Debates of April 27th, 1995

Herb Grubel Capilano—Howe Sound, BC

Mr. Speaker, as a professional economist before coming to Ottawa I had taken some interest in the economics of health care. In 1992, I published two editorials on the subject in the Medical Post .

Today I would like to share the most important insights about the problem of health care I have gained from these studies and suggest some policy initiatives based on them. These ideas are my own and not necessarily those of the Reform Party.

I believe the public provision of health care through the present Canadian system is bedevilled by a fundamental problem which is due to the absence of a deductible and of co-insurance. This problem is amenable to relatively easy solutions once political and ideological rhetoric is put aside.

Of course, the system has other problems. There are no patent solutions. Some of these problems involve fundamental issues of technology, incentives, values, ethics and morality. I will not discuss these today.

I would like to remind everyone that the Canada Health Act has created a gigantic system of insurance. Every Canadian contributes premiums through general taxes. Benefits are provided to anyone without the need to pay financial deductibles and co-insurance. As everyone knows, our system has produced a wonderful world in which every taxpaying Canadian is eligible to receive free of any charge general medical care, specialized services and hospitalization. Congratulations Canada.

In my view, one of the most important reasons for the financial problems which undoubtedly now are haunting our system stem from the absence of deductibles and co-insurance. I have reached this conclusion because the absence of restraint on demand stemming from this completely costless service has resulted in very large increases in demand. This is not a universally accepted proposition. Therefore, I would like to illustrate its validity by making reference to two historic experiments of public insurance systems that failed because of the absence of deductibles and co-insurance.

The first involves the government automobile insurance monopoly introduced by the NDP government in British Columbia in 1972. It started with great fanfare, having no deductibles at all on any repairs on cars, on the grounds that even small scratches and dents on cars ultimately lead to more serious problems. Therefore, it was argued it was wise to encourage repairs of such damage at no cost since some shortsighted owners might be discouraged from having the work done by a deductible of $50 or $100 or whatever it might be. The rest is history. The policy was cancelled by that same caring, foresighted NDP government because it was simply too costly.

The second experiment involved the British government, which in the early days of the public health scheme argued that no one in Britain should suffer because he or she did not have the money to pay for medication. I have heard the same arguments here about access to health care. I wonder why the rhetoric from members of the Liberal Party has not also extended to medication. After all, some people are suffering because they do not get all the medication they want just like that. They may have to spend some money.

The universally free dispensing of medication was ended after only a short time. Costs had become much higher than had been anticipated by a study of demand, a study which had been conducted under conditions when people paid for their medication. Studies have shown that if the cost is free it is easier to go back to the pharmacy to get medication rather than look for it in the medicine cabinet. People ended up with huge stocks of medication which were finally flushed down the toilet at an extremely high cost to society.

These two examples are instructive for Canadian medicare. The policy of having no deductibles or co-insurance in Canadian health care was motivated by the noblest of intentions, just like they were in the case of automobile insurance and free medication in England.

We need to take care of the needs of the most poor in society and we must prevent serious problems which might develop if small ones are neglected. The two experiments were terminated because of the universal law of demand. The price was too low and demand became too high. I believe that what we are seeing after 20 years of operation in Canada is exactly the same situation. That is one of the main reasons why the Canadian health care system is in such financial trouble.

There is a fairly straightforward solution: introduce user fees. However, there is a strong resistance in Canada to the use of this instrument.

We heard them just a few minutes ago. The arguments are the traditional ones: care about access for those who cannot afford it, and those who, even if they can afford it, are stupid enough to let illnesses go and the consequences will be more costly than if they had taken care quickly of the illness symptoms at the beginning.

Some even argue, somewhat more sophisticatedly, that the inconvenience of visits to physicians and the risk associated with all medical procedures represent a strong deductible and co-insurance. Others argue that the deterrent effect of such measures is small and not very cost effective. This is the position taken by my colleague at the university of British Columbia, Bob Evans, a professor of health economics, one of the most highly respected and best known economists in Canada. I disagree with him.

The arguments against deductibles and co-insurance involve empirical judgment on the way in which these incentives are introduced. I would now like to propose and outline briefly a scheme for the introduction of co-insurance and deductibles, which I have published in the Medical Post . It can be summarized quickly as follows.

Every doctor visit or treatment by a Canadian elicits a government notification of the cost involved. One gets a little postcard saying that your visit on such and such a day cost society and you $30. At the end of every tax year, the value of the medical services consumed is added as income when we file our income tax.

Think about what this would do. The poor would have access. Universality of access would be preserved. In the end, the poor would not pay anything. One of the most cherished, basic,

fundamental characteristics of our system would be preserved, one I think is worth preserving. Of course, the better off who have income tax to pay would as a result pay a share of the cost they have incurred on society.

Now I must state something that immediately comes up whenever I discuss this in a public forum. Of course there would have to be a ceiling to the amount of money that individuals would have to add to their income tax as income and on which they pay taxes. I do not even want to venture what it is, but maybe nobody would have to pay more than 5 per cent or 10 per cent of their income.

One of the most important things that every health care system must present is protection against the catastrophic consequences of serious illnesses. That could be preserved and will be preserved by the proposal I have just outlined.

One of the biggest problems I have is with the idea that these incentives of people paying their own money, in a way, having a deductible and co-insurance, would not work. Just recently I received some information about experimentations that are going on in the rest of the world. I would like to share these ideas with members.

I found the following. Most health economists agree that the primary reason why health care costs are rising is that the money we are spending in the medical marketplace is usually someone else's. More than a decade ago, the Rand corporation discovered that when people are spending their own money on health care, they spend 30 per cent less, with no adverse effect on their health.

Now it turns out that in the United States some employers are experimenting in putting this principle to work. Please do not be turned off by the idea that I have just mentioned that this is taking place in the United States.

Let me set the stage. Here are companies whose names I will read off that have for their employees systems of health care that are superior to that available to every Canadian. They have health insurance from the first dollar. They have catastrophe insurance. They are employed. They are very well taken care of.

Here is the experiment: Forbes magazine pays each employee $2 for every $1 medical claim they do not incur up to a maximum of $1,000 a year. For every time they look at what it costs to go to the doctor and they decide not to go during the year, they can earn as much as $1,000 extra income. Forbes' health costs fell 17 per cent in 1992 and 12 per cent in 1993.

Another example: Dominion Resources, a utility holding company, deposits $1,620 a year into a bank account for the 80 per cent of employees who choose a $3,000 deductible rather than a lower one. The result is the company has experienced no premium increase since 1989, while employers face annual increases of 13 per cent.

Another example: Golden Rule Insurance Company deposits $2,000 a year into a medical savings account for employees who choose a $3,000 family deductible fee. The result is in 1993, the first year of the plan, health costs were 40 per cent lower than they would otherwise have been.

Take the United Mine Workers, a union that is very concerned about the welfare of its members. Last year they had a health plan with first dollar coverage for most medical services. This year they accepted a plan with a $1,000 deductible. In return, each employee receives a $1,000 bonus at the beginning of the year and employees get to keep whatever they do not spend. As a result, the mine workers still have first dollar coverage plus all the catastrophe insurance coverage and all that, but now the first $1,000 they spend will be their own money rather than their employer's money.

These plans are popular with employees. They can save money in an amount directly related to their own effort. They are not deterred from seeking medical care by the traditional out of pocket deductible. They can usually use their medical savings to buy services not covered by traditional services, and they are usually not restricted to certain doctors, as they would be under a managed care plan.

We have here very strong evidence that deductible co-insurance works. It works in ways that satisfy the people who are involved.

Let me try in my own words to explain what are the fundamental benefits. These experiments have permitted individual employees to feel clearly and voluntarily that under a wide range of conditions they would have gone to the doctor if it cost them nothing, but when faced with the true cost of the doctor visit they preferred having the money instead.

It is important to note that under these medisave schemes that I have just described individuals retain the benefit of full protection against the consequences of serious illness. They are making these choices with their own money. We have just deleted the distortion the zero deductible and co-insurance system has introduced into the incentives of the individual. They are being misled by the system into believing that for them and society the cost of going to the doctor is zero. It is not.

As we can see, individuals like it if they are given the choice, the freedom to do so. They prefer it. And the system itself saves money. It is an opportunity that I believe we in Canada can also take advantage of. Of course there have to be modifications, because we want to preserve the current system of universality of access and all the other aspects we have just discussed.

Let me conclude by suggesting that these well documented experiences provide strong support for the effectiveness of introducing deductibles and co-insurance into the Canadian health care system through the tax system I just sketched. It could be modified and create more positive incentives by giving every Canadian a $1,000 tax offset against which the cost of medical services would be deducted. I think that very quickly after such a system is introduced people would know about it and they would pay attention to these things.

However, I believe these are details. I want to add to the current debate over the possible reform of the health care system the idea of using deductibles and co-insurance for routine medical services, administered through the tax system, while the system continues to provide universality of access and protection against catastrophic health costs.

Let me repeat: It is possible that this scheme-which not only I have proposed in the Medical Post editorial, but which has been proposed by the Fraser Institute competition for the reduction of the cost of government and has been proposed by other doctors who wrote to me after my publication-may very well be a way in which Canada can have all the wonderful qualities of our system we now have and create incentives for greater efficiency and prevent the demise of the system, which otherwise might collapse under the threat of excessive financial costs.

Dan McTeague Ontario, ON

Mr. Speaker, I will ask two very direct questions to the hon. member, given that time is limited.

The system he is proposing is a claims bonus system. In my view, it contradicts the public health preventative care policy we are concerned with in this country. Someone who might, for instance, suffer a headache and does not go to a doctor or a health care facility might otherwise wind up with an aneurism, which of course will be more expensive to the health care system. That is only an observation, but it connects with my previous question.

A more important point is the one the hon. member made concerning deductibles. I am wondering if the hon. member has discussed this with his colleagues, including his leader, who during the 1993 campaign cited: "I want to make it absolutely clear that the Reform Party is not promoting private health care, deductibles or user fees". I think the hon. member has to check his facts and perhaps check with his leader. Could he please respond to that?

Herb Grubel Capilano—Howe Sound, BC

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for this silly remark.

We are talking about something that has potential, regardless of what my leader said a year ago. I do not care. I present this as my personal opinion. Every time I go on a radio program or any time I present it to a general audience, they ask why we are not doing this. It is because of silly remarks of the sort I just heard.

Dan McTeague Ontario, ON

Your leader said it.

Herb Grubel Capilano—Howe Sound, BC

My leader had not had the opportunity to hear what I had to say when he made this remark. It takes time for these ideas to spread.

I think it would be very much in the interest of Canada if members from the other side opened their minds just a little bit. There might be ideas out there that they have not thought of that would do exactly the same thing they want to do, except it would save the system at the same time.

Let me read something. Some critics claim that these medical service accounts that have been experimented with in the United States will encourage people to avoid preventive care. Yet experience shows that the reverse is true.

I wonder if the member would please listen.

Medical service accounts make money available immediately when the medical need exists. This allows people to make purchases they might not make if they had a traditional deductible requiring an immediate out of pocket payment. Therefore his objection to this scheme is simply incorrect. We would preserve exactly what we have now. It is not a traditional deductible system.

On the other hand, it is quite clear that I am prepared to continue to support a system which has no co-insurance and no deductibles if ways can be found to finance it.

Fred Mifflin Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak on Bill C-295, an act to provide for the control of Canadian peacekeeping activities by Parliament and to amend the National Defence Act in consequence thereof.

I have no doubt that the bill was motivated by the concern of all members for the well-being of the Canadian forces personnel and for a wise and sound decision making process on the part of the government.

Unfortunately I have to say that after close study of the bill, in my opinion it might on serious consideration make the process a little worse than the situation that we now have in place. For that reason I oppose it.

Before describing the details of my opposition, I have a general observation to make that applies to much of the thinking that emanates from our hon. colleagues on the Reform benches. It is a tendency that I see reflected in this bill to look for American models in matters of public policy in Canada.

This tendency skews the vision and certainly on our part. I do not believe we can make policy on the basis of the trends and obsessions of our American neighbours, as much as we respect and admire them. We are not them and their examples are foreign to our needs and purposes.

The government has gone to great lengths to ensure a made in Canada defence policy. In fact, members of all parties were members of the special joint committee that put together an outstanding report. I say this not in any sense of gloating but in modesty. Ninety-five per cent of it is reflected in the white paper. It is a Canadian defence policy and one that reflects Canada's needs and aspirations. I for one-I am sure I am joined by many others-would want to keep it that way.

Bill C-295 would restrict the prerogative, the speed and the discretion of the crown to determine Canada's contribution to the United Nations for reasonable peace operations. Like other military operations, peacekeeping is carried out under the authority of the Minister of National Defence under the National Defence Act. It provides that the minister has the management and direction of the Canadian forces and of all matters pertaining to national defence. The bill would remove the responsibility and the discretion not only of the minister but also of the government respecting military operations.

As a result, the bill would adversely affect the speed with which the government can respond to UN requests for assistance in peace operations as well as the timeliness with which it can respond to changes in the peacekeeping mandate.

One of the major problems cited by many former Canadian UN commanders is that it takes too long for the international community to become involved in times of crisis. Most recently Major-General Romeo Dallaires has been an eloquent and passionate advocate of the need for speed in emergencies, claiming that he could have saved tens of thousands of lives had he received the troops he needed when he requested them.

Bill C-295, which would add another layer in the decision making process, would ensure that it would take still longer for Canada to become involved and to provide help. In an emergency we should treat it like one and act urgently. The bill would also create an unworkable structure for the management of international Canadian forces operations. All potential operations are evaluated against a series of guidelines that include the broad political and foreign policy context, the overall mission requirements and, of course, our own military capability.

The 1994 defence white paper outlines certain key principles intended to help the government assess the various factors to be considered before deciding whether Canada should participate in a mission. These guidelines are based on the peacekeeping experience we have acquired over the last 40 years. They also illustrate in a careful but pragmatic way the new international world order that has followed the end of the cold war.

The white paper highlights the key principles that must guide the design of all peacekeeping missions. These principles are as follows: first, there must be a clear and enforceable mandate; second, there must be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority; third, the national composition of the force must be appropriate to the mission, and there must be an effective process of consultation among mission partners; fourth, in missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there must be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures; finally, with the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, Canada's participation must be accepted by all parties to the conflict.

Canada's experience also suggests that successful missions are those that respect certain essential operation considerations. Some were touched on by the hon. member. The size, training and equipment of the force should be appropriate to the purpose at hand and remain so over the life of the mission. There should be a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure and clear rules of engagement.

To look at another aspect, I believe Bill C-295 would give up Canadian sovereign command of Canadian forces elements and would create in its place an unworkable command and control relationship. In this area, in particular, I have problems with the intent of the bill.

Canadian forces personnel now serving on peace operations are always commanded by a Canadian. Command of Canadian forces personnel is no longer given up to allied or UN command, as it was during the first and second world wars. Canadian units and personnel can only be placed under the operational control, not the operational command, of the UN or other multinational commanders for specific tasks.

The practical difference between the two is that when Canadian forces are deployed under operational control, changes to the task assigned or significant changes to the area of operation cannot be implemented. For example, the UN would have to seek Canadian approval to deploy Canadian forces UNPROFOR personnel to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia from Croatia, should the need arise. Such approval would not be required under operational command.

On the other hand, a non-Canadian commander who only has operational control cannot assign separate deployment of components of a unit. For example, the force commander of UNPROFOR who has operational control of Canadian forces personnel cannot unilaterally assign, for example, B company of 2-PPCLI to the British battalion. Such a deployment would require Canadian national approval. If the commander had operational command, there would be no requirement for such Canadian approval.

Currently, commanders of Canadian contingents are directly responsible to the chief of defence staff for the Canadian contribution to the overall mission and tasks of any given operation abroad. The subclause of Bill C-295 which calls for the Canadian commanding officer to be placed under UN or other international command would be contrary to current practice and would mean less, not more national control, something my instincts tell me is far from being the intent of the bill.

Bill C-295 would restrict Canada's capability to contribute to the strength of a fast reaction force on standby. As the hon. members probably know, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and myself have launched an initiative to assess the short, medium and long term implications of a United Nations fast reaction force and a possible Canadian contribution to this effort in the future.

Let us come back to Major-General Dallaire's plea for rapid deployment to Rwanda and in response to other international crises. Whether or not Canada participates in a given mission, when the decision is made to participate, timeliness is often crucial. This bill, if passed, would slow the decision-making process down almost every time there is a crisis.

In summation, I regret I do not support Bill C-295. I know the hon. member has put a lot of work into it and I appreciate the comments he has made. However, under the guise of providing greater control by the Parliament of Canada of international peacekeeping operations, I believe it tends to confuse certain key concepts, some of which I have alluded to. It reduces national authority over our peacekeeping troops abroad. It significantly restricts one of the government's prime assets, the flexibility and ability to manoeuvre and shape our resources to suit rapidly changing requirements in dangerous times.

Maud Debien Laval East, QC

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill C-295. This bill provides for the control of

Canadian peacekeeping activities by Parliament and amends the National Defence Act in consequence thereof.

Bill C-295 has three main objectives: first, to enhance parliamentary control over the involvement of Canadian forces in international peacekeeping missions; second, to limit it to a neutral or non-combatant role; third, to control the placing of Canadian forces under UN or other non-Canadian command.

I would like to stress at the outset that the members of the official opposition are glad to have the opportunity to discuss such changes to the way the Canadian forces participate in peacekeeping missions. And we would like to thank the hon. member for Fraser Valley East for giving us the opportunity to express our opinion on these matters.

Much of the content of Bill C-295 is in step with the concerns already expressed by the Bloc Quebecois, as much in the debates in this House as in the dissenting report we submitted regarding the Canadian foreign policy review.

I would briefly like to reiterate the Bloc Quebecois' position on the issue being discussed today. Firstly, I would like to stress that the official opposition believes that one of the most important roles of the Canadian forces on the international scene is to support peacekeeping operations and to take an active role in them. This is one of Canada's crowning achievements which has helped earn us our reputation.

Nevertheless, we believe that, in the future, Canada should select more carefully the operations in which it will participate. Recent peacekeeping missions have, as you recall, had their difficulties, of which Canada should take note. Examples are the missions to Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, or even the situation in Haiti, which reminded us of the need to ensure that our operations serve to further legitimate democratic causes and are meticulously planned.

The conflicts I just cited as examples clearly show how important it is to define, under the auspices of the United Nations, specific objectives and mandates for each mission beforehand. The Bloc Quebecois also recognizes that we need to give the Canadian forces special status, in order to maintain the credibility of our operations.

At the same time, Canada should review its current military alliances and adapt them to strategic missions in accordance with the needs of the United Nations. This approach would inject new life into these organizations and would make them more effective in protecting safety and in resolving conflicts. It would also make it possible for Canada to meet its public security objectives, which are crucial to its own domestic security.

Furthermore the official opposition feels that Canada should encourage the creation of a permanent contingent that would be at the disposal of the UN to carry out its peacekeeping missions abroad. The number of personnel assigned by Canada to these peacekeeping missions should be limited. Unfortunately, Bill C-295 is silent on this point.

Finally, as we have said many times before, for instance in our dissenting opinion, we believe that Canada should put its decisions to participate in peacekeeping missions to a vote in the House of Commons, and do so as soon as possible, if there is enough time. We are of course delighted to see some of our suggestions reflected in the bill before the House today. However, some sections raise a number of problems, and we would like to suggest some improvements.

For instance, in clause 4 of Bill C-295, there seems to be no provision for the eventuality that Canadian forces might be asked to take part in peacekeeping operations at a time when parliamentarians are not sitting in this House. On the other hand, with respect to the order that would place the officer in command of the Canadian forces under the command of the United Nations or an international organization represented by an officer of another state, in subclause 6(3), the bill provides that the order would be laid before the House of Commons on any of the first three days on which the House sits following the day the order is made. Perhaps the same provisions could be included in clause 4?

Furthermore, clause 4 makes no provision for renewing the mandate given to Canadian forces. Perhaps it would be advisable to add a provision to that effect. Still in clause 4, and more specifically in subparagraph 4(1)(v), the Minister of Defence is asked to specify a maximum planned expenditure for the mission.

We realize such provisions are necessary. Canada's financial situation demands that we act responsibly. However, instead of immediately patriating military personnel once the expenditure limit previously approved by the House has been exceeded, this clause should provide for increasing, always by a resolution of the House of Commons, the resources allocated for an operation in exceptional cases, such as emergency humanitarian aid.

We also have some questions about the scope of subclause 5(3). This subclause mentions three circumstances in which Canadian forces would be allowed to use deadly force. We must ensure that Canadian military personnel take part in peacekeeping rather than peacemaking missions. Would it not be more prudent to make the rules specifying the circumstances in which force may be used subject to criteria set by the UN? Otherwise, we might have a situation where the participation of Canadian military personnel in peacekeeping missions would be subject to criteria that are different from those for other national contin-

gents. These questions show how important it is to specify the scope of subclause 5(3).

As for clause 6, I have two comments. First, in clause 6(3), we want all references to the other place deleted. As you know, the Bloc Quebecois considers it a waste of public funds to maintain the other house, which should be abolished as quickly as possible.

As our final amendment, to clause 6(4), we believe that the renewal should be submitted to the House of Commons and not to the Governor in Council. This amendment is in keeping with the spirit of the bill, which attempts to involve Parliamentarians more in decisions pertaining to peacekeeping activities.

In closing, I would once again like to thank my colleague for Fraser Valley East for allowing us to debate this important question. I assure him that the Bloc Quebecois supports the principles underlying Bill C-295. For this reason, we support the bill in second reading.

We would like the questions raised by the opposition to be given serious consideration so improvements may be made to the bill before its passage at third reading.

Carolyn Parrish Mississauga West, ON

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have the opportunity to participate in the debate on Bill C-295, an act to provide for the control of Canadian peacekeeping activities by Parliament and to amend the National Defence Act in consequence thereof.

I will take a few minutes this afternoon to talk about the context of the bill, namely the nature of Canada's current involvement in peacekeeping activities and the way in which we currently manage our participation in the operations. I should also like to look at a number of specific details in the bill and explain why I cannot support the changes the bill proposes.

Since World War II successive Canadian governments have argued that a safer, more secure international environment is key to Canada's own security and prosperity. As a responsible international participant and as a major trading nation, Canada is concerned with the dangers of a spillover of a localized strife and the threat it poses to the larger international community. At the same Canadians desire a reduction or end to the widespread human suffering in situations where there are strong indications that outside assistance can make a difference.

To this end Canada has worked with other countries to create a stable international environment. One of the instruments we have used in this effort has been peacekeeping, a technique of multilateral conflict management and resolution that has proven exceedingly useful over the years, and at which Canada has excelled.

Canada's contribution to peacekeeping is rooted in the belief that a stable international order sustained by substantial multinational consensus is the best foundation for Canada's long term peace and security. Hence, we willingly make available well trained and suitably equipped military personnel for peacekeeping and related operations.

However, our commitment to peacekeeping cannot be taken for granted. Canada carefully examines all requests for peacekeeping assistance and turns down those it regards as inappropriate. Our record of support is unparalleled, but that does mean our decision to take part in such missions is automatic. Canada has declined opportunities to participate in the third UN Angola verification mission, the UN Aouzou Strip observer group and the UN observer missions in Georgia and in Liberia. In recent years Canada has also significantly reduced or withdrawn contingents from Cyprus, Western Sahara, Somalia and El Salvador.

Traditionally the international community has turned to Canada for peacekeeping resources, not only because our foreign policy has been inclined to support involvement but also because our armed forces are flexible, multipurpose and combat capable. Our personnel are well trained, suitably equipped and have a very impressive track record. The world has come to depend on Canada for peacekeeping.

Canadian participation must always be placed in a larger international context. Our decision to join in a mission is a unilateral one and any changes to the way we operate would also be unilateral. However, the actual mission is always multilateral and complex. With many partners affecting our understanding we become team players when we join. This is an important consideration because UN Security Council resolutions are not always absolutely precise in specifying all the aims, duties or roles of a mission. Decisions evolve as circumstances change.

I should like to turn now to a discussion of some specific provisions of Bill C-295 which in my mind are not workable.

Clause 8 of Bill C-295 requires that once the aims of a particular mission have been achieved the Canadian contribution is to be terminated. The bill is not clear as to how the UN objectives or those expressed in the resolution might be reconciled. Yet the withdrawal of a Canadian contingent based upon an arbitrary expiry date would have two undesirable effects. First, the entire Canadian contribution might prove pointless if withdrawn too early. The second and more serious impact is that withdrawal could be counterproductive to the mission as a whole and thereby in itself threaten peace and security.

I also question those provisions of the bill related to active service. This bill would deem members of the Canadian forces assigned to peacekeeping missions to be on active service for all purposes. The bill proposes that the National Defence Act be amended so that an officer or non-commissioned member assigned to a mission that is subject to the proposed peacekeeping act shall be deemed to be on active service for all purposes.

Quite simply, this proposal is unnecessary. Pursuant to an order in council dated April 6, 1989, all regular force members anywhere in or beyond Canada and all reserve force members beyond Canada are currently on active service. Moreover, all members of the regular force have in fact been on active service continually since 1950.

There is therefore no legal requirement for individual orders in council placing members on active service as a consequence of a particular peacekeeping operation. These orders in council are simply a parliamentary convention. But convention though they may be, the practice certainly reflects the government's desire to consult more frequently with Parliament concerning the general thrust of Canada's peacekeeping policy and practice.

As members well know, there have been two substantial debates on international peacekeeping commitments since this government came into power, the first on September 21, 1994 and the second just recently on March 29.

Bill C-295 does not adequately address the scope of UN peacekeeping operations or chapter 7 action taken by the UN Security Council. This is the third element of the bill with which I have serious concerns.

The definitions and structure imposed by the bill do not accord with international treaties and the UN charter obligations. In trying to encompass the broad range of operations that may be authorized or directed by a UN Security Council resolution, the definition of a peacekeeping service in clause 2 of the bill is very imprecise.

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his June 1992 report to the Security Council defined four terms: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, all of which contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Each of these UN concepts can, and most often do, entail the use of military force. However, civilian personnel such as elections officials and civilian police are also becoming common in UN peacekeeping operations. The problem with Bill C-295 is that it does not provide a clear delineation of which operations are covered, nor does it offer any specific rationale for applying such regulations only to Canadian forces.

I would also like to question the section dealing with the rules of engagement. Bill C-295 creates overly simplistic legal obligations for rules of engagement and the use of force. Rules of engagement are always issued to armed Canadian forces personnel participating in international operations. They often operate under UN rules of engagement, although these are always drafted in conjunction with the Canadian forces staff at National Defence Headquarters as well as the Canadian contingent commander.

In this way, UN rules of engagement reflect a distinctly Canadian approach in structure, terminology, and interpretation of the mandate within which the rules operate. Occasionally, when the UN is slow to produce an acceptable set of rules of engagement, Canadian forces will operate under Canadian rules while permitting the UN to maintain overall control of an international operation.

Clause 5(3) of the bill restricts the use of force to self-defence. However, this restriction cannot, unless specifically authorized by a UN Security Council resolution, extend to the protection of civilians, even if they are subject to the actual or immediate threat of deadly force or if they are threatened with a serious abuse of human rights. All rules of engagement must be carefully analysed, taking into account the specifics of the mandate. That mandate could require troop-contributing states to use force for reasons other than those specified in the bill.

The issue of neutrality in Bill C-259 is also insupportable. The blanket requirement in subclause 5(1) that Canadian forces be neutral and not engage in combat is itself contradicted later in paragraphs 5(3)(a), (b), and (c) of the bill. The authorization this later subclause gives would violate the neutrality provisions because force could be used to protect one civilian group against the actions of another. There may be cases in which combat is the only means of restoring peace. Once again, this bill, if implemented, would restrict the flexibility of our Canadian forces in what are often very fluid and unpredictable circumstances.

In conclusion, I think that the same argument could be applied to the bill as a whole. The provisions of Bill C-259 foreclose options and restrict the flexibility of the Government of Canada to direct and manage the peacekeeping operations it undertakes.

I urge all members of the House to give careful consideration to how this bill would affect the ability of our Canadian forces to perform the tasks they have been assigned. This bill, however well meaning in its intent, would, in my view, have a detrimental effect on Canada's ability to undertake peace operations.

Out of respect for the admirable work that our Canadian forces are doing on a day to day basis and with their interests in mind, I cannot support this bill.

Jim Hart Okanagan—Similkameen—Merritt, BC

Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to stand in the House today and support Bill C-295, put forward by my colleague for Fraser Valley East.

The part of this bill I would like to address is clause 4, dealing with the authority of the House of Commons. As everyone in this House knows, much to the distress of the Liberal government, the Reform Party strongly endorses the notion that the House must be accountable to Canadians, and not just financially accountable. Everything we do in the House must reflect the desires and expectations of the people. Only under the most extreme circumstances should Parliament act without consulting the people who elected us. This is especially true when Canadian lives are at stake.

Last year I had the privilege of being a member of the special joint committee reviewing Canada's defence policy. During this year of intense research and consultation with Canadians, we made a number of recommendations in our report, entitled "Security in a Changing World". This is one of the recommendations, and I quote:

Defence policy cannot be made in private and results simply announced. Canadians will not accept that, nor should they. Nor should the government commit our forces to service abroad without a full parliamentary debate and accounting for that decision. It is our expectation that, except in extraordinary circumstances, such a debate would always take place prior to any such deployment.

This recommendation was endorsed by all members of the committee, including those sitting opposite today. Though there have been eleventh hour debates on peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia and the government's white paper on national defence did recognize many of the special joint committee's recommendations, this specific recommendation was overlooked by the minister and the government.

Currently, cabinet has the full authority to designate soldiers to be on active service for war or for peacekeeping activities. If Parliament is not sitting, section 32 of the National Defence Act requires that the House reconvene 10 days after placing soldiers on active service. Strangely, the government is not required to hold a debate on this. The notion of accountability is conspicuously absent. Canadians have no say in committing our troops to life threatening circumstances.

Clause 4 of Bill C-295 provides a method for full parliamentary review in the spirit of the special joint committee report and holds the government accountable for all peacekeeping commitments. Clause 4 states: "No Canadian forces shall serve or be committed to service in peacekeeping service or continue in such service beyond the time or expenditure limit previously approved by the House of Commons, pursuant to this section, unless the Minister of National Defence has moved in the House of Commons a resolution" outlining five criteria that must be debated and passed.

This opportunity for debate is essential. Since the end of the cold war the government has designated more troops to active service than any time since the Korean war. While we are very proud of our international recognition as peacekeepers and in some cases peacemakers to the world, the missions we have engaged in are becoming increasingly dangerous and uncertain in purpose. Canadians should be proud of our peacekeepers, because our troops are indeed the best in the world.

The first criterion in the resolution authorizes the specific mission for peacekeeping service. This is extremely important. The House of Commons must be told exactly what the specific mission is.

When I talk to my constituents about defence issues many ask me what our specific mission is in hot spots such as the former Yugoslavia. They also ask why we are still there when the troops are fired on and held hostage by the combatants. They seem to realize there is no will for peace in that troubled nation and wonder exactly what we are doing to resolve the conflict.

This brings me to my second criterion. Bill C-295 would ensure the resolution specifies the objectives, duties and role of the mission. This is important in the new peacekeeping roles we find ourselves in.

In the former Yugoslavia it is often unclear what objectives we are striving for. The classic peacekeeping role of keeping two warring factions apart from each other while they negotiate a final peace or maintaining a ceasefire to which all parties agree is absent in Bosnia. In a conflict such as this where all warring sides clearly do not want peace and look at our troops as occupiers, it is difficult to ascertain exactly what our objectives are.

If we are to send peacekeepers into dangerous situations such as this it is imperative Parliament pass a resolution specifying the objectives of our troops, what objectives they will be attempting to meet.

Canadian troops cannot be pawns in any conflict. We must have a clear role spelled out. This is particularly important when communications between Canada's peacekeeping forces and the Canadian public are weak.

The third criterion of the resolution defines the state or area in which the mission is to operate. Only Parliament should have the authority to specify where our troops are to be committed.

The fourth criterion in the resolution specifies the date on which the authority expires. It is essential for Parliament to decide the exact date on which the mission ends.

Some of our former commitments have seemed unending in scope. Our service in the former Yugoslavia is on a six-month term but other peacekeeping missions, such as our mission to Cyprus, lasted 30 years.

Giving Parliament the authority to determine the date on which the authority is to expire for a mission also gives Parliament the opportunity to cancel or renew the mission. Parliament will be able to evaluate the mission and decide whether we have accomplished our objectives. It can also re-evaluate the conflict and assess whether it has changed in scope and whether we still have a role to play.

In common with the fourth criterion is the fifth. It specifies a maximum planned expenditure for the mission. Peacekeeping missions, like anything else the government does, must have financial bounds. The nation does not have a bottomless purse. We must determine what we can afford.

Clause 4 of the bill also provides for a five-hour debate on the resolution before the question is put to the House. As with any bill, the resolution can pass with or without amendments and it can also be defeated.

The time for Parliament to become accountable to the Canadian people for designating our troops on active duty is now. We must be the ones to decide and those who represent them in Parliament are their voice.

I strongly urge all members of the House to support Bill C-295.

Warren Allmand Notre-Dame-De-Grâce, QC

Mr. Speaker, on March 13, I asked the Minister of Justice if he would order a full review of the Access to Information Act as recommended by the information commissioner in his 10th anniversary report. In response, the Minister of Justice said that he was considering such a review and hoped to come forward with reforms in due course.

In 1986-87 I was a member of the justice committee which made an extensive review of this act. It issued a report entitled: "Open and Shut" which made 87 recommendations for amendment. Unfortunately, none of those recommendations were implemented by the former Conservative government.

Recently the information commissioner made similar recommendations in three documents entitled: "The Access to Information Act: 10 Years On"; "The Access to Information Act: A Critical Review"; and "Information Technology and Open Government".

The basic principle of this act is that Canadians should have the right to information about their government and to information compiled and held by the government. Of course, this is information paid for with taxpayers' money.

For years prior to the Access to Information Act the government's general policy was to say no whenever information was requested and only to say yes by exception. The purpose of the Access to Information Act was of course to reverse this process. There would be exceptions, of course, for national security, for privacy and for cabinet confidence, but the general rule was to make information available.

The "Open and Shut" report concluded that the act had major shortcomings and weaknesses which should be corrected. As I said, the committee made 87 recommendations to do that.

Among those recommendations were first, that all government institutions, including much of our parliamentary process, be included under the act.

Second, it was recommended that all crown corporations except the CBC be included under the act. These institutions are not included under the act at the present time.

Third, it was recommended that all persons in Canada, not just citizens and residents, have access to the act.

Fourth, it was recommended to entrench the status of the information co-ordinators who are present in every department to facilitate the operation of the act and to give those co-ordinators senior rank in the departments.

Fifth, there were several recommendations with respect to the exemptions. We said that the exemptions should be subject to a significant injury test. We also recommended narrowing certain exemptions.

With respect to the cabinet confidence exemption we said that it should be covered under the act, but subject to a class tested discretionary exemption. In other words, cabinet confidences would not automatically be outside the scope of the act.

We also said that the information commissioner should have the power to issue certain binding orders in some cases, although generally he would still act by recommendation only. We made recommendations that the social insurance number be restricted in its use by outside agencies.

We recommended that the time for answering information requests be reduced from 30 to 20 days. We also recommended that there be legislation to protect whistle blowers within the Government of Canada.

Those are some of the recommendations which were made in 1986-87 in the "Open and Shut" report. I would like to ask the government again tonight if and when it intends to move on the recommendations made in "Open and Shut" in 1986-87 and also on the recommendations made recently by the information commissioner in his 10-year report.