Debates of March 3rd, 1997

Canada Labour Code

[Alfonso Gagliano, Liberal, Minister of Labour and Deputy Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

moved:

Motion No. 33

That Bill C-66, in Clause 38, be amended by replacing line 13 on page 31 with the following:

"given pursuant to a provision of this Part, other than subsection 49(1); and"

[Réal Ménard, Bloc, Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, QC]

moved:

Motion No. 34

That Bill C-66, in Clause 39, be amended by replacing lines 16 to 42 on page 31 with the following:

"39. (1) Subsection 89(1) is replaced by the following:

1. (1) No employer shall declare or cause a lockout and no trade union shall declare or authorize a strike unless the employer or trade union has given notice to bargain collectively under this Part.

(2) Paragraph 89(2) (b) of the Act is replaced by the following: b ) the requirement of subsection (1) has been met in respect of the bargaining unit of which the employee is a member.''

[Alfonso Gagliano, Liberal, Minister of Labour and Deputy Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

moved:

Motion No. 35

That Bill C-66, in Clause 39, be amended by replacing line 20 on page 31 with the following: d ) twenty-one days have elapsed after the date''

[Réal Ménard, Bloc, Hochelaga—Maisonneuve, QC]

moved:

Motion No. 39

That Bill C-66, in Clause 42, be amended by a ) replacing lines 4 and 5 on page 33 with the following: d .1) where the requirement of subsection 89(1) has been met, cancel or'' b ) replacing lines 13 and 14 on page 33 with the following: d .2) where the requirement of subsection 89(1) has been met and the''

Motion No. 44

That Bill C-66, in Clause 45, be amended by replacing lines 42 and 43 on page 35 with the following:

"was entitled before the requirement of subsection 89(1) was met;"

Mr. Speaker, I do not know if you realize it, but we are coming to an extremely crucial and decisive point in today's debate. Until now, we were tempted to be indulgent and conciliatory, but I ask the government to take note that we are entering a period during which we will toughen our stand.

There are limits to what the official opposition can put up with. We may live in a society of law, we may be civilized people, we may believe in the virtues of dialogue, but the fact remains that the government has gone too far. It has gone much farther than what the official opposition can ever put up with. Here I want to directly address, through you, Mr. Speaker, the parliamentary secretary.

The first irritant, and I hope that the parliamentary secretary fully understands what we are talking about, is the 72 hour prior notice, an expression that means something important. Imagine, this takes the form of an obligation. We do not know where this came from, because it was not in the old labour code and, to our knowledge, and we were watchful, this was not asked for by the witnesses.

Moreover, I saw in the ministerial notes that were communicated to us that it is claimed to be a consensus in the Sim report. I hope the government will be able to give us some sources, some evidence, because we will be in the unfortunate obligation to question the integrity, I would even say, the honesty of the government, with regard to its assessment of consensus.

I would like to make a demonstration that will have an premise, a development and a conclusion, as we were taught in the good old days of classical college. Starting from the beginning, I will try to describe the process to you.

Fourth months before the expiry of a collective agreement, because this is always what we are talking about ultimately, it is possible to produce a notice, an intent to bargain, which we call a notice to bargain. In the previous code, it was three months, with Bill C-66, it is four. Therefore, the parties must bargain. Of course, we then understand that there either is an agreement or there is not.

When there is no agreement on the items discussed in the bargaining process, the labour minister is first of all notified that there is no agreement, and then he has a number of courses of action. However, the major new element-and this was something the parties had been asking for-is that the conciliation process can be used only once. This new element means that it will no longer be possible to have two stages in the conciliation process.

Do you follow, Mr. Speaker? I am trying to give a clear lecture, and I will to do so till the end.

A notice to bargain is delivered four months before the expiry of the term of the collective agreement. Either there is an agreement or there is not. When no agreement can be reached, a notice of dispute is delivered. After this notice is delivered, sixty days must go by. This is a maximum, unless, by an exceptional procedure, the parties agree otherwise. During that period, the minister appoints an arbitrator, a conciliation commissioner, a conciliation board or an arbitration board.

Also, a report has always to be tabled. Either there is an agreement or there is not. The parties are brought together. The process is well known. The thing that we must keep in mind, as members of Parliament, is that legislators provide for a sixty day period as a maximum. Again, this is unless, by an exceptional procedure, which is not the conventional procedure, the parties agree on a longer period.

If there is no agreement, and it has happened in the past, in Parliament, and in the private sector, during negotiations, there is a 14 day cooling off period, after which the union regains the right to strike. We cannot emphasize enough that strikes carry a price. It is the last resort, the most meaningful one, and workers do not make use of it before all the other options have been exhausted.

Nobody will go on strike before all other alternatives have been exhausted. You are aware of that, Mr. Speaker, even if you tend to be rather conservative. Everybody in the labour relations community knows that. Witnesses have reminded us of that.

Unions have the right to strike once the minister has ruled that the parties are free to exercise their right to strike or to lock out. During a strike, essential services have to be maintained according to the board's orders. But we have here a gap in the process, something that baffles the mind. It is hard to understand the minister's reasoning. Why is it necessary to have a 72 hour notice when it is the Minister of Labour himself, the very Sicilian member for Saint-Léonard, who releases the parties? Parties are free to act only by ministerial consent. How is this a useful addition to the process?

The parties told us in committee that, during the period between the notice of a labour dispute and the time the right to strike is regained, they want to be able, but not forced, to conduct intensive negotiations.

There is a number of tools and options the Minister of Labour can use. For instance, the minister can appoint a conciliation officer or a mediation officer, or opt for a conciliation board or a mediation board.

Mr. Speaker, a gentleman as vigilant as you are must have realized by now that the 72-hour subterfuge, since there are no other words to describe it, is in fact nothing more than a tactic used to weaken the relationship of power. We know full well that this compulsory advance notice gives the opposing party the opportunity to get organized.

Really, it is all in very poor taste. It is incomprehensible. I do not think I am wrong in saying that the NDP supports the position and amendment of the Bloc Quebecois. I must say that we are stunned and dismayed, because, until now, the process had been pretty well received. First, the negotiation process was shortened, because there was only one step left, and it made sense to have a little more time before the expiration notice. Once the notice to bargain was given, the two parties would start to talk to each other and, if no agreement was reached, the 60-day period kicked in and that period of time gave the minister a number of possibilities. In the end, if still no agreement could be reached, the ultimate option had to be considered. And that ultimate option was a strike. Previously, the cooling-off period lasted 7 days; it now is 14 days. But overall, the witnesses did not seem to be against this process. It was pretty well received, but everything is spoiled now.

In fact, I am trying to contain myself, because this 14-day period will turn into a 21-day period according to another amendment included in another group of motions.

I really do not know what the minister was thinking when he came up with these amendments that are not needed to ensure the balance we used to have and that was well received.

We are concerned about the 72-hour period, because-and I will end on this note-72 hours are enough to weaken a relationship of power that took years to build.

We cannot talk about labour relations without mentioning the balance of power that constantly shifts between the union and management.

I will repeat it without any shame-you know that I am a straight talker-72 hours' advance notice is in very bad taste. The parliamentary secretary would gain in stature if he accepted to intercede with the Minister of Labour. Incidentally, we would like to have our greetings passed on to the minister, because we know that he is very interested in our work here. Everybody knows that.

Through you, I would have only one word of advice for the parliamentary secretary and that would be to make aggressive representations and use all his well known speaking skills to ask the government to remove this clause because it completely upsets the balance the bill had almost reached. Without the 72 hours, the process would have been rather well accepted by the parties.

Tobacco Act

[Herb Gray, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Solicitor General of Canada]

Mr. Speaker, an agreement could not be reached under the provisions of Standing Orders 78(1) or 78(2) with respect to the report stage and the third reading stage of Bill C-71, an act to regulate the manufacture, sale, labelling and promotion of tobacco products, to make consequential amendments to another act and to repeal certain acts.

Under the provisions of Standing Order 78(3), I give notice that a minister of the crown will propose at the next sitting of the House a motion to allot a specific number of days or hours for the consideration and disposal of proceedings at the said stages.

The House resumed consideration of Bill C-66, an act to amend the Canada Labour Code (Part I) and the Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act and to make consequential amendments to other acts, as reported (with amendments) from the committee, and of motions in Group No. 6.

Canada Labour Code

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, Mercier, QC]

Mr. Speaker, on this group of motions, I will try to remain calm, but it will not be easy.

This bill, I repeat, is supposed to modernize the Canada Labour Code, to take into account different labour relations, to take into account that relations between unions and employers have changed considerably.

Instead of facilitating negotiations and, should they break down, the exercice of the right to strike or to lock out, which can rapidly lead to a negotiated settlement, this bill makes the rules more rigid and makes negotiating and reaching a settlement even more difficult.

In this regard, it is a dismal failure. And one wonders what prompted the minister to completely overlook what could have improved the conditions under which the right of association and the right to strike can be exercised in Canada.

My colleague from Hochelaga-Maisonneuve spoke about the obligation to give 72 hours' notice before the right to strike can be exercised. For my part, I would like to talk about what comes before. What comes before that is the requirement for unions to exercise their right to strike within 60 days of obtaining such right, otherwise they have to go back to their members for another strike vote. This is the provision of this bill that I find most difficult to understand. I was a negotiator at one time and, when I see this proposal, I wonder if those who thought of it have ever been involved in negotiations.

If a union-and let us not forget that several of these unions are national-has just obtained the right to strike, it will start a negotiation process that could take a long time. If, after nearly 60 days, it has not come to an agreement, what will it do? Will it do everything it can to come to an agreement at the risk of exceeding the 60 day limit and losing the right to strike? No. If it is responsible, it will stop negotiating instead of pursuing the negotiations and trying to find a solution. It will stop negotiating and submit a report that will allow it to win another strike vote.

This 60 day rule will hinder the negotiation process instead of making it easier. It will impede the pursuit of a settlement and force unions to hold more strike votes. In the end, as I was saying, it will make the conditions that can lead to a settlement more rigid, less flexible.

When you know that it is the basis of this bill, when you see that the right to strike or the right to lock out cannot be exercised-and I insist because some disputes end up in a lock-out or a strike and, at the beginning, nobody knows what will come first. When you add to that the 72 hour notice rule, it is even more difficult to understand.

When things start to go wrong in a business and work starts to slow down, as a precautionary measure, the employer may be

tempted to lock his workers out to avoid having to keep paying them to produce less. Let us be honest about that.

No lockout action can be taken without giving notice at least 72 hours in advance. Similarly, a union anxious to exercise its right to strike because bargaining is at a standstill will also be subject to a 72-hour notice provision. Moreover, should no strike occur on the date indicated, a new 72-hour notice will have to be given.

Again, this makes the use of these job actions available to either the employer or the workers rigid. Understandably, everyone wants to prevent strikes and lockouts, but sometimes, on matters of principle or money issues translating into matters of principle, one side or the other figures the only way to get what it wants is to use leverage.

In those circumstances, the rules set out in the labour code must help and facilitate a settlement, and not make things drag on endlessly, get in the way of a settlement or even preclude a settlement that could have been reached had it not been for these rules. The fact of the matter is that we are going to end up with a worse Canada Labour Code than the one we had.

That is quite embarrassing. I guess we could say the minister and the parliamentary secretary will have pie in the face, but in the end those who will be stuck with bad rules and a bad labour code are those in the field, those entitled to these services and the businesses that will have to contend with additional problems.

At committee, we tried to get the point across that it made no common sense but, I will repeat it in this place, the way business was conducted in committee in no way does credit to this government.

Legislation is passed a dozen at a time, but the legislation that is passed has no bearing on the code, is of no use to bargaining parties and is not the type that can be subject to arbitration or to a board decision. When it comes to drafting something that will make up a code, the committee should listen to those concerned and to the official opposition when it has something to say on the matter. We did not set out to embarrass the government because ultimately this is meant to serve the public. We have tried to help the government. But we were literally bulldozed out of the way; there is no other way to describe what happened at the human resources development committee.

When all we have is ten minutes to discuss this important segment of the Canada Labour Code reform at report stage, we have no choice but to raise our voices.

[George Proud, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Labour]

Mr. Speaker, the official opposition has put forward a series of motions that would remove the compulsory conciliation stage in the new requirements for the acquisition of the right to strike and lockout, abolition of the conciliation process, Motion No. 34.

However, before addressing this motion which would allow the parties to acquire the right to strike and lockout at the date of expiration of the collective agreement without having to file a notice of dispute with the minister or to complete the conciliation process, it is important to stress the role of conciliation in the collective bargaining cycle under the Canada Labour Code.

During the extensive consultation process leading up to the introduction of Bill C-66, representatives of labour and management organizations subject to Part I of the code, while critical of lengthy delays in the current conciliation process, found conciliation itself valuable and praised the services offered by the federal mediation and conciliation service.

The labour-management working group did not recommend that compulsory conciliation be abolished as proposed by the official opposition. It requested that the two stage process be replaced by a shorter one stage process which could take various forms. The official opposition is asking us to ignore the labour management consensus which is reflected in the changes included in Bill C-66.

Extending the cooling off period, government Motion No. 35. While the new conciliation process has received general support by labour and management, some parties have expressed concerns with respect to the duration of the cooling off period that the bill will extend from its current 7 days to 14 days. Finding some merit to these concerns, the government proposes to amend Bill C-66 to increase the duration of that period to 21 days. This is the purpose of Motion No. 35.

The cooling off period is designed to give the parties time to evaluate their respective positions and weigh the consequences of a decision to resort to economic sanctions. During this period pressure on both sides is at its peak and there are high expectations of the mediation that may take place.

Given the changes made to the conciliation process and given the fact that some federal businesses are active over a large geographic area and have nationwide bargaining units that can make the logistics of mediation meetings difficult, some have expressed doubts as to whether the 14 day cooling off period as provided for in the bill will be sufficient to give the parties a serious opportunity to settle their dispute and to have a positive impact on the work of the mediator. This amendment will provide a more realistic timeframe for the mediator to discharge his or her mandate.

Motions Nos. 15, 16 and 17, strike and lockout notice. Under Bill C-66 the right to strike and lockout will be required 21 days after the conciliation is completed, subject to the parties meeting

new requirements regarding the holding of a secret ballot vote within the previous 60 days and giving a 72 hour advance notice.

The official opposition has put forward Motions Nos. 15, 16 and 17 which would delete the reference to the 72 hour notice requirement and the obligation to send a new notice if no strike or lockout occurs at the end of the notice period.

The purpose of the new 72 hour notice provision which implements a recommendation of the tax force is twofold. First, it will allow for an orderly shut down or reduction of operations and alleviate the problems of perishables. Second, it will further focus the parties on serious negotiations and should encourage settlement of disputes.

To those unions which have expressed concern that this new requirement will frustrate their right to strike, we want to point out that Bill C-66 will not require that a new notice be given once a strike or lockout action has commenced, even if it is temporarily suspended. Furthermore, when the other sides begins first with a strike or lockout action the requirement will not apply to the other party.

Some other unions, mostly longshore unions, expressed the view that the 72 hour notice will allow an unfair advantage to the shipping companies and agents in the negotiation process, as it will remove the prospect of ships being held captive during a port work stoppage. This position is echoed by the official opposition.

The major economic impact of a port work stoppage is that the port is closed and the fixed capital remains idle. Such a major impact on important investments is a significant pressure point and a reasonable offset for the loss of income employees must incur during a work stoppage.

We believe that the 72 hours notice requirement will provide an appropriate balance between these two competing interests.

Motions Nos. 18 and 23, strikes and lockout votes. The official opposition is proposing two sets of motions relating to the strike and lockout vote requirement. With Motion No. 18 the vote requirement would simply be removed from the bill, whereas with Motions Nos. 20 to 23 the statute would require a vote but include no conditions for its conduct and no means for voters to challenge its validity.

It is important to stress that with the exception of the current Canada Labour Code secret ballot strike votes are mandatory in all Canadian jurisdictions as a prerequisite for legal strike action.

Although the vast majority of unions subject to the code already hold secret ballot votes before declaring a strike in the absence of a statutory requirement, employees in the bargaining unit who are not union members may be excluded from participating in a major decision which directly affects them.

Second, strike votes are not always held in a timely fashion. In some cases a strike mandate is acquired early in the bargaining process as a means of demonstrating solid employee support for union demands but which may not be a true reflection of support for a work stoppage.

The conditions for a valid vote specified in Bill C-66 reflect the recommendations of the Sims task force. They are similar to provisions found in a number of provincial statutes and they are not onerous.

The vote must be held by secret ballot among all employees in the bargaining unit or among all employers in the association within 60 days prior to strike or lockout action. Eligible voters must be given reasonable opportunity to participate in the vote.

Finally, the union or employer's association must obtain majority support among the employees or employers who participate in the vote.

It is hard to imagine that any democratically held vote would fail to meet these basic requirements. These conditions will simply ensure that such votes are timely, fairly conducted and are based on the entire workplace involved in this dispute.

Government Motion No. 19, extension of the 60 day vote period. Concerns have been raised that the 60 day period for holding a strike vote may cause difficulties in some cases, particularly where employees in the bargaining unit are dispersed across the country or do not work at a specific location.

To address these legitimate concerns, the government has introduced a motion to allow the 60 day validity period for a strike or lockout vote to be extended by written agreement of the parties.

This amendment is consistent with the general approach in Bill C-66 supported by labour and management that legislation should be flexible enough to meet the specific needs of the parties.

Government Motion No. 33, no strike or lockout during the term of the collective agreement. Another amendment that would further improve Bill C-66 is Motion No. 33 which will clarify the scope of the prohibition set out in the new section 88.1.

The only exception to the prohibition on strikes and lockout during the term of the collective agreement under section 88.1 as currently drafted is where a notice to bargain has been served pursuant to a reopener provision in the party's collective agreement.

However, there are other situations contemplated by the code that allow for notice to bargain and therefore full negotiations to take place before the expiry of a collective agreement.

There are also some instances in the current code and in what will be the amended code when the board has discretion to authorize a party to give notice to bargain other than during the last four months of a collective agreement.

This motion adjusts the language of section 88.1 to ensure that where notice to bargain is authorized to be served during the term of an agreement, the parties may acquire the right to strike or lockout once they have completed a conciliation process and met the other statutory prerequisite.

I would ask members to support this motion as well as Motions No. 19 and 35.

[Osvaldo Nunez, Bloc, Bourassa, QC]

Mr. Speaker, Bill C-66 provides that the right to strike or lockout will be subject to the holding of a secret ballot vote during the previous 60 days and the giving of a notice of at least 72 hours.

This is a very anti-union and unfair provision for workers and unions. The right to strike is being subjected to so many conditions and restrictions that the next step will be to eliminate this right.

First, the right to strike and the right to lockout are put on the same level. However, the right to strike is exercised by a group of workers. There has to be a majority vote. But in the case of a lockout, there is no vote. A company official decides when to lock employees out, which is unfair.

Then, a secret ballot vote must be held. This means that the union must convince workers that the offer is not acceptable, that the ultimate recourse against the employer is to take a strike vote. This is not easy for unions. During my years with the FTQ, the Quebec federation of labour, we had to convince the majority of workers of the need, at some point, for a strike vote.

Meanwhile, the employer who works every day with a group of employees may sometime exert undue and unwarranted pressure to convince them of the opposite, of the fact that they must not go on strike, that working conditions are acceptable, that the offer is an excellent one, etc.

Worse still is the fact that, to have the right to strike, the vote must be held at most 60 days before the strike. This means that if negotiations last for months, and even years, several consecutive strike votes will have to be held. This is unfair for unions. Unions should have the right to assess the situation and to set a date for a strike vote. The union should also be the one deciding when the vote will apply and when the strike will begin.

Not only must this secret ballot vote be held within 60 days of the strike, but an advance notice of at least 72 hours must be given to the employer. This is going too far. One wonders what will happen to the right to strike in Canada, a right that is provided under the Canada Labour Code. For all intents and purposes, it will be almost impossible to go on strike with so many restrictions.

There are conventions under the International Labour Organization that recognize the workers' right to strike. This provision, introduced by the government as an amendment to the Canada Labour Code, goes against the ILO principles that recognize the right to strike.

I wanted to express my absolute opposition to these very unfair and anti-union provisions.

[Dale Johnston, Reform, Wetaskiwin, AB]

Mr. Speaker, the member who just sat down tried to claim that these members are anti-union. When I read through their recommendations where they have objection to secret ballot votes, I have to wonder if maybe their amendments are not anti-democratic. What better way to express a view on anything than through a secret ballot.

We talked earlier in other amendments about undue pressure being put on either one side or the other to come to a decision that was considered to be harassment, undue pressure or otherwise excessive convincing. I do not think we can have it both ways. We cannot say that this group is not allowed to express their rights but this group is allowed to express their rights and to put on whatever pressure is necessary so that they can come out with a favourable outcome of their vote.

What are they suggesting, that they have a show of hands only or a mail in ballot? A secret vote is the only way to go.

The government has made some amendments that are worthy of support. I have recommended to our caucus that we support them as they seem to make good sense and are not in any way confrontational. In this particular area we should be doing everything we can to seek a balance and to make sure that one side does not have all the ammunition and the other side just has a shield.

Rather than going on and on in this regard, we would be willing to support Motions Nos. 19, 33 and 35. However I am unable to come up with the proper rationale to support any of the Bloc amendments.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Milliken)]

Is the House ready for the question?

[Some hon. members]

Question.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Milliken)]

The question is on Motion No. 15. Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the motion?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[Some hon. members]

No.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Milliken)]

All those in favour will please say yea.

[Some hon. members]

Yea.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Milliken)]

All those opposed will please say nay.

[Some hon. members]

Nay.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Milliken)]

In my opinion the nays have it.

And more than five members having risen:

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Milliken)]

The recorded division on the motion stands deferred. The vote on Motion No. 15 applies to Motions Nos. 16 and 17.

The next question is on Motion No. 18. Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the motion?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[Some hon. members]

No.

[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Milliken)]

All those in favour will please say yea.

[Some hon. members]

Yea.