Thank you.
I'm here on behalf of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. To my immediate left is our project director of public safety, Alexi Wood.
I have three points to make. The first is that mandatory minimum sentences are capable of producing very serious injustice. One of the most effective examples is the current plight of Saskatchewan farmer Robert Latimer. For ending the life of his severely disabled daughter, Mr. Latimer was charged with and convicted of second-degree murder. And for that, he drew the automatic sentence of life in jail with no chance for parole for ten years. What's particularly troubling about this case are the facts. As found by the judge, Mr. Latimer committed this deed to relieve what he saw as the unremitting, terrible pain his young daughter was suffering. In the judge's words, Mr. Latimer was motivated solely by his love and compassion for his little girl. As a result, the judge gave Mr. Latimer a constitutional exemption from the operation of the mandatory minimum and gave him a much lighter sentence. The other tryers of fact, the jury, recommended he be eligible for parole after one year. So those who were finding the facts, who heard all the evidence and saw all the witnesses, urged a course of leniency.
Now, it isn't necessary to excuse mercy killing in general, or Robert Latimer in particular, in order to be outraged by the current punishment this man is suffering. Most second-degree murders are committed out of hate, greed, or at least selfishness. It is repugnant that a compassionate father who breaks the law out of love should suffer the same penalty as a malevolent robber who breaks the law out of greed. In the opinion of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, this situation is nothing less than a national disgrace, and the culprit is mandatory minimum sentences that permit no flexibility, that rigidly impose a sentence regardless of whatever peculiar or particular circumstances may apply. That is the first case.
I have another case to illustrate the nature of the injustices this is capable of producing. In 1994 the Ontario Court of Appeal reduced the jail sentence of a prisoner who had been convicted of discharging a firearm with intent to cause harm. They reduced this sentence from 12 months to six months because in the opinion of the court he had an exemplary record previously and he was acting in a situation of high stress that required split-second decision-making. The prisoner, it turns out, was a police officer. The person at whom he unloaded his firearm was a burglar he was chasing. He grazed his arm.
Now, if that man had come up for sentencing today, he would have to serve no less than four years. Thanks to the grace of Bill C-10, he could have to serve five years. I find it inconceivable that even the most ardent proponents of mandatory minimum sentences would wish that kind of outcome on that police officer.
How does this happen? It's because simplistic solutions such as mandatory minimum sentences inevitably encounter complex reality, and you can't always make them fit. That's the reason why this is such an abomination.
That's the first point. The next two points will run much more quickly.
The second point is that even as mandatory minimums cause a lot of harm, they also produce virtually nothing for public safety. One of the reasons is probably quite obvious, and that is that, as studies have demonstrated, the greatest number of people in the public don't have the remotest idea what crimes are accompanied by what mandatory minimums.They simply don't know. The more you add to it with all the fancy tables—if you're convicted this many times, and that many times.... Whoever thinks that any member of the public is going to know this?
How in the world is anything supposed to deter the commission of crime if the people it's supposed to deter don't know it exists? Small wonder that there is a wealth of literature that reaches the conclusion that these mandatory minimums do not contribute to public safety.
The third and last point is that there are alternatives to mandatory minimums. If a judge imposes an excessively lenient sentence, there is recourse to appeal. And prosecutors have appealed, and courts of appeal have increased sentences in circumstances that warranted it. It has happened on a number of occasions; this is no secret.
Consider the difference. If a sentence is too lenient, it's subject to appeal; if a mandatory minimum in a particular set of circumstances is too harsh, there's virtually nothing you can do about it, except perhaps pray. That is an unacceptable double standard in our justice system.
The final point I would like to make about the alternative is that for those few crimes that are so horrendous it's inconceivable that they wouldn't be worthy of this mandatory minimum—such as murder, for example—one way to deal with them is by what we call a “presumptive minimum”. That is, you might provide—for murder, let's say—life in prison, but say presumptively “unless a court finds exceptional circumstances”. That signals to the court that this minimum should apply unless the circumstances are genuinely compelling.
There's no reason to make it a conclusive mandatory that is so insensitive to peculiar differences in situations. There's simply no earthly reason to do it.
To sum up, Mr. Chairman, we say that mandatory minimums should not increase. Indeed, they should decrease, first, because they are capable of producing very serious injustice, and have; secondly, because they contribute virtually zilch to public safety; and thirdly, because there are viable alternatives to using them.
All of which is, as always, respectfully submitted.
Thank you.