posture on research partnerships with private sector entities.
Where warranted, Public Safety Canada receives information from our security and intelligence partners in order to provide customized advice to granting councils as well as to individual grant applicants. This advice includes an assessment of the sensitivity of the science and threats posed by the private sector partner.
Public Safety's role in the implementation of the guidelines is to serve as the interface between the federal granting councils and the national security community. When the federal granting councils identify potential national security risks in some of the funding applications they receive, they will refer those applications to Public Safety to coordinate a national security review with our security and intelligence partners.
The implementation of the guidelines is a collective effort that involves the collaboration of several federal departments, such as Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Public Safety Canada, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment and Global Affairs Canada.
To undertake this work, Public Safety Canada received funding in budget 2022 to establish a research security centre, and since September 2022, my team has been working hard to staff the centre. I'm pleased to report that the centre is now fully up and running.
The security and research centre is made up of two teams. We have a team of six regional advisors based across the country. They are responsible for liaising with universities and provincial governments in their respective regions.
We also have a team of six analysts, located in Ottawa, who are responsible for the implementation of the national security guidelines for research partnerships and for providing support to regional advisers by developing outreach products designed to inform researchers of threats to their research.
The Safety and Research Centre is responsible for three areas of activity. The first concerns the implementation of guidelines. The second is to provide expertise to advise universities and researchers on how best to protect their research. The third is to act as a liaison enabling external stakeholders to access Government of Canada services and expertise on research security issues.
Our regional advisers are in constant contact with universities in their regions, providing advice and guidance where necessary and relaying feedback on our programs back to the main team in Ottawa. The work they have been doing thus far by making those connections and providing that outreach has been invaluable to our productive efforts to make Canadian research more secure.
I want to emphasize that the federal government is not going it alone in this area. Indeed, we continue to discuss with provinces how we can better align our approaches and the overall level of security for the university sector across Canada.
We're also not alone internationally—
4:05 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Lloyd Longfield
Okay, I think I'll have to call it there. We're at the five minutes. We're a bit over time, so maybe you could work the rest into the answers to questions.
Thank you for your testimony.
We're going to start our questions for the six-minute round with Corey Tochor from the Conservatives.
4:05 p.m.
Conservative
Corey Tochor Conservative Saskatoon—University, SK
Nicole Giles, your director, David Vigneault, has recently characterized his earlier attempts to communicate with the universities on this issue as “uncomfortable”. This is from a CBC story that came out in October 2017. What did he mean by “uncomfortable”?
4:05 p.m.
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Well, 2017 was a long time ago—
4:05 p.m.
Conservative
4:05 p.m.
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
It is something that reflects a change in how we can engage with universities. When our CSIS Act was set up, most of the intelligence holdings and information that were of interest to foreign states were held by the government. That is now largely held by universities and the private sector, so part of the discomfort has been explaining that they are actually targets of the actions of foreign states that are looking to steal their intellectual property and take advantage of their openness.
4:05 p.m.
Conservative
Corey Tochor Conservative Saskatoon—University, SK
On the uncomfortableness.... There were earlier reports this year about U of T still working with Huawei. Would CSIS—you or David—be uncomfortable with them working with Huawei?
4:05 p.m.
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Thank you for the question.
Our role in this process is to ensure we can help universities understand why working with PRC-affiliated entities could go against their interests and to ensure they're aware of the potential threats associated with that. Then, of course, universities will make their own decisions about where they would like to invest in research.
4:05 p.m.
Conservative
Corey Tochor Conservative Saskatoon—University, SK
He made the comment that it's a “one-way engagement”. Which way is that, then?
4:05 p.m.
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I'm sorry. Could you repeat the question?
4:05 p.m.
Conservative
Corey Tochor Conservative Saskatoon—University, SK
He made the comment that it's a “one-way engagement”. What does David mean by that?
4:05 p.m.
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I'm not sure, Mr. Chair, what comment that refers to.
The way we have been trying to think about it is emphasizing that it's a two-way conversation, that it's our—
4:05 p.m.
Conservative
Corey Tochor Conservative Saskatoon—University, SK
I'm sorry to interrupt, but Mr. Vigneault said that it was a one-way engagement with universities. Was he referring to his role in talking to universities or the universities talking to him? Would you know that?
4:05 p.m.
Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I'm sorry, Mr. Chair. I'm not aware of the specific quote, so I'm unable to ascertain his intention behind it.
What I can say is that the approach we certainly have been aiming to take is that of a two-way conversation, where we can provide our best advice and we can hear from them on what their concerns are.
