Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to take the floor on Bill C-240, an Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and the Criminal Code.
If this bill, introduced by the hon. member for Surrey-White Rock-South Langley, were passed, authorities would be able to review, while it is being served, the sentence of a inmate guilty of a serious and violent crime, if they believed he would reoffend upon his release.
Bill C-240 would even allow an inmate to be kept in jail for an indeterminate period of time if he were to be considered beyond rehabilitation.
As one can see, the judicial system would be given significant powers. Before I explain my reservations about this bill, I would like to clarify a few points to avoid any misunderstanding.
Like most Canadians and Quebecers, I am absolutely not in favour of releasing under probation offenders who are dangerous for society. I agree that violent offenders who are obviously not rehabilitated should be punished and serve their sentence. We must keep them behind bars as long as they are a threat to our society, and they should serve their full sentence. It is a matter of public security, and that position is generally accepted.
In a system based on the rule of law, the judicial system, the law enforcement agencies and the political institutions should make sure criminals serve their sentence and law-abiding citizens can lead a normal life. That is the basis of the social contract binding the citizens and the State.
We know that if we do not have clear rules and adequate penalties for those who break the law, we run the risk of anarchy.
The bill before us, if passed unamended, would seriously undermine fundamental rights and rules of justice we want to protect at all costs. Let me explain.
As I said previously, we live in a free and democratic society based on the respect of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. In the field of criminal justice, that means the inalienable right of every individual to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This is a rule of law that we inherited from the British
common law and which still remains a basic foundation of our legal system.
Also, under these principles, an individual can only be punished once for the crime that he or she was found guilty of. In other words, no one can be tried and condemned twice for the same offence. Trying to forego this fundamental principle of justice would amount to unduly suspend the civil rights of the individual and to use the rule of the arbitrary. Obviously, this kind of situation is unacceptable in a society such as ours.
The bill before us contains, in clause 25, a provision which would allow a court to keep an individual in prison despite the fact that they served their time. This situation would result of the fact that, in view of new evidence which had not been or could not be produced at the time of the trial, the individual is considered dangerous and should be kept in prison.
From my interpretation of this bill, evidence that was not produced at the time of the trial against the accused could be introduced in court in order to keep them longer in prison. This provision, I think, would seriously undermine the fundamental rights of that person.
I remind you that since it was enshrined in the 1982 Constitution, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has been the best means of protection available to Canadians against otherwise absolute powers of the modern state. The Charter provides a list of rules and principles intended to protect the fundamental rights of an individual. In this regard and for the purposes of the debate, section 11 of the Charter clearly states that: "Any person charged with an offence has the right (-) if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again and, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again". In other words, under the Charter, a person cannot be punished twice for the same offence in Canada. This is a fundamental right entrenched in the Constitution.
To me, some provisions in this bill clearly violate this principle, as we could, from now on, convict for a second time someone who has already served his sentence if a court finds that the offender still represents a danger for society. Clearly, we would have to wait for a Supreme Court judgment to determine if this bill could overrule the principles set forth in the Charter. And I think that the Supreme Court would declare the bill unconstitutional.
For the purposes of the debate, we must also consider that the Criminal Code of Canada already includes provisions for continued detention of dangerous criminals, even after their sentences are served.
Indeed, we know that the courts have the power to declare that these people are "dangerous offenders" who should be sentenced accordingly. But-and this is absolutely fundamental-the Crown attorney must make the point during the trial and not a few years later when the accused is about to be released, as would be allowed with Bill C-240.
Why should we pass new legislation to protect society against dangerous criminals while the Criminal Code provides us with all necessary tools to that end? Either we let the Crown attorney do his or her job, or we, as legislators, tighten the definition of a criminal offender.
Finally, according to this proposal, it would be the responsibility of the National Parole Board to inquire and determine if there is enough evidence to proceed to another trial and, ultimately, to extend the sentence. I think this would substantially increase the Board's case load, with all the additional delays and costs. Besides, this is not its jurisdiction in the first place.
To conclude, I want to reiterate my firm belief that fundamental human rights are inalienable and should not be suspended. Sure, we can present some foul crimes in such a light that people will think that, given special circumstances, fundamental rights should be disregarded. But I do not think this is justifiable, because as legislators we must uphold certain principles.
If Bill C-240 is adopted in its present form, it would be possible, I repeat, for the courts to detain individuals for longer than their original sentences, under the pretext that they still represented a danger to society. In other words, they could be punished for longer than their original sentences. It is obvious that this is unjustifiable.
Citizens must not be deprived of their fundamental rights under the pretext that society or the correctional system can find no other way to protect the public against dangerous criminals. This solution does not resolve the problem of dangerous offenders, who can pose a serious threat to society.
In conclusion, I would like to say that once society begins to make exceptions to the fundamental rights of the person, its members have every reason to believe that society is becoming dangerously intolerant and that, in the long term, their personal freedom is at risk.