Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to debate Bill C-51, the anti-terrorism act, 2015. This is obviously an important bill in this time of troubles around the world and in Canada.
The legislation before us today is comprised of five elements relating to national security. I will limit my comments to the proposed amendments to Division 9 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, or IRPA. Those amendments are in part 5 of the bill. I am also going to comment on other important aspects of the bill that define some of the threat disruption activities in which CSIS can engage. That is contained in part 4 of the bill.
Since we took office, our Conservative government has made the safety of Canadians a special priority.
Since being elected in 2006, we have spent a lot of effort as a government in putting a focus on keeping Canadians safe. Specifically, we have taken strong action to crack down on terrorist, both at home and abroad.
It is clear that the international jihadist movement is one dimension of terrorist threats that we face, and that movement has declared war on Canada and her allies, that is western liberal democracies. That is why we have taken strong action under the leadership of our Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and put forward this legislation.
We have made it a criminal offence to go overseas to engage in terrorist activities. We have created provisions to strip citizenship from those convicted of terrorist offences. We have created mechanisms for individuals to sue state sponsors of terrorism, like Iran. We have also declared war on the barbaric caliphate, or the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL.
We are doing even more today, denying access to Canadian territory to non-citizens who pose a threat to national security and maintaining the safety of Canadians among the objectives set forth in IRPA.
Generally, determining the admissibility to Canada of non-citizens is made by immigration officers, or members of the Immigration and Refugee Board, using information that can be made public.
Some non-citizens are found inadmissible on the basis of serious grounds, such as national security, human or international rights violations, and serious or organized criminality. In such cases it is sometimes necessary to rely on classified information to support a finding of inadmissibility.
The Division 9 of IRPA establishes a mechanism to allow the government to use and protect classified information in those immigration proceedings by allowing part of the proceedings to be held in a closed setting.
Under IRPA, classified information includes security or criminal intelligence information and information obtained in confidence from a source in Canada or from a foreign government that is protected from public disclosure if its release would be injurious to national security or the safety of any person.
Also, Division 9 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act includes three mechanisms that allow the use and protection of classified information during proceedings. Section 77 provides the authority as it relates to security certificates before the federal court. Section 86 provides authority as it relates to applications for non-disclosure before the Immigration and Refugee Board. Finally, section 87 provides the authority as it relates to applications for non-disclosure in the context of judicial reviews before the Federal Court.
Closed portions of the proceedings are not open to either non-citizens or their lawyers, and the public may not participate in order to protect the classified information. During the closed portions of these proceedings, a judge appointed special advocate, who is non-governmental and security cleared, represents the interest of the non-citizen.
Special advocates are empowered to cross-examine and make submissions to the court. They are empowered to challenge the government's claim that the disclosure of information would be injurious to national security or would endanger the safety of any person and, with the permission of a judge, exercise any other powers necessary to protect the interests of the non-citizen.
Division 9 cases also include open, public proceedings in which the non-citizen and his or her lawyer can participate. In this open part of the proceedings, a summary of the classified information is produced to allow the non-citizen to be reasonably informed of the allegations against him or her.
In some instances, Division 9 cases have involved a significant amount of classified information, some of which was not useful to the government to prove its inadmissibility allegations or to the non-citizens to be reasonably informed of the case against them. Hence, the anti-terrorism act of 2015 includes measures to clarify the classified information that would form the security certificate cases before the Federal Court and cases involving applications for non-disclosure before the Immigration and Refugee Board.
This information includes the following: it has to be relevant to the case; it has to be information on which the case is based; and it would allow the person to be reasonably informed of the case against him or her. In other words, the government would file only information and other evidence that it relies upon to make its case, and provide relevant information that is useful to the non-citizen.
Another important step we are taking in this legislation involves the appeal and judicial review of an order to publicly disclose classified information. Currently, an appeal or judicial review of a disclosure order may be available only at the end of a proceeding. Even if the government successfully seeks to have a disclosure order overturned at the end of the proceeding, it may be too late as the injury to national security may already have occurred or a person's safety may have already been endangered. While the government could seek to withdraw this information from the case to mitigate the risk of injury, this might not always be possible or doing so could dramatically weaken the case. Bill C-51 therefore seeks to allow the government to appeal or have the court review orders for public disclosure during Division 9 proceedings rather than at the end.
Let us be clear. The proposed amendments to IRPA would facilitate and reinforce Division 9 proceedings. The Division 9 regime, while exceptional, provides for a fair and constitutional process. In fact, in 2014 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of Division 9 when it found the statutory framework to be consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. When considering whether the government can protect information in a given case, the judge must ensure that it does not impede a fair process and that the non-citizen is reasonably informed of the case against him or her. To make this decision, the judge has the discretion to ask special advocates for submissions and to communicate with special advocates to allow them to make these submissions. When taken together, these new provisions would preserve the discretion of the judge to ensure fairness.
Ultimately, the objective of the process is the removal from Canada of non-citizens who are inadmissible on the most serious grounds and who may pose a serious threat to Canada and Canadians. Overall, these amendments would ensure that Division 9 proceedings continue to be fair, while offering more robust protections for classified information.
Our government takes the obligation to protect public safety very seriously. We are also determined to respect the rights of individuals under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and to meet our international human rights obligations.
Now I want to talk about some of the threat-disruption activities in which CSIS could engage because of changes being proposed in this bill. I will just give one example.
A young Canadian activist becomes disenchanted with Canada, and he has reviewed some YouTube videos, for example, and has listened to some influential people in his community. Individuals within his local place of worship have advised CSIS that he is planning to travel overseas to engage in terrorist activities.
Currently, in this scenario, without this piece of legislation, CSIS can investigate but cannot do anything to stop the individual from travelling. The furthest CSIS can go is to advise the RCMP that it believes the person is about to commit an offence and the RCMP could launch its own investigation, which could take several days. Under the anti-terrorism act of 2015, CSIS could actually engage with a trusted friend or relative to speak with this individual to advise against travelling for terrorist purposes. Further, CSIS officials could meet with the individual to advise him that they know what he is planning to do and what the consequences of taking further action would be. Members can see how this could lead to preventing terrorist activities and why it is important to have that.
Here is another example before I wrap up my remarks. Let us say that CSIS learns through its intelligence activities that a planned shipment of chemicals may be used in a terrorist attack on a Canadian business operating in a foreign country. The exact timing is vague or unknown. Currently, CSIS can share this information with the foreign government and other foreign partners, and a travel alert could potentially be issued by foreign affairs. That is all it could do.
With the anti-terrorism act, 2015, CSIS could actually engage in a joint operation with a foreign partner to disrupt the shipment. For example, the shipment could be rerouted so that it is not delivered into the hands of terrorists.
I will give a third example. A Canadian ally warns CSIS that foreign spies are planning to meet with a Canadian avionics firm. CSIS investigates and determines that the spies are posing as businessmen in order to purchase telemetry equipment. This dual-use technology is a civilian application in flight test programs but is also used in ballistic missile targeting. Under the current laws, as part of its investigations, CSIS can interview officials from the Canadian company to gather information and ask the CBSA to check the parts' paperwork at the time of export to determine if there are customs violations. That is all it can do.
With Bill C-51 enacted, CSIS could seek and receive a warrant to intercept the equipment and alter it so that it would not have any suitability for non-civilian applications.
These measures could save lives. These measures could disrupt terrorist organizations from terrorizing innocent populations. That is why they are very important.
I will wrap up. I have heard some exaggerations on the part of the opposition and some fabrications about what is in this bill. Canadians understand the importance of security and countering terrorist threats at home and abroad. That is why, if we talk to Canadians about what it is actually in the bill, the reasonable measures within it that put our security agency, CSIS, on par with what other security agencies do around the world, they support it. They understand the importance of these measures and the importance of giving them some additional powers that still respect the rights and freedoms we have in this country.
As the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and many of my colleagues have said, and as I have told people in my constituency of Etobicoke—Lakeshore, there is no liberty without security. Security is fundamental to our freedoms, and that is why it is important that we have strong security measures in this country.
I call on the opposition parties and members throughout the House to support this important piece of legislation.
