Bill C-16 (Historical)

An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act

This enactment amends the Canada Elections Act to provide that, subject to an earlier dissolution of Parliament, a general election must be held on the third Monday in October in the fourth calendar year following polling day for the last general election, with the first general election after this enactment comes into force being held on Monday, October 19, 2009.
The enactment also provides that the Chief Electoral Officer may recommend an alternate day if the day set for polling is not suitable.

Canada Elections Act

[Gerald Keddy, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margaret's, NS]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to rise in the House today, the first day that Parliament is back in session, to speak on fixed election dates. I have listened to some of the debate in the House, not all of it, with a bit of chagrin really at some of the misleading comments made by some of the Liberal members, in particular the member for Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine.

We all have an obligation in the House to look at the legislation that a government puts on the order paper, and to offer valid criticisms and amendments to that legislation if we feel the legislation is not doing what it set out to do, or if it is legislation we cannot support. Some of the comments that I am hearing amaze me. Members will say that they have no intention of supporting this piece of legislation, but when they are asked a direct question, they are not really certain what their positions are. They cannot have it both ways.

I was elected on June 2, 1997. Three years later, on November 27, 2000, there was another election. Barely three and a half years after that, on June 28, 2004, there was another election. Less than two years after that, on January 23, 2006, there was another election. There were four elections in barely nine years. If there had been fixed terms, we would have saved the people of Canada the full cost of one election, over a quarter of a billion dollars. That quarter of a billion dollars could have been spent on government programs across this country, on very seriously needed infrastructure, on education, on health care, on a myriad of important issues that every man and woman in this chamber face in his or her riding.

To promote the idea that the system cannot be changed, as some of the Liberal members have, is fundamentally flawed. Of course we can change the system. We need to change the system. Before I was elected to the House, one of the first questions I was asked was about four year terms. Back in 1997 I supported four year terms. I have supported four year terms the entire nine years that I have been a parliamentarian. Fixed terms would be good for the people of Canada. Fixed terms would be a positive move to put more responsibility on government. It does not take responsibility away from government. It makes government much more responsible. It takes away one of the government's tools to manipulate the system.

It should be noted that when we started talking about fixed election dates, the Liberals said, “You talk about fixed election dates when you are in opposition. It is an election promise. If you ever become government, it will never happen”. The Conservatives are the Government of Canada. We have introduced Bill C-16 and we will bring in fixed election dates unless Parliament sees fit not to. I would be shocked if any member, for purely partisan reasons, would vote against a bill of this quality.

This bill will deal with a number of issues that Canadian citizens face and will help make Parliament work better. There are some major advantages to this piece of legislation: number one is the issue of fairness; number two is transparency and predictability; number three is improved governance; and number four is higher rates of voter turnout. All those issues, issues that affect the governance of this place, will be assisted and improved under the bill. To say otherwise is misleading.

To listen to the argument that somehow this would change the powers of the Governor General is even further misleading. The power of the Governor General and the power of a confidence motion in the House are inextricably linked. The power to dissolve Parliament is the historical prerogative of the Crown and is considered essential to the principle of responsible government. It is expressly conferred on the Governor General in section 50 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Section 50 of the Constitution Act, 1867, provides:

Every House of Commons shall continue for Five Years from the Day of the Return of the Writs for choosing the House (subject to be sooner dissolved by the Governor General), and no longer.

Because we are changing the length of the term, the proposed bill has to explicitly state that:

--nothing in this section affects the powers of the Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General’s discretion.

The only reason that is in there is to enable a government, if it loses the confidence of the House, to go to the people of Canada. If the government were unable to do that, we would be in gridlock. We would be totally ineffective and unable to govern the country.

I listened to the Liberal members speak as though this was some kind of figment of our imagination, that the only other country in the world that had four year terms was the United States of America and that somehow there was the old argument that the Conservatives were somehow cozying up to the Americans. It is absolutely unfair and untrue.

The reality is that a number of other countries have fixed terms such as Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and last, but not least, the United States. Imagine that, all those countries have fixed elections dates and they still have democratic states.

There are countries that have a fixed term, but allow for more of a degree of flexibility. There is the fixed term of four years and the government has two months from the day to call its election.

It is a very similar system to the one proposed. Those countries include: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy and Spain. This is not something new that is being thrust upon the Canadian public. It is an idea that has been around for a very long time. It should help to bring some credibility back to the Parliament of Canada. It should help to increase voter turnout.

We have had a great deal of discussion before the bill was tabled and we will continue to have discussion with the tabling and at committee. The whole point is of a fixed election date. The next one would be October 19, 2009.

This is an important issue and I hope every member in the chamber will find time to speak to it.

There is much more to say, but I will try to wrap up. We have an opportunity to take one of the primary tools that past prime ministers in the country have used like a club. They have gone to the people before their five years were up and every political party has suffered from that. I think the Parliament of Canada has suffered from it.

For the first we are having a democratic debate on four year terms. This is the first Prime Minister who is willing to give up that huge tool in his tool chest and yet we are debating that in the House. This is somehow up for discussion. This will level the playing field, it will give democracy more of an opportunity to work and it will be a good thing for the public of Canada.

[Randy Kamp, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in the debate at second reading on Bill C-16, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act. I am splitting my time with the hon. member for South Shore—St. Margaret's.

During the election campaign I heard a lot from constituents, as I think most of us did, about cynicism and distrust of the political process. In my opinion, the measures contained in this bill are part of a package of electoral reforms that should go a long way toward addressing the democratic deficit that most Canadians are experiencing. I want to thank the Minister for Democratic Reform for bringing it forward.

I want to do just a couple of things in the short time that I have. I want to speak briefly about the benefits that I see in fixed election dates and then address some of the objections that have been raised, but first let me put the bill in some kind of context.

As a member of Parliament from British Columbia, I am particularly pleased to support this legislation because Bill C-16 was modelled after provincial fixed election dates legislation. In fact, on my anniversary, May 17, 2005, in British Columbia for the very first time in Canada a provincial election took place on a date set by law. It was not a date set by a premier or a prime minister to work to his or her advantage. That breakthrough was the result of Bill 7 which was passed in 2001 which amended the constitution act to provide for a fixed date for general elections every four years.

In its terms, the act provided that subject to the right of the lieutenant governor to prorogue or dissolve the legislative assembly as he or she sees fit, a general election had to occur on May 17, 2005 and subsequently on the second Tuesday in May in the fourth year following the most recently held general election. That means we know already that the next provincial election in B.C. will be held on May 12, 2009.

Although British Columbia was the first province to enact this kind of fixed election date legislation, other provinces have followed. Newfoundland and Labrador passed its election dates bill in 2004 and Ontario passed similar legislation in 2005. Other provincial governments are actively considering fixed election dates legislation. In fact, throughout the world this kind of legislation is quite common, in Chile, Costa Rica, South Korea, the Netherlands, the United States, Sweden, Switzerland and other countries.

Some argue that in the Westminster parliamentary system flexible election timing is a necessary element in case a government loses the confidence of Parliament and therefore a fixed election date system is incompatible. However, it is important to note that legislation that is similar to ours appears to be working well in New Zealand, Scotland, and Wales, all of which have the Westminster system of government. The legislation in British Columbia and Ontario allows for the possibility of early dissolution, and the legislation before us today is modelled on that provincial legislation.

Before discussing what I see as some of the benefits of this legislation, let me answer the question that I am sure members have been wanting to ask: How has British Columbia's fixed election dates worked and has it been a positive change? The answer in my opinion is an emphatic yes.

Let me mention a number of what I see as positive outcomes. First of all, as Henry Milner said in his study that we talked about just briefly here, “Why should the party in power have a special advantage in planning electoral strategy due to its inside knowledge of when the next election will take place? Why should its leaders be permitted to time an election to exploit conditions favourable to their re-election?”

It is commonly thought that governments can manipulate economic policy enough so that they face voters at the most advantageous time. With election dates known in advance, it becomes more obvious when governments go on a spending spree to bribe voters with their own money. Of course this government will not do that, but previous governments provided plenty of examples of this practice.

Second, it decentralizes power. Canadians know that in our system of government the prime minister has considerable power. Political power, according to Donald Savoie in his book, is without equal in the western democracies. Our Prime Minister wants to re-balance that power. This legislation which would limit his ability to call an election at his discretion is a step in that direction.

Third, this kind of legislation makes the process more efficient in at least a couple of ways. It allows those setting the government's legislative program in parliamentary committees to better plan their work agenda. It is always a frustration of parliamentarians and probably to those who observe our work, to see perfectly good legislation die in committee or on the order paper because of an election which was unexpectedly called. To some extent fixed election dates should improve this.

Also, election planning would be more efficient. It is expected that fixed dates for elections will reduce administrative costs because officials will be able to start their work well in advance. An elections B.C. information officer is quoted as saying that the fixed election date “enabled us to plan and administer the election much better. Electoral district officers had the time to find facilities and train staff so that the election was very successful”.

Fourth, another benefit is that it should reduce voter cynicism and increase voter turnout. In an Environics poll in 2004, 81% of Canadians preferred that elections be held at specific and fixed times instead of whenever the party in power wanted to call them. Anything that reduces cynicism and increases confidence in the political process is a good thing and it should increase voter turnout. Also, if voters know well in advance when an election will be, particularly seniors or students who have seasonal issues, it should allow them to participate.

Fifth, it should increase the quantity and quality of candidates and volunteers as well. If potential candidates can plan well in advance, as some of my colleagues have said, especially those with family or career obligations, fixed election dates should attract more and better candidates who are able to plan for what is coming perhaps a year or more in the future. It should also allow potential campaign volunteers to plan their schedules to be able to participate.

Let me address criticisms which have been raised to fixed election dates.

Some say that it will create a series of lame duck governments especially in the last year of the term. The government would know when the term was going to end and would wind down its agenda and not do anything. I do not understand that logic. I would have thought that if a government knew an election was coming it would beef up its political agenda and would make sure it was doing as much as it could do in preparation for that. In British Columbia there was absolutely no evidence that the government in power was in any way a lame duck. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that the Government of Canada would be any less effective with the establishment of fixed election dates.

Some have said that it is simply illusory legislation, in other words, that the prime minister would still be able to call an election at any time before the fixed date, so it is really not a fixed date. We recently had that discussion in this place.

It is important to point out that Bill C-16 was modelled on provincial legislation for what was called, and we are calling, fixed election dates. In British Columbia the premier retains the ability to advise dissolution before the stipulated date should it be necessary to a loss of confidence. This is required in order to maintain the fundamentals of responsible government within the Westminster system. Those who seem to be opposed--or maybe they are not opposed; we could not quite tell from the recent comments we heard here--I do not know if they want to do away with the Westminster system, but if we want to maintain it, this is the kind of mechanism we have to have.

I am fairly certain there are few here who would be prepared to champion the constitutional changes necessary to create a rigid system that did not permit in any circumstances a Parliament to be dissolved before the scheduled fixed date. As we saw with the May 17, 2005 election in British Columbia, the premier did not call an election before that date. I think he would have been punished if he had.

Some say it is going to result in an extended campaign. Some have suggested that if we know the year the campaign is coming the campaigning will start a year in advance. Perhaps this is something that does need to be addressed. The negative effect of this can be controlled somewhat with proper spending limits and legislated time restraints and so on, and also with the right election date. We are setting the date of October 19, 2009 as the date of the next general election, with the following election being held on the third Monday in October four calendar years hence.

In conclusion, I am proud as a British Columbian to support Bill C-16 because fixed election dates legislation has been shown to work well in B.C. I hope members from all parties will join me in supporting this bill so that Canadians can join the citizens of mature democracies around the world and vote in elections that have fixed dates in the future.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Mr. Speaker, there are several ways. One of the ways would be, while not limiting the Governor General's power and authority to dissolve Parliament at his or her discretion upon recommendation of a prime minister, to include clauses that would actually specify the reasons or the justification that a prime minister could legally have to recommend to the Governor General premature dissolution of Parliament.

We would need to actually specify the reasons with which a prime minister would be able to go to the Governor General prior to the date that has been fixed under the bill to recommend premature dissolution. It might be that it would not be a vote of confidence. Would that not be novel? It might be that it would not be a confidence vote because maybe the party that is in power has suddenly gone through the roof in the polls and knows that there is something bad coming down the pipe that maybe nobody else knows about, so maybe it should call an election now.

Nothing in Bill C-16 would stop that party, which is now the ruling party, from doing exactly what it accused and denounced the Liberal Party of doing when we were in power. We would want to look very carefully at including amendments that would limit the reasons that a prime minister could give to the Governor General to recommend an early dissolution of Parliament.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is interesting, talking about electoral reform, because Bill C-16 has absolutely nothing to do with electoral reform. If in fact it had something to do with electoral reform, it would then be proposing an amendment to our Constitution to limit the authority of the Governor General and therefore that of the Prime Minister to call an election at any time. Therefore, I have a real problem with this. I want to see the bill go to committee so that we can amend it.

If we are in fact for real fixed elections, and Bill C-16 is about real fixed elections, it would then mean going to all of the provinces for a constitutional amendment in order to limit the authority, the power and the royal prerogative of the Governor General to dissolve Parliament at any time at her or his discretion.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I find it quite interesting that the hon. member will read one quote from Henry Milner, but not mention the fact that Henry Milner clearly points out that there is first, a fixed election date, a true fixed election date, but there is no possibility for premature elections.

Second, there are flexible fixed dates, where one knows where the actual election will take place because in the constitution it says every three years on the third Monday of the third month, or every four years, et cetera. That allows for a mechanism for premature dissolution of the parliament or the national assembly. That is called flexible fixed. That was the point I made.

When the Conservative government tabled Bill C-16 and claimed to this House and to Canadians that it is about fixed election dates, it is about no such thing.

If the government wishes to say it is about flexible fixed or fixed flexible dates where premature elections can happen because the Governor General's power to dissolve parliament would not in any way be diminished by this bill, that is factual. Anything else is not factual.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

One of the members just suggested that I look under criminal. I think that is Conservative too.

Let us look at the issue of making premature elections more difficult. If one in fact were to allow for premature elections, which Bill C-16 allows for, then the issue is whether Bill C-16 in any way, shape or form would make it difficult for a Canadian federal government to call a premature election. The answer is that nothing in this section affects the power of the Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General's discretion. That is the long answer. The short answer is that nothing in Bill C-16 would limit or restrict the authority of a Canadian government to call a premature election if Bill C-16 were in effect.

Second, is there anything that even makes it difficult, that would be dissuasive? No, because there is nothing in this section that affects the powers of the Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Government General's discretion.

Why is the government wasting our time and the time of Canadians by trying to blow sand in our eyes, by claiming that Bill C-16 is about fixed elections, when it is about nothing of the kind?

It is a marketing tool by the Conservative Party to hoodwink Canadians into thinking that it really is about fixed elections and that the Conservative Party has kept yet another promise. In fact, the Conservative Party has yet again attempted to hoodwink Canadians, and second, this bill is duplicitous. This bill is deceptive. It has nothing to do with fixed elections.

For goodness' sake, if the Conservative government were honest, it would at least say that the bill has nothing to do with fixed elections, because even if the bill were to come into force, the Prime Minister would still be able to go to the Governor General at any time and ask the Governor General to dissolve Parliament. The Governor General's royal prerogative to do so would not be in any way diminished, limited, reduced, or any other word we can think, by this bill.

If the Conservative government were honest, it would at least admit that.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

I know, but I also like saying duplicitousness. If I look in the dictionary next to Bill C-16, I see Conservative Party and duplicitous. That is what I see when I look in the dictionary: Bill C-16, Conservative Party, duplicitous.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

--and recommend to the Governor General to dissolve Parliament. The Governor General would have all the authority to do so.

As my colleague from Beaches—East York just mentioned, if somebody actually read the BNA Act, our Constitution, they would see that this is actually what we already have. Under the Constitution, Parliament has to be dissolved no later than in the fifth year of the preceding election.

However, within that time, the prime minister can go to the Governor General and recommend that Parliament be dissolved at any time. In fact when one looks at it, historically it is usually toward the end of the fourth year following a general election that the prime minister of a government in Canada has actually done that. That is the first thing.

I ask that members please not say that Bill C-16 is about fixed election dates, because it is not, and I ask them not to claim that this would ensure that the Prime Minister of the sitting government, the Conservative government, will not, to use the terms that the members opposite have been using this very day, abuse his authority by calling an election at any time. In fact, if this bill were in effect right now, it would allow the sitting Prime Minister of the Conservative Party, who is also Prime Minister of Canada at this point, to go tomorrow to the Governor General. There is absolutely nothing in the bill that would stop that.

I ask members to please not call it a fixed election date and to please not attempt to portray it as being something fundamentally different from the system we have been governed by here in Canada since Confederation, because this does not change anything fundamentally. This is a game of smoke and mirrors on the part of the Conservative government.

Does that surprise me? I would like to say it does, but unfortunately it does not. It is no different from the tabling of the 2006 budget. The Conservative government heralded tax cuts. It said, “We are going to help the most poor, the most disadvantaged”. What? Does increasing the lowest marginal tax rate from 15% to 15.5% lower taxes? No, of course not. It increases taxes.

I do not know about my colleagues on the opposite side, but I can speak for my colleagues on this side, the Liberal Party, the official opposition. After July 1 when that tax hike kicked in, most of us received a lot of letters from our constituents who happen to be seniors. They were saying, “I thought the Conservative government said it was lowering taxes. How come my taxes just got increased half a point?” They were not too pleased. The Conservatives may want to think about that.

On the other hand, the Conservatives talked about lowering the GST and how that was going to put a lot of money into people's pockets. Studies actually show that in order for somebody to make back $100 on that one point reduction they would have to spend a heck of a lot more money. They would have to spend $10,000 for that one point reduction to put $100 in their pockets.

I do not know too many people in my riding who have that kind of disposable income that they can spend $10,000, whether it be on clothes, restaurant meals or buying a new car. I do not know too many people who can spend $10,000 of their disposable income in order to get back $100. Most people would have preferred that the marginal tax rates remained where they were rather than increase them 5% in order to pay for luxury items for people who can afford to go out and spend $10,000, $20,000, $30,000 or $40,000 a pop.

Another example of the duplicitousness of this--

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

I apologize.

I should say that the right hon. Prime Minister and his cabinet should state that Bill C-16 is not about fixed election dates. Bill C-16 is about fixed flexible dates, which would still allow the prime minister all the authority to go to the Governor General at any time prior to the set date--

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is always a pleasure to participate in a debate when you are in the chair. I will read a clause from C-16.

Clause 1 is one of the most important:

1. The Canada Elections Act is amended by adding the following before the heading “WRITS OF ELECTION” before section 57:

Date of General Election

56.1 (1) Nothing in this section affects the powers of the Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General's discretion.

If this bill were to be passed and adopted , it would receive the royal assent of the Governor General, the Right Hon. Michaëlle Jean, at her discretion, during her term of office.

The most important section and the actual core of Bill C-16 is the section that states:

Nothing in this section affects the powers of the Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General's discretion.

For those who may be watching TV right now and may not understand what that actually means, under the British North America Act and our Canadian Constitution, the Governor General has full authority, a royal prerogative, to dissolve Parliament at her or his discretion. Tradition calls for the Governor General to do so only at the recommendation of the sitting prime minister.

Therefore, one could pardon the Conservative Party prior to becoming the government, when it was in official opposition, for saying it was talking about fixed elections, but in fact not fixed elections. Now that it actually forms the government, one can no longer excuse that. The government has constitutional experts at its fingertips and knows very well that it cannot institute true fixed election dates without diminishing the discretionary power of the Governor General under our Constitution to dissolve Parliament upon recommendation of the prime minister. This would mean that the Governor General would have absolutely no royal prerogative at her discretion to dissolve Parliament. That requires a constitutional amendment, ladies and gentlemen.

So when the Conservative government, since tabling Bill C-16, has a campaign calling Bill C-16 a bill to create fixed election dates, I would say the government and the bill are clearly duplicitous, because that bill is not about fixed election dates. That bill, by precisely saying in that very paragraph that nothing in it affects the powers of the Governor General, “including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General's discretion”, shows that it is duplicitous.

It has absolutely nothing to do with fixed election dates, because in fact fixed election dates are fixed election dates. One cannot change the date at any time. In order for the Conservative government to bring in legislation with actual, factual and true fixed election dates, its bill would have to diminish the powers of the Governor General to dissolve Parliament at any time as per her or his discretion. In order to do that, the bill would have to amend our Constitution. This bill does not do that.

The Speaker of the House has said that I can say this, so if the government were honest—and that has been deemed parliamentary—the government would in fact say that this bill is not about fixed election dates and that this bill does not in any way diminish the power of the Governor General nor the authority of the Prime Minister at any time, even the day after. If the bill is adopted, goes through all three readings in the House, goes through all three readings in the Senate, becomes legislation and the Elections Canada Act is changed, the very next day the sitting Prime Minister could go to the Governor General and say, “I'm calling an election”, and the Governor General would be able to dissolve Parliament.

So for the Conservative government to claim that Bill C-16 is about fixed election dates is not telling the whole story. The story is what under this we would be talking about for the Prime Minister between the date that Bill C-16 would become law and the third Monday of October in the fourth calendar year following the first general election after this section comes into force, which would be Monday, October 19, 2009. Between the date that this bill comes into effect and Monday, October 19, 2009, the Prime Minister could go to the Governor General at any time on any single day and say, “I am asking and recommend that you dissolve this Parliament”. The Governor General would have the power and the authority under our Constitution to dissolve Parliament and launch a general election.

At the very least, the Conservative government should state in fact that Bill C-16 is not fulfilling its electoral promise to create fixed election dates. What it is doing is simply saying that if the Prime Minister, between the adoption of this bill and Monday, October 19, 2009, has not woken up at any time and decided that he wants an election, then the election will happen on October 19, 2009, but that at any time before that the Prime Minister could recommend to the Governor General to in fact dissolve Parliament. That is the first thing.

When one looks at what is the definition of “fixed election”, I would recommend that my colleagues go to a major study that was done by Henry Milner, “Fixing Canada's Unfixed Election Dates: A Political Season to Reduce the Democratic Deficit”, published by the Institute for Research in Public Policy on December 5, 2005, volume 6, number 6. He actually gives a definition. It is quite interesting. He states that a fixed election date is when there is no possibility of dissolving the assembly, whether it is a national assembly or a parliament, prior to the date that has been fixed by legislation.

In any other system, yes, the Constitution of the country may in fact establish, for instance, that the term of the assembly is three years or four years and actually may lay out the third Monday of the 10th month of the year. There is thus an election every three or four years, but it also allows a mechanism for early dissolution, either because of a non-confidence vote or because there is an issue that the government wishes to plebiscite on. So in fact, that is not a fixed election date. That would be called a fixed flexible date, because while there is supposedly a fixed date, the government or the assembly still has the power and the authority to dissolve prior to the expiry date of the fixed term, whether it is three years, four years or five years.

The very first thing, the very least thing the Conservative government and Prime Minister Harper and his cabinet should say is in fact—

[Mario Silva, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am very much in support of the legislation. I strongly believe that this country needs positive electoral reform and this is a very positive measure.

However I would like my colleague's comments on the vote tomorrow. As we know, the House will be voting on the issue of softwood lumber and the government has called that vote a vote of confidence. My fear is that even though we are moving with Bill C-16, and I think the House will be supportive of that proposal, calling these constant votes of confidence on legislation undermines in many ways the spirit of the proposals we are trying to put forward in Bill C-16.

If we have a fixed election date and then the government wishes to have it fall because it wishes to call an election in order to go to the polls, then in many ways we would be going against the very spirit and principles that we are trying to outline in Bill C-16.

[Scott Reid, Conservative, Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to speak to Bill C-16, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act. I will go through the act by summarizing the legislation provisions. I will then describe to the House what problems the bill resolves and I will end by pointing out some of the benefits it will give to the Canadian democratic system.

I have seven points in summarizing what the law does. First, it ensures that elections will take place every four years on the third Monday in October.

Second, it ensures that the first of those Mondays will be October 19, 2009.

Third, it ensures that the date is chosen so as not to conflict with any religious or national holidays.

Fourth, it ensures that in the event of an unforeseen conflict with a religious or national holiday and perhaps with a provincial or municipal election the date can be adjusted.

Fifth, to prevent the abuse of this ability to adjust the date, it ensures that the date can only be moved to the Tuesday after the Monday or to the Monday that follows the third Monday. In other words, the fourth Monday in October.

Sixth, the law is carefully crafted to ensure that no limit is placed on Parliament's ability to indicate loss of confidence in the government or of the Governor's General's prerogative to dissolve Parliament. In this light, I will stop for a moment to address the question raised by the hon. member opposite just a moment ago. Section 56.1 of the act will now read or will be added to the current legislation:

Nothing in this section affects the powers of the Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General’s discretion.

Were that not there, then the law would in fact be unconstitutional. It goes on to state:

Subject to subsection (1), each general election must be held on the third Monday of October in the fourth calendar year following polling day....

That is how we deal with that very important constitutional provision.

Seventh, in the event of an early election that occurs on a day other than the third Monday in October--presumably this would be an election in a minority government where the government was defeated by the opposition--the calendar for future elections would automatically reset to the third Monday in October in the fourth calendar year following the year in which the election caused by that vote of non-confidence takes place.

I want to talk about what this resolves. It removes the power of the prime minister, nominally the Governor General but always the Governor General acting on the advice of the prime minister, to call an election when it is good for the government, when it suits the government and when it is damaging to the chances of the opposition, the main opposition party or some other opposition party, to contest that election. It would remove an inherent unfairness in the system. I have only been elected to this place three times, in 2000, 2004 and earlier this year, but in my short parliamentary career I have found the system to have been abused egregiously by the former prime minister, Jean Chrétien, in calling the election of 2000 and again in 2004.

In 2000, he called an election shortly after a new opposition leader had been elected. He called it at a time when nominations had not been completed in most of the country for the then opposition party, the Canadian Alliance. In doing that he unfairly advantaged the governing Liberals and hurt the opposition party, the Canadian Alliance. I saw this in action in 103 ridings in the province of Ontario, as there then were. Nominations that had been completed for the Canadian Alliance at the time that he called the snap election with no advance warning were called when 5 of those 103 ridings had completed their nomination process. In the other 98 ridings no nomination had been finished, including in my riding.

What happened at the conclusion of that election? The Liberals won 100 seats, the New Democrats won one seat and the Canadian Alliance won two seats. Due to the vagaries of our electoral system, that in no way reflected the actual vote total but it did give the results that Jean Chrétien wanted. It gave him another majority government that he did not deserve and would not have had, I would argue, had he had to follow a reasonable timetable that did not give him this unwarranted discretion.

Out of the 98 candidates who had not been nominated until the election was called, only one, myself, actually managed to win the election. Even that, frankly, was due to a three way vote split. Of the five candidates nominated, my colleague from Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke was elected, about a 20% success rate. That gives us an idea of what he was doing and the abuse of the system that he perpetrated. This could not happen under the law as written now.

Which government will be the first to face this restriction on its power? The current government will not have the kind of power to abuse our democratic system the way that Jean Chrétien and other prime ministers before him have abused it.

In 2004, something similar happened. The election was called before the main opposition party, the new Conservative Party of Canada, had a chance to hold its first policy convention. The Conservative Party had no way of planning its first policy convention and produce a platform prior to that election being called. What was the then prime minister doing during that election, hon. member for LaSalle—Émard? He was ranting about how we had no policies and inventing the most egregious and outlandish policies to fill the vacuum created by the fact that he was able to call an early election. That is the kind of thing that will not happen under the current legislative proposal.

I want to talk about the benefits. To some degree we can discern the benefits of the new legislation from the problems that I have raised but I wanted to break it down into four headings. The first of these benefits would be that all parties could now prepare for elections. They could plan their leadership races secure in the knowledge that a snap election would not be called at a time when they were in the process of electing a leader. That is a significant advantage. They could also plan their policy conventions as my party was unable to do in 2004.

It is an advantage for people who are considering becoming candidates. There is much talk in this place, especially when we think we would like to vote ourselves a pay raise, about the importance of getting the best candidates to come in here and contest elections. That is fine for those who are independently wealthy and those who have jobs, particularly lawyers, that permit them to have a great deal of flexibility, but if they come from a job where they cannot take off time to seek a nomination in quite the same way or to be a nominee for some unspecified period of time, the uncertainty associated with not knowing when an election will be called means that it is necessary to put their life on hold in a way that precludes many quality candidates from actually seeking nominations.

I can think of a couple of examples prior to the 2004 election which were cited in The Hill Times. All members have access to back issues if they care to look up the stories of how individuals had to withdraw from nominations. I know of a policeman in the Toronto area who wanted to run for my party but he had to withdraw because it was impossible to coordinate his job demands and the demands of an uncertain electoral timetable. Riding associations could now plan their nomination meetings to occur at a time relatively close to an election rather than trying to preclude the unforeseen future election that might come at some point.

Elections Canada could improve how it conducts elections. It would reduce costs and improve efficiency if it were certain that elections were going to occur on a predictable four year timetable. For example, the problems of finding and renting space on an uncertain schedule is very difficult, particularly in areas where there are low vacancies in rental properties.

In 2000, it was so hard to find rental space in my riding, the old riding of Lanark--Carleton, that the Elections Canada office wound up being placed literally across the street from the riding boundary. It was the least central location imaginable in the riding but it was the only way Elections Canada on short notice could secure rental space in that riding.

It was very difficult to deal with the boundaries redistribution issue when there was great uncertainty prior to the 2004 election as to whether the then prime minister would call the election when the old boundaries were in place or the new boundaries. This created immense chaos in my riding and many others across the country because there was a great lack of information about where the boundaries would be and therefore the administration was to pursue.

My last point is that voter participation would greatly increase.

[Tom Lukiwski, Conservative, Regina—Lumsden—Lake Centre, SK]

Mr. Speaker, I would again comment on the fact that my hon. colleague opposite does not quote any constitutional law experts. She is just saying “some” experts.

I can assure members that there is no constitutional imperative that would require any change to the current conventions of the House. In fact, the current conventions would be either further entrenched by this bill, as opposed to the conviction held by the hon. member from Wascana. In his opinion we should be removing provisions of the act that allow the prime minister to go to the Governor General and ask the Governor General to dissolve Parliament. If that happened, in my opinion the end result would be the courts would then have to determine what would be and what would not be a confidence vote.

Right now Bill C-16 entrenches the conventions that we have held for over 100 years in this Parliament. We do not need a constitutional law expert to verify that.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like the hon. member to comment on the views of some constitutional law experts who have said that the government's Bill C-16 would in fact change the powers of the Governor General. In order to do that, fixed election dates--

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-16, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act, be read the second time and referred to a committee.