Mr. Speaker, we have a system of law. We live in a society governed by laws. We have a parliamentary institution, and a government, charged with enforcing existing legislation. The entire Canadian legal system as it relates to labour relations is based on the freedom to negotiate, on the objective of ensuring peace between the parties to an industrial dispute and the harmonious operation of the factories and workplaces once the dispute has been resolved. I believe that the freedom to negotiate is a key element in all of this.
The freedom to negotiate is dependent on the balance between two powers: the very important economic power wielded by the employer, which is countered by the union with its own brand of power, given to it under law in the form of the right to strike. It is a legislated right.
One would think that, generally and normally, when both parties exert pressure, when they act in good faith without anyone trying to disrupt the process, when they are willing to make concessions, with common sense prevailing, an agreement will eventually be reached. The legal system and government services are designed to help reach an agreement because everyone understands that the best and only effective solution is a negotiated solution.
What happened in this case? They may well criticize the Bloc Quebecois for being the only party in this House which defends the legal system of free collective bargaining. Well and good, but they forget that the main culprit in this dispute is the government, in particular the Minister of Labour, who turned into an employer in this matter.
They will say that, the opposition being the opposition, it will attack the government and try to bend the truth a little. It is common practice in politics.
Instead, let us read the report and conclusions of an impartial witness, conciliation commissioner Hope, whose job was to observe, minute by minute, the progress of the negotiations.
This report contains devastating comments on the behaviour of the government and the Minister of Transport. In this matter, the government, far from favouring settlement and protecting against any external disruptions the progress of the usual settlement mechanisms whose results are based on free collective bargaining, sought to disrupt and destroy this balance by siding with the employer. I would even say that it became an employer. The government behaved like an employer in this matter. I would go so far as to say that it prevented the official employers from negotiating.
Let us suppose for a moment that we are all CN presidents-we would be happy in some respects, of course, as this would be a remarkable promotion-and that our representatives, reporting on the discussions, tell us that we ought to make concessions on our demands to drop non-monetary clauses, that if we make no concessions, the resulting strike would hurt us and that the public may not appreciate our behaviour during the negotiations, so that we must make concessions.
Normally in such conditions, an employer makes concessions and uses some common sense to reach a compromise with the union, which is also under pressure. But why would an employer negotiate when, like the president of the CN in this case, he has the government's assurance that it supports his position, as denounced in the Hope report, when he knows that the government is 100 per cent behind him and that, in the event of a labour dispute, the government will take out the bludgeon to quash immediately the right to strike and pass special legislation providing for a third party to impose working conditions? There is no motivation to do so.
In fact, the employers did not negotiate in this case. They did not negotiate because they relied on the complicity, I would say the collusion, of the Minister of Transport, expecting him to make sure that back to work legislation would be tabled in this House within hours of the start of a strike or lockout.
So, what was bound to happen did: the employers put on the table major clawback demands and, according to Mr. Hope, refused to negotiate. They even refused to consider the possibility that their demands be discussed or revised in any way, or that reservations be made about them. They did not even take part in
discussions on their demands. It was a take it or leave it proposition.
So, of course, this lead to a conflict. Barely 12 hours into this conflict-and this illustrates what I just said-the Minister of Labour, who is new to the issue, sets in motion a process to break the strike through special legislation. The Minister of Labour is therefore a major player in this issue. We must recognize however that there was not much she could do because, as the saying goes, the scene was set. All she now had to do was follow the script. The scene was set thanks to the great producing abilities of the Minister of Transport.
What could she do except become the employer herself and ensure that the strike could be quashed immediately, while at the same time setting the working conditions? I think that a Minister of Labour worthy of the name would have borne in mind that she or he has a job to do and is not accountable to the Minister of Finance-who wants to privatize CN-but is responsible for social peace and to the parties. Her role involved trust and confidence.
The Minister of Labour should tell her colleague for transport that, while he had been able to reach the agreements he wanted with his friends, the employers, she, as Minister of Labour, could not take sides, that she was responsible for social justice and fairness. What should she have done then?
I am not saying that the government should tolerate the negative effects of a strike indefinitely. It would have been appropriate to table this special legislation on Monday and get the parties back to work. It is at this level that the Minister of Labour could have played an important part in cabinet. She could have enlightened her cabinet colleagues and told them: "Yes, we will get these people back to work to avoid the negative effects of the strike, but we will also ensure that the parties can negotiate without interference, while it is still time to do so. For the first time in this conflict, we will put in place conditions such that the parties involved can negotiate in good faith and find a solution to their problems. We will force the employer to negotiate by not giving it the assurance that the government will impose back-to-work legislation and thus serve its interests".
The Minister of Labour knew what to do very well. She was very familiar with the usual solution in such a conflict. This is something that people involved in labour relations learn quickly. The minister knew what to do: go to mediation. She knew it so well that she did so in another conflict, in Montreal, which had persisted for 25 months. In this case, it has been 18 months, but in Montreal, it had been 25 months. So what did she do? Following the wise counsel of her senior officials, and assuming her responsibility as Minister of Labour, she decided that there would be mediation in the Port of Montreal conflict, to force the parties to conduct true negotiations under appropriate conditions, so that a negotiated solution might be reached. The process proved to be successful in the days that followed. Considering that the solution is known and that it gave very positive results in Montreal, why does the Minister of Labour decide to go all out in the case of the railway work stoppage and pass a piece of legislation imposing working conditions?
I want to be clear. We are not opposed to back-to-work legislation. We believe it is legitimate to resort to such legislation and we would have agreed to do so as early as tomorrow, so that by Monday evening the act would have been passed in this House. However, we do not accept the fact that this situation be used as a smoke screen. After all, what do you think is the goal of the government in this issue?